

PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE SEMINAR ON
THE ACT OF FREE CHOICE

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Held in The Hague 15 November 2005
on the occasion of the book launch of P.J. Drooglever,
*Een Daad van Vrije Keuze. De Papoea's van westelijk
Nieuw-Guinea en de grenzen van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht*
(*An Act of Free Choice. The Papuans of western New
Guinea and the limits of the right of self determination*)

Edited by P.J. Drooglever

Institute of Netherlands History
The Hague 2008

Het Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis maakt deel uit van de Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek.

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Gedrukt door: Quantas, Rijswijk

ISBN 978-90-5216-160-0

NUR 680

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Preface

This publication contains the papers that were presented at the seminar held on 15 November 2005 in the auditorium of the Royal Library in The Hague. The seminar was organized to mark the occasion of the book launch of a monograph written by P. J. Drooglever on the history Western New Guinea up to the Act of Free Choice of 1969. It was published by Boom Publishers in Amsterdam and the Institute of Netherlands History under the title *Een Daad van Vrije Keuze. De Papoea's van westelijk Nieuw-Guinea en de grenzen van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht* (An Act of Free Choice, the Papuans of West New Guinea and the limits of the right of self-determination). The book was written at the request of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ministry had asked for an academic study that would provide sound information on the subject for a wide audience. In the accompanying contract it was stipulated that the ministry would deliver the necessary facilities, but that the responsibility for the research and the conclusions would be exclusively within the competence of the author and the Institute of Netherlands History. As a consequence, responsibility for publishing and promoting the book would also rest with the Institute.

Even during the early stages, the project already attracted a great deal of attention. At the time of the book launch, the auditorium was packed to its full capacity of 250 people, while fifty or more individuals had gathered in a separate room to follow events via a video-presentation. Those present belonged to the circles of academics, politicians and journalists from the Netherlands and abroad, Papuan exiles living in Europe and former Dutch officials and military personnel who had served their time in New Guinea. From Indonesia, too, a considerable number of parliamentarians, academics and diplomats had come over to The Hague. Among them was a delegation from the Moluccas. By their presence the members publicly demonstrated their interest in the history of the Papuans, that in so many respects had been linked to that of their own. Finally, and as an unexpected surprise, there was a large delegation of 12 prominent Papuans, including Tom Beanal, Willy Mandowen and Hamid Al Thaha, all belonging to the Papua Presidium; by far the most representative organization of the local population of the former Netherlands New Guinea, the present Indonesian province of Irian Jaya or Papua.

The monograph on the Act of Free Choice covers the history of West New Guinea from the sixteenth century onwards right into the latter half of the twentieth century. The main focus is on the period between 1940 and 1969. These were the years in which the dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia on the future of New Guinea warmed up, which resulted in the New York Agreement of 1962 and the transfer of the territory to Indonesia in the following year. As agreed, it was followed by a UN-supervised Act of Free Choice in 1969. On that occasion, the population allegedly opted

for integration within the Indonesian state. In the book many aspects of the internal and international developments are discussed, together with the cultural and administrative history of the territory. The central question was, and still is, to what degree did the changes that took place in all these different fields work out for the Papuans. It can be added that it was the first time that all aspects could be studied together from a great many archival sources in the Netherlands, the United States, Australia and the United Nations. Moreover, it took place in combination with a research study that was being carried out for a documentary edition on Dutch Indonesian relations between 1950-1963, which largely covered the same themes. That documentary edition is now ready too. It is available in digital format on the website of the Institute of Netherlands History. In the course of the research many new facts and links could be detected. These have found a ready place, not only in the documentary edition but in the monograph on the Act of Free Choice as well.

The present collection contains the papers of the seminar, organized to offer a suitable context for the launch of the monograph. It was meant as an opening shot for further discussion. It contains seven contributions in all. Five of them were presented during the morning session which was chaired by Gerry van Klinken of the Royal Institute of Anthropology and Linguistics in Leyden. In these papers, various aspects are discussed that belonged to the central themes of the monograph. The authors were invited for their up-to-date knowledge of the field. It must be noted here that they had not yet seen the monograph and had only had access to the Summary a few days before the seminar. Therefore, their work is hardly influenced at all by its content. The Summary is added as an appendix to these congress papers, not only in English but in an Indonesian translation as well. The latter was provided by Agus Sumule of Cendrawasih University in Papua. I happily use this opportunity to express my thanks to him for this kind and generous gesture.

In the papers, attention is paid to aspects that are of direct relevance for the development of Papuan society. Two Dutch anthropologists, Leontine Visser and Jaap Timmer, focus on some fundamental changes in the position of the members of the Papuan elite before, during and after the transfer of their island to the Indonesians. The subject is elaborated further by the Australian historian, Richard Chauvel, who gives an analysis of their political ideas in the 1960s and their positioning in the conflict between Indonesia and the Dutch on the future of the country. The British historian, John Saltford, focuses on the way in which the United Nations took charge of its responsibilities during its interim administration in 1962/63 and at the time of the Act of Free Choice. Finally, the Singaporean politicalologist, Bilveer Singh, analyses the political anatomy of the West Irianese society, its friction points with Indonesia, and the geopolitical aspects of the resulting conflict in more recent years.

These contributions mainly centered around historical topics. In the ensuing discussions, however, the actuality of the past jumped to the foreground. Here, the gauntlet was taken up by John Saltford who de-

fended the thesis that the way in which the Act of Free Choice had been carried out did not conform with the terms of the Agreement of New York and the rules laid down by the United Nations Organisation themselves for events of this kind. Therefore, the plebiscite should be held once again, this time under fairer conditions for the Papuans. The thesis found support among the public, but its validity was placed in serious doubt by the other speakers at the morning session.

The afternoon session was of a more informative character and was aimed, in particular, at the non-specialists among the public. Here, the language was mainly Dutch. It opened with a presentation of the film *Anatomie einer Krise*, introduced by the journalist Rogier Smeele. The film is a composition of scenes from Indonesia and New Guinea during the early 1960s. It portrays the increasing tensions between the Netherlands and Indonesia and the stress that resulted from this for the population of New Guinea.

After this direct confrontation with the mood of the time, Jos Amapon Marey threw a retrospective view on the same episode. In 1962, he had just finished his training at the School for Native Civil Servants in Hollandia and was having his first practical experiences as a civil servant. These had given him a chance to work in close contact with some of the leading Dutch and United Nations officials. For him, it was the exiting beginning of a career that soon ended in lifelong banishment from his native country. When he had finished his sober exposé on past events the floor was taken by Pieter Drooglever who summarized the main conclusions of his book. Their contributions are included in the present collection and are numbered six and seven, respectively.

The closing scene of this session was a panel discussion chaired by Nico Schulte Nordholt. Other members of the panel were Richard Chauvel, Pieter Drooglever, Viktor Kaisiepo, Jaap Timmer and Dirk Vlasblom. They opened with a few statements to encourage debate. With good results as members of the public actively participated in the ensuing discussions. Some of the questions posed were of an informative nature; people wanting to know more about the content and background of the book. These could be readily answered. The absence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ben Bot, was a reason for critical comment. In a series of earlier public statements he had already distanced himself from this project; one that he had inherited from his predecessors. Bot had done this for political reasons, i.e. not to antagonize Indonesia. Yet, by explaining his position in interviews to the press he had even gone to the point of casting doubt upon the value of the study per se. Both aspects had irritated many participants at the seminar.

Serious criticism on the substance of the book came from the Indonesian academic, Astrid Susanto, who for many years had been an official within the Indonesian administration on West New Guinea. In her reaction she emphasised its positive aspects for the life of the Papuans. It was attentively listened to by the audience, but it was apparently on a bad footing

with the experiences of the Papuans among the public, who in emotional words elaborated on the dismal qualities of that administration as they had learnt to know it. After all, it had forced many of them to live a life without a future as exiles in foreign countries. The most eloquent representative of the latter group was Nancy Jouwe, daughter of the Papua leader Nicolaas Jouwe. Remarkable too were the contributions of the sons of his erstwhile colleague and rival Marcus Kaisiepo. Bernhard, the oldest of the two, represented the sentiment of anger and dissatisfaction. His brother, Viktor, demonstrated his diplomatic qualities, making clear that the door towards Indonesia should not be shut without a word.

With these remarks the debate returned once more to the theme of the morning session. This centred on the question of what policy towards Indonesia would best suit Papuan interests. Linked to this was the question of what advantage they would gain from the publication of the book when it finally saw the light later that day. The author emphasised that it was certainly not a report, written with the purpose of reaching conclusions that would fit in with the politics of the day. It was an academic analysis that did not stress points further than could be defended safely. From the outset it was intended to be so by the minister, the Institute of Netherlands History and the author himself. In the discussions, it was argued that the absence of the minister was in line with that policy. However, it was also argued that it was a missed opportunity to demonstrate that the Netherlands government was still interested in the fate of its erstwhile subjects. The explicit academic character of the book would have made such an approach easier.

As for the study itself, voices resonated that its non-political character was actually its strongest point. The fact that no position was taken beforehand either with regard to the conflicts of the past or the problems of the present added weight to its conclusions. What there was, was well founded. That was exactly the point made by the spokesman of the Papuan Delegation, Willy Mandowen. In an improvised and emotional address he stressed that with the present book the Papuans now could rely on an authoritative history of their own past, which for them would be a source of self-confidence.

That being said, the meeting entered its final stage with a speech by the chairman of the Institute of Netherlands History, Dick de Boer. He made clear that the board of the Institute had greatly appreciated the opportunity of being instrumental in writing a study of this kind and that it gladly shared responsibility with the author for the way in which he had fulfilled his task. Having said so, he handed over the first volume of the book to the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jozias Van Aartsen, who in 2000 had commissioned the Institute to write the book. In his words of thanks Van Aartsen made clear that he had felt committed to the fate of the Papuans from the time he had been a schoolboy. It had been a recurrent subject around the table in his parental home. Small wonder, since his father was a minister in the De Quay Cabinet which had paved the way to the New York Agreement of 1962. So the commitment of the father

had been instrumental in putting the son into action in 2000, when asked to do so by the parliamentarians Middelkoop and Van den Berg. Seen in that light, the absence of Minister Bot was interesting again. After all, his father, too, had participated in the same cabinet, bearing even more direct responsibility for the conduct of the New Guinean affairs in his capacity as Vice-Minister for Overseas Affairs. During their ministerial terms, more than forty years later, the sons drew different conclusions for the present from that shared past. This underlines the tricky nature of the subject, both then and today.

The publication of *Een Daad van Vrije Keuze* did not go unnoticed in the press. It was discussed in many journals, both in the Netherlands and outside. The same was also true for radio and TV. Once more attention was drawn to the final phase of decolonisation in Indonesia, which had ended up in the dismal interaction between Dutch promises and Indonesian claims. Whatever the merits of both, they certainly had not worked out for the good of the Papuans. Small wonder, the actual position of the Netherlands government was taken note of as well, often with a critical undertone. Recent history and contemporary politics had touched each other very closely. Actually, they had been overlapping to some degree. It was the leading Dutch newspaper NRC-Handelsblad that made the point. It was regretted that the Minister, once committed to the subject, had not made one more small gesture. Accepting the unpleasant truths of history does not necessarily lead towards the conclusion that the past has to be played over again.

This encapsulates the presentation of the book and the discussions that accompanied it. It owed much of its success to the active participation of speakers and participants. I also have to express a word of thanks to my colleagues at the Institute who helped to organize the seminar. The first to mention is Donald Haks who, in the spirit of a true Director, kept tight hold of the reins while still deriving great pleasure from the race. Furthermore, we owe much to the small team led by Maria Schouten which took care of the complicated logistics. And, finally, a word of thanks has to be conveyed to the chairmen of the two sessions, who gave ample leeway to the emotions of the public without losing sight of the need for rational argumentation. In doing so, they demonstrated that politics are not the exclusive prerogative of either Jakarta or The Hague, but have a place in the world of academia as well.

Pieter Drooglever
28 August 2007

The Papuan Civil Servant as development broker: Governing New Guinea between 1950 and 1962.

Leontine E. Visser

At the Round Table Conference in 1949 the former Residency of New-Guinea was exempted from being included in the transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia from The Netherlands to Indonesia. During the following years from 1949 to 1962 Western New-Guinea was headed by a Dutch governor and a mixed Dutch-Papuan staff governing the districts and sub-districts.

Papuans today usually do not speak of these final 17 years of Dutch rule as colonization (*penjajahan*). Also, the Dutch administrators themselves saw it as their duty to give priority to “the improvement of the mentality of the Papuan which would give him the feeling to be capable of something, and to launch a demographic policy which placed the Papuan at the centre”.¹ Young Papuans became actively involved, first in junior positions and later, towards the end of the 1950s, also in senior positions of the public administration. A *community development* policy was introduced in the early 1950s.² Vlasblom speaks of the years 1950-1958 in terms of a *inhaalmanoeuvre* or ‘catching up’ because of the government’s endeavour to increase the standard of living and the livelihoods of the Papuan people.³

The books by Schoorl and by Vlasblom are both Dutch narratives of a historically unique era of Dutch overseas governance, differing in global political context, time frame, personnel, intention, and interaction with the indigenous population from the Dutch rule over Indonesia before World War II. Yet, except for a few accounts,⁴ there is little account of the everyday practice of the Papuan public administrators. Especially in the case of the 1950-1962 Dutch governance of New-Guinea we feel that the ‘history of governance’ is incomplete without a better insight into the participation of the indigenous Papuan elite in governing New-Guinea. Therefore, a series of interviews were held in 1999 and 2000 by Jos Marey and by myself with 15 Papuan administrators and several other civil servants like clergymen, a policeman, and a head of school at the time. They extensively narrated about their education, everyday administrative and developmental tasks, inspection tours, dramatic or hilarious events, their relationship and collaboration with their Dutch superiors and colleagues, and the political and bureaucratic changes since 1962. Together, these narratives provide a unique picture of the everyday practice of the development administration of Western New-Guinea since 1950 at central, district, and sub-district levels. This paper contains a short sketch of

the role the indigenous governing elite. Who were these administrators or *tuan bestir*⁵ of the 1950s and 60s? How did they perceive their tasks, and how did the actual governing take place? Under what social conditions did they perform their tasks?

The training of Papuan civil servants

Since 1948, Papuan school leavers were regularly selected by their headmasters to be admitted to the School for Indigenous Administrators (*Opleidingschool voor Inheemse Bestuursambtenaren* or OSIBA). The Dutch development priorities and presence along the north coast resulted in the selection of a majority of Biak and Sentani pupils. They were often the sons of local leaders⁶, they should have good school records, and be in good health. Like the name suggests, it was a school for indigenous people. Non-Papuan students, like Javanese, Batak or Moluccan students were not admitted, and mixed Chinese-Papuans were only admitted under the condition of being accepted together with a Papuan pupil from the same class (called 'twinning'). The government paid for the school fees, including a yearly holiday trip home. The 4-year curriculum of the OSIBA provided a general education, introducing the young students to subjects like public administration, law, but also to ethnology and *adat*; to agronomy, world history, economics, and health. Classes were taught in Dutch. It is important to note that the third year of the curriculum was spent in the field where the future administrators were engaged in the actual practice of governing. After their practical training they returned to the classroom for a final year.

This practice-oriented education, plus their own intimate knowledge of the language and culture of Papuan societies was what the 17-18 years old boys could rely upon when they were sent to their first post. They would closely collaborate with, and be guided by their Dutch superiors who later, during the years of Papuanisation, often became their colleagues. Being educated in a weberian style of bureaucracy, the Papuan administrators indeed perceived of themselves as public administrators⁷ who were primarily the servants of the people (*hamba masyarakat*). One aspect that often misses or is under-exposed in the Dutch narratives is the dependency of the Dutch administrators on the language and cultural communication skills of the Papuan staff, especially in their contacts with the local population. The people called the indigenous administrator *tuan bestir* with a mixture of awe and appreciation. During his patrols he would walk great distances to their village, eat and sleep in their huts. Knowing their customs and being Papuan like them, especially the inhabitants of the interior regarded the Papuan administrator as a development broker, a mediator between their society and the state, in a modernizing and urbanizing environment dominated by the Dutch.

The oral histories we gathered show that in the everyday practice of governing New-Guinea the organization of government administration can hardly be separated from the social context of governing. But for the sake

of clarity of this short paper we nevertheless propose to deal with these two aspects individually.

The social context of governing

State formation was still in its infancy, and the effectiveness of the public administration of Western New Guinea depended very much on the capacities and capabilities of the administrators to reach out to the Papuan inhabitants. This was especially the case in the interior and in the South. One could say that in the 1950s New-Guinea had people, but no state. It was the task of the government administrators to bring the state to the people, in order to make them aware of, and acknowledge the state in the form of governmental rule.

In the early 1950s, the young administrators who had just arrived from The Netherlands could learn as much from their Papuan assistants as the latter were guided by the Dutch. Even for those who had served in Indonesia before the Japanese invasion of 1942 and who joined the civil service in New-Guinea after 1945, the social, cultural, and economic environment of New-Guinea was rather new. The Dutch administration was still in the process of being settled there. Under such conditions, the work of making the first contacts was left to Dutch junior officials, who had to closely collaborate with the indigenous administrators. That had been true in the 1920s for the academically educated⁸ civil servant Friedericy in South Celebes. In *De Raadsman* (1958), the novel based on his experiences, he describes the ambiguous relationship with his local assistant, which he pointedly called his *Raadsman*, his 'Councillor'. Though endowed with the political, legal and administrative powers of colonial rule, he himself as a young, foreign and inexperienced administrator felt in many respects fully dependent upon the help of his assistant, being a scion of the local nobility whose power was legitimated by local history and his royal descent. In New-Guinea, about thirty years later, similar relationships between junior and senior, foreign and indigenous administrators could be found, despite the different international political conditions of the 1920s and 1950s. According to the narratives of those interviewed, many among the Dutch and the Papuan administrative staff were younger, single men. All had had a rather comparable, modern- Western education. Outside office hours they would go for a swim and have fun together, which created a sense of equality, mutual trust and respect that supplemented the hierarchical work relationships with non-Papuans, with which most Papuans were historically not familiar.

In the translation of abstract notions like 'state' and 'society' to tangible events of communication between their representatives, the visibility and brokerage of the Papuan administrator or *tuan bestir* were vital elements. He would be out of office three times more often than inside going on *tournee* or patrol, which regularly meant walking up and down hills through the jungle for days on end or taking a boat to reach the upland and coastal villages. He would stay overnight in villages, getting

a first-hand impression of the social, natural, and health conditions, and he would talk, teach or 'advise' (*nasehat*) the people about keeping their huts and living environment clean, about schooling, and the need to live together in larger communities to be more accessible and to obtain access to 'development'. Here, the language used was not the language of the state (Dutch) spoken in the office, but Biak or another contact language more easily understood locally.

The representatives of the state were not coming empty-handed. In the beginning they would bring the so-called contact-articles, but later more structural, material development would be organized. For example, the local administrator of Kaimana arranged for the KPM freighters to make a call at Kaimana. And when the first ship moored at Kaimana harbor in 1952, he was there to meet the captain. *Kita punya Bestir ada datang!*⁹ Roads were constructed, bridges and schools were built, and new seeds and crops introduced.

