

West Irian and the Suharto Presidency: a perspective

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Introduction

For Suharto, like many others, the struggle over West Irian¹ was regarded as part of the unfinished business of Indonesian nationalism to end the much detested Dutch colonialism in the then Dutch East Indies. The fact that the Dutch surrendered all of its colonial territories at the Round Table Conference except West Irian only emboldened nationalists such as Suharto that the struggle was worth pursuing, was winnable and that it was only a matter of time before the Dutch would capitulate. That the Dutch would hold on to West Irian for another twelve years was something unforeseen and every passing year represented defeat and humiliation, this more than anything else was responsible for the unanimous decision that if West Irian could not be recovered through diplomacy, just as was the rest of Indonesia, then perjuangan or military struggle should be pursued. This directly involved Suharto in the West Irian issue, where just as in the struggle against Dutch colonialism prior to this, he was among those in the forefront leading the military struggle to win independence for Indonesia.

In this context, Suharto's involvement in the West Irian issue can be understood from two different strategic positions he held, namely, first as the Commander of the Mandala Command tasked to militarily defeat the Dutch in West Irian and second, as Indonesia's President, where his policies had a direct bearing on the future of the territory and the people therein. For the convenience of discussion, the role of Suharto and the West Irian issue can be examined through a number of phases. These phases broadly describe the political evolution of the West Irian issue and the manner Suharto was positioned as far as developments in West Irian were concerned. In the main, there were six phases as follows:

- [1] 1945-1949 – the phase of revolutionary war against the Dutch
- [2] 1950-1961 – the phase of diplomacy in recovering West Irian
- [3] 1961-1963 – the phase of military pressure and the successful recovery of West Irian
- [4] 1963-1965 – the phase of preliminary Indonesian domination
- [5] 1965-1969 – the phase of challenge in the pre-Act of Free Choice era
- [6] 1969-1998 – the phase of total Indonesian domination in the post-Act of Free Choice era

However, before plunging into Suharto's role in West Irian, it is imperative that the realities as obtained in West Irian be first understood.

The political anatomy of West Irian

By any count, West Irian is a highly complex and complicated piece of real estate. The word 'Papua' and 'Irian' has been traditionally used to describe the piece of territory that forms part of Indonesia following its successful struggle against the Dutch. While there is much controversy about the terminology, in actuality, both terms have been in vogue for quite sometime. As was argued by Jan Ramandel, while the earlier European explorers such as Ortis de Retez, a Spaniard, referred to the island as 'New Guinea', the territory was seen as belonging to Irian (tanah Irian) and its people were Papuans or blacks.² The word 'Papua' is also widely used in local languages, especially from Biak. In the same way, the term 'Irian' is also used in various regional languages in West Irian, including in Biak, Serui, Waropen, Tobati and Merauke.³ It was against this background that on 29 April 1945, Irianian nationalists such as Frans and Markus Kaisiepo, Pieter Hamadi and others declared the change of name of Papua to Irian at Kota NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration), Kampung Harapan, Sentani.⁴ In order to understand the political anatomy of West Irian and how it can come to be perceived by Irianians, Indonesians and others, it is vitally necessary to understand its strategic, political, economic and social-cultural attributes.

Geography

West Irian is the easternmost and largest province of Indonesia, covering the western half of the world's second largest island after Greenland. On its northern side, West Irian is washed by the Pacific Ocean, on the southern side by the Arafura Sea, on the western side by the Seram and Banda Seas as well as the Maluku province and on the eastern side by Papua New Guinea, with which it shares a long land border. Papua has a land area of 421,981 square kilometres. This constitutes 21.9 percent of Indonesian total land area (1,937,179 square kilometers).⁵ Despite being one of the largest islands in the world, West Irian is thinly populated, highly rugged and inhospitable with limited cultivated land and covered with dense forests and swamps. Topographically, West Irian has 15 mountains, 40 rivers, 12 lakes and 40 islands. Geologically, West Irian is also highly prone to earth quakes, experiencing more than 10,000 local earth quakes and about 20 major ones in 2000 alone.⁶ In addition to the massive land-mass, a number of islands line West Irian's coast such as Biak, Gag and Dolok.

Geopolitics

Geographically, it was not the mere size and location of West Irian that made it a zone of contention but rather its geopolitical significance to the key stakeholders, namely, Indonesia, the Netherlands, Australia and the United States. From Jakarta's perspective, West Irian's importance stemmed from a number of imperatives. First, it viewed itself as a successor state to the Dutch and claimed all sovereignty to the former Dutch East Indies and any denial of this would imply that the decolonization and 'national revolution' was incomplete. Second, and probably more important, Dutch presence in West Irian was viewed as a national affront

and a threat. In addition to failing to give up its 'colonial ways', the Dutch presence was perceived as a military threat. Indonesian strategic planners saw Dutch presence in West Irian as a 'knife pointing into the heart of Indonesia', and hence, something that had to be removed by force if necessary. Jakarta saw Dutch presence in West Irian as being responsible for the various secessionist movements, especially led by former Dutch military officers and their cronies. At the same time, Dutch military presence in West Irian was viewed as a threat, something The Hague had openly brandished to deter Indonesia from threatening Dutch economic interests in Indonesia. Hence, for all these considerations, Jakarta challenged the Dutch presence in West Irian and was prepared to go to war to reintegrate the territory into the Indonesian state as failing to do so would imply that its territorial integrity had been compromised.⁷

The Dutch were motivated to hold on to the territory for various reasons. First, the Dutch saw the territory as part of their attempt to create a 'Tropical Holland', the 'Eurasian Fatherland' that would be used to settle Eurasians fleeing from independent Indonesia as well as Dutch citizens living in the Netherlands, especially from the rural regions. Second, it was a function of individuals such as Jan van Eechoud and Dutch civil servants who believed that the territory and its people deserved a different fate and future, and they championed a separate political existence for the territory. Third, related to the second point, was the argument made by various Dutch officials that the West Irianese, essentially being Melanesians, were ethnologically different from the rest of Indonesia and poor and backward at that. They felt that they deserved a different political arrangements that would suit them politically, socially and economically. Fourth, flowing from the above, there was the 'civilising/sacred mission', which led many Dutch officials to believe that the West Irianians ought to be 'tutored', with Dutch help, towards self-determination and independence. In this, they were supported by Church, Fifth, there were also those who believed that even though Indonesia was lost as a colonial territory, The Netherlands could continue exploiting the 'spoils of colonialism' even though it was focused only on West Irian. Finally, for various psychological reasons, holding on to West Irian was partly driven by the sense of shame and humiliation many Dutch officials felt at the loss of Indonesia. Holding on to part of its former colonial territory was akin to hanging on as an 'Asian Power', hoping that if Indonesia unravels, then The Hague would be given the first chance to 'reclaim' its colonial possession, the same manner, the Dutch returned following the Japanese conquest in March 1942.

While these were the various reasons provided by Dutch officials, between 1950 and 1962 the strategic importance of West Irian was increasingly referred to as the key *raison d'être* for the Dutch continued presence in the territory even though the decolonization revolution was in vogue worldwide. Three key arguments were continuously utilized during this period. First, military bases in West New Guinea, it was argued, would be useful to protect Dutch economic interests in Indonesia, if they were ever threatened by an increasingly nationalistic or communist government in

Jakarta. Second, the Dutch argued that their presence in the territory was important as it contributed to the American defence system in the region to contain Communism. Thirdly, the Dutch argued that their presence in the territory would safeguard Australian strategic and security interest in West Irian and New Guinea, the territory adjoining West New Guinea that Australia held as a trust territory for the United Nations.

From August 1945 to November 1949, Australia was extremely supportive of Indonesia and played a critical role in helping Indonesian nationalists secure independence. However, when it came to the issue of West Irian, the Labor Government maintained a neutral posture of letting the Dutch and Indonesians settle it among themselves. This position changed fundamentally with the onset of the Liberal Government under Robert Menzies following the December 1949 Federal elections. Believing that West Irian was of vital importance for Australian security, the Menzies Government's policy was to support the position of the Dutch and deny the territory to Indonesia.⁸

In the main, from December 1949 right up to the time the territory was surrendered to Indonesia, Australia continued to argue it had vital security and strategic interests in West Irian and that it should not fall to Indonesia. Australian security planners preferred a Dutch control of the territory as it provided a security buffer from Indonesia. When there were concerns that the Dutch might not be able to hold on to the territory for long, Canberra proposed either a Dutch-Australian condominium or even a Dutch transfer of the territory to Australia. Australian security planners argued that West Irian was vital to Australian security from a number of perspectives. First, the territory was believed to be part of an important link to the northern defence corridor and as the main security threat was believed to emanate from the north, securing this was viewed as being vital for Australian security. This was also in consonance with Australian 'forward line' defence, implying that its frontline was established in Southeast Asia, as was evident in the deployment of Australian troops in Korea, Vietnam and Malaya (later, Malaysia). As the security situation in Southeast Asia worsened with especially following Mao's victory in China, the French defeat in Indochina and the outbreak of various communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia, Canberra's concern with security in the region and the fear that Indonesian-controlled West Irian could be used to threaten Australia was something that was credible in the minds of most Australian strategic planners.⁹

Second, Australia believed that Indonesia's control of West Irian would negatively affect its position in the Australian-administered Territory of Papua and Guinea. Security planners in Canberra viewed Dutch-controlled West New Guinea as a strategic buffer to prevent Indonesian potential aggression eastward. This was best articulated by Menzies when he argued, "we want to retain you [Netherlands] as our neighbour in New Guinea and want nobody but you. In no case do we wish the Indonesians take over...." This mainly stemmed from the fear that not only will Indonesian troops would infiltrate into Australian-controlled territory in

Papua and Guinea, worse still was the concern that following Indonesian takeover of Dutch New Guinea, Indonesian revolutionary fervour would spread beyond the border threatening Australian control of the territory. In other words, Canberra also feared that once Indonesia occupied Dutch West Guinea, it would be tempted to lay claim to Eastern New Guinea.¹⁰

While publicly Australian policy makers were focusing on the social-cultural differences between Indonesia and the West Irianians, in actuality it were the military-security factors that were uppermost in their minds. A June 1955 Cabinet submission by Casey on the grounds for supporting the Dutch position made this apparent:

‘We consider – that legally their sovereignty is clearly established; that they make good neighbour for our own territories in Eastern New Guinea and that it is desirable in the interests of Australia’s own defence that West New Guinea should be in the hands of a non-Communist Government. Indonesia is non-Communist but – – – we cannot be sure that it will not in the course of time come into the Communist orbit.’¹¹

Yet, it was for the very strategic and security reasons that the Australians were forced to change their position on West Irian and accept Indonesian control of the territory. While the Australians, like the Dutch, would like to hold on to their positions, by late 1959 and especially since late 1961, developments in Indonesia and elsewhere, forced Canberra to review its position. The single biggest fear that dominated Australian thinking with regard to Indonesia, especially in the Cold War setting was that Indonesia might fall to the Communist Party of Indonesia. This was the worst case scenario. However, by 1959, the United States and Australia-supported pro-Muslim rebels on Sumatra and in East Indonesia were defeated by the Indonesian military. At the same time, Western support for the destabilization of Indonesia merely strengthened the hands of the PKI, the very thing that the West wanted to avoid. Hence, the blowback from Western policies on this point, that forced Washington, London and Canberra to review their policies toward Indonesia. Now the position of Dutch New Guinea became paramount. In order to prevent the PKI’s victory in Indonesia, a tactical change of policy took place in the West and culminated in Canberra distancing itself from the Dutch as it realized that both Washington and London would not come to its assistance should war break out between Indonesia and the Dutch and Australians over West Guinea. To break out of the isolation, Canberra undertook a strategic review and increasingly began to accept Indonesia’s control of West Irian.

In short, Canberra, like Washington and London decided that the interests of the West Irianians must not be promoted to the extent that it threatened their interests in Indonesia, as the latter was far more important strategically and geopolitically. As the strategic importance of Indonesia far outweighed that of West Irian, Dutch control of New Guinea was sacrificed, forcing Canberra to acquiesce in an Indonesian takeover of the territory in 1962, with all its earlier arguments about history, ethnicity and strategic importance to Australian becoming irrelevant.

In the beginning, Washington did not regard the emerging Dutch-Indonesian conflict over West Irian to be important and assumed that the unsettled business of decolonization would be eventually settled as was agreed up at the RTC. For Washington, West Irian was strategically unimportant as Indonesia's importance far outweighed the largely backward territory. Also, as two of its close allies, the Dutch and Australians, were involved in opposition to Indonesia, Washington preferred to maintain a neutral stance as it was a conflict among its 'friends'. At the same time, important strategic planners in Washington continued to believe that West Irian was a 'useless' piece of territory and that Dutch policies were putting at risk their overriding vital strategic interests in Indonesia. They might have the effect of pushing the country into the communist camp. The US saw fighting communism as far more important compared to championing for a backward piece of territory that the Dutch had all these years neglected, and were believed to be holding on to it for psychological and nostalgic reasons. In view of this, when both The Hague and Canberra tried to extend SEATO's umbrella's over West Irian, Washington opposed it.