No abstract notion of 'the state', but tangible material development mediated by the administrators of the districts and sub-districts. Schoorl¹⁰ correctly speaks of the of the Dutch civil servants, who carried out a multiplicity of functions, as agents of development. I would add that the agency of the Dutch governance of New-Guinea during the 1950s and the early 1960s very strongly relied on the development participation of their Papuan staff and the communities involved.

The government as an exchange partner

Local men and women would bring their skills and physical labour in exchange for the tools and materials provided by the government to build roads and buildings, to construct development. The government and the indigenous people thus became exchange partners in a very similar way to social and cultural forms of exchange relationships as in the case of, for example, the clan groups of the Birds Head. Until today, they exchange women, *kain timur* cloth, land, and other items of wealth through marriage and at funerals, despite clerical and administrative sanctions and without a clear distinction between urban and rural areas. Here, the state has become a partner in the 'exchange' of schools and bridges against labour and land.¹¹

In Papua, like in other Pacific cultures the notion of a highly dynamic, temporary inequity or hierarchy between exchange partners is widely accepted, but under the condition of a mutual understanding and recognition of a long-term equity.¹²

As long as both partners sustain their mutual relationships of gift exchange over time, the people will acknowledge the state and its representatives. If a road has been promised by the provincial government, but no construction has started yet, people may have difficulty complying to yet another demand from the government because the relationships in

the economy of symbolic exchanges¹³ have not yet been balanced. During the 1950s and even in Papua today¹⁴ the notion and the material form of 'development' is very much a part of the social, cultural, and economic conceptualizations of exchange between the various kin groups or between people and the state's representatives. Since the Papuan governing elite who themselves often descended from indigenous ruling *korano* and *ondoafi* families gained access to greater financial wealth since their inclusion in the administration in the 1950s, they also sought to increase their cultural wealth and personal status by becoming involved in the exchange of symbolic goods with local leaders. This pattern may become even stronger in today's networks between government officers and private entrepreneurs or local leaders - although we name it differently - and its scale and frequency have drastically increased.

Thus, one can hardly sustain that the Papuan clans and their leaders in this early period were estranged from their government. On the contrary: they were conditional to the establishment of the state through government rule. The Papuan members of the administration were of course highly conscious of the fact that they were the mediators of that process. They were the *dukun* of a Papuan state, and they felt proud of that role.

Prismatic society?

Especially in the more remote areas the local administrator also functioned as a judge (*alleensprekend rechter*). Legal practice implied here that customary 'law' or *adat* and formal law were applied in some form of integration. One of the persons interviewed who had also been trained at the Indonesian Institute for Administrative Science (IIP) at Malang used the term *prismatic society*¹⁵ to indicate that the administration of Papuan societies and the implementation of formal rules and regulations were to a large extent determined by the social conditions, especially in the interior and along the southern coast, and that these complex conditions varied depending on the angle from which one looks at them, like in a prism. Therefore, he thought that it had been a pragmatic but also a wise decision to integrate *adat* notions of justice in as far as they were in line with formal law, to support and strengthen the modernization of Papuan society. *Adat*, he argued, is the primary moral order acknowledged by all Papuans, especially at times of major social transformation. But he admitted that applying an integrative legal-*adat* standard of justice could also create problems for the Papuan administrator himself in defending his verdict to his superiors. This experience is not unlike those narrated by Schoorl and by Lagerberg, who refers to the fact that the new legal order penalized actions that were licit according to *adat*, like murdering an adversary.¹⁶ The resulting problem was that it was not easy to decide on the punishment in such a case. Should the 'murderer' be sentenced, not sentenced or, if sentenced, for 3 or for 10 years?

Societal contextualization of the practice of governing was a necessary condition for effective government in the 1950s and -60s. But the societal

knowledge that was necessary for the purpose could only be obtained if the administrator was *curious*, since there was hardly any documentation on the subject and the necessary ethnographic studies on Papuan societies were written 'on the job' so to speak by Dutch missionaries and a fair number of administrators-ethnographers themselves.¹⁷ Unfortunately, there are still very few Papuan accounts of the years 1945-62, although Vlasblom gives some interesting excerpts from his interviews with several key figures. The forthcoming edited volume by Visser and Marey of the oral history of Papuan former administrators on the governing of New-Guinea should help to start filling this gap. The attitude of the indigenous administrators of the 1950s is clear: an administrator should try to understand people's behaviour by taking interest in the variation and differentiation of the social and economic conditions, power relationships and cultural concepts and practices of his administrative district. An example given is the famous *aksi koteka*: the endeavour of the Indonesian government to modernize Papuan clothing habits by replacing the penis gourd used in the Baliem area by a pair of trousers. But only one pair was provided in this cold upland climate where washing was not easy. Soap was not provided nor available. So after a while, people started feeling filthy. The change to modernity was frustrated by the local people's very civil notion of cleanness, as a consequence of the fact that the government's regulation to wear trousers was not properly contextualized to fit local livelihood conditions.

Internal organization of the government

According to European bureaucratic models, exemplified by Max Weber's *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*,¹⁸ a pre-defined and impersonal hierarchy of tasks and functions is a characteristic of an ideal-type bureaucracy, and certainly the Dutch administration of New-Guinea tended to follow this model. The attitude and knowledge of the Dutch administrators who went to New-Guinea after 1947 differed from those who served in the pre-war Netherlands-Indies. Papuans often express their feeling that they were not colonized by the Dutch. Incidentally, individual Dutch administrators would nevertheless exhibit a certain 'colonial' behaviour that was not in line with local views. Like in the case we recorded where the sight of Papuan women carrying bricks for house construction prompted a remark by the Papuan assistant to the administrator (*Controleur*): 'Why do these women have to do the heavy work?' Whereupon the latter answered: 'Well, the women here are always doing the heavy work on behalf of the men, isn't it?'

Of course there was institutional order and discipline, for example in the production of the monthly reports to the Resident. Written by the district's administrator, succinctly and to the point, on the basis of the information and data gathered by the Papuan patrol officers. The reports would be sent up to the Resident, and sent back again from the upper levels, with comments that would reach the sub-District providing feedback to those accountable. However, the functional hierarchy did not prevent

a Papuan administrator in the region from taking the responsibility for new initiatives. An example is the establishment of a branch of the New Guinea Import-Export Company (NIGIMY) in Wamena by the indigenous administrator to stimulate economic development in the interior by creating access to modern goods for both government personnel and local people.

The 1960s

After the departure of the Dutch in 1962 several important changes occurred in the everyday practice of the government officers. The following examples are mentioned in the interviews:

- No monthly reports were being produced any more because the new Indonesian administrative top did not request them. So, no accounting took place of whether or not procedures were followed and actions carried out. The reports that were made were not systematic any more, since every department (Health, Education) developed its own style. Neither was any feedback given to subordinate levels about the way of reporting and their contents. It gave many administrators who were 'out there' in often remote places, a feeling of isolation and stagnation instead of development.
- The status and income of civil servants was changed immediately upon the transfer of power. They no longer were *Pegawai Negeri* with a fixed position, but temporary officials (*Pegawai Sementara*), and their income changed for the worse accordingly. It demonstrated that the status and functions of the Papuan administrators of what was now the Indonesian province of West Irian were not automatically acknowledged by the Indonesian state.
- The monetary unit was changed from Guilder into Irian Barat Rp (IBRP) within a rather short period of time and in a social-economic environment where a money economy had only recently been introduced. Because of the value difference, Indonesian teachers and others who came to fulfill government services in West Irian, had an economic advantage over local people. They could more easily buy the stocks left behind in the shops after the Dutch had left.
- In the early 1960s, many Papuan administrators were sent to Bandung or Jakarta to upgrade their administrative knowledge in anticipation of a position in the Indonesian system of public administration and government. After 6 months of schooling, they would receive a Hansip uniform and were trained in a military camp, followed by another month of *Pancasila* education. Several persons recount how, during their stay in Bandung, they were shocked by the apparent differences between the social-economic environment of Hollandia or Serui on the one hand, and Bandung and Jakarta on the other hand. In Bandung for the first time they saw beggars who were desperately searching for food - even coming into the classrooms.

The economic and political situation indeed worsened in Java between 1963 and 1965 (Ricklefs, 1981: 260-69). The Papuans who were confronted

with the political and economic decline when on study leave in Java became acutely aware of the cultural, social, and economic differences between their homeland and other parts of Indonesia (cf. A. Mampioer in Vlasblom, 2004: 390-91). But they also remember that in 1963 there was a food crisis in Manokwari and Biak, and a cholera epidemic in Yapen-Waropen. There was this other side of the everyday existential struggle for food and elementary livelihood conditions which frustrated the ordinary people in Irian, an aspect that is often too implicit and underscored in the primarily political international accounts of the civil unrest in Irian in the 1960s, the Manokwari uprising in 1965, and the growing expectations and disappointments in the years before the 1969 'Act of Free Choice' or *Pepera*.

The picture that I have presented here is not necessarily historically 'true', and it does not need to be. It is a sketch based on the narratives of the real-life experiences, facts, and memories of members of the Papuan governing elite during a particular historical period. They had started their career in the 1950s and many of them continued to be part of the Indonesian bureaucracy in Irian Jaya/Papua until they retired. I have tried to lift a tip of the veil of the social contextualization of the participation of the Papuan administrators through their everyday practice of governance, by taking examples from their narratives of 1999 and 2000. A history of the governance of New-Guinea would not be complete without their contribution.

ENDNOTES

- 1 K. Lagerberg, 'Hollandia en de controleur in het veld' in: P. Schoorl (ed.) *Besturen in Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea 1945-1962* (Leiden, KITLV-Uitgeverij 1996) pp. 50, 51. Translation of the quotation by L.V.
- 2 D. Vlasblom, *Papoea; Een Geschiedenis* (Amsterdam, Mets & Schilt 2004) p.197.
- 3 Vlasblom', *op. cit.* pp. 187-257.
- 4 e.g. Mampioer in Vlasblom, *op. cit.* pp. 215-219.
- 5 *Bestir* from the Dutch word *bestuur* or administration.
- 6 Like *kepala suku, ondoafi* and *korano*.
- 7 The Dutch term *ambtenaar* bears the notion of being a cog in the wheel of the State.
- 8 H.J. Friedericy studied *Indologie* at Leiden University and was sent to The Netherlands Indies in 1921, right after his graduation and at the age of 21. He was a civil servant (*Ambtenaar Binnenlands Bestuur*) in Celebes between 1921 and 1930.
- 9 Our Government is there!
- 10 P. Schoorl, *op. cit.* pp. 7-40.
- 11 L.E. Visser, 'Remaining poor on natural riches? The fallacy of community development in Irian Jaya/Papua' in: *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* 2 no 2, pp. 66-68.
- 12 A.B. Weiner, *Inalienable possessions. The paradox of keeping while giving* (Berkeley,

- University of California Press 1992).
- 13 P. Bourdieu, *Practical reason* (Cambridge, Polity Press 1998) pp. 92-98
 - 14 L.E. Visser, *op. cit. passim*.
 - 15 F.W. Riggs, *Administration in developing countries: the theory of prismatic society* (Boston 1964).
 - 16 P. Schoorl, *op.cit.* pp. 16-19, 50-52.
 - 17 See also S. Jaarsma, *Waarneming en interpretatie. Vergaring en gebruik van etnografische informatie in Nederlands Nieuw Guinea 1950-1962* (dissertation Utrecht/ISOR 1990).
 - 18 A. van Braam, *Max Weber/Gezag en bureaucratie* (Universitaire Pers, Rotterdam 1972).

Spectres of Indonesianisation and Secession in Papua

Jaap Timmer

Introduction

In this paper, I trace and sketch the backgrounds of social, economic and political fault lines in Indonesian Papua. While reformasi policy makers in Jakarta have developed a series of inconsistent policies towards Indonesia's easternmost province over the last few years, the reactions of local elites in Papua are more than merely reactionary. For example, the apparent endorsement of the Indonesian state by supporters of Abraham Atururi (the transitional Governor of Irian Jaya Barat who preceded the current interim Governor Timbul Pujiyanto) has provoked a fundamental challenge to those elites who seek to maintain and consolidate their recent political gains under a Special Autonomy (Otsus) law written for a unified Papua. From 2000 till 2005, this political lobby was led, among others, by the late Jaap Solossa, then Governor of Papua, his Vice Governor, Constan Karma, and the Speaker of the Representative Council (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) Papua, John Ibo.

At the same time, Papuan activists and a number of political and religious leaders incessantly reinforce the political spectre of secession because of a failure of policy in Papua. They raise their voices at local, national and international forums and usually resort to rethorics that closely link with human rights discourses in the West, but also with such intimidating and ultimately ineffectual claims as Indonesian genocide in Papua.¹ Locally, the independence struggle is inspired by the overlapping agendas of the Papua Customary Council (DAP, Dewan Adat Papua) and the Papua Presidium Council (PDP, Presidium Dewan Papua).

While not representing the people of Papua as an elected organisation, the DAP is growing in popularity since it appeared to many that Otsus does not better the situation for most. Significantly, the DAP was able to mobilise thousands of protesters to reject Otsus on 12 August 2005. Meanwhile, incapable of resolving the complaints about poor implementation of the Otsus Law and mounting corruption and greediness, the crisis of legitimacy of the provincial government worsened. The establishment of the Papuan People's Consultative Assembly (MRP, Majelis Rakyat Papua), the proverbial heart of Otsus, has been criticised by the DAP saying the election of its members was unfair as the government had interfered in the process.

Admittedly, any governor of Papua moves in a delicate space between the majority of people whose resentment towards the government is ever

growing (and is supported by elements of the regional elite, partly for their own interests) and policy makers in Jakarta (with significant support from still powerful nationalist elements in the central government and the armed forces) who would react with risk-bearing panic if they see that the bureaucracy in Jayapura supports such organisations as the DAP. The picture is still more complex as the new province of Irian Jaya Barat includes the region where most of today's influential legislators in Jayapura come from and find support. A loss of their local constituency would threaten their political future. Perhaps most crucial in understanding the current conflict in Papua is that to Jakarta this all appears to be confusing and thus potentially a threat to the integrity of the Indonesian nation.

That such a situation can lead to disturbing incidents is exemplified by the case of Theys Eluay. A few years ago, this Papuan customary leader was considered a reliable Golkar proxy by Jakarta and elements of the armed forces but later he made an about-turn and began to advocate independence as of 1999. He spoke passionately about the rights of the Papuans during a number of mass gatherings including the Second Papuan Congress in May 2000. As head of the PDP that was established during the *Musyawah Besar* (Grand Gathering for Discussion) in February 2000, his popularity grew rapidly. He was killed in November 2001. There is compelling evidence that the regional command of Kopassus, the Indonesian military's Special Forces orchestrated the murder of Eluay in November 2001 (Giay 2003).²

This example illustrates that Jakarta faces problems with virtually anyone they work with in Papua and this leads to scaremongering intelligence assessments and poorly monitored military actions. Also Papua watchers are often at loss about the backgrounds of regional and personal tensions as well as the role played by deep-rooted sentiments and critical local traditions of knowledge with their 'exotic' millenarian overtones.

In the following I will provide some background information on the question why it is so difficult to understand Papua. First of all, I will briefly discuss forty years of development in Papua and the historical backgrounds of the widespread resentment towards the Indonesian government in general and policy makers in Jakarta in particular. Secondly, I will argue that we need to understand the ways in which 'chaos' in Papua offers opportunities for people in Papua who know how to play the system. I will argue that poor governance and unequal distribution of resources has contributed to and, in fact, sharpened the regional fault lines within today's elite while at the same fostering demands for sovereignty among the people.

I will illustrate this by focusing on the elites that originate from the Kepala Burung (coastal Sorong and Manokwari groups alongside 'mountain people' from Ayamaru) and the role played by people from the central highlands, southern coast, and the north coast including the elites from the Cenderawasih Bay that emerged during the post-Second World War

Dutch period. The emerging picture is sketchy at best; it is a first attempt at mapping the complex territory in terms of emerging identities and shifting political aspirations.³

The complexity lies in the different social, economic and political positions of the large variety of cultural groups each with their own distinct history of contact with outside agents of governments and religious missions. Earlier in history, contacts with other parts of Indonesia, in particular the Moluccas, affected coastal Papuans. The links at the eastern border with Papua New Guinea or with 'Melanesia' that are so much feared by policy makers in Jakarta have in fact been largely confined to limited educational migration before 1962, sometimes massive border crossings, little news about the Pacific in national and regional newspapers, and scarce messages from the thousands of refugees who dwell across the border with Papua New Guinea. But let me begin with the colonial period.

A Late Start

Until 1935, Netherlands New Guinea was largely unexplored territory. Starting shortly before the Second World War, an increasing number of expeditions for mapping local communities and to search for oil and gold began, amid increasing Christian missionisation. After the war, the Dutch put more effort into the development of infrastructure (building on the efforts of missionaries) and providing health services and schooling to Papuans. Economic development was minimal. There were a small number of European coconut, coffee and kapok plantations and one Japanese venture which grew cotton and collected copal.⁴

The most significant resource extraction development was the oil industry in the Kepala Burung region where the Netherlands New Guinea Oil Company (NNGPM, *Nederlandsche Nieuw-Guinee Petroleum Maatschappij*) discovered a major oilfield near Sorong that was brought into production in 1949. However, by 1962 the production at this site had virtually ceased.⁵ The labour-force at the oil fields was mostly non-Papuan and Dutch. Economic development during these final years of Dutch Government in New Guinea "was geared towards the discovery of ways and means to unleash the initiative of the Papuans themselves".⁶

In the course of the 1960s, after the transfer of West New Guinea to the Republic of Indonesia, social and economic conditions in the region deteriorated. The local administration became a refuge for mainly untrained staff that had to operate with a shortage of funds and limited infrastructure. Furthermore, a confrontation campaign that Indonesia launched against Malaysia in 1963 over the future of the former British colonies in North Borneo drained much of the country's resources. As a result, the newly acquired province of Irian Barat ('West Irian') was put significantly lower on the nationalist agenda while frustration over the United Nations' position towards the 'neo-colonial construct of Malaysia', led Jakarta to decide to quit its membership of the United Nations.

As part of the decolonization agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands, the Dutch promised the Indonesian government that they would contribute with a grant-in-aid of US\$ 30 million to a Fund of the United Nations for the Development of West Irian (FUNDWI). As a result of Indonesia's decision to suspend membership of the United Nations much of the FUNDWI effort at rehabilitation was suspended. Assessment and planning for FUNDWI programmes resumed after Jakarta decided to renew its participation in the United Nations in November 1966.

The Indonesian National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) incorporated the funds into the first Five-year Development Plan (Repelita I, 1969-1974). In 1970, US\$ 21 million was allocated for FUNDWI-assisted programmes largely focusing on infrastructure and rehabilitation. It was clear that developing Irian Barat would be an arduous task. Consequently Irian Barat received about four times more funds than any other part of the nation. Until today Papua remains a particularly favoured province in terms of resource allocation while only a relatively small proportion of the funds are allocated to the development of Papuans.

As noted in the final FUNDWI report,⁷ in terms economic activity at the community level, by far the most potent influence in the private sector was the spontaneous (and organised) influx of immigrants from other Indonesian islands, who took up a large stake in local fisheries, timber business, retail trade and supply of labour.⁸ This development and the concurrent mounting feelings of displacement among Papuans increased over the years.

New Order Development

After General Suharto assumed power in 1966, the government launched the New Order (1966-1998) approach to the development of Indonesia. Support for human development increased and primary and secondary education services were provided with many subsidies to even the most remote communities. Moreover, the government tried to stimulate development by employing a high number of people with good technical skills, but failed to prioritize the local people.

It has not always been easy though to assign seasoned administrative and technical personnel in this distant province despite financial and other incentives. On top of that, many of those deployed to the region believed that after a few decades of Dutch colonial politics encouraging anti-Indonesian sentiment they had to make Papuans into Indonesian civilians. This line of thinking also suggests that Papuans are prone to being influenced by individuals who feel discontent or by outsiders who want to destroy the unity of Indonesia. Civilisation of the Papuans became the battle cry.

One of the most prominent civilising offensives of this period was Operasi Koteka ('Penis Gourd Operation'). This operation was targeted at

highland communities most of which had experienced contact with government for periods not longer than one or two decades. One of the aims was to convince people to wear clothing so as to protect them from outsiders who might see their near-nudity as offensive. The operation met with significant resistance and after a few years the military command began to appreciate the argument of the local Catholic Church that Papuan customs should be respected. In the course of the 1970s, the civilizing effort calmed down.⁹

At the level of economic development, the number of permits for mining, forestry, fishing and tourism industries increased. After the government offered new arrangement allowing oil and mining companies to keep a fairly large percent of their profits, a contract with the United States-based Freeport Sulphur was signed. On the basis of exploration results dating back to the Dutch period and an initial period of mining in the mid-1960s, copper and gold mining in the western highlands got underway substantially and appeared highly profitable.¹⁰ In 1973, President Suharto celebrated the mining industry and the wealth of the region when he visited the Freeport mine site. It was on this occasion that he renamed the province Irian Jaya or 'Glorious Irian'.

Throughout the New Order period, Jakarta often stressed that Papuans do not understand that Indonesia is in fact spending a lot of money to improve the living standards of the people. What was needed was to educate these masses to the point where they became full members of the Indonesian nation. This top-down line of thinking continues today and leads to miscommunication and misunderstanding between Papuans and outsiders, causing disappointment, resentment and protest.

A careful assessment of the current situation in Papua is provided by the National Human Development Report (NHDR 2004) that is produced by the UNDP in collaboration with the national statistical agency (BPS-Statistics) and the national development-planning agency (BAPPENAS). The report brings together the production and distribution of commodities and the expansion as well as use of human capabilities. The NHDR shows that the average Human Development Index (HDI) for Indonesia in 2002 is 66, ranging from 76 in the highly urbanised and industrialised region of East Jakarta to 47 in the district of Jayawijaya in Papua.¹¹

The considerable variation across the country is related to differences in the availability of profitable natural resources, people's access to these natural resources and the distribution of the revenues of the extraction of these riches. At the national level, the situation of the resource-rich province of Papua is ranked 26 places lower in HDI than in per capita GDP, a clear indication that income from Papua's mining, oil, forestry and fishing industries has not been invested sufficiently in services for the people. An even stronger variation is found within Papua where the districts HDIs vary from 47 for Jayawijaya to 71.4 and 73 in Jayapura and Sorong respectively.¹²

In the statistics for social welfare produced by the BPS Papua in 2002, the districts of Jayawijaya, Paniai and Puncak Jaya show the highest number of poor families and the greatest amount of so-called 'isolated communities' (masyarakat tertinggal).¹³ These numbers clearly reflect the limited access to services and indicate the extent to which the government has failed to increase living standards among rural Papuan communities. Highlanders experience this as an unfair distribution of resources, particularly when they reflect on their dislocation in the light of the economic growth and wealth enjoyed in the urban centres dominated by non-Papuan and Papuans from coastal regions.

Beside the fact that the vast bulk of revenues from natural resource exploitation are not shared evenly within the country and not distributed equally between the different groups in Papua, many non-Papuan are more likely to find employment in the commercial sector. Despite the fact that employment for Papuans in the bureaucracy has increased over the last few years due to affirmative action, there are still great disparities.

For most regions, funding for development programs came through the government, with the exception of private investments in urban centres and the Freeport mine location. The benefit of private expenditure tends to be weighted towards the rich of whom a large proportion is non-Papuan. This has contributed to significant regional divisions in levels of health service and educational attainment. Also, infant mortality rates for Papuans and poor migrants in both urban and rural regions are much higher than they are for the wealthy in Timika, Sorong, Merauke and Jayapura.

In conclusion, the legacy of 32 years of New Order government in Papua has led to a number of dramatic changes. Most worryingly, the statistics indicate that the region falls far below the national average in terms of health, education, and infrastructure. At the same time the country possesses an overwhelming amount of natural resources (minerals, timber, oil and gas). On top of the resulting imbalances between 'Jakarta' and 'Papua', regional divisions in development, in particular between northern coastal and central highlands communities have been reinforced by unequal distribution of resources.

Little Suhartos

During the Suharto-led New Order politics, an ever-growing but relatively poorly funded military apparatus supported a network of alliances for both political control and predator business. The latter was organised around the exploitation of resources taken from rural communities without proper compensation. As noted above, Papua was one of the regions where mining became of central importance. Forestry and fishery activities were initially limited but grew significantly during the period of reform and decentralisation after the fall of the Suharto-regime in 1998.

Recently, the London-based Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) and Telapak in Jakarta reported on rampant logging in Papua in a report titled 'The Last Frontier: illegal Logging in Papua and China's Massive Timber Theft' (2005). The report is an alarming indication of illegal trade threatening the last tract of pristine forest in the Asia-Pacific region. The investigation revealed how one timber species, merbau (*kayu besi*), a luxurious dark hardwood, is the main target of a billion-dollar trade route from Papua to the booming cities of China's Yangtze River delta. Many in the formal sector and the military are involved in this highly profitable timber traffic.

The national decentralisation effort following autocratic rule, has allowed many local leaders to gain a larger share of the profits that were effectively channelled to Jakarta elites during the earlier period. They became "little Suhartos" in popular expression. Nepotism, international finance, military muscle, and the siphoning of funds and revenues by the military at every level of the government became the key ingredients of decentralisation in Papua. Local security guards are developed without control by the government at all levels. Furthermore, growing lack of transparency and accountability in commercial and security affairs allows economic resources and decision-making power to remain in the hands of a few, usually the district heads alongside investors and personnel from the security forces.

Involvement of the military in large-scale resource projects such as the Freeport gold and copper mine includes security deals with the company and the establishment of the military as the main bridge between allegedly rebellious local communities and an industry that feels threatened by attacks from Papuans. In the extreme case of Freeport, a condition of systematic intimidation, manipulation and terror developed which profited the military, victimised local groups such as the Amungme and Kamoro, and did not improve the reputation of the mine. These conditions have made many Papuans feel vulnerable to outside forces, in particular the military and the police.

On top of that, limited access to services and the benefits of resource development projects sharpen the fault lines between local people and those who have arrived in Papua through transmigration programs or the larger waves of spontaneous migration. Butonese, Buginese, Makassarese and Javanese immigrants have filled manual labour and small business opportunities. As a result, economic, ethnic and religious differences play a significant and sometimes alarming role in land and resource politics.

In terms of governance, the region is still among the most poorly developed in Indonesia. Largely in line with the preceding policies of the Dutch administration, the Government of Indonesia believes that such traditional Papuan activities as exchanging cloth among the people of the western Kepala Burung, organising bride wealth ceremonies in the highlands, and implementing large-scale fertility ritual gatherings in the

south-coast plains region are hampering 'the native's' integration into an emerging Indonesian state system and economy. Most administrators working in Papua are convinced that they have to manage a process of cultural incorporation of indigenous cultures within an Indonesian administration and economy. They see themselves as being responsible for relating new structures, goals and values of a centralized administration to the different cultures of the Papuan societies.

The attitudes of both Papuan and non-Papuan government officials are often marked by a sense of not knowing how to develop the region and, in some cases, outright ignorance and apathy. Lack of knowledge and capacity, and negative ideas about the potential of Papuan communities to participate in modern development persist until today. This constitutes one of the main determinants of Papua remaining among the least developed regions of Indonesia. It was only when people in Papua were allowed to formulate and plan increased sovereignty within the framework of Regional and Otsus, that local communities and leaders were accorded a functional place in the governance of the region. The need for bridging Indonesian institutions and regulations that are founded on nation-wide centralized principles of New Order guided democracy, became a central concern during the drafting of the Otsus Law.

The responses from Papuan communities to a highly centralised administration that fits poorly with the reality on the ground and distributes resources unequally are varied. In the south-western Kepala Burung region, for example, Imyan people see their autonomy threatened due to a variety of demands by the government (for participation in development programs) and the church (demanding that people be good Christians, adhering to the Ten Commandments, attending services and contributing money and services to the church organisation), and conflicting with duties perceived as traditional (such as gardening, hunting, organising bride wealth payments, settling disputes, and so on).¹⁴

The duties for the church and the government are experienced as conflicting by local people, in particular because they clash with 'traditional' duties in terms of time and labour, while 'tradition' or 'custom' (adat) is perceived as stable and good. In this context, adat comprises all contemporary reflections on and practices that people regard as customary and containing the rules of good and just living. Tradition often becomes a marker for being different from outsiders and organising things differently than the Indonesian state does.

In many of the locations where large-scale resource extraction takes place, such as the Freeport copper and gold mine in the Mimika region and the recently initiated British Petroleum/Pertamina Tangguh LNG plant in the Bintuni Bay, as well as logging and fishery business, local communities organise themselves against neighbouring groups that also claim natural resources and compensation. One of the effects of this development is eccentric and charged revitalizations of customary structures and the establishment of customary organisations (masyarakat adat).

Due to the expectations of monetary flows that resource development projects might bring, there are often competing claims over land and resources. This poses not only a problem for local communities who no longer know whom to trust and through whom to raise their voices with outside companies and the government; but also for the government and the companies who find it increasingly difficult to deal effectively with the dispersed forms of Papuan leadership.

Besides 'tradition' or 'custom', Christianity has left a deep imprint on the culture of Papuan communities. Missionisation began in the 1855 and continues until today in remote regions of the southern plains and the highlands while two major church organisations have established a firm role in the lives of Catholic Papuans (mostly in the south and southwest) and Protestant Papuans (mainly in the north and northwest).¹⁵ Local interpretations of Christianity presently form an important background for the social and political changes taking place in Papua today.

Christian symbols and rituals appear in a creative combination with pre-Christian cosmologies and rituals often become weapons of the weak, functioning as ways to subtly undermine the nation and its ideologies.¹⁶ Religious tensions with 'immigrant communities' at times induce Papuans to confirm or stress that they are Christian in a nation whose majority is Muslim. At the same time, the Church is the most prominent and most sizeable good functioning civil society organisation that moreover belongs to the Papuans. On top of that, the church organisations are present in most remote areas where the government and non-governmental organisations generally fail to deliver services.

New Elites

As indicated above, the province of Papua is resource rich and has the highest GDP of Indonesia but its people are among Indonesia's poorest. Educational opportunities are limited and those with training face high unemployment rates in an environment that favours employees from other regions of Indonesia. Papuan parents target government jobs if they are seeking a prosperous future for their children because competition in the commercial sector is too stiff. The government sector is also not immune to racism against Papuans, perhaps in combination with a fear of too much influence in the formal sector of people that are inclined to develop a separatist form of nationalism.

In that sense, any attempt at Papuanisation in terms of involving more Papuans in decision-making processes and employing more Papuans in the formal sector revolves in a vicious circle. A generally low level of education with a curriculum focused around making proper Indonesian citizens out of 'unruly rebellious Papuans' has subdued alternative strategies among Papuans for creating forms of nationalism and connecting to advocacy bodies within Indonesia and abroad. Recent generations of Papuans have, however, seized chances for education, in particular those

from regions where people were less disgruntled by the Indonesian takeover, and were favoured in terms of access to education, such as the Kepala Burung region.

In particular, among the recently ascended Sorong and Ayamaru elites, there is a high degree of acquaintance with Indonesian ways of doing politics and, in line with most elements of the elite, a growing appreciation for engaging in political and economic games that primarily benefit the elite, producing dishonesty and resentment among others in the bureaucracy and among the communities that they administer. Highlanders and people from the south-coastal regions are often consumed with envy about the power enjoyed by people from the Cenderawasih Bay, the Kepala Burung and Sentani.

Present-day conflicts in Papua include disputes over natural resources and economic and political power struggles, and frictions between different ethnicities, religion, and immigrants and locals.¹⁷ Studies of 'the conflict in Papua', however, commonly focus on Jakarta policies and armed forces operations. Most reports produced by Papua watchers portray developments in Papua mainly in terms of violations of human rights by 'Jakarta', which in turn is a phenomenon opposing 'Papuan resistance'. This resistance is often depicted as a single actor with a uniform ethnic identity driven by a uniting national consciousness. Papuan identity is then presupposed to exist in a bounded cultural and racial sphere defined as 'Melanesia' as opposed to 'Indonesia' or 'Asia'.

The lack of attention to the variety of and changes in Papuan worldviews is astonishing as newly emerging identities and related concerns and strategies lead to tensions in and between local communities and shape largely the politics of the elite. In the virtual absence of a middle-class and very limited private investment in human development and the delivery of services, the powerful elites in Papua are to be found in the administrative sector and in religious institutions. Therefore, Papuan political power is in the hands of these new bureaucratic and religious elite.

The varied ethnic and political landscape in Papua is accentuated by the timing and nature of contact with outside powers. In pre-colonial times, contact with regional others and internal and in-migration were perhaps the most significant factors in demographic, social and cultural change in Papua. More in general many coastal groups looked for centuries towards the east. In particular the coastal communities of the Kepala Burung and the Cenderawasih Bay maintained trade and marriage relationship with the Moluccas and Islam spread along certain coastal stretches.¹⁸ In contrast, people in the highland regions lived relatively isolated in mountain valleys with little direct but extensive indirect trade networks extending to the coast.¹⁹

Cultural differences between the mountains and the north and the west coast changed markedly with the advent of Christian missionisation and Dutch administration during the 20th Century. Mission activity, followed

hesitantly by the government, affected the Cenderawasih Bay, the Kepala Burung, the north coast and coastal stretches such as Mimika and Merauke along the southwest coast, while most groups in the highlands and communities in the southern plains remained 'untouched' until the 1960s. Encounters between highland people and the state and church intensified after the Indonesian government took over the territory from 1963.

Shortly before and after the Second World War economic development was limited, while at later stages, new political developments took place. Especially the rapid expansion of administration and education had a major impact on the coastal people in Biak, Manokwari, Yapen en Sentani, and to a lesser extent in the Kepala Burung and Fak-fak. Papuans from these regions absorbed Dutch teachings at high schools in Netherlands New Guinea and were exposed to European life styles. Some were given the opportunity to enjoy education in Europe and the Pacific. The figures remained modest since in the early 1960s, only about ten thousand Papuans (of a total population estimated at around one million) were in government service while a smaller number was employed in the private sector.

Papuanisation and Indonesianisation

Later generations grew up in the context of the Indonesian nation-state, undertook studies at Indonesian institutions and made careers in the Indonesian civil service, equipping them with the skills and language of modern Indonesia. Whereas many members of the old Papuan elite that was created by the Dutch were marginalised, the new generations of educated Papuans (still largely from coastal regions) found their way into the civil service. Participation of Papuans in the administration and commercial ventures was however still restricted. The Indonesian government was afraid that Papuans would gain too much of a voice in the administrative sector while banking facilities are few and tend to privilege Javanese, Buginese, Moluccan and foreign investors. Moreover, the commercial infrastructure is poorly developed and bureaucratic approvals for trade are awfully slow, in particular for Papuans.

It was only in the late 1990s that sincere efforts were made to Papuanise the formal sector. Today, around 35 percent of the labour force in the government is Papuan, which is a poor reflection of the demographic reality in which approximately 60 percent of the population is Papuan. Nevertheless, over the last few years more Papuans have become legislators both at the district and provincial levels. Amid many people from elsewhere in Indonesia, the provincial bureaucracy is chiefly dominated by coastal Papuans from the Cenderawasih Bay islands of Biak and Yapen, Sentani, and, more recently from the Sorong and Ayamaru regions of the Kepala Burung.

Widjojo signalled in this respect that the biggest problem facing Irian Jaya was social and cultural polarisation and domination of the formal sector

by ethnic Biak, Ayamaru, Serui and Sentani.²⁰ In contrast to the provincial bureaucracy, in the district governments in the highlands and south coastal regions the local population is more strongly represented notwithstanding the presence of a significant number of decision makers from Biak and Yapen in the Cenderawasih Bay, the Sorong region of the Kepala Burung, and a few Javanese and Moluccans.

As mentioned above, amongst the recently ascending Sorong and Ayamaru elites, there is a remarkable acquaintance with Indonesian ways of doing politics. The acquired skills and knowledge of the present-day bureaucratic elite enables a number of influential people to establish links with Jakarta that primarily serves their own benefit. Highlanders and people from the south-coastal regions (Mimika, Merauke) are often consumed with envy about the power enjoyed by people from the Kepala Burung and the Cenderawasih Bay. Underlying this foremost regional cleavage in Papua is the serious lag in development of most regions of the highlands.²¹ Moreover, because of isolation and due to ongoing often poorly orchestrated TNI action, the highland region is currently the chief nursery of Papuan resistance to the Indonesian government.

This Papuan resistance also translates into regional tensions as highlanders regularly challenge both the provincial government and coastal Papuans from Biak, Sorong and Sentani where they at times accuse of collaboration with 'Indonesia'. This tension highlights one of the main divisions within the Papuan nationalist movement that is illustrated by Rutherford recounting a joke in which a highlander tells another highlander that when Papua gains independence all Biaks will become foreigners (amberi) while highlanders will become Biaks.²²

During the massive gatherings during the Papuan Spring Papuan leaders managed to balance representations from the highlands and the coast and Papuans felt united in their *memoria passionis*. With the advent of administrative fragmentation or *pemekaran* ('blossoming'), the tensions between elites from Biak, Yapen, Ayamaru and Sorong as well as between 'the coast' and 'the highlands' intensified. A recent Indonesia briefing by the International Crisis Group outlines that the new *pemekaran* policy alongside a certain level of support for Otsus 'has generated intense acrimony within the governing elite in Papua between those who stand to gain from the division ... and those who benefit more from the status quo'. Chauvel notes that '[t]he jockeying for position that this policy unleashed suggests that regional and tribal interests remain politically salient'.²³

Many in Papua, in particular among the elites, know how the Indonesian state works and have learned how to profit from companies wanting to buy their trees, mine their ores, drill their gas, and so on. Over the last few decades, civil society organisations and Papuan intellectuals have also begun to surface in politics and policy roles in Papua in increasingly significant ways. Nation-wide appeals and support for peaceful protests, demonstrations and seminars organised by networks of Papuan stu-

dents, the drafting of and lobbying for Otsus regulations by academics and bureaucrats in Jayapura, and a growing number of critical writings by Papuans are indicative of powerful changes in the social and political landscape of the region.