So for a while the Eisenhower's administration broached the idea of splitting Indonesia, at a time it believed Java to be lost to the PKI.¹² However, the US's support for the rebels backfired as the TNI quickly defeated them by 1959. If anything, there was fear that Indonesia would be pushed even more strongly to the left and into the Soviet camp as evident in the vast economic and military largesse that was forthcoming from Moscow. By the time the Kennedy administration entered office, the decision was made to secure Indonesia at the expense of West Irian. As preventing Indonesia's fall to the communists became uppermost, Washington's pivotal role in the issue surfaced the same manner it did in 1949, in forcing The Hague to grant Indonesia independence. This time, through the good offices of the US, the Dutch were impressed upon a face-saving formula with West Irian being transferred to Indonesia with the ultimate aim of stalling the PKI's march to power in the country. This also stalled Indonesia's entry into the Soviet camp.

Following the Second World War, each of the major stakeholders in the West Irian episode began to perceive the territory as important. It were especially the military-security perspectives that mattered. Geopolitics determined the policies in the most interested capitals. By 1962, from the security perspective, it was concluded that higher interests of preventing Indonesia from being lost to the communists and falling into the Soviet orbit dictated the reintegration of West Irian with the Republic and that the Dutch and Australians had to be brought to line and not to push the issue any further, since it would have resulted in the establishment of a Soviet beachhead in Southeast Asia to the detriment of the United States and its allies. In the end, these considerations securitized West Irian for Indonesia. So Sukarno's policies of brinkmanship made him emerge as the winner. It was a fact that was only grudgingly accepted by the Dutch and Australians.

Demography

Population statistics are highly controversial matters in West Irian. According to Leo Laba Ladjar, the present Bishop of Jayapura, there is a tendency for the locals to inflate their actual numbers for two main reasons. The first is that it enables them to demand more financial and other resources from the central government. The second reason is Second, by claiming that the indigenous population is numerically large is primarily that it offers them an argument to demand a larger share of the key positions and other resources at the local level, namely, provincial, municipal and regency, and deny this to others, especially the migrants from outside West Irian.¹³ According to the population census in 1990, there were 1,648,708 inhabitants in West Irian. The inter-censal population survey in 1995 recorded a population of 1,942,627 people in West Irian. In 1998, this increased to 2.1 million people. At the end of 2000, there were 2,219,500 people, forming less than 1 percent of Indonesia's total population of more than 225 million. In 2003, the official statistics indicated that the West Irianian population stood at 2,469,785 people.¹⁴ According to official projections, the population of West Irian is expected to increase to 2,556,419 and 2,646,489 in 2004 and 2005 respectively.¹⁵ Even though as a province, West Irian has a population density of about 5 persons per square kilometer, in reality, the distribution is quite uneven with Biak Numfor having a density of 229.26 per square kilometer, Yapen Waropen, 33.74 and with Fak-Fak and Mimika only 2.30 and 2.98 respectively. Due to the government-sponsored transmigration programmes, the province has seen one of the fastest growths in population figures in the last two decades or so. There are more than 770,000 migrants living in West Irian, most of who are from the over-populated islands of Java, Bali and Sulawesi. The most heavily populated parts of the province are the Paniai Lake district and the Baliem Valley to the east, areas that are also the most highly cultivated. Even though the demographic size of West Irian is relatively small, its complexity and cleavages are marked and dominant. This has always made reaching consensus on any issue a trying project and partly explained Indonesia's, and for long, the Dutch's belief that the one man one vote system will have great difficulties in being operational in West Irian.

Social-Cultural

The West Irianian culture is diverse, reflecting the hundreds of ethnic groups that occupy the territory. West Irianians are in general Melaneans, though they are further divided into more than 240 smaller ethnic and cultural groups. Despite the wide and varying cultures that can be found in West Irian, the residents of West Irian can be generally divided into three main groups, the coastal dwellers, the forest dwellers and those who live on plateau areas. Accordingly, the coastal dwellers depend on sago cultivation as well as fishing for food and income. Those in the forest obtain food from hunting, fishing from lakes as well as small cultivation while those living on plateaus depend mainly on small agricultural cultivation.

Religion

Due to Dutch, British and German colonialism, the majority of West Irianians are Christians even though animism continues to be widely practiced. In terms of religion, in 1998 out of a population of 2.164 million, West Irian had 1,171,297 Protestants, 478,609 Catholics, 452,214 Muslims, 5,600 Hindus and 3,780 Buddhists. This works to about 85 percent being Christians and 15 percent Muslims. In the main, the general trend has been sustained over the years as is evident from the statistics for religious denominations in the province from 1995 to 1999 in Table 1 and from 2000 to 2003 in Table 2.

Table 1: Statistics of Religious Denominations in West Irian, 2000-2003

Year	Protestants	Catholics	Muslims	Hindus	Buddhists
2000	1,171,297	478,609	452,214	5,600	3,780
2001	1,171,030	530,643	452,030	6,640	4,085
2002	1,235,670	543,030	498,329	7,249	4,123
2003	1,338,064	505,654	491,811	6,869	3,400

Source: Papua in Figures 2003, p.200.

According to the provisional 2000 population census, 58.31 % of the population was Protestants, 24.08 % Muslims, 17.30 % Catholics and 0.31 % others.¹⁶ In 2003, the figures were as follows: 57.0 % Protestants, 21.55 % Catholics, 20.96 % Muslims, 0.43 % others. As the main religious divide in West Irian between Christians and Muslims, the main concentration of Muslim population is found in the regencies of Sorong, Merauke, Jayapura, Manokwari as well as in the capital city of Jayapura.

What is clear from the above is the conflicting religious figures for West Irian and this merely confirms the earlier statement by Bishop Leo that there is a lot of 'politicking' and 'manipulation' as far as the actual figures are concerned. However, what is clearly evident is the dominance of the Christians, both Protestants and Catholics, compared with the Muslims. The former are a dominant minority, even though there is a strong suspicion that the number of Muslims is far greater than is officially admitted.

Table 2 : Population Concentration by Religion in 2003 in West Irian

Regency/Town	Christians	Muslims	Total (plus others)	% of Muslims
Merauke	270,395	84,593	355,549	23.79
Jayawijaya	434,157	3,155	437,363	0.72
Jayapura	127047	53065	180805	29.34
Paniai	147267	400	147690	0.27
Puncak Jaya	80904	680	81681	0.83

Nabire	92642	28050	121286	23.12
Fak-Fak	40521	52274	92966	56.22
Mimika	61066	38010	99259	38.29
Sorong	55089	34940	90719	38.51
Manokwari	154575	48762	205025	23.78
Yapen Waropen	90040	9802	99967	9.80
Biak Numfor	105794	12023	118213	10.17
Jayapura (capital)	107417	76143	186460	40.83
Sorong (town)	76804	49914	128815	38.74
Total	1,184,371	491,811	2,345,798	20.96

Source: Papua in Figures 2003, p.202.