The high turnout of voters and the generally smooth implementation of the 2004 national parliament, provincial legislators and presidential elections in Papua clearly demonstrated the growing will to support civilian-led government and the rule of democracy in Indonesia since the fall of New Order's President Suharto in 1998. This faith in the possibility of having a voice in the politics of Indonesia through democratic means is part of a larger process of people in Papua integrating Western and Indonesian reflections on colonial history, Christianity, and New Order nation-building and development. In general, we see that the people of Papua are moving away from colonial shackles and old and new subservient positions. Yet these positive developments occur amid increasingly unsettling disparities in social and economic development in the region and concurrent rising of ethnic tensions and fear of poorly monitored military actions.

Conclusion

The post-Suharto reformasi period in Papua was marked by revivals of optimism about change and expectations of imminent far-reaching sovereignty. The prospect of justice, the acknowledgement of the 'true history of Papua', and increased respect for the Papuans, alternate with strong disappointment and mounting resentment towards 'Jakarta' due to renewed harsh and poorly controlled TNI operations.

Amid a persistent undercurrent of distrust towards the national government many in Papua show a remarkable ardour for entering into a bargaining process (albeit often with high opening bids, alarming policy makers in Jakarta). Hopes of justice be done to the Papuans were again visible during the recent national elections in which the people of Papua went to the polls in high numbers. Also the Otsus and pemekaran supporting lobbies Papua indicate that many in Papua want to participate actively in a political economy of dependence on and engagement with Jakarta.

'Dependence' is constructed and maintained as much by Papuans who support a dialogue with 'Jakarta' and are eager to cast votes during democratic elections as by political actors who try to convince Jakarta of the importance to recognise the grievances of the people of Papua, or merely seek to profit financially from this relationship. On the other hand, both the 'indigenous Papuans' and those generally labelled as 'immigrants' – the divisions between the two can never be clear, let alone desirable – have for a number of reasons quite a strong urge to live their lives largely autonomous. This is due to the general denial of their dignity and their

disappointment in the central government's policies towards Papua. When the need to distance oneself from unreliable elites and decentralisation that goes astray, people begin to revitalise traditions of relative freedom allegedly enjoyed in the past.

The voices for more autonomy in Papua are generally not about Papuan nationalism but relate to a resistant stance against the dominance of the state. The state has not brought what Papuans expected and is thus challenged by social, ethnic, religious and regional identities. Most Papuans treat the state with a high degree of suspicion. Currently, there are two points of contention among the vast majority of people in Papua. One is the unpredictability of 'Jakarta' as the model of the state that the central government is propagating to Papua is unclear, and the other is frustration over the wealth and influence of Papuan elites whose agendas are often too detached from the circumstances they suggest to address.

Many of the current internal differences in Papua and the lingering conflict with Jakarta relate to shifts in power at the centre of the state and increased concerns over access to resources as a result of decentralization at the regional level. The gap between Papuan worlds and a world coloured by an apparently organised state structure that often disguises nepotism, military business and power, and international economic interests is widening. The provincial government, civil society organisations and local communities have still a long way to go to arrive at a shared commitment to the possibility of increasing access to services in particular for rural communities, triggering pro-poor social, economic and political change, and regulating a more equal sharing of resource benefits through Otsus regulations.

The main issues that unite Papuans in a feeling of resentment towards the Government of Indonesia are frustrations over the limited successes of development, seemingly systematic marginalization, and ongoing repression. However Indonesian Papuans may behave, talk and occupy positions in the formal sector, there are clear signs that Indonesian nationalism is very limited, if non-existent, among the majority of Papuans. Partly, the sentiments of being different and of suffering are expressed in terms of local 'traditional' cultural ideas and practices, millennial expectations, and concerns with knowledge.

To remain critical of what is going on in Papua, policy makers (as well as Papua watchers) should be careful not to fall into the classical mistake of seeing that there is a united Papuan cause that is frustrated by 'Indonesia'. In fact, there has never been an all-together Papuan effort to a struggle for secession from Indonesia. There have always been strong divisions within Papua even when people organise in civil society organisations, government bodies, or alongside activist circles abroad. What most Papuans have in common though is a painful memory of development programs and democratisation efforts dogged by unfulfilled promises and failures.

ENDNOTES

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- 2 B. Giay, *Tanggapan masyarakat* (Abepura 2003).
- 3 See J. Timmer, 'Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua' (discussion paper ANU, Canberra 2005).
- 4 See C. Lagerberg, *Jaren van reconstructie ('s-Hertogenbosch 1962)* en P. Schoorl, 'De controleur BB als een agent van ontwikkeling op Nieuw Guinea' in: P. Schoorl, *Besturen in Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea 1945-1962* (Leiden 1996).
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- 7 UNDP, *Fund of the United Nations for the Development of West Irian (FUND-WI)-Final Report* (Jayapura 1975) p. 10.
- 8 See G.J. Aditjondro, *Datang dengan Kapal* (report YMDP.IRJA, Jayapura 1986).
- 9 See D. Vlasblom, *Papoea: Een Geschiedenis* (Amsterdam 2004) pp. 499-503.
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- 12 *Op. cit.*, p. 11.
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- 14 J. Timmer, *Living with Intricate Futures* (Nijmegen 2000).
- 15 See F.C. Kamma, *Dit Wonderlijke Werk* (2 vols., Oegstgeest 1976); J.F.L. Cornelissen, *Pater en Papoea* (Kampen 1988); Boelaars, *Met Papoea's samen op weg* (3 vols., Kampen 1992, 1995 and 1997) and B.O. van Nunen, *Enam Puluh Tahun Penginjalan Fransiskan di Irian Jaya* (Ms unpublished, Jayapura 1999).
- 16 J. Timmer, *op. cit.*
- 17 International Crisis Group 2002; Amnesty International 2002.
- 18 See:
 - R. Chauvel, *Constructing Papuan Nationalism* (Washington 2005)
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 - F. Huizinga 'Relations between Tidore and the north coast of New Guinea in the nineteenth Century' in J. Miedema e.a. ed.: *Perspectives on the Bird's Head of Irian Jaya* (Amsterdam 1998)
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 - P. Swadling, *Plumes from Paradise* (Boroko 1996)
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 - L. Visser 'The Kamrau Bay area', *Bulletin of Irian Jaya* 17, pp. 65-76..
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- 20 Muridan S. Widjojo, 'Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Adat', (paper FORERI,

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Papuan political imaginings of the 1960s: international conflict and local nationalisms¹

Richard Chauvel

The paper examines the ideas of the future - Papuan political aspirations - that developed among the Papuan elite in the late 1950s and 1960s, particularly in the last two years of the Indonesia - Netherlands dispute. It emphasises the context of the dispute, but focuses on the Papuan actors in it. The paper does not contend that Papuans influenced the direction or outcome of the dispute, on the contrary, rather that the dispute shaped the development of the elite and its political aspirations. The first part of the paper examines the emergence of a Dutch-educated Papuan elite after the Pacific War. Dutch policies sought to cultivate an elite that identified with Papua as part of Melanesia rather than with Indonesia. The paper argues that this elite were the "first Papuans", in that they expanded their identities from the regional and tribal to the pan-Papuan. Education policies and structures facilitated the development of a pan-Papuan identity. Another factor influencing an emerging Papuan identity was the very structure of the colonial administration. Netherlands New Guinea had a 'dual' system of colonialism, as much Indonesian as it was Dutch. The 'first Papuans' forged their identity and their political attitudes in reference to and, sometimes, in opposition to the Indonesians, who held many of the middle and lower positions within the administration, education system and the missions. The Indonesian role in the colonial administration of Netherlands New Guinea strengthened Indonesian nationalists' conviction that the territory was part of Indonesia. This paper argues that the Indonesian role in this 'dual' colonial system tended to have the opposite effect on Papuans.

The second part of the paper argues that Papuans developed their political ideas in the context of and in response to the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands. The young and small elite were confronted by choices - integration with Indonesia, the Melanesian Union idea or independence as a separate state. The nationalist impulse, as this was expressed in the *Manifest Politik* of October 1961, represented a Papuan attempt to determine their own future, rather than have the Dutch, Indonesians and Americans do it for them. That small, young and politically inexperienced elite failed to exert any influence on the outcome of the dispute, but it had created a conviction that Papuans had a right to determine their own future. Of all the stakeholders in the New York Agreement, it was only the Papuans in the years after 1962, who clung to the belief that the provisions for an "Act of Free Choice" were anything but a fig leaf. The paper concludes by arguing that the early 1960s was a formative period in the construction of Papuan nationalism and has become the centre-piece of Papuan nationalist historiography.

The Papuan Elite

The mission and Dutch educated elite emerged as a new social group in Papuan society during the Indonesian struggle against the Dutch during the Revolution and the subsequent conflict between Indonesia and The Netherlands. Papua was not one of the centres of the Indonesian nationalist movement, except as a place of exile for revolutionaries. Nevertheless half a century of missionary education had produced a small group of people aware of the great changes taking place elsewhere in the Netherlands empire. A 1949 government report identified an educated group of some 1700 Papuans in the territory - village schoolmasters, government officials, para-medics, agricultural officials, police and tradesmen - most of whom have had some secondary education.² In the view of the first post-war Dutch Resident of New Guinea, J.P.K. van Echoud: "The intellectuals consist of a very small number of teachers, officials of the lowest rank and nurses. New Guinea cannot achieve any autonomy for many generations."³ He considered that there were hundreds of Papuans ready for training as teachers and officials. This task of training a Papuan elite should be a major objective of Netherlands policy and for this purpose Van Echoud established special schools for police and officials. He also established a Papuan para-military force, the "Papoea Bataljon". Pupils were deliberately drawn from various regions in Papua so as to broaden local identities into a Papuan one.

Van Echoud's students understood the essentially political purpose of his policies. In October 1961, eleven years after van Echoud ceased to be Resident, during the New Guinea Council debates about the recognition of the *Bintang Kejora* as the national flag, one of the Papuan members proposed that, if the *Bintang Kejora* was raised, a flower be placed on van Echoud's grave as he was the one who had planned all that we are now about to achieve.⁴ About the same time Markus Kaisiepo recalled a meeting with 'Father' van Echoud in 1945 at the school van Echoud established to train Papuans as officials. Van Echoud told the students that they had to study diligently because they were the new Papuans for a new New Guinea. "This is what I have been trying to do ever since. Not only me; all of us."⁵

When, in 1960, The Netherlands sought to accelerate the pace of political advancement the further development of an elite was a critical part of the policy. Th. H. Bot, the State Secretary for New Guinea, established a policy framework for elite development which was much broader, more systematic in its application and more clearly directed towards the political objectives of self-government and self-determination of the Papuans than that envisaged by van Echoud.⁶ *Residents* and *Controleurs* throughout the territory were instructed to register "prominent Papuans" in the areas of their administration with the objective of identifying those who could be involved in the Government's plans. Specifically, those who would be suitable for political education, potential candidates and government nominees for representative councils, government advisors as well as those who could be sent on trips to Holland and elsewhere. The administration

had a well-established intelligence apparatus to keep pro-Indonesian political activists under surveillance. The register of “prominent Papuans” was a means of identifying the Papuan political resources to be mobilised and cultivated in the administration’s development strategies.⁷

The lists of “prominent Papuans” included all the well-known political figures, such as Nicholaas Jouwe, Markus Kaisiepo, A. Indey, Wettebossy, H. Womsiwor and E.J. Bonay. However, the net went much further to encompass teachers, missionaries, government clerks, village heads, nurses and policemen, skilled and semi-skilled urban wage-earners, many of whom had little or no prior political experience. The lists provide an insight into the processes of post-war social change in Papua. For example, they included people who had served in van Eechoud’s Papua Battalion and worked in the oil industry in Sorong.⁸ By July 1961 some 395 “prominent Papuans” had been identified from five residencies in Papua.⁹

These political developments need to be placed in a somewhat broader context of socio-economic change. In the early 1960s only about 40,000 Papuans out of a total population of around 700,000 lived in the small urban centres dotted around the coastal areas and off-shore islands. Secondary education had been developed only on a very small scale. When Paul van der Veur was planning a survey of secondary school students in 1962 he found it was not necessary to ‘sample’ the population. He could have surveyed the entire population of secondary school students. Van der Veur’s survey found that the students were prominently the first generation of their families with a western education. The fathers of about two-thirds of the pupils worked in the subsistence sector of the economy. While fathers of nearly 16% occupied the teaching, bureaucratic and political positions to which the students themselves aspired.¹⁰

Becoming Papuan

Bot, like van Eechoud before him, recognised that the topography and ethnic diversity meant that there was little sense of national awareness among Papuans. One of the Government’s objectives was to stimulate such awareness. The central education institutions made an important contribution, as would the *Papoea vrijwilligers korps* (PVK-Papuan Volunteers Corps) and the New Guinea Council. Bot also sought to encourage an awareness among the elite that they belonged to the same people as the Papuans of the Australian-administered territories. The objective must be that Papua, located on the periphery of Asia, shall in the future constitute part of a greater Melanesian entity, ultimately independent, yet assuming a place in the world linked spiritually and economically with the West.¹¹

The Dutch and mission education system were key institutions in expanding the horizons from the tribal and the local to the Papuan. The Papuan graduates of van Eechoud’s schools were in some senses the ‘first’ Papuans as well as the first generation of Papuan nationalists in that they were the ones that began to think of themselves as being members of a broader

pan-Papuan society, not merely a member of a particular ethno-linguistic group.

In the case of the Netherlands Indies / Indonesia, Benedict Anderson has identified the critical influence of the institutions of colonial education, particularly for the first generation of students, in promoting “colonial nationalisms”. The colonial education system was highly centralized, with common textbooks and standardized programs. These institutions provided students with a common experience – “...a territorially specific imagined reality which was everyday confirmed by the accents and physiognomies of their classmates.”¹² Although the scale was much smaller and the level of education not at tertiary level, the expansion of schools and training institutions after the Pacific war in Papua, also promoted the development of a pan-Papuan identity among the first generation of students. Indeed, this was the specific objective of Dutch policy.

In his official study of the emerging political elite of the early 1960s, G. W. Grootenhuis observed that the more progressive and better-educated members of the elite that he found among the leaders of PARN (National Party) were moving out the milieu of their own ethno-linguistic group. They had much greater contact with Papuans from other regions and with non-Papuans. Through their education and occupation they had moved from one region of Papua to another. Many of the PARN leaders were from Serui and had moved to Hollandia (Jayapura) where they tended to live in Hamadi among Papuans of diverse backgrounds, rather than members of their own group. They played an active part in community organizations such as trade unions, youth and sports groups, where they came into regular contact with Dutch residents of Hollandia. They read the local newspapers and listened to the Dutch government as well as Indonesian radio broadcasts. Grootenhuis argued that the PARN members had made but the first step out of their local milieu. They were usually the first members of their family to enjoy an education higher than village primary school. They lived among people of diverse backgrounds in Hollandia, but their spouses were mostly from their own group.¹³ PARN was part of the flowering of political activity that followed the announcement of The Netherlands’ ten-year plan for the decolonisation of Netherlands New Guinea. As its name suggests, PARN purported to be neither anti-Indonesia nor anti-Dutch, but pro-Papuan. PARN sought to unite all Papuans and create a national identity.¹⁴

The objective of Dutch policies may have been to promote a sense of pan-Papuan identity. The regional and tribal composition of the Papuan elite reflected the impact of much longer term influences of the colonial system than the policies of van Eechoud and Bot. Paul van der Veur’s survey of students in 1962 found that students from the regions of Papua with the longest contact with the colonial administration and missionaries were best represented in the secondary school population. Students from Biak-Numfur islands made up nearly 25% of the total student body, while students from other long-contact regions like the island of Japen (Serui) and the region around the capital Hollandia added another 20%. However,

emphasising the role of education as a vehicle of social change there were also some students from some regions only recently brought under Dutch administration.¹⁵

The prominence in the elite of people from Biak and Serui gave political developments in the post-war period a particular regional dimension. The identification of political leaders from particular regions and ethnic groups with pro-Indonesian or pro-Dutch orientations was a feature of 1960s generation of Papuan nationalists. In 1960 the Catholic weekly *Tifa* published an article entitled “Nationaal Partai”, in which it noted that all the PARNA leaders were from Serui and that Biak had no representatives. *Tifa* observed that the struggle between Biak and Serui was the oldest in Papuan politics. After the war Markus Kaisiepo, from Biak, was the leading pro-Dutch politician and Silas Papare, from Serui, led the pro-Indonesia forces.¹⁶

Not becoming Indonesian

Van Eechoud and Bot’s promotion of a Papuan identity was not the only factor responsible for the emergence of a growing political awareness among educated Papuans. Another stimulus came from the very structure of colonial rule in the territory. The structure of the Netherlands administration provided the particular context for Papuan – Indonesian relations. Netherlands New Guinea had a system of ‘dual colonialism’ in which a handful of Dutch officials held the most senior positions in the administration and missionary organizations, while many of the middle and low ranking officials, policemen, teachers and missionaries were Indonesians, many from Maluku, as Papua was administered as part of residencies and governments based in Maluku until the Pacific War. The ‘dual colonial’ structure of Netherlands New Guinea was quite distinct from the forms of ‘indirect rule’ found elsewhere in the Netherlands Indies, where members of local elites were co-opted into the colonial administration and local administrative structures subsumed within the colonial government. In Papuan eyes, the colonial officials were nearly all foreigners – a few Dutch and many Indonesians. Particularly before the war Papuans came into contact with the more numerous Indonesians with much greater frequency than with Dutch officials and missionaries. The Indonesians were at the interface of colonial rule. The inevitable resentments were directed against the Indonesians rather than the Dutch. The presence in Papua of so many Indonesian servants of the Dutch state contributed to the Indonesian nationalist sense that Papua was part of Indonesia, but it did not necessarily contribute to the Papuan sense of being part of Indonesia.