These figures show that, unlike East Timor, the non-Christian population has always been rather substantial. This is not only due to the transmigration or voluntary migration from outside West Irian but also due to the fact that the western part of West Irian was historically, for long, under the reign of the Sultan of Tidore, the oldest Islamic sultanate in eastern Indonesia. This accounts for the sizeable Muslim population in western West Irian, especially in places such as Sorong, Manokwari and Fak-Fak.

Languages

The province is home to more than 250 sub-groups. Due to the rugged topography, historically West Irian has been a divided country, leading to the development of many separate tribal cultures, each with its own unique customs and languages. The main languages spoken are Dani, Asmat, Ekari, Amungme, Mey Brat, Waropen, Nimboran, Jagai, Auwyu, Tobati, Biak, Arfak, Moi, Segel, Karabra, Kebar, Amberbokem, Sarmi, Sentani, Marindanim, Yahray, Mandobo and Afyat. Politically speaking, stemming from language differences and other attributes, one can identify more than 20 cultural footprints in West Irian. In turn, these can be sub-divided into 6- 7 cultural areas.

Political System

Prior to the division of West Irian into three provinces, as far as administrative divisions were concerned, there were two municipalities (Jayapura and Sorong), 12 regencies (Merauke, Jayapura, Jayawijaya, Nabire, Fakfak, Manokwari, Yapen Waropen, Biak Numfor, Puncak Jaya, Paniai, Sorong, and Mimika), 173 districts, 91 sub-districts and 2,803 villages. Since the 1950s, the territory had a number of governors as follows: Zainal Abidin Syah (1956-61); P. Pamudji (1961-62); Elizer Bonay (1963-64); Frans Kaisiepo (1964-73); Acub Zainal (1973-75); Sutran (1975-81); Busiri Suryowinoto (1981-82); Izaak Hindom (1982-88); Barnabas Suebu, (1988-93); Jacob Pattipi (1993-98); Freddy Numberi (1998-2001); and J.P.Solossa (2001-present).

On 13 October 1999, the Acting Minister of Home Affairs, Feisal Tanjung installed Abraham Oktavius Ataruri as West Irian Jaya Governor and Herman Monim as Central Irian Jaya Governor. Earlier, on 16 September

1999, the House had passed a bill on the establishment of three provinces (North Maluku, West Irian Jaya and Central Irian Jaya) and 32 regencies into law. Under this law, Irian Jaya was split into three provinces of West, East and Central Irian Jaya. Even though this was later rescinded due to West Irianians' opposition, President Megawati resurrected the separation of West Irian into three provinces in 2003.

Following the 1999 general elections, the two leading political parties in West Irian were GOLKAR and the PDIP. As for representation from West Irian to the House of Representatives, Provincial and Regional Parliaments, GOLKAR controlled 38.09%, 37.81% and 36.66% of the seats respectively while the PDIP controlled 33.43%, 33.22% and 32.66% of the seats respectively.¹⁷

Economy

Despite being the fourth richest province in Indonesia after East Kalimantan, Jakarta and Riau, the economy of West Irian is still essentially dominated by primary industries and the majority of the population continues to be engaged in agriculture and are stalked with poverty. Extraction of minerals and agriculture dominates West Irian's economy. In particular, the extraction of oil, gas, copper and gold is particularly significant. The largest transnational mining companies active in exploiting minerals and oil in West Irian include Union Oil, Amoco, Agip, Conoco, Phillips, Esso, Texaco, Mobil, Shell, Petromer Trend Exploration, Altantic Richfield, Sun Oil and Freeport, Oppenheimer, Total, Ingold, Marathan Oil, Kepala Buring, Dominion Mining, Aneka Tambang, BHP, Cudgen RZ and CRA. Most of the mining concessions are situated in the Ertsberg and Grasberg mountains, the Paniai and Wissel Lakes region, Fak-Fak, the Baliem Valley, the Bird's Head western tip and the PNG border area. In 1967, Freeport McMoRan Company of Louisiana, secured mining rights at Mt. Carstenz, where it started to exploit the huge gold and copper reserves that had been explored before. Presently, Freeport's Mt Ertsberg mine is the second largest copper mine in the world and contains the largest proven gold deposits in existence. As far as oil deposits are concerned, the Anglo-Dutch firm Shell has been mining it for sometime.

On the agricultural side, cultivated land constitutes 2.49 % or 1,020,800 hectares of available land. West Irian's main agricultural produce includes rice, corn, coconut, cocoa, palm oil and carrots. In 2002 alone, the total tonnage of these produce amounted to 400857 metric tonnes.¹⁸ Apart from these, chicken, duck, pig and cattle farming also constitute a large portion of West Irian's agricultural produce. Aside from its agricultural land area, much of West Irian's land area is heavily forested. The island of New Guinea is among the largest areas of tropical rainforest left in the world. West Irian's forests, rich in bio-diversity, account for approximately 34.6 million hectares or 24 % of Indonesia's total forested area of 143 million hectares. Of which, 27.6 million hectares have been designated as production forest.¹⁹ Forestry then is a big source of income for the Indonesian government. Among the numerous timber logging countries operating in Indonesia includes PT Djayanti Group, PT Barito Pacific Timber

Group, PT Porodisa Group, PT Kayo Lapis Indonesia Group, PT Mutiara Group, PT You Lim Sari, PT Astra (Indonesia), Marubeni, Sagindo (Japan), and Mamberamo (Australia).²⁰ The timber business in West Irian alone is estimated at US\$85.68million²¹ annually. The huge profits that is generated, not only exemplifies the massive deforestation that is taking place, but have also raised concerns about the environmental degradations that have resulted.

Culture as the base of West Irian's political anatomy.

While the facts on West Irian's anatomy are meant to shed light into the general backdrop of West Irian, they are by no means extensive. Clearly, West Irian is as complex and diverse as any other society. It would only be prudent that any attempt to delve into the issue at hand must comprehend the general traits and structures that have been briefly described above. However, what is increasingly discernable is the utmost importance of culture as the basis of West Irianian politics. Since time immemorial, tribal architecture has always formed the basis of West Irian and its politics. Failing to appreciate this will lead to a failure to understand the West Irianian worldview and will amount to nothing more than touching the superficial aspects of West Irianian society. Worse still, it can and has led to misunderstandings and this can have disastrous consequences on politics and governance. To that extent, tribal cultural beliefs and practices form the basis of West Irianian politics. One can posit that tribal politics or 'tribalitics', for short, form the basis of West Irianian politics.

According to Willy Mandowen, one of the key West Irianian leaders at present and the Mediator of the Papuan Council, whatever transpires in West Irian, one must take note of the fact that there are essentially 132 tribes, 257 languages that can be deconstructed into 60 proto-type of languages and in turn divided into two main groups (Austronesian and Papuan or non-Austronesian) and in turn, the whole cultural basis of West Irian can be divided into 6 to 7 cultural areas.²² At any one time, due to the importance of culture, the traditional political structure remains vitally important and this needs to take note of four main structures, namely, the patriarchal system, the Heads of tribes, the Big Man and the Royal system. In order to maintain a semblance of peace at any one time, all the four elements of West Irianian society must be integrated in order to achieve a political equilibrium based on traditions and culture.²³ While much has been written on West Irianian culture and tribalism, there are a number of key aspects that have bearings on politics and should be taken cognizant of. Four particular ones are noteworthy.

First and foremost, there is the need to understand West Irianian diversity. West Irianians are spread out over the island with footprints also found in Papua New Guinea. Each tribe has its own unique features and tends to be self-contained. Second, West Irianians tend to be inward-looking with a worldview and life style premised on traditions, culture and various rituals and practices. The challenge for any political or social-cul-

tural authority is how to co-exist with these culture and traditions. West Irianians do not like to be confronted and due to history and geography, have developed a simple approach and attitude towards external ideas and even authority. According to Bishop Leo Laba Ladja, the unwritten and unstated code of conduct and principle of all West Irianian is a simple one : 'Asal jangan gangu ketenangan kami' or 'as long as you do not threaten our peace', translated into "do not threaten our life style, beliefs and value system", the West Irianians do not really care and are more than prepared to accept whatever or whoever is the 'Payung'(umbrella) or over-arching authority.

Third, West Irianians, due to their culture, religion and value system are always in quest of harmony between man and nature, and between the micro and macro cosmos. As long as their life style, culture and traditions are not threatened, West Irianians believe that they are successful in their pursuit of harmony and in peace with the cosmos. Finally, even though there are sharp cleavages among the West Irianians, stemming from different tribes, religion, language, belief systems, between the highlanders and lowlanders, between the north and south, islanders and mainlanders, broadly speaking, West Irian can be divided into a number of cultural areas on the basis of ethno-linguistic characteristics. Even though within a particular cultural area, there might be differences, as long as there are broad compatibilities, a basis of unity and coexistence can be obtained and if there are conflicts, these can be resolved through traditional means of resolutions. The Dutch, due to their understanding and appreciation of West Irianian anthropology divided the territory into a number of regencies, which were largely coterminous with the cultural areas.²⁴ Today, leading West Irianians also value the importance of cultural areas and see them as important and appropriate 'governing units'. What this also implies is that like the Dutch, if West Irian is to be effectively governed, it should also be split up along cultural areas rather than some other determining mechanism. Don Flassy, a leading West Irianian nationalist and ethno-cultural specialist, has identified seven main cultural areas in West Irian as follows: Saireri, Doberai, Bomberai, Ha-Anim, Tabi, Lani-Paqo and Me-Pajo.²⁵

What the above discussion has demonstrated is that the key to understanding and appreciating West Irianian politics is their culture. If West Irian is to be compared to a painting, then culture is the canvass regardless of what is being drawn. While the drawing can change, what will remain critical and largely permanent is the canvass, and this is the ethno-cultural attribute of West Irian.

Suharto and the West Irianese issue

Suharto's role can be best highlighted by analysing his involvement in the different phases of the political evolution of West Irian.

1945-1949 : the phase of revolutionary war against the Dutch

In this phase, Suharto was minimally involved in the West Irian issue as, like other nationalists, he was more preoccupied with the military struggle focussed in Java. However, it is useful to note that during this period of revolutionary war, Suharto was appointed as commander of the third war area encompassing Jogjakarta region, then still occupied by the Dutch. His courageous action, with the help of the Sultan of Jogjakarta, to seize the capital of the Republic, albeit only for a mere 6 hours, helped to convince major powers that the Republic of Indonesia was not total in Dutch's hands. That particular Suharto's action eventually led to the Round Table conference in The Hague. Thus, Suharto emerged from the period of revolutionary war as a much applauded hero. Later his fame as commander of the third war region led him to the presidency.

Equally important, once the military struggle proved successful, the fact that West Irian remained a Dutch colony was something that continued to trouble many nationalists and this must be something that must have also impacted upon him. As he was later to elude, in Suharto's words, ever since the Round Table Conference failed to incorporate West Irian into the Republic of Indonesia, the West Irian issue has been "a thorn in the side of the republic".²⁶ The failure of the Dutch to transfer West Irian to Indonesia was considered a betrayal by the former colonial power and all sorts of allegations and conspiracies were alluded to as far as The Hague's motivations were concerned. Here, due to the Cold War and the West's, especially the Americans' reluctance to pressure the Dutch to decolonize the territory was viewed as an act of bad faith and where anachronistic acts were being condoned supposedly by a power, the US, that claimed to be anti-colonial in essence.

1950-1961 : the phase of diplomacy in recovering West Irian

During this phase, Suharto was also minimally involved in the West Irian issue. As a leading general, he was more preoccupied with the different internal challenges from various segments, be it the Darul Islam group, the Westerling revolt, etc. Increasingly, the inability and failure of Jakarta to regain the territory through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, especially at the United Nations, led to the heightening of militant nationalism and this was exploited by Sukarno to consolidate his domestic power base. This culminated in the collapse of Indonesia's democratic experiment, aided in part by the weak economy and American-supported separatist movements in Sumatra and Sulawesi. As Sukarno's militancy and brinkmanship with regard to the West Irian issue intensified and the public was mobilized in support of this anti-Dutch endeavour, nationalist fervour reached a new height and where all segments of society, including the military, were mobilized and united in regaining West Irian by force if necessary. Even though he was not directly involved in the West Irian conflict at this stage, Suharto's fame and prestige continued to rise. This period witnessed Suharto's rise to the prestigious post of Commander of Diponegoro division with the rank of Major General. Due to his fame as commander of the third war area (wehrkreisse III), it placed him first amongst equals to the other generals. As such it was not surprising that

Sukarno appointed him as Commander of the Mandala Operation tasked with the recovery of West Irian from the Dutch.