The former Governor of Netherlands New Guinea, Jan van Baal, observed that the educated Javanese, Makassarese or Ambonese, deployed as officials throughout the Indies, were impressed by the sheer size of the colonial state and felt that they belonged to it. Their national awareness as Indonesians developed from this experience. The Indonesians,

particularly Moluccans, who participated in the development of Papua, thought of Papua as part of their country. However, there were virtually no Papuans who participated in the development of Indonesia, outside Papua. Papuans thought of the Indonesians in Papua not as compatriots, but as foreigners, who were colonizing them and their land and most of all occupied the positions Papuans wanted. Van Baal commented that no one foresaw the tragic consequences for the Papua – Indonesia conflict this would have.¹⁷

When Papuans themselves became colonial officials after the Pacific war, Papua was more distinctly set apart than before from the unit of the Netherlands Indies / Indonesia. The Resident of New Guinea still was responsible to the Lt. Governor General in Batavia (Jakarta), but the administration was now more separate from that of the neighboring islands of Maluku. The training of Papuan officials was undertaken in Papua and upon graduation they were appointed to positions in Papua. Hollandia (Jayapura) was the center of their bureaucratic pilgrimage – their Rome – not Jakarta or Ambon. Just as happened in the Netherlands Indies, the deployment of Papuan colonial officials to positions throughout the territory, irrespective of their ethno linguistic background, contributed greatly to their becoming the first Papuans.

E.J. Bonay, one of the leaders of PARNA and under the Indonesian administration the first governor of West Irian, states that the terms “Papua” and “Amberi” were the ones used by Papuans during the Dutch period to describe, respectively the indigenous peoples of the territory and the Indonesians, from elsewhere, who had become the officials, police and military officials of the colonial government. The “amberi” were the “accomplices” and “stooges” of the colonial government, whose treatment of Papuans was inhuman and who thought Papuans were stupid, dirty and curly haired. Bonay argued that Papuans took their revenge against the “amberi” during the “Koreri” movement, 1938-1943. He asserts that the “amberi” sense of superiority evident in the Dutch period has got worse since the “amberi” became Indonesians and the new colonizers in Papua. Bonay contends that it is not surprising that the conflict and antagonism between Papuans and “amberi” was a continuity from the past.¹⁸

The antagonism that Bonay observed and experienced between Papuans and *amberi* as a function of the ‘dual colonialism’ of the government structure was one of the central themes in an official Dutch study of the emerging Papuan political elite in the early 1960s. The study argued that Papuan elite attitudes towards the Netherlands – Indonesia dispute were influenced by personal experience. The study’s author, G.W. Grootenhuis, argued that key to personal experience was the notion of “progress” (*voortgang*). Grootenhuis’ Papuan informants made the distinction between the pre-war period when Papuans were treated as “animals” (*bintang*) by Indonesian officials and after the war, when there was increasing interaction with the much greater number of Dutch officials, and Papuans were treated as “humans” (*manusia*). The change corresponded with an improvement of material welfare, but Grootenhuis argues it was the tre-

atment that Papuans experienced at the hands of Indonesian and Dutch officials that was the critical factor. Papuans resented the discrimination they had suffered at the hands of Indonesian officials. Many felt they had been treated as being dumb and not able to speak good Malay (Indonesian) by their Indonesian teachers. Those Papuans who had obtained positions in the administration felt that they were kept in the lower positions by Indonesian officials, who regarded them as incapable of being anything else. The official Dutch were regarded as bearers of development - of education, Christianity and material progress. The Indonesians were not only the source of discrimination and prejudice, but were suspected as working against the progress offered by the Dutch. If Indonesia was successful in its struggle to gain control of Papua, Grootenhuis' informants feared that this would mean a return to the "binatang" period and Papua would be cut off from the source of progress (kemajuan). As young educated Papuans contemplated independence in the early 1960s, they were uncertain about the future role, if any, of the Indonesian officials, teachers and missionaries. Some thought that they should be permitted to remain, but not without conditions.¹⁹ Echoing Grootenhuis' use of '*manusia*' and '*binatang*', Van der Veur, in his survey of Papuan students in 1962, found that students showed a strong desire to be modern, to be *manusia* and not *binatang*. The students aspired to hold the modern political and administrative positions. Among the reasons cited by the students for the opposition to Papua becoming part of Indonesia was that they "did not want to become slaves".²⁰

It would be misleading to assume that all relations between Indonesians and Papuans were as antagonistic as Grootenhuis' report suggests. During Indonesia's struggle for independence against the Dutch there were Indonesian politicians who were able to mobilize Papuan support for independence, with Papua as part of an independent Indonesia. Soegoro Atmosprasodjo was a former internee in Boven Digul.²¹ He had worked for the Dutch during the war in Australia and was appointed as head of a training school for Papuans in 1945. Dr. Sam Ratulangi was the Republican Governor of Sulawesi, sent into exile in Serui in 1946 with his closest assistants and their families. Soegoro's activities in Hollandia and Ratulangi's in Serui suggest that Indonesian nationalists were able to disseminate their ideas among Papuans, both the small group of graduates of the missionary schools and van Eechoud's training schools and amongst less sophisticated villagers. Soegoro did have the capacity to speak to Papuans in terms of their own interests and how these could be advanced within an independent Indonesia. The former detainee from Boven Digul and the Ratulangi group were experienced and skilful politicians, who sought to mobilize Papuan support for the Republican support. They interacted with Papuans in a very different manner to the east Indonesian officials, teachers and missionaries.²²

Born in conflict: Papuan responses to the Dutch – Indonesia conflict

The last months of 1961 and the first of 1962 were the climax of a 12 yearlong dispute that went to the brink of open military conflict. The US sponsored negotiations that led to the New York Agreement of August 1962 took place under the threat that Indonesia would move from armed infiltrations to a large-scale military attack. It was this environment that stimulated and shaped a critical period of Papuan nationalism. Papuan nationalist political activity itself was a factor in the escalation of the conflict. President Sukarno recognized that a rival Papuan national claim to Papua was a much greater threat to Indonesia's own claim than continued Dutch rule.²³

The political developments in Papua were responses to the escalating international conflict. The Papuan leaders' reactions were by no means uniform. For Papuan leaders, both pro-Indonesia and nationalists, this period was a political roller coaster. They were alternatively encouraged and demoralized by the international developments. As the tension escalated, the focus of the dispute for Papuans shifted from the rival claims to sovereignty over the territory to the issue of self-determination and the prospect of an independent state of West Papua. The shift was a catalyst to an emerging sense of Papuan nationalism. Among the Papuan political elite there was an awareness that their homeland's fate was at stake. These international developments and the Papuan responses revealed the divisions in the elite and more broadly in Papuan society. Papuan leaders found it difficult to position themselves in the conflict.

Foreshadowing a theme among the *reformasi* era nationalists, Papuan leaders in 1961 resented the fact that there was an international struggle taking place, beyond their control, but about their future. At a meeting in August 1961 Herman Wayoi, the chairman of PARNNA, protested that Papua was not a commodity: "This land is of and for the Papuans."²⁴ It was with this sense of resentment and in a rapidly changing international environment that led to the flag raising on 1 December 1961. On 19 October a group of some 72 people (all but one Papuans), representing most regions of the territory, both Christians and Moslems gathered in Hollandia. Four of Papua's leading politicians and members of the New Guinea Council – Nicholaas Jouwe, E.J. Bonay, Nicholaas Tanggahma and F. Torey, took the initiative for the meeting.²⁵ The meeting elected 17 people to form a *Komite Nasional Papua*. The *Komite Nasional* issued a *Manifest Politik* that, inter alia, stated:

"On the basis of desire of our people for independence, we urge through the mediation of the *Komite Nasional* and our popular representative body, the New Guinea Council, the Governments of Netherlands New Guinea and The Netherlands so that as of 1 November²⁶:

our flag be flown beside the Netherlands flag;
 our national anthem, *Hai Tanahku Papua*, be sung along with the
Wilhelmus;
 the name of our land become West Papua;
 the name of our people become Papuan.

On this basis we the Papuan people demand to obtain our own place like other free peoples and amongst nations we the Papuan people wish to contribute to the maintenance of the freedom of the world."²⁷

The *Manifest Politik* was formulated a couple of weeks after the Netherlands Foreign Minister, Joseph Luns, presented his plan to internationalize the dispute to the UN General Assembly. Torey, who was one of the founders of the *Komite Nasional* and a member of the New Guinea Council, explained the *Manifest Politik* in the context of Luns' proposal. He said that Luns' proposal had created much misunderstanding in Papua. Some members of the New Guinea Council considered that if all they did was passively listen to the claims of the Indonesian and Netherlands Governments, they would eventually be forced to support one of the adversaries and their own voice would not be heard at the UN or in the international community. Torey argued that the objective of the *Manifest Politik* was to establish Papua's right with the raising of the flag to demonstrate to the international community that Papuans desired to stand on their own feet and later establish their own nation. That was Papua's right. Torey related that this was why *Komite Nasional* proposed to the Government that on 1 November that the Papuan flag would be flown beside the Netherlands flag, the anthem be sung and our land and people be known as Papua.

The *Manifest Politik* was the first assertion of the Papuan demand to join the other free peoples of the world and establish their own nation state. Following Kelly and Kaplan, Papuans wanted to become part of the system of nation states developed after the Second World War. It was significant that the Papuan demand was expressed at a moment when the processes of decolonization were being played out in the forum of the UN. Kelly and Kaplan are correct in asserting that decolonization was an imposition of a new political order from top down.²⁸ Papuans understood that the process was largely out of their control, but at this brief moment they attempted to use the international system and its central institution – the UN – as well as its language and principles to assert their demand to become a member of the club.

Despite the fact that not all the leaders who gathered on 19 October supported the *Manifest Politik*, it was decided to press on because shortly the UN would decide the fate of Papua and its people. The *Komite Nasional* wanted to make sure Papua's voice be heard and that the world understood that Papuans had their rights and Papuans knew what they wanted. Torey acknowledged that it was unusual to raise a national flag beside that of the colonial power. It was not *Komite Nasional's* intention that the raising of the flag meant the transfer of sovereignty. In Torey's opinion,

a proclamation would pose a dilemma. Independence would mean the departure of the Dutch, Indonesia would invade and Papuans would not have the resources to defend themselves.²⁹

As Torey acknowledged there were some members of the *Komite Nasional* and the Council, who had concerns about the flag. Achmad argued that the flag should only be raised after there was an information campaign about the flag and when sovereignty was transferred to Papua.³⁰ Burwos thought that many people would not understand the distinction the *Komite Nasional* leaders were making between the flag raising and independence. Many of the people he represented in Manokwari thought that the flag raising would mean that independence had been granted.³¹ Outside the Council there were others who shared this view. PARNA initially argued that independence could be achieved within the framework of the Luns Plan. In November PARNA insisted that a transfer of sovereignty should take place at the same time as raising the flag.³² Despite these reservations the Council members supported the *Komite Nasional*'s petition.

Despite the misgivings the Luns' proposal had created in Papua, when the New Guinea Council came to debate the proposal there was strong support from Papuan members because of the centrality of Papua's right of self-determination in the Luns Plan. Torey argued that the Luns Plan represented the one chance to resolve the problem of West Papua. However, he wondered what would happen if the Luns Plan was not accepted. It was certain that Indonesia's demands would grow. He feared that the Dutch would withdraw. He asked himself what steps would need to be taken by the Netherlands Government to guarantee Papuans right of self-determination.³³

Two days prior to the flag raising, none of the resolutions supporting the Luns Plan for the internationalization of Papua gained the required two-thirds majority in the General Assembly.³⁴ The reaction of the most senior Papuan politicians was not quite what the Netherlands authorities in The Hague had expected. Kaisiepo, for example, told a Dutch journalist although he had accepted the wisdom of the Dutch attempt to obtain an international guarantee for Papua's right of self-determination, Papuans had never sought internationalization, rather they wanted the continuation of the Netherlands administration until self-determination. Jouwe contended that the result offered little hope for Indonesia's case as an absolute majority of UN members had supported Papua's right of self-determination.³⁵

The first raising of the flag took place in front of New Guinea Council building on 1 December 1961. The *Komite Nasional* organized the occasion. Kaisiepo, the deputy speaker of the New Guinea Council, and W. Inury, chair of the *Komite Nasional*, welcomed the Governor, senior officials, members of the Council and political party leaders. Unfavorable weather helped keep the ceremony in Hollandia quiet.³⁶ Flag raising ceremonies took place throughout the territory. Not surprisingly, in areas like Biak there was strong interest shown, but even where support for Indonesia

had deep roots, like Serui and Yapen, there was much local interest. There were no "incidents" reported.³⁷

Papuans and the New York Agreement

An examination of Papuan thinking and actions surrounding the *Manifest Politik*, with its assertion of Papua's right to independence, and the flag raising of 1 December shed light on a critical period in the development of the nationalist movement. Another aspect of this period relates to the key issue of self-determination, the New York Agreement and the implementation of the "Act of Free Choice" in 1969. Central to Papuan concerns was their own participation, or rather the lack of it, in the determination of Papua's future.

On 16 February 1962, after Sukarno's *Trikora* speech calling for the liberation of West Irian, the New Guinea Council held a debate on the right of self-determination. Tanggahma and Bonay's contributions reflected two broad approaches. One rejected Indonesia; the other argued that a solution could only be found with Indonesia. Tanggahma discussed four possible scenarios: Integration with Indonesia was undesirable. An association with Australian New Guinea could only be contemplated when both halves of the island were independent. A long-term association with The Netherlands was not possible because the world considered it colonialism. The only option was continued Dutch administration leading to self-determination. Bonay argued that it was only possible to resolve the conflict if Indonesia and The Netherlands cooperated. As long as there was a dispute, Papua would never be able to exercise its right of self-determination. Bonay wanted a tripartite conference, where Papua would seek recognition for its right.³⁸

These diplomatic developments surrounding the climax and eventual resolution of the West New Guinea dispute took place at the highest levels of the United States, Indonesian and Netherlands Governments. Papuan leaders, pro-Indonesia or nationalists, took no part. They could only observe from a distance and send protest telegrams, petitions and resolutions to those in Washington, Jakarta and The Hague determining their fate. These means of representation were much used as the tensions grew and negotiations continued. The Papuan responses were in keeping with the pattern of political developments after 1960. Members of the New Guinea Council and those involved in the political parties established in the atmosphere of rapid political advancement were critical of the American intervention, which they considered partisan. Robert Kennedy in particular attracted their ire. Political leaders also sought to remind the Netherlands Government of its commitment to self-determination and consultation.³⁹ PARNA took a somewhat different line. While maintaining its established policy of Papuan representation in any negotiations, it addressed issues raised in the Bunker Plan. It proposed a two-year joint administration of Indonesia, The Netherlands and West Papua responsible to the United Nations. At the end of the two years there would be a United Nations-supervised election.⁴⁰

The crucial aspect of the Bunker Plan for Papuans was when, how and under whose administration they would exercise their self-determination. In June, Jouwe, who was a member of the Council delegation to The Hague and who had then attended the 4th Committee meeting in New York, made it clear to Ambassador Bunker that the guarantee for self-determination had to be watertight. Jouwe insisted that Papuans should exercise their self-determination under the supervision of the United Nations and before the administration was transferred to Indonesia.⁴¹ Given that Indonesia had not accepted the right of self-determination for any of its regions and had consistently rejected it in the specific case of Papua for the duration of the dispute, any Indonesian commitment to self-determination under the Bunker Plan was treated with some scepticism by Papuan leaders.⁴² The demand for the plebiscite to be held during the period of United Nations administration was a consistent and enduring theme of debates in the New Guinea Council and the subject of many motions while the negotiations were in progress and after the New York agreement was announced.

Bonay, one of the PARNA leaders, was the only member of the Council who accepted the Bunker Plan as it offered a prospect of a peaceful resolution. Tanggahma was another Council member who sought something of a rapprochement with Indonesia. He tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the Council to send a delegation to Indonesia.⁴³

Student opinion

The activities of the *Komite Nasional*, the formulation of the *Manifest Politik* and the debates in the New Guinea Council provide some insights into how the senior leaders in the Papuan elite were responding to the escalating conflict. It is difficult to assess to what extent the views expressed by members of the New Guinea Council and parties like PARNA reflected broader sections of Papuan society. Paul van der Veur's survey of 927 students attending post elementary schools – "a potential elite group" – give us a glimpse into the thinking of another section of the emerging elite. The survey was conducted between April and June 1962, thus after Sukarno's *Trikora* speech, during the Bunker negotiations and the Indonesian military infiltrations.⁴⁴ Van der Veur asked the students their views about Papua's future political status. He posed the students a number of possibilities: continuation of Dutch rule; transfer of Papua to Indonesian authority; federation with the Australian-ruled eastern half of the island and independence in the not too distant future. Van der Veur argues that the results indicated that the program of "...rapid decolonisation had caught the imagination of a large segment of the youth...".⁴⁵ Specifically, the results indicated that a large majority (77.4%) of the students favoured the continuation of Dutch rule, a very small number (0.9%) preferred Indonesian rule, a substantial minority (34.5%) favoured independence and a substantial majority supported some form of union with the eastern half of the island. The support for continued Dutch rule was qualified by statements (300 out of 598 respondents) to the effect of 'until we are ready

for independence'. Similarly, the support for independence was qualified with comments such as 'not too soon' and 'by 1970', the date foreshadowed by the Dutch for independence. The students' responses indicating strong opposition to the transfer of Papua to Indonesian rule were sometimes associated with comments reflecting anti-Indonesian stereotypes.⁴⁶ Van der Veur considered that the students were relatively well informed about the political developments. In retrospect, the student's confidence, in April-June 1962, that continued Dutch tutelage to self-government and independence was a possibility seems optimistic. The students may have been expressing, unconsciously, their own vested interest in the conflict. They were among the beneficiaries of Dutch policies. They, like the members of the New Guinea Council, were the potential elite of an independent Papua. This said, the students' strong opposition to the solution then being negotiated by the Dutch and Indonesians seems clear enough.

The New York Agreement

In August, as the Bunker negotiations reached their final stage, both the Indonesian and the Dutch governments appointed Papuans to their respective delegations. Silas Papare, Fritz Kiriho and Dimara joined the Indonesian delegation, while Council members Jouwe, Womiswor and Tanggahma were appointed as advisers to the Netherlands delegation. Governor Platteel was especially keen that Papuans be seen as participants in the negotiations. Since before the negotiations commenced, the New Guinea Council and the major political parties had demanded participation and consultation. He wanted to avoid any suggestion that the Dutch had excluded Papuans from the decision-making.⁴⁷ As it turned out, the Papuan advisers arrived after the negotiations had been finalized.

The Bunker negotiations culminated in the New York Agreement, under which Netherlands New Guinea would become the Indonesian province of West Irian. The administration would be transferred through the mediation of a United Nations transition administration from 1 October 1962 to 1 May 1963. After six years of Indonesian administration, the inhabitants of West Papua would have the opportunity to exercise their self-determination through an "Act of Free Choice".

Papuan reactions to the agreement were mixed. There was rejection, feelings of betrayal, resignation and accommodation to an Indonesian future as well as some discussion of possible proclamations of independence. The Governor's good intentions did little to appease Papuan feelings that forces beyond their control had determined their fate, despite their representations. The political organizations and activity as well as the Papuan nationalist sentiments and national symbols that had emerged in the previous couple of years counted for little in the last analysis.