1961-1963: the phase of military pressure and the successful recovery of West Irian

Against the backdrop of Sukarno's national mobilisation to recover West Irian by all means, Suharto directly entered into the West Irian fray. On 19 December 1961, Sukarno decreed the establishment of the People's Triple Command or Tri Komando Rakyat (Trikorra). The operational command of Trikorra was called Komando Mandala Pembebasan Irian Barat or the Mandala Command for the Liberation of West Irian with Major-General Suharto as its Commander. As Commander of the Mandala Command, Suharto's primary task was to mobilize and make preparations for the use of the military to regain control of West Irian by 1 January 1963. In preparation for this, the Mandala Command, which was a combined arms command, began land, air and sea infiltrations into West Irian. Suharto's main task was to plan for Operation Jayawijaya, "a full-scale joint amphibious assault to liberate West Irian by conquering Biak, the enemy's main power base".²⁷ The infiltrations and the various air and naval operations convinced the Americans that war was imminent and this forced Washington to pressure the Dutch to sue for a negotiated settlement. The Bunker 'deal' concluded on 15 August 1962 meant that Operation Jayawijaya was aborted and Suharto's planned military takeover of West Irian never eventuated. Still, in Suharto's view: 'Although the United Nations mediated the transfer of control over West Irian, the result should be attributed to our strong determination and drastic action taken. With the Jayawijaya Operation, we broke through the diplomatic impasse and returned West Irian to the protection of the Republic of Indonesia.'²⁸

1963-1965 : the phase of preliminary Indonesian domination

Having successfully overseen the initial incorporation of West Irian into the Republic, Suharto was deployed as the Commander of KOSTRAD. In this capacity, he had minimal involvement with regard to the West Irian issue. Though only minimally involved in the issue, he was fully aware of the implication that the government would face as a consequence of the Bunker deal and the New York agreement. He was also fully aware of the possible involvement of KOSTRAD in the implementation of the said agreements in the face that both civilian and military emplacement in West Irian as well as the rising opposition to West Irian's incorporation into Indonesia, especially from the nascent political elites trained by the Dutch.

1965-1969: the phase of challenge in the pre-Act of Free Choice Era

This period saw the rise of Suharto as acting president by decree that was issued by Sukarno and later, being constitutionally elected to the presidency. Psychologically, this represented a major transformation of Suharto, within a year, from a military man into a politician, having a Javanese cultural background. Against this backdrop of a politician-cum-Javanese-cum-military background, all his policies with regard to West Irian should be understood and analyzed. In this phase, three critical develop-

ments took place under the initial period of Suharto's political leadership in Indonesia. First, the West Irianians' opposition to Indonesian rule broke out militarily with the OPM becoming the sword bearer. Second, Jakarta signed the initial contract with Freeport, giving it concessions to exploit the copper and gold minerals. Third, the controversial Act of Free Choice was conducted that ended West Irian's legal and constitutional integration into the Republic of Indonesia and where the United Nations sanctioned this by taking 'note' of what had transpired.

1969-1998 : the phase of total Indonesian domination in the post-Act of Free Choice Era

As Suharto was directly involved in West Irian's integration into Indonesia through the Mandala Command, he had some knowledge of what the territory was all about. As he reflected later in his presidency: 'In matters of development, it is true that West Irian deserves special attention. In 1962, the region became a part of the Republic [factually not true as it was under the United Nations]. It was then the youngest province...that had chosen to integrate with us through a special process. When looking closely at the situation, West Irian was lagging 17 years behind other parts of Indonesia, a truly backward region. It was by chance that I came to know about the exact conditions there because as Mandala Commander I had to travel throughout the region. - - - When the New Order government began its national development program, I paid special attention to West Irian. I made the decision that the province must be able to equal the achievements of other regions. Subsequently, in addition to the development budget allocated for the provincial government, funds are now provided for the construction of development projects under Presidential Instructions such as for primary schools and health centres. In addition, there is a supplementary budget for the acceleration of regional development.

To this day, Irian Jaya is given special treatment in terms of development priority and funding in comparison with other provinces. Other regions need not envy this policy because West Irian is well behind them all in matters of development. The region really deserves a special policy and development assistance. This is carried out by the Minister of Home Affairs and is a political decision. West Irian must be able to taste the fruits of its freedom in the shortest possible time. Everyone is welcome to see for himself how the region is progressing.²⁹

In evaluating Suharto's role in West Irian, there are many approaches one can adopt. One useful method would be to analyse the political, economic, social-cultural, environmental and military-security policies that were adopted during the New Order era. What can one conclude about the impact of these policies? How effective have they been in addressing the special problems of West Irian, be it from the developmental or fruits of freedom perspective? Whatever position one takes, what cannot be denied is that there has been an ongoing conflict in the territory from the moment it was incorporated into Indonesia. The causes are many and what remains to be debated is the extent to which the Suharto govern-

ment was responsible for the problem? Or, are the roots more deep-seated in history or simply a function of the nature of the territory and its people. These will be examined in the following sections.

Suharto and the rise of West Irian's opposition.

The Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM or Organisation for Independent Papua's presence was the single most important testimony that there was opposition to Jakarta's policies, even legitimacy, in West Irian. For many West Irianians, the handover of the Dutch to Indonesia merely represented the passing of control from one 'colonial power' to another. The OPM and its supporters viewed Jakarta's relationship with the territory as nothing more than an exploitative one, and hence, the 'struggle'. In some ways, there is agreement among many analysts that large-scale exploitation has been taking place with very little benefits being accrued to the locals of the province. According to Adam Schwarz: 'In 1985, it (Irian Jaya) had the sixth highest per capita gross domestic product among Indonesia's 27 provinces but also had the highest incidence of rural poverty. Infant mortality in Irian Jaya is 133 per thousand, 85 per cent above the national average: life expectancy is just 48 years. "The people in the house called Irian Jaya feed those in other houses but are themselves starving. Do you think this is fair?" asked Irian Jaya's highly regarded governor Barnabas Suebu in a 1991 interview. The government must do more to make the investment climate in Irian Jaya more attractive. "I've asked for tax holidays, new credits, etc. but I'm still waiting for an answer", he said.³⁰

Against this backdrop, a number of problems and factors have fuelled the separatist challenge in West Irian. The main ones being :

1. Development of underdevelopment. In many ways, the grievances amongst the people began right after the integration of West Irian into the Republic of Indonesia stemming from economic reasons. In the period 1950 – 1962, the Dutch Government spent lavishly on infrastructure and other socio-economic projects, giving the locals what they have never experienced before, namely, economic prosperity. The much due and deserved largesse was very much appreciated particularly amongst the Irianese nationalist elites. However, right after the transfer of power, West Irian was placed under the administration of UNTEA which among other thing continued developing the area even though very little trickled down and this greatly angered the Papuan nationalists. With Indonesia in full control of the territory, the benefits from the 'economic tap' almost ceased and only the local cronies of Indonesia and key power holders from Jakarta benefited from the wealth of the province. This provided a major source of anger and is something that has continued to fuel the separatist struggle.
2. Feeling of racial discrimination. The West Irianians feel that they have very little freedom to manage their own communities and to actualise themselves, as the key and lucrative positions in government bodies and private companies are dominated by non-West Irianians. In short, there is a feeling of being 'colonised' by other Indonesians, many who unfortunately also happened to be non-Christians.

3. The aggressive exploitation of natural resources (copper, gold, timber) irrespective of local interests and traditions. This is best symbolised by Freeport Indonesia, an American company that literally dominates the West Irian economy and which has been operating in collusion with the Indonesian Government, especially during the Suharto era. Not only are the interests, traditions and land ownership rights of the West Irianians ignored, what is worse, very little benefits have accrued to them, with West Irian described as a 'treasure house' but where the locals are trapped in the cycle of poverty'.
4. Growing demographic imbalance between ' transmigrants' and the locals, with the former being given all the privileges and access, very often at the expense of the locals. There is fear among the West Irianians that there is a danger of them becoming minorities in their own land, especially to the more aggressive and capable ethnic groups from other parts of Indonesia, especially the Bugis and Balinese.
5. Growing unhappiness in the manner West Irian became part of Indonesia with the Act of Free Choice being described as nothing more than 'The Act of No Choice', thereby challenging the legal basis of West Irian's integration or restoration into Indonesia.
6. Gross violations of human rights by the security apparatus, especially the military when conducting operations against the OPM and other groups opposing Indonesia's political and economic presence in the province. The murder of Theys Eluay and other leading nationalists was symptomatic of this abuse.

Evaluating Suharto's role in the West Irian issue.

In hindsight, the manner Suharto approached the West Irian issue had varied consequences and implications for Indonesia, the territory and people of West Irian, and in turn, this had ramifications for Indonesia's image and standing world-wide. One can find both protagonists and antagonists toward Suharto's West Irian policy.

Successes

1. Succeeded in keeping West Irian within the NKRI fold.
2. Initiated large scale political, economic and social-cultural transformations of West Irian, making it a modern society along the lines of other provinces within a relatively short time frame.
3. Undertook massive infrastructure development in the province, especially in terms of building roads, schools, hospitals and places of worship.
4. Changed West Irian from a strategic backwater into a key centre of economic development by plugging it into the national and global economy.
5. Terminated the West Irian issue in domestic and international politics (at least initially), signalling the 'end of the revolution' and achievement of Indonesian territorial unity.
6. Within limits brought West Irian civil servants and military personnel to the national level by giving them an opportunity to participate in decision making at the various levels.

Failures

1. As integration was largely achieved through military means, the TNI was given a dominant role in West Irian and its society, and this was to have dire consequences in the long term in terms of Jakarta-West Irian relations due to the dominance of 'security' rather than 'prosperity' approach in managing West Irian.
2. Was unable to appreciate the complexity of West Irian society, in particular, the embedded nature of its tribalism.
3. Underestimated the extent and depth of West Irian nationalism, especially due to policies of the last Dutch Governor, Plateel, which provided the locals with a hope of self-determination and independence.
4. Undermined traditional *Adat*-oriented society through political, economic and social-cultural policies, especially by establishing a highly centralised administrative structure, perceived as a Javanese transplant (Bupati, Camat, Lurah, etc) that had no root in West Irian and worse still, undercut and marginalised the traditional leaders.
5. Was unable to integrate West Irian into the larger Indonesian society, signalling a failure in winning the 'hearts and minds' of the people.
6. Failed to control the Indonesian Armed Forces and other elements of the central government that harmed West Irian and its people.
7. Despite integrating West Irian into the national economy, economically the people barely benefited as there was minimal trickle-down effect. Developmental-oriented policies backfired as the people perceived them as being 'neo-colonised' by Jakarta.
8. Adopted Dutch policies of 'divide and rule' without understanding the paradigm of West Irian society and this had disastrous long term consequences in terms of centre-regional relations.
9. Adopted an attitude of superiority and ethnic stereo-typing, in effect, adopting a civilising mission to modernise the people of West Irian, in turn, creating massive disaffection in the territory.
10. Failed to act decisively against the rampant corruption in West Irian at almost every sector and level of the local government.
11. Failed to transpire good governance in the province.

Conclusion

In summary, the emergence of West Irian as a flashpoint in Indonesia has a longstanding history and is caused by a number of factors, the main ones being the perceived political hegemony of Jakarta that undermined the locals, the perception of the mainly 'Christian' West Irianians that 'Islamic' Indonesia is threatening their life style and culture, the insensitive manner various government-sponsored transmigration programmes have been implemented at the expense of the locals, the growing marginalisation of the locals, especially their access to traditional lands that are being occupied by foreign multinationals and non-West Irianians, the indiscriminate use of force by the security apparatus, with the Indonesian military being increasingly viewed as an 'occupation force' and most important of all, the rise of distrust of Jakarta at all levels of society. It is

against this background that many have argued, even fear, that there is the danger that West Irian may go the same way East Timor was lost.

In view of these strongly held grievances, from the perspective of the West Irian nationalists and opposition, their challenge to Jakarta is a legitimate one as the territory had already declared its intention to become a self-governing territory. This, according to the West Irian opposition was evident in the 1961 proclamation of independence, the unveiling of the West Irian flag and national anthem. West Irian nationalists argue that they are not secessionists, as dubbed by Jakarta and the security apparatus as they are only legitimately reclaiming what belongs to them, namely, their sovereignty that has been unjustly usurped from them. The West Irian opposition has argued that both the Dutch and Indonesia, with the support of the United Nations, United States and its allies such as Australia betrayed the trust of the West Irianians and for geo-political and geo-strategic reasons handed the territory to Indonesia. Hence, the suit against both the Netherlands and Indonesia, the former and present occupying power. The West Irian opposition has argued that both the Dutch and Indonesians are at fault and the source of the present problem in West Irian as they did not take cognisance of the situation and aspirations of the West Irianians as were expressed in 1961, namely that they wanted independence. To that extent, the issue of perception is an important one as the West Irianians nationalists' object being labelled as secessionist as they believe that they are only claiming what is their inalienable right to independence and sovereignty in West Irian.