The New Guinea Council building became a focus for well-organized and well-supported demonstrations against the agreement. At the first such

demonstration Markus Kaisiepo condemned the agreement: "We were traded as goats by the Americans." He agreed with the PARNA leader, Bonay, that the time had passed for Papuans to support Dutch policy. Now they must support us.⁴⁸ Bonay himself recalled two of the chants at the demonstration: "How many dollars for Papua, Yankee." "We Papuans want freedom, not Soekarno."⁴⁹ There were some Council members who noted the difference between the resolution of the international dispute and the accommodation of Papuan national aspirations. As was the case during the negotiations, the critical factor for many Papuan leaders was timing of self-determination after years of Indonesian control. The issue provoked a clash at the National Congress in September between supporters of a plebiscite in 1963 under the United Nations administration or 1969 under Indonesian control.⁵⁰ Zacharias Sawor, a Dutch educated Papuan agricultural official, attended the meeting. He recalled that the majority at the Congress wanted the plebiscite to be held while the UN-TEA troops were present so as to insure a proper vote.⁵¹

Among some Council members there seemed to be an awareness, that despite their protestations and representations, the New York Agreement meant Papuans had lost this battle. The intent of the National Congress, held in mid September 1962, appeared to be both to reassert the Papuan national ideals and yet reach some accommodation with the Indonesian administration. The 1969 plebiscite was the focus of symbolic compromise and the next objective of the national struggle. Tanggahma argued:

We must give Indonesia no chance to destroy our aspirations. Jakarta would get the opportunity if Papuans were disruptive. Therefore I will urge people to maintain law and order. Papuans must strengthen themselves in order to sustain and preserve their nationalist sentiments until the plebiscite. To this end Papuans must organize themselves in large parties with the same objective: independence in 1969.⁵²

During the brief period between the *Komite Nasional* and its *Manifest Politik* in October 1961 and the signing of the New York Agreement in August the following year there was a shift in the Papuan political agendas. The changes reflected the roller coaster ride that the Indonesia – Netherlands dispute generated for Papuan leaders. The nationalist demands of the *Manifest Politik* were formulated at a time of relative optimism. The *Komite Nasional* members might have resented the fact that the Dutch government, despite the undertakings to the contrary, had not consulted the New Guinea Council about the Luns Plan; still, the plan held some promise that Papua's right of self-determination would be protected and an Indonesian takeover avoided. When the New York Agreement was signed there was little discussion about what the flag raising of 1 December meant. The focus of the debate was on the agreement's provisions for self-determination, particularly when and how these provisions would be implemented. Papuan leaders were keenly aware in 1962 that implementation under the UN administration would mean something different from implementation after Indonesia assumed control of the administration.

Self-determination

A key ingredient and consistent theme in the development of Papuan nationalism from 1962 to the renaissance after Soeharto is the interpretation of the self-determination provisions of the New York Agreement. The provisions for self-determination were the straw of hope to which Papuans clung. Clemens Runaweri, in his report prepared just before his attempt to represent Papua at the UN discussions on the "Act of Free Choice" in 1969 wrote:

The main problem of the dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia was dealing with the political future of the Papuans. And the presence of the UN Representative in this territory is for the purpose of protecting the Papuans right of self-determination. Unfortunately this UN man seem not to be a protector but as an advisor with competence and authority. He is actually a looker watching at a game played by the Indonesian Army Generals against the innocent and unweapon Papuans.⁵³

What Clemens Runaweri saw as the crux of the problem, the other interested parties in the conflict regarded as something to be shaded by a fig leaf. The Australian Minister for External Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick in January 1962 anticipated that successful negotiations would probably include a 'face saving' formula for the protection of Papuan interests. The Papuans' right to choose their own future would be "entirely dependent on Indonesian good faith" and that there would be no way of ensuring that this aspect of the agreement would be carried out.⁵⁴ Foreign reporting on developments in Papua between the Indonesian assumption of the administration and the "Act of Free Choice" was intermittent and patchy. However, one of the consistent themes in the reporting was the hope and trust Papuans placed on the just implementation of the self-determination provisions of the New York Agreement. It was a hope maintained in the face of overwhelming evidence that Papuans experienced in their daily lives that the Indonesian authorities had a different understanding of the provisions and contrary outcome in mind. For example, Floyd Whittington, the Counsellor of the US Embassy who visited West Irian in August 1964, observed that knowledge of the terms of the New York Agreement was widespread in Papuan society and "...the prospect of a plebiscite burns like a talisman of hope for the future. The most remarkable aspect of this problem was the unanimity with which Papuan leaders of varying attitudes toward continued union with Indonesia agreed that it was of the greatest importance that a fair plebiscite actually be conducted."⁵⁵

In retrospect, that hope and trust seems misplaced, naïve and ignorant of the international forces that facilitated a resolution of the West New Guinea dispute in Indonesia's favor. Perhaps the contemporary Papuan belief that a thorough investigation into the New York Agreement and the conduct of the "Act of Free Choice" will resolve their conflict with Indonesia reflects something of the same view of the world and how international relations are conducted. Naïve the Papuan faith in the self-determi-

nation provisions might seem, but it is a key and consistent ingredient in Papuan nationalism.

Correcting the course of Papuan History

In the post Suharto *reformasi era* revival of Papuan nationalism the history of the 1960s – that of Papua’s incorporation into Indonesia – has become the history to be “rectified”. Much of Papuan nationalism has become a debate about history. This paper has argued that Papuan nationalism was also shaped by history. The nationalists of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s were educated and developed their political ideas in the context of Indonesia’s struggle for independence and the subsequent dispute between The Netherlands and Indonesia about who owned the land of Papua. The key ingredient that made Papuan nationalism was the demand in the *Manifest Politik* of October 1961 that the Papuan people obtain their own place like other free peoples and nations. This demand was formulated as a response to Foreign Minister Joseph Luns’ ill-fated attempt to internationalise the dispute with Indonesia. Luns’ Plan sought to protect Papuan interests, yet just as much as Sukarno’s command a couple of months later to crush the puppet state of Papua, it was a case of others determining Papua’s future, not Papuans.

To say that much of Papuan nationalism has been a debate about history is misleading. It has been more of a monologue. The *Kongres Papua* of mid 2000 formalised in the following resolutions the key assertions of the Papuan rectification.

1. The people of Papua have been sovereign as a nation and a state since 1 December 1961.
2. The people of Papua, through the Second Congress, reject the 1962 New York Agreement on moral and legal grounds as the agreement was made without any Papuan representation.
3. The people of Papua, through the Second Congress, reject the results of Pepera (the Act of Free Choice) because it was conducted under coercion, intimidation, sadistic killings, military violence and immoral conduct contravening humanitarian principles. Accordingly, the people of Papua demand that the United Nations revoke resolution 2504, 19 December (sic) 1969.⁵⁶

One of the few Indonesian attempts to respond to and engage with the *Kongres Papua’s* interpretation of history was that of former foreign minister Dr. Subandrio in his book entitled, appropriating the Papuan slogan, *Meluruskan Sejarah Perjuangan Irian Barat* (Correcting the History of the Struggle for West Irian). Subandrio can make as good a claim as any Indonesian, with the exception of Sukarno, for the diplomatic success of 1962, so it is appropriate that he responded to the *Kongres Papua* and celebrated his own and Sukarno’s achievement. He criticised President Abdurrahman Wahid for giving in to the demands of the “Papuan separatists” by changing the name of the territory from Irian to Papua and for

supporting financially the *Kongres Papua*. Subandrio sought to rebut the *Kongres Papua's* arguments that Papuans were not involved in Indonesia's struggle for independence, by asserting that thousands of Indonesian freedom fighters had been exiled to West Irian (Boven Digul), where they acculturated with the local inhabitants. Subandrio concluded that: "Apparently, the Papuan Peoples Congress did not understand the history of independence of its own nation."⁵⁷ Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, then Security Minister, said at the launch of Subandrio's book that: "How fortunate are the Indonesian people to have elder statesmen, who still possess great *concern and commitment* to clarify the truth and the facts as an official guidance to the Indonesian people and the international community, when there is a group of people attempting to *cloud, distort and manipulate the facts of history*, certainly with subjective comment and interpretation and with the political objective of separating from the territorial unity of Indonesia."⁵⁸

The history of the land of Papua and the Indonesian state during the 1960s is where two contending nationalisms confront each other. In a letter to a Dutch friend at the time of the Luns Plan, Subandrio wrote that if The Netherlands persisted with the policy to establish *Papua Merdeka*, for Indonesia that could mean nothing else but *konfrontasi*.⁵⁹ The Netherlands decided not to persist, but many Papuans have and it has meant *konfrontasi*.

ENDNOTES

- 1 In addition to the references cited, this paper draws on a number of the author's earlier publications, in particular *The Land of Papua and the Indonesian State: Essays on West Papua*, volumes one & two (Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Working Papers 120 & 121 (2003));
 - *The Papua Conflict: Jakarta's Perceptions and Policies* (Policy Studies 5, East West Center Washington, March 2004) ;
 - co-author with Ikrar Nusa Bhakti; *Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity and Adaptation* (Policy Studies 14, East West Center Washington, 2005)
- 2 *Report on Activities, Reactions and Aims of the autochthonic population of Netherlands New-Guinea concerning the future political status of their country in connection with the Dutch-Indonesian Round-Table-Talks*, Hollandia, September 1949.
- 3 J.P.K. van Ee choud, Nota Bestuursbeleid Nieuw Guinea, 10-3-47, *Nationaal Archief Den Haag (NA), Archief Minog, Rapportage Indonesië, dossier 779*.
- 4 *Handelingen Nieuw Guinea Raad (NGR), Eerste Buitengewone Zitting*, 30-10-61, p. 33
- 5 Vraaggesprek met Kaisiepo and Jouwe, 13-10-61; *NA, Archief Minog, Kabinet van de Gouverneur van Nederlands Nieuw Guinea, dossier 35*.
- 6 Verslag van de Reis van de Staatssecretaris van Binnenlandse Zaken, Mr Th. H. Bot naar Nederlands Nieuw Guinea, Australische Nieuw Guinea, Australië en de VS, 9 jan - 24 feb 1960, p. 33, *NA, Particuliere collectie Th. H. Bot, dossier no. 44*.
- 7 Memo Residents Conference november 1959 re: registration of prominent Pa-

- 8 Letter Resident Hollandia to the Governor of Netherlands New Guinea 25-4-60; Letter A. Boendermaker, Directeur van Binnenlandse Zaken, to the Governor of Netherlands New Guinea, 9-5-60, *NA, Archief Minog, Kabinet van de Gouverneur van NNG, dossier 17*.
- 9 The 'List of Prominent Papuans' of July 1961 mentions 151 'prominents' in Hollandia, 90 in the Geelvinkbaai, 29 in Fakfak, 98 in West New Guinea and 27 in South New Guinea, *NA, Archief Minog, Kabinet van de Gouverneur van NNG, Dossier 17*.
- 10 Paul van der Veur, "Questionnaire survey among the potential Papuan elite in 1962 West New Guinea", *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (BKI)*, (1964) vol 120 no 4, pp. 425, 431-432.
- 11 Verslag van de Reis van de Staatssecretaris van Binnenlandse Zaken, mr. Th. H. Bot naar Nederlands Nieuw Guinea, Australische Nieuw Guinea, Australië en de VS, 9 jan - 24 feb 1960, pp. 1-3.
- 12 Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: ed. 1991) pp. 121-122
- 13 Rapport van de wetenschappelijk ambtenaar G.W. Grootenhuis in NNG, "Papoea Elite en Politieke Partijen", (Hollandia 1961) deel I, pp. 26-27, *NA, Archief Minog, Dossierarchief no 11575*. This official report was written at the height of the government's promotion of the Papuan elite and as tensions with Indonesia increased. It was sympathetic to the Netherlands Governments's policy objectives.
- 14 Tifa, (Hollandia) no. 226, 27-8-60
- 15 Paul van der Veur, 'Questionnaire', *BKI 120:4*, pp. 429-430
- 16 Tifa (Hollandia), no. 226, 27-8-60
- 17 Jan van Baal, *Ontglipt Verleden* (2 vols, Franeker 1989) vol. II, pp. 166-7; Danilyn Rutherford, *Raiding the Land of the Foreigners: The Limits of the Nation on an Indonesian Frontier*. (Princeton 2003) p. 180.
- 18 E.J. Bonay, "Sejarah Kebangkitan Nasionalisme Papua." (Unpublished manuscript, Wijhe, The Netherlands, 1984) p. 84.
- 19 Rapport Grootenhuis, "Papoea Elite en Politieke Partijen" vol I, pp. 15-17, 106.
- 20 Paul van der Veur, 'Questionnaire' *BKI 120: 4*, pp. 449, 453-4
- 21 Boven Digul, north of Merauke in southeast Papua, was established after the 1926-7 communist uprisings in Java and Sumatra as a place of internment for Indonesian nationalists and communists. Anderson argues that Boven Digul had a central place in the folklore of the Indonesian nationalist struggle and was "a sacred site in the national imagining". He mistakenly contends that, apart from the internees, no Indonesian nationalists saw Papua with their own eyes until the 1960s. Anderson, *op. cit.* p. 176
- 22 Richard Chauvel, *The Land of Papua and the Indonesian State*, vol. I, pp. 10-13.
- 23 Sukarno, "Tahun Kemenangan," August 17, 1962, *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi*, (Panitya Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, Jakarta), vol II, p. 500
- 24 Bestuursverslag van de Resident van Hollandia over de maanden augustus-september 1961, *NA, Archief Minog, Dossierarchief no G 16725*.
- 25 Monthly Report – Australian Liaison Officer to Netherlands New Guinea – October 1961, *National Archives of Australia (NAA), DEA file 3036/1/1/1, CRS A1838*.
- 26 The Dutch authorities accepted the *Manifest Politik*, but wanted the first flag raising to take place on 1 December rather than 1 November so that it would

- not compromise the Dutch position during the debate about the Luns Plan at the UN. See Chauvel, *The land of the Papua and the Indonesian State* vol. 1, p 41.
- 27 Manifest Politik, Hollandia, 19-10-61, *Pengantara: het nieuwsblad voor Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea*, 21-10-61; Politiek Leven over Oktober 1961, *ibidem*, Hollandia, 28-11-61 in NA, *Archief Minog, Dossierarchief no G 16725*. The *Bintang Kejora* was chosen as the national flag from three designs. The *Hai Tanahku Papua* was composed by the Dutch missionary Kijne in 1925.
 - 28 John Kelly and Martha Kaplan, *Represented Communities: Fiji and World Decolonization*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001, p. 5
 - 29 NGR 30-10-61, pp 13-18
 - 30 NGR 30-10-61, p. 21.
 - 31 NGR 30-10-61, pp. 40-1
 - 32 Codetelegram Platteel 435 to Bot, 9-11-61, NA, *Archief Minog, Codetelegrammen 1945-1963*.
 - 33 NGR 31-10-61, pp. 19-20. Nicholaas Jouwe was not present in Hollandia during the debate about the Luns proposals. He recalled that he objected to Luns' initiative on the grounds that the New Guinea Council had not been consulted nor, he thought, had the members of the South Pacific Commission, particularly Australia and New Zealand. Jouwe considered that Papua's future was to be secured in association with its neighbours in the Pacific, rather than with the UN. Interview, Nicholaas Jouwe, The Hague, 5-12-2001.
 - 34 Codetelegram Bot 488 to Platteel, 28-11-61, NA, *Archief Minog, Codetelegrammen 1945-1963*. The Brazzaville resolution, which expressed the strongest recognition for Papua's right of self-determination as established in the UN Charter, received 53 votes in favour, 41 against and 9 abstentions.
 - 35 Codetelegram Platteel 482 to Bot, 29-11-61, NA, *Archief Minog, Codetelegrammen 1945-1963*.
 - 36 Bestuursverslag van de Resident van Hollandia over de maanden november en december 1961, NA, *Archief Minog, Dossierarchief G 16725*.
 - 37 Maandverslag over de maand December 1961 van de afdelingen Geelvinkbaai en Centraal Nieuw-Guinea, NA, *Archief Minog, Dossierarchief G 16726*; Codetelegram Platteel 485 to Bot, 2-12-61, NA, *Archief Minog, Codetelegrammen 1945-1963*.
 - 38 Codetelegram Hollandia 61 to Bot, 16-2-62, NA, *Archief Minog, Codetelegrammen 1945-1963*.
 - 39 Monthly Reports – Australian Liaison Officer to Netherlands New Guinea – March & April 1962, NAA File M 341, 5..
 - 40 Bestuursverslag van de Resident van Hollandia over de Maanden Maart en April 1962, NA, *Archief Minog, Dossierarchief G 16725*.
 - 41 Interim Report – Australian Liaison Officer to Netherlands New Guinea – 19-6-62, NAA, File M 341, 5. From Jakarta's perspective, the Bunker Plan was the first of numerous formulas for a settlement of the dispute in which self-determination was acceptable. Self-determination was acceptable precisely because Papuans would exercise it after a period of Indonesian administration.
 - 42 Monthly Report – Australian Liaison Officer to Netherlands New Guinea – April 1962, NAA, File M 341, 5.
 - 43 *Nieuw Guinea Koerier*, 14-7-62. Tanggahma's motion failed seemingly because a majority of members considered that a delegation could not go to Indonesia while Indonesian military activities persisted.
 - 44 Paul van der Veur, 'Questionnaire', BKI 120: 4, p. 424

- 45 *Ibid*, pp. 447-449.
- 46 *Ibid*, p. 449
- 47 Codetelegram, Platteel to Bot, 7-8-62, NA, Archief Minog, Codetelegrammen 1945-1963. Platteel was responding to advice from J.H. van Roijen, the Netherlands Ambassador in Washington and head of the negotiating team. Van Roijen had advised against the inclusion of any Papuans as they would be seen as "stooges" by the Indonesians and others and this would have undesirable consequences for the further conduct of the negotiations. Telegram, Bot to Platteel, 7-8-62. NA, Archief Minog, *Archief kabinet van de Gouverneur van NNG dossier 12*.
- 48 *Nieuw Guinea Koerier*, 11-8-62; Interim Report – Australian Liaison Officer to Netherlands New Guinea – 14-8-62, NAA, *File M 341*, 5.
- 49 Bonay, *op cit*, bab 5, p. 1
- 50 *Nieuw Guinea Koerier*, 21-9-62.
- 51 Sawor, Z. *Ik bén een Papoea. Een getuigeverslag van de toestanden in Westelijk Nieuw-Guinea sinds de gezagsoverdracht op 1 oktober `1962* (Groningen 1969), pp. 83-84. When a delegation from the Congress went to Jakarta, Sawor recorded Soebandrio as telling them that the Indonesian Government would do its best to establish security through peaceful and diplomatic means, but if that was not possible the troops would be sent in. Soebandrio forbade the delegates to express their views on self-determination until they had seen the conditions in other parts of the country. It is our principle that Indonesia does not claim anybody else's territory. Sawor noted that a few months later Indonesia launched its confrontation campaign against Malaysia.
- 52 *Nieuw Guinea Koerier*, 24-8-62.
- 53 Clemens Runaweri, 'Political Situation in West Papua between May 1, 1963 and April 11, 1969, and the Act of Free Choice in July – August 1969', p. 18 (English original).
- 54 Submission 10, West New Guinea, 'Where is the Dispute Heading', G.E. Barwick, 11 January 1962, NAA, *Prime Minister's file C508 pt 2, CRS A4940*.
- 55 Airgram A-207 from the American Embassy in Jakarta to the Department of State, Washington, 11 September 1964, West Irian – August 1964, Floyd Whittington, p. 9. *National Archives Record Administration (NARA) 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-6, Box 2307, POL 2*.
- 56 Resolusi Kongres Papua, Port Numbay (Jayapura), 4 June 2000. The UN resolution was on 19 November 1969.
- 57 H. Dr. Subandrio, *Meluruskan Sejarah Perjuangan Irian Barat*, Yayasan Kepada Bangsa-saku, Jakarta, 2001) p. 12
- 58 *Ibid*, p. 248. Emphasis in the original.
- 59 *Ibid*, p. 41.