ENDNOTES

- 1 In this study, West Irian refers to the piece of territory that the Dutch earlier referred to as Netherlands New Guinea. This was later renamed West Irian or Irian Barat. In 1973, Suharto renamed the territory Irian Jaya. In the post-Suharto period, the province was renamed Papua. Since then the territory was split into three provinces, first by President B.J. Habibie and later, President Megawati Sukarnoputri. The territory has been collectively referred to as Irian Jaya or West Irian as Papua is merely one of the three new provinces within it. The people of the territory can be referred to as West Irianians, Irianians or even Irianese. Some have collectively referred to them as Papuans.
- 2 See Jan H. Ramandel, *Dari Samudranta Ke Irian Jaya*, (Jayapura, Irian Jaya: CV. Bulan Bintang, 1999), p. 9.
- 3 *Ibid*, pp. 20-21.
- 4 *Ibid*, p. 3 and pp. 81-84.
- 5 For details, see *Irian Jaya in Figures 2000*, (Jayapura, Irian Jaya: Badan Perencanaan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan Daerah Propinsi Irian Jaya dan Badan Pusat Statistik Propensi Irian Jaya, 2001), pp. 3-9.
- 6 *Ibid*, p. 29.
- 7 This thinking was aptly captured by J.A.C. Mackie when he argued: "The rationale behind Indonesia's case was perfectly straightforward: her claim to Irian Jaya derived from the central principles of nationalism and anti-colo-

- nialism upon which her revolution against the Dutch had been fought. To abandon the claim would have been to deny those principles at a time when the very unity of the fragile new state depended on maintaining the principles of nationalism as paramount in the face of potentially secessionist regional dissident movements. Indonesians believed that in pursuing their claim to Irian Jaya they were merely trying to gain control over territory that should have been recognized as rightfully theirs from the outset. The Dutch were thought to be holding on to West New Guinea for no better reason than to use it as a base from which they could subvert and fragment the new Republic of Indonesia especially by stirring up trouble in the Moluccas and the other eastern islands of the archipelago. The Dutch tried to deny Indonesia's claim by stressing the racial differences between Indonesians of Java or Sumatra and the Melanesian inhabitants of West New Guinea, but Indonesia regarded this as irrelevant, since they themselves were ethnically a heterogeneous bunch and they did not regard racial affinities as the determining criteria of their nationhood". See J.A.C. Mackie, 'Does Indonesia have expansionist designs on Papua New Guinea?', in R.J. May (ed.), *Between Two Nations: The Indonesia-Papua New Guinea Border and West Papua Nationalism*, (Bathurst, N.S.W.: Robert Brown and Associates, 1986), p. 69.
- 8 This was articulated by the Australian Foreign Minister Percy Spender as follows: The Australian Government does not regard Dutch New Guinea as forming part of Indonesia. We believe that the peoples of West New Guinea have little in common, except a past common administration, with the peoples of Indonesia. Their developmental problems are separate and the level of political development necessitates placing them in a category quite different from the United States of Indonesia. In fact, we regard Dutch New Guinea as having much in common from an ethnic, administrative and development point of view with our own territories of New Guinea and Papua". See Cited in C.L.M. Penders, p. 301.
 - 9 This was clearly stated by Percy Spender in the following terms: "Experience has shown to the Australians how strategically vital to Australian defence is the mainland of New Guinea. I have pointed out before that we cannot alter our geography which for all times makes this area of supreme consequence to Australia. Quite apart from its military and strategic significance, one cannot disregard the ever-increasing Communist pressure in Asia. Communism has not got any foothold yet in Australian New Guinea. Australia is determined in so far as it can to ensure that it will not". Cited in L. Metzemaekers, "The Western New Guinea Problem", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 24, No. 2, (June 1951), pp. 139-140.
 - 10 Foreign Minister Percy Spender argued in August 1950: "If the claim of Indonesia to Dutch New Guinea were conceded to any degree at all, it would be a matter of time, no matter how genuine may be assurances to the contrary, when the claim will be pushed further so as to include the trust territory of Australian New Guinea and its people". Cited in C.L.M. Penders, *op cit*, p. 306.
 - 11 Cited in Peter Edwards (with Gregory Pemberton, *Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts, 1948-1965*, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1992), p. 201.
 - 12 See Audrey R. Kahin and George McT.Kahin, *Subversion As Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia*, (New York: The New

- Press, 1995).
- 13 Author's interview with Bishop Leo Laba Ladjar in Jayapura, 18 April 2005.
 - 14 See Papua in Figures 2003, (Jayapura: Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua, 2003), p. 90.
 - 15 Ibid, p. 97.
 - 16 Ibid, p. 129.
 - 17 Ibid, p. 54.
 - 18 See <http://eng.papua.go.id/profil/?halaman=8&ids=3>
 - 19 See <http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/cline/papua/deforestation.htm>
 - 20 See <http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/cline/papua/deforestation.htm>
 - 21 Estimates are derived from the value of timber per metric tonne multiplied by the average annual timber production in Papua.
 - 22 Interview with Mr. Willy Mandowen in Jayapura, Papua, on 18 April 2005.
 - 23 Ibid.
 - 24 During the reign of Governor P.J. Platteel, the Dutch divided Papua, first into four and later, six residencies. The seventh 'residency' referred to those regions that were under observation and their fate was yet to be decided. The six residencies were Hollandia, Geelvinkbaai, West Nieuw Guinea, Fak-fak, Zuid Nieuw Guinea and Centraal Bergland. The regions under observation were known as Exploratie-ressort included Westelijk Bergland, Midden Bergland, Bokondini en Swartvallei, Noord-Oost en West Baliem and Oosttelijk Bergland. See John RG Djopari, *Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 1993), p. 28.
 - 25 See Don A.L.Flassy, *Sinkronisasi UU-RI Untuk Papua: Indonesia Tampil Beda Provinsi-Provinsi Otsus Diurus Menteri Khusus Papua*, (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 2004), p. 11. For a more detailed study, see Don A.L.Flassy, *Ethnografi Papua: Pengetahuan Sosial Budaya Bagi Manajemen Pembangunan dan Pemerintahan*, (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 2002), pp. 48-59.
 - 26 Soeharto: *My Thoughts, Words and Deeds: An Autobiography*, as told to G.Dwipayana and Ramadhan K.H., (Jakarta: PT.Citra Lamtoro Gung Presada, 1991), p. 85.
 - 27 Ibid, p. 89.
 - 28 Ibid, p. 91.
 - 29 Ibid, pp. 91-92.
 - 30 Cited in Adam Schwarz, *A Nation In Waiting: Indonesia's Search For Stability*, (St.Leonards, N.S.W. Allen and Unwin, 1999) p. 64.