The United Nations, West Papua and the Act of Free Choice: de-colonisation in action?

John Saltford

Outline

In my paper today I would like to outline some of my own research into the events that took place during the 1960's in West Papua. A lot of this was based upon documents from the UN, British and Australian National Archives and I guess that it fits in nicely with Pieter Drooglevers work on the subject.

I will start with a brief look at the events leading to the Dutch departure in 1962 and the signing of the UN-brokered New York Agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Following this I will look at the agreement itself and its implementation. Specifically this will concern the preparations and events surrounding the 1969 act of self-determination in West Papua and the UN's role in this "Act of Free Choice" as it was known. I will then spend some time looking at the UN's official position on self-determination in non-self governing and trust territories and examine how West Papua's experience compared with other examples from the period.

By the end of the paper I would hope that an answer to the question in the title can be clearly given. That is to say, was the Act of Free Choice, as Jakarta would argue, the final episode in West Papua's de-colonisation? Or did it mark the beginning of a new and particularly tragic period of foreign occupation?

So to begin I will turn to the subject itself and provide a summary of the events leading up to the transfer of West Papua from Dutch to Indonesian rule.

Background

From 1950 until October 1962, West Papua was on the UN General Assembly's list of non self-governing territories. It had in fact been inscribed on that list by the Dutch, who, as the administering power, had also submitted annual progress reports to the UN on conditions and developments within the territory. Beginning in 1959, elected regional councils were set up with the aim of introducing democratization at both local and regional levels. Internal documents from the period indicate that the Dutch planned to establish an independent West Papuan state by 1970. Beginning in 1959, elected regional councils were set up with the aim

of introducing democratization at both local and regional levels. At the same time efforts were made also to 'Papuanise' the administration so that a sufficient number of local people would be trained to take over once the Dutch had finally left. In short, one could argue that from the late 1950's at least the Dutch were attempting to pursue a, rather belated, policy of genuine de-colonisation.

However, West Papua's journey towards independence faced a major stumbling block in the form of Indonesia and its leader President Sukarno. Sukarno's argument was that Indonesia had sovereignty over all territories of the Dutch East Indies Empire – and that included West Papua. The Dutch response was that they had only administered West Papua as part of the East Indies because their minimal presence there did not warrant a separate colonial administration. More importantly, the Dutch argued that the vast majority of West Papuans were Melanesian and ethnically and culturally completely different to the Asian Indonesians. Their natural links lay instead with Australian New Guinea and the rest of Melanesia.

In September 1961, as Indonesian pressure grew, the Dutch presented the "Luns Plan", to the UN General Assembly to resolve the dispute. They proposed to hand the territory over to a UN administration that would remain until the population was considered ready to exercise their right to self-determination. In the end, although most member states voted for the plan, it did not get the required two-thirds majority by the General Assembly to be passed.

Bolstered by political support and massive arms shipments from the Soviet Union, the United States and some European countries, Indonesia threatened war. Alarmed at this growing Soviet influence in a SE Asian country, the United States concluded that the best solution was for Sukarno to get his way. President Kennedy therefore put increasing pressure on the Netherlands to negotiate with Indonesia. When it became clear that neither the US, Australia nor Britain intended to offer military support to the Netherlands in the event of a war over West Papua, the Dutch reluctantly agreed to sign the August 1962 New York Agreement with Jakarta.

New York Agreement

I'd now like to spend a little time examining this New York Agreement - an agreement which at first glance resolved a troublesome colonial conflict and at the same time set the West Papuans on the path to self-determination. Looking at the pros and cons of this agreement from a West Papuan perspective I'll start with the cons:

Cons

First of all, although it was supposed to be an agreement on the future of West Papua, the West Papuans themselves were effectively excluded

from the negotiation process, meaning that they had no ownership of this crucial document outlining their future.

Secondly, as with the previous Dutch "Luns Plan", under the New York Agreement, West Papua was to be handed over to a UN administration. But the key difference was that the UN could then transfer authority to Jakarta before any act of West Papuan self-determination had taken place.

The agreement was also deliberately vague on the method to be adopted for self-determination. As a result of a Dutch concession in the last days of the negotiations there was no mention of the words 'plebiscite' or 'referendum'. Without these one can argue that the intention of the wording in the final Agreement was not to give the Papuans a say in their future, but simply to allow the Dutch to surrender the territory to Indonesia with the minimum of humiliation. As one American official commented even before the talks began:

I can't blame the Dutch for doubting that the Indonesians have any intention of allowing a genuine plebiscite 5 years or so from now. But the important thing is that some such Indonesian promise is the essential face-saving device the Dutch have been seeking - we must get them to take it as the best they can expect.

By 1963, this was also a view accepted by the Dutch. With the dispute over, they were keen to put West Papua behind them and re-build their relationship with Jakarta. In March of that year, a Dutch official told the Australians that:

The Hague had little interest in arrangements for the act of self-determination and were only concerned that a facade of respectability be maintained.

Pros

For all its failings however, the New York Agreement did give the Papuans certain rights that Indonesia, as a signatory, was obligated to enforce:

Under Article 22, The UN and Indonesia had to guarantee fully the rights, including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement and of assembly of the West Papuans.

Furthermore, despite the omission of any reference to a plebiscite, Article 18 guaranteed the rights of all adult West Papuans to participate in an act of self-determination to be carried out in accordance with international practice.

Under Article 16, a number of UN experts were to remain in the territory following the transfer of administrative control to Indonesia. Their primary task was to assist the Indonesians in ensuring that proper preparations were carried out for the planned act of self-determination. Of course

this would also mean that there would have been a UN presence in the territory after 1963 to monitor Jakarta's rule and, at the very least, bear witness to any Indonesian breaches of the agreement, particularly those relating to the political and human rights guaranteed under Article 22.

This then was the New York Agreement, but how was it put into practice?

Implementation: UNTEA (1 Oct 1962 - 1 May 1963)

As planned the UN Temporary Executive Authority, known as UNTEA, took over from the Dutch on October 1 1962. They then administered the territory for seven months (the minimum period specified in the Agreement) before handing control over to Indonesia on May 1 1963. Throughout this brief period of UN rule, Indonesian military and civilian personnel were present in growing numbers. Although officially under the authority of the UN, it was clear from the start that the UNTEA administration was totally reliant upon the cooperation of the Indonesians. Because of this, they tolerated systematic Indonesian interference and intimidation of the population throughout.

One particular example of this was the banning of a proposed West Papuan nationalist march on 1 December 1962. (the first anniversary of the territory's official flag raising and re-naming as West Papua). At the time, the UN claimed that the organisers had agreed to cancel the march. In fact UN documents show that it was banned following an Indonesian threat to the UN Secretary-General that pro-Indonesian militias, supported by the Indonesian army, could react violently if the march went ahead. As a consequence, the West Papuans right to free speech and assembly, guaranteed by the Agreement, was denied by UNTEA.

Senior UNTEA officials were of course well aware of the reality of the situation. In fact Rawlings, the UN Commissioner for Biak reported in December 1962:

I have yet to meet any thinking, sober, generally responsible Papuan who sees any good with the coming link with Indonesia - - - Unwelcome as the anxiety and resistance of thinking Papuans maybe, it is of course hardly surprising if one is not under pressure to close one's eyes to what is in fact happening to this people at the hands of the three parties to the Agreement.

Despite his obvious sympathy for the West Papuans, he made clear to his UN superiors that their priority should be to get out as soon as they were able to, regardless of their supposed obligations to the local people. And his December 1962 communication ended with the advice:

That there will ultimately be quite serious resistance to the Indonesians is, I think certain - - - Therefore - - - from the point of

view of expediency it behoves the UN to depart as soon as the Indonesians are in fact thick enough on the ground to make acceptable UN administration impossible. At present pace that is likely to be well before May 1st.

Harold Luckham, Rawlings' counterpart in the area of Fak Fak, found much the same in his area. In a series of letters written to the British Foreign Office shortly after his mission ended, Luckham mentioned systematic Indonesian intimidation of the local people, including crude attempts to organise pro-Indonesian demonstrations. These actions were actually carried out by Luckham's own Indonesian staff who were supposed to be acting under his authority. In one example, Luckham described how a demonstration was staged for him in which he could clearly see armed Indonesian soldiers at the rear forcing reluctant West Papuans to join in.

Implementation: Article 16

Following the May 1 1963 transfer of administrative power to Indonesia, Jakarta made clear that no UN officials would be allowed to remain in the territory to fulfil the requirements of Article 16. With no international observers present, Indonesia was then free to act as it pleased and ignore Article 22's provisions on human rights and political freedoms. Despite this there are at least some unofficial foreign accounts of conditions in West Papua during these first years of their supposed "liberation" from colonialism.

One witness to life in this period was a German agricultural officer who lived in the region of Manokwari (on the far west of the island). In 1967 he was interviewed by staff at the British Embassy in Jakarta. As well as describing an on-going West Papuan rebellion in the area he also spoke about the Indonesian officials who administered the territory:

Many officials go there solely to enrich themselves through embezzlement or, in the case of many of the soldiers, by simply stealing. Most Javanese in any case have an almost Afrikaner attitude towards "those black men" and social mixing between the two races is rare.

Another insight into life under Jakarta's rule was given by an American diplomat who visited the territory in 1968 and reported privately to the British:

The Indonesians have tried everything from bombing them with B.26's, to shelling and mortaring them, but a continuous state of semi-rebellion persists. Brutalities are undoubtedly perpetrated from time to time in a fruitless attempt at repression.

Implementation: The Act of Free Choice

This was the situation facing the Bolivian diplomat Fernando Ortiz Sanz when he arrived with a small UN team in August 1968. His mission, as outlined in the Agreement, was to act as the UN Secretary General's representative and 'advise, assist and participate' in the act of self-determination planned for the following year.

While accepting Jakarta's argument that the Papuans were too "primitive" to have a referendum, Ortiz Sanz initially urged the Indonesians to adopt a "mixed method" for the Act of Free Choice. This meant allowing direct voting in the towns, while other areas would rely upon some form of 'collective consultation.' This, he privately advised the authorities, "represents the minimum requirement to satisfy world public opinion". But the suggestion was quickly rejected by Jakarta and instead a series of Indonesian-organised committees selected a number of officially approved individuals from each region to vote on behalf of the people.

The Australian journalist Hugh Lunn has described witnessing one such selection process in Biak in which plain clothed Indonesian soldiers simply selected the representatives themselves from the small assembled crowd. They then arrested three peaceful demonstrators who had sat down at the front displaying placards calling for a direct free vote. Disturbingly, this was done even while UN officials, including Ortiz Sanz himself, looked on. A colleague of Lunn's allegedly pleaded with Ortiz Sanz to intervene but he refused saying simply that the UN was just there to observe.

The result of this selection process was that just over one thousand supposed representatives were chosen to take part in the eventual Act of Free Choice. For this final Act, Jakarta organised a series of eight assembly meetings around the territory where the representatives would be required to publicly make their choice. Several of them have since claimed that the authorities isolated them from their friends and families for several weeks before the vote and subjected them to a series of threats, insults and bribes. Some were then selected to speak at the assemblies and given instructions on what to say before being made to rehearse their lines in front of Indonesian officials. The man in charge of this was General Ali Murtopo who reportedly warned anyone thinking of voting for independence that they would have their "accursed tongues" torn out. At least one "representative" is alleged to have been taken away and killed for refusing to comply.

At the time, the UN Secretary-General claimed that he had not given his approval for this indirect method of determining the population's wishes. But in fact, as early as 1963, the UN and the Dutch had privately advised Indonesia that they would accept an act of self-determination involving as little as 800 representatives and no direct voting by the general population. Both Ortiz Sanz and the Secretary-General also confidentially urged Indonesia to lobby other states to remain silent on the issue at the UN General Assembly. Specifically, Ortiz Sanz wrote to his superiors in the

UN Secretariat informing them that he had urged Jakarta to privately seek assurances from The Hague that they “would not cast any doubt on, or challenge, the Act of Free Choice. This would prevent a heated debate in the General Assembly”.

Meanwhile, behind the scenes countries like Australia and Britain lobbied other states on behalf of Jakarta. As part of its own collaboration with Indonesia, the UN also played down evidence of dissent. In particular, the Secretary General’s report to the General Assembly states that a majority of the petitions which Ortiz Sanz received from West Papuans were pro-Indonesian. De-classified UN documents show that the opposite was the case.

The reality then was that Ortiz Sanz and his team effectively stood by while Indonesia organised an Act of Free Choice that involved no genuine participation by the people whatsoever. In the end, apart from a protest from some African countries led by Ghana, the international community was simply uninterested in the fate of the West Papuans. Indonesia was an important pro-western country. Many states had their own separatist problems and there was little sympathy in encouraging what was seen as a threat to Indonesia’s territorial integrity. Besides, to put it bluntly, the West Papuans were simply not important enough for other powers to incur Indonesia’s displeasure. As one British diplomat remarked at the time, UN member states wanted the issue:

“cleared out of the way with the minimum of fuss.” The UN Secretariat, he added; “is only too anxious to get shot of the problem as quickly as possible”.

It was no surprise that when the actual Act of Free Choice took place, all 1022 representatives voted unanimously in favour of West Papua becoming a part of Indonesia. One can only wonder whether the UN officials or the foreign ambassadors present felt at all embarrassed to be associated with such a crudely orchestrated performance. In the UN General Assembly three months later, the member states voted simply to take note of the result, while thanking the Secretary General for his good work in fulfilling his responsibilities as laid out in the original agreement.

Self-Determination in accordance with International Practice

To re-cap, under the New York Agreement, The Netherlands, Indonesia and the UN had an obligation to protect the political rights and freedoms of the West Papuans. But as Indonesian officials themselves have since admitted, this did not happen. In fact it is clear that that the rights and freedoms of the West Papuan people have been systematically abused throughout Indonesia’s forty two year occupation of their country.

The New York Agreement also specified that the West Papuan act of self-determination should take place, in accordance with international

practice. In the Secretary General's official 1969 report to the UN General Assembly, the phrase "international practice" was replaced, without explanation, by the words "Indonesian practice."

Resolution 1541

Of course even if the phrase had not been omitted from the Secretary General's report one could argue that "International Practice" is such a vague term that it is very difficult to form any conclusions about whether or not the Act of Free Choice met the required criteria. However to understand what was accepted international practice at the time one need only look at UN General Assembly Resolution 1541 from December 1960. This specified clearly the circumstances under which a non-self governing territory (as West Papua officially was then) could integrate with an independent state.

The resolution states that this should be on the basis of complete equality between peoples of the non-self governing territory and the independent state with which it is being integrated with. Furthermore Principle IX of the resolution states:

"the integrating territory should have attained an advanced stage of self-government with free political institutions so that the peoples would have the capacity to make a responsible choice through informed and democratic processes - - - The integration should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the territory's peoples acting with full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes having been expressed through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based upon universal adult suffrage."

Whatever Jakarta may continue to claim about the legitimacy of its occupation of West Papua, the implementation of Act of Free Choice does not even begin to fulfil any of the conditions set out in resolution 1541.

The argument that the West Papuans were somehow not developed enough to vote directly is a point still made by Indonesian officials today when trying to justify the method adopted for the Act of Free Choice. But if this was the case then, under Resolution 1541, no act of self-determination should have taken place until the territory and its people were ready for such an important exercise. In fact West Papuans had already taken part in direct elections under the Dutch and would do so again in the 1971 Indonesian general elections. So whichever way one considers the argument on the "primitiveness", or otherwise, of West Papua and its people it cannot be used to justify the events of 1969.

Some cases of self-determination elsewhere

British Cameroon

In order not to look at the West Papuan case in isolation it is useful to compare it with UN involvement in other acts of self-determination, particularly in the 1950's and 1960's. Africa provides a number of examples. In British Cameroon in 1961, the UN was involved in organising plebiscites to determine whether the territory should join Nigeria or Cameroon following independence. In the Northern part of the territory nearly 250,000 people voted with 60% favouring union with Nigeria and 40% opting for Cameroon. In the Southern part 330,000 voted with 30% favouring Nigeria and 70% preferring Cameroon.

French Togoland

In French Togoland in 1956 a plebiscite was held, without UN involvement, to determine whether the territory should become an autonomous region within the French Union or remain a UN Trust Territory. 339,000 people voted with over 90% favouring a link with France. But such was the importance attached by the UN General Assembly to genuine self-determination that it refused to recognise the result on the grounds that the option of independence had not been included in the referendum. Four years later in 1960 French Togoland, under its new name Togo, did achieve independence, along with 17 other African countries in what became known as "the Year of Africa".

Eritrea

However, there are other historical incidences where the UN's behaviour on an issue of self-determination was at the least questionable. In 1949 the UN General Assembly voted to set up a Commission to "assess the political wishes of the parties and people of Eritrea". This was to be done, not by holding a referendum but by, "collecting the views of the principal political parties and associations" and "holding hearings of the local population." The Commission's conclusion was that the majority of Eritreans favoured political association with Ethiopia. Not surprisingly many Eritreans felt that a genuine and free expression of the will of the people had not taken place. Forty years and much bloodshed later, the Eritreans finally had their UN observed referendum in April 1993. An overwhelming majority voted for independence in a process described by the Secretary General's Special Representative for Eritrea as, on the whole, "free and fair at every stage."

Sarawak and Sabah

Another controversial episode with perhaps more relevance to the West Papuan experience concerned the findings of a "United Nations Assessment Team" which visited the British territories of Sarawak and Sabah in 1963 to determine whether or not the populations wished to become a part of the new Malaysian Federation. The UN Team's mission followed on from an earlier assessment by the British-appointed Cobbold Commission which had arrived in the territories in 1962 and held hearings to determine public opinion. They had also sifted through 1600 letters and

memoranda submitted by individuals, organisations and political parties. Cobbold concluded that around two thirds of the population favoured joining Malaysia while the remaining third wanted either independence or continuing control by the UK. The UN team largely confirmed these findings, which were later accepted by the General Assembly, and both territories subsequently joined the Malaysian Federation. The conclusions of both the Cobbold Commission and the UN Team were arrived at without any referendums being held.

East Timor

Perhaps the best known example in recent times of UN involvement in an act of self-determination is the case of East Timor in 1999. There is no time here to detail the brutalities and widespread killings inflicted upon the East Timorese during their twenty four years under Indonesian occupation. But when they were finally allowed to exercise their right to genuine self-determination the method agreed upon was a UN organised referendum. This took place on 30 August 1999 with nearly 400,000 people taking part of which 78.5 percent voted for East Timorese independence. In the end, despite further savage violence and destruction by Indonesian forces and their militias, East Timor became an independent state on 20 May 2002 following several years of UN rule.

Further evidence and conclusions

From these examples one can conclude that West Papua's experience of self-determination and "de-colonisation" bore little or no resemblance to internationally recognised practice either in the 1960s or since. The nearest comparison was that of Sabah and Sarawak where genuine self-determination did not take place. But even here it can be argued that the evidence upon which the views of the populations were determined could at least be said to have had some basis in reality. This was not the case in West Papua, and privately at least, other states including the US and the UK acknowledged this.

To give just one example from the US Archives, an American diplomat in 1968 reported back on a conversation held with Ortiz Sanz in Jakarta shortly before the UN mission had even begun. In it he wrote:

"Ortiz recognises that the problem facing both him and Indonesia is the risk that the [Papuan] representatives, however they might be constituted, would vote against remaining with Indonesia. He concedes that it would be inconceivable from the point of view of the interests of the UN as well as Indonesia, that a result other than the continuance of West [Irian] within Indonesian sovereignty should emerge."

UK documents say much the same. For example in the briefing for the UK's mission to the UN General Assembly in September 1969 the advice given is for British diplomats to steer clear of the issue, but the brief adds:

“Privately, however, we recognise that the people of West Irian have no desire to be ruled by the Indonesians who are of an alien (Javanese) race, and that the process of consultation did not allow a genuinely free choice to be made.”

Significantly the UK Government, alone among Western states, recently conceded this publicly when British Foreign Office Minister Baroness Symons admitted in Parliament in December 2004 that the Papuans were “largely coerced into declaring for inclusion in Indonesia.” It might have taken thirty five years, but this candidness by a permanent member of the UN Security Council is to be welcomed.

UN staff themselves, at the time and subsequently, were also under no illusion as to what was happening to the West Papuans. A US Embassy report from 1969 notes; “UN staff on the ground [in West Papua] believe that given the chance 95 percent of Papuans would support independence.”

One of these UN staff, now retired, spoke recently about his experiences. He admitted that the Act of Free Choice had been a farce and also described how, when he had tried to attend a pro-independence rally in April 1969, an Indonesian officer had pressed a gun to his stomach and threatened to shoot him unless he left immediately. As a result he never got to see the rally which was broken up soon afterwards by armed troops.

It wasn't just the UN staff on the ground who knew what was going on. In 2001, retired UN Under-Secretary General Chakravarthi Narasimahan, the man with overall responsibility for the UN's involvement in West Papua throughout the 1960's, gave an interview about the Act of Free Choice. In it he declared that it was “just a whitewash” and he added:

the mood at the United Nations was to get rid of this problem as quickly as possible - - - Nobody gave a thought to the fact that there were a million people there who had their fundamental rights trampled - - - How could anyone have seriously believed that all voters unanimously decided to join his [Suharto's] regime? ”

To conclude, this is the unpleasant reality of what happened to the West Papuans and their country at the hands of Indonesia, the UN and some of its key member states. Indonesian officials today must privately regret that Suharto's soldiers did not permit at least some dissenting voices to be heard to allow a more realistic outcome. Instead they are left to try and make us believe, in the face of overwhelming evidence, that the Act of Free Choice and its 100 percent result was anything more than a ridiculous and overtly manipulated denial of West Papuan rights.

The message that often comes from talking to Indonesian diplomats is that there is no need to re-visit this issue, it is best to move on and address the future. But I would argue that a proper acknowledgement of the truth

by Jakarta, its allies and importantly the UN, is necessary if there is to be a genuine effort to begin the process of finding a just and lasting solution to the tragedy of West Papua. It is surely in the best interests of all sides, including Indonesia, that the full facts surrounding the Act of Free Choice are officially acknowledged. There is nothing to be gained from clinging on to a distorted version of history that can only further distort current efforts to solve the West Papuan issue peacefully.

West Irian and the Suharto Presidency: a perspective

Bilveer Singh

Introduction

For Suharto, like many others, the struggle over West Irian¹ was regarded as part of the unfinished business of Indonesian nationalism to end the much detested Dutch colonialism in the then Dutch East Indies. The fact that the Dutch surrendered all of its colonial territories at the Round Table Conference except West Irian only emboldened nationalists such as Suharto that the struggle was worth pursuing, was winnable and that it was only a matter of time before the Dutch would capitulate. That the Dutch would hold on to West Irian for another twelve years was something unforeseen and every passing year represented defeat and humiliation, this more than anything else was responsible for the unanimous decision that if West Irian could not be recovered through diplomacy, just as was the rest of Indonesia, then perjuangan or military struggle should be pursued. This directly involved Suharto in the West Irian issue, where just as in the struggle against Dutch colonialism prior to this, he was among those in the forefront leading the military struggle to win independence for Indonesia.

In this context, Suharto's involvement in the West Irian issue can be understood from two different strategic positions he held, namely, first as the Commander of the Mandala Command tasked to militarily defeat the Dutch in West Irian and second, as Indonesia's President, where his policies had a direct bearing on the future of the territory and the people therein. For the convenience of discussion, the role of Suharto and the West Irian issue can be examined through a number of phases. These phases broadly describe the political evolution of the West Irian issue and the manner Suharto was positioned as far as developments in West Irian were concerned. In the main, there were six phases as follows:

- [1] 1945-1949 – the phase of revolutionary war against the Dutch
- [2] 1950-1961 – the phase of diplomacy in recovering West Irian
- [3] 1961-1963 – the phase of military pressure and the successful recovery of West Irian
- [4] 1963-1965 – the phase of preliminary Indonesian domination
- [5] 1965-1969 – the phase of challenge in the pre-Act of Free Choice era
- [6] 1969-1998 – the phase of total Indonesian domination in the post-Act of Free Choice era

However, before plunging into Suharto's role in West Irian, it is imperative that the realities as obtained in West Irian be first understood.

The political anatomy of West Irian

By any count, West Irian is a highly complex and complicated piece of real estate. The word 'Papua' and 'Irian' has been traditionally used to describe the piece of territory that forms part of Indonesia following its successful struggle against the Dutch. While there is much controversy about the terminology, in actuality, both terms have been in vogue for quite sometime. As was argued by Jan Ramandel, while the earlier European explorers such as Ortis de Retez, a Spaniard, referred to the island as 'New Guinea', the territory was seen as belonging to Irian (tanah Irian) and its people were Papuans or blacks.² The word 'Papua' is also widely used in local languages, especially from Biak. In the same way, the term 'Irian' is also used in various regional languages in West Irian, including in Biak, Serui, Waropen, Tobati and Merauke.³ It was against this background that on 29 April 1945, Irianian nationalists such as Frans and Markus Kaisiepo, Pieter Hamadi and others declared the change of name of Papua to Irian at Kota NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration), Kampung Harapan, Sentani.⁴ In order to understand the political anatomy of West Irian and how it can come to be perceived by Irianians, Indonesians and others, it is vitally necessary to understand its strategic, political, economic and social-cultural attributes.

Geography

West Irian is the easternmost and largest province of Indonesia, covering the western half of the world's second largest island after Greenland. On its northern side, West Irian is washed by the Pacific Ocean, on the southern side by the Arafura Sea, on the western side by the Seram and Banda Seas as well as the Maluku province and on the eastern side by Papua New Guinea, with which it shares a long land border. Papua has a land area of 421,981 square kilometres. This constitutes 21.9 percent of Indonesian total land area (1,937,179 square kilometers).⁵ Despite being one of the largest islands in the world, West Irian is thinly populated, highly rugged and inhospitable with limited cultivated land and covered with dense forests and swamps. Topographically, West Irian has 15 mountains, 40 rivers, 12 lakes and 40 islands. Geologically, West Irian is also highly prone to earth quakes, experiencing more than 10,000 local earth quakes and about 20 major ones in 2000 alone.⁶ In addition to the massive land-mass, a number of islands line West Irian's coast such as Biak, Gag and Dolok.

Geopolitics

Geographically, it was not the mere size and location of West Irian that made it a zone of contention but rather its geopolitical significance to the key stakeholders, namely, Indonesia, the Netherlands, Australia and the United States. From Jakarta's perspective, West Irian's importance stemmed from a number of imperatives. First, it viewed itself as a successor state to the Dutch and claimed all sovereignty to the former Dutch East Indies and any denial of this would imply that the decolonization and 'national revolution' was incomplete. Second, and probably more important, Dutch presence in West Irian was viewed as a national affront

and a threat. In addition to failing to give up its 'colonial ways', the Dutch presence was perceived as a military threat. Indonesian strategic planners saw Dutch presence in West Irian as a 'knife pointing into the heart of Indonesia', and hence, something that had to be removed by force if necessary. Jakarta saw Dutch presence in West Irian as being responsible for the various secessionist movements, especially led by former Dutch military officers and their cronies. At the same time, Dutch military presence in West Irian was viewed as a threat, something The Hague had openly brandished to deter Indonesia from threatening Dutch economic interests in Indonesia. Hence, for all these considerations, Jakarta challenged the Dutch presence in West Irian and was prepared to go to war to reintegrate the territory into the Indonesian state as failing to do so would imply that its territorial integrity had been compromised.⁷

The Dutch were motivated to hold on to the territory for various reasons. First, the Dutch saw the territory as part of their attempt to create a 'Tropical Holland', the 'Eurasian Fatherland' that would be used to settle Eurasians fleeing from independent Indonesia as well as Dutch citizens living in the Netherlands, especially from the rural regions. Second, it was a function of individuals such as Jan van Eechoud and Dutch civil servants who believed that the territory and its people deserved a different fate and future, and they championed a separate political existence for the territory. Third, related to the second point, was the argument made by various Dutch officials that the West Irianese, essentially being Melanesians, were ethnologically different from the rest of Indonesia and poor and backward at that. They felt that they deserved a different political arrangements that would suit them politically, socially and economically. Fourth, flowing from the above, there was the 'civilising/sacred mission', which led many Dutch officials to believe that the West Irianians ought to be 'tutored', with Dutch help, towards self-determination and independence. In this, they were supported by Church, Fifth, there were also those who believed that even though Indonesia was lost as a colonial territory, The Netherlands could continue exploiting the 'spoils of colonialism' even though it was focused only on West Irian. Finally, for various psychological reasons, holding on to West Irian was partly driven by the sense of shame and humiliation many Dutch officials felt at the loss of Indonesia. Holding on to part of its former colonial territory was akin to hanging on as an 'Asian Power', hoping that if Indonesia unravels, then The Hague would be given the first chance to 'reclaim' its colonial possession, the same manner, the Dutch returned following the Japanese conquest in March 1942.

While these were the various reasons provided by Dutch officials, between 1950 and 1962 the strategic importance of West Irian was increasingly referred to as the key *raison d'être* for the Dutch continued presence in the territory even though the decolonization revolution was in vogue worldwide. Three key arguments were continuously utilized during this period. First, military bases in West New Guinea, it was argued, would be useful to protect Dutch economic interests in Indonesia, if they were ever threatened by an increasingly nationalistic or communist government in

Jakarta. Second, the Dutch argued that their presence in the territory was important as it contributed to the American defence system in the region to contain Communism. Thirdly, the Dutch argued that their presence in the territory would safeguard Australian strategic and security interest in West Irian and New Guinea, the territory adjoining West New Guinea that Australia held as a trust territory for the United Nations.

From August 1945 to November 1949, Australia was extremely supportive of Indonesia and played a critical role in helping Indonesian nationalists secure independence. However, when it came to the issue of West Irian, the Labor Government maintained a neutral posture of letting the Dutch and Indonesians settle it among themselves. This position changed fundamentally with the onset of the Liberal Government under Robert Menzies following the December 1949 Federal elections. Believing that West Irian was of vital importance for Australian security, the Menzies Government's policy was to support the position of the Dutch and deny the territory to Indonesia.⁸

In the main, from December 1949 right up to the time the territory was surrendered to Indonesia, Australia continued to argue it had vital security and strategic interests in West Irian and that it should not fall to Indonesia. Australian security planners preferred a Dutch control of the territory as it provided a security buffer from Indonesia. When there were concerns that the Dutch might not be able to hold on to the territory for long, Canberra proposed either a Dutch-Australian condominium or even a Dutch transfer of the territory to Australia. Australian security planners argued that West Irian was vital to Australian security from a number of perspectives. First, the territory was believed to be part of an important link to the northern defence corridor and as the main security threat was believed to emanate from the north, securing this was viewed as being vital for Australian security. This was also in consonant with Australian 'forward line' defence, implying that its frontline was established in Southeast Asia, as was evident in the deployment of Australian troops in Korea, Vietnam and Malaya (later, Malaysia). As the security situation in Southeast Asia worsened with especially following Mao's victory in China, the French defeat in Indochina and the outbreak of various communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia, Canberra's concern with security in the region and the fear that Indonesian-controlled West Irian could be used to threaten Australia was something that was credible in the minds of most Australian strategic planners.⁹

Second, Australia believed that Indonesia's control of West Irian would negatively affect its position in the Australian-administered Territory of Papua and Guinea. Security planners in Canberra viewed Dutch-controlled West New Guinea as a strategic buffer to prevent Indonesian potential aggression eastward. This was best articulated by Menzies when he argued, "we want to retain you [Netherlands] as our neighbour in New Guinea and want nobody but you. In no case do we wish the Indonesians take over...." This mainly stemmed from the fear that not only will Indonesian troops would infiltrate into Australian-controlled territory in

Papua and Guinea, worse still was the concern that following Indonesian takeover of Dutch New Guinea, Indonesian revolutionary fervour would spread beyond the border threatening Australian control of the territory. In other words, Canberra also feared that once Indonesia occupied Dutch West Guinea, it would be tempted to lay claim to Eastern New Guinea.¹⁰

While publicly Australian policy makers were focusing on the social-cultural differences between Indonesia and the West Irianians, in actuality it were the military-security factors that were uppermost in their minds. A June 1955 Cabinet submission by Casey on the grounds for supporting the Dutch position made this apparent:

‘We consider – that legally their sovereignty is clearly established; that they make good neighbour for our own territories in Eastern New Guinea and that it is desirable in the interests of Australia’s own defence that West New Guinea should be in the hands of a non-Communist Government. Indonesia is non-Communist but – – – we cannot be sure that it will not in the course of time come into the Communist orbit.’¹¹

Yet, it was for the very strategic and security reasons that the Australians were forced to change their position on West Irian and accept Indonesian control of the territory. While the Australians, like the Dutch, would like to hold on to their positions, by late 1959 and especially since late 1961, developments in Indonesia and elsewhere, forced Canberra to review its position. The single biggest fear that dominated Australian thinking with regard to Indonesia, especially in the Cold War setting was that Indonesia might fall to the Communist Party of Indonesia. This was the worst case scenario. However, by 1959, the United States and Australia-supported pro-Muslim rebels on Sumatra and in East Indonesia were defeated by the Indonesian military. At the same time, Western support for the destabilization of Indonesia merely strengthened the hands of the PKI, the very thing that the West wanted to avoid. Hence, the blowback from Western policies on this point, that forced Washington, London and Canberra to review their policies toward Indonesia. Now the position of Dutch New Guinea became paramount. In order to prevent the PKI’s victory in Indonesia, a tactical change of policy took place in the West and culminated in Canberra distancing itself from the Dutch as it realized that both Washington and London would not come to its assistance should war break out between Indonesia and the Dutch and Australians over West Guinea. To break out of the isolation, Canberra undertook a strategic review and increasingly began to accept Indonesia’s control of West Irian.

In short, Canberra, like Washington and London decided that the interests of the West Irianians must not be promoted to the extent that it threatened their interests in Indonesia, as the latter was far more important strategically and geopolitically. As the strategic importance of Indonesia far outweighed that of West Irian, Dutch control of New Guinea was sacrificed, forcing Canberra to acquiesce in an Indonesian takeover of the territory in 1962, with all its earlier arguments about history, ethnicity and strategic importance to Australian becoming irrelevant.

In the beginning, Washington did not regard the emerging Dutch-Indonesian conflict over West Irian to be important and assumed that the unsettled business of decolonization would be eventually settled as was agreed up at the RTC. For Washington, West Irian was strategically unimportant as Indonesia's importance far outweighed the largely backward territory. Also, as two of its close allies, the Dutch and Australians, were involved in opposition to Indonesia, Washington preferred to maintain a neutral stance as it was a conflict among its 'friends'. At the same time, important strategic planners in Washington continued to believe that West Irian was a 'useless' piece of territory and that Dutch policies were putting at risk their overriding vital strategic interests in Indonesia. They might have the effect of pushing the country into the communist camp. The US saw fighting communism as far more important compared to championing for a backward piece of territory that the Dutch had all these years neglected, and were believed to be holding on to it for psychological and nostalgic reasons. In view of this, when both The Hague and Canberra tried to extend SEATO's umbrella's over West Irian, Washington opposed it.

So for a while the Eisenhower's administration broached the idea of splitting Indonesia, at a time it believed Java to be lost to the PKI.¹² However, the US's support for the rebels backfired as the TNI quickly defeated them by 1959. If anything, there was fear that Indonesia would be pushed even more strongly to the left and into the Soviet camp as evident in the vast economic and military largesse that was forthcoming from Moscow. By the time the Kennedy administration entered office, the decision was made to secure Indonesia at the expense of West Irian. As preventing Indonesia's fall to the communists became uppermost, Washington's pivotal role in the issue surfaced the same manner it did in 1949, in forcing The Hague to grant Indonesia independence. This time, through the good offices of the US, the Dutch were impressed upon a face-saving formula with West Irian being transferred to Indonesia with the ultimate aim of stalling the PKI's march to power in the country. This also stalled Indonesia's entry into the Soviet camp.

Following the Second World War, each of the major stakeholders in the West Irian episode began to perceive the territory as important. It were especially the military-security perspectives that mattered. Geopolitics determined the policies in the most interested capitals. By 1962, from the security perspective, it was concluded that higher interests of preventing Indonesia from being lost to the communists and falling into the Soviet orbit dictated the reintegration of West Irian with the Republic and that the Dutch and Australians had to be brought to line and not to push the issue any further, since it would have resulted in the establishment of a Soviet beachhead in Southeast Asia to the detriment of the United States and its allies. In the end, these considerations securitized West Irian for Indonesia. So Sukarno's policies of brinkmanship made him emerge as the winner. It was a fact that was only grudgingly accepted by the Dutch and Australians.

Demography

Population statistics are highly controversial matters in West Irian. According to Leo Laba Ladjar, the present Bishop of Jayapura, there is a tendency for the locals to inflate their actual numbers for two main reasons. The first is that it enables them to demand more financial and other resources from the central government. The second reason is Second, by claiming that the indigenous population is numerically large is primarily that it offers them an argument to demand a larger share of the key positions and other resources at the local level, namely, provincial, municipal and regency, and deny this to others, especially the migrants from outside West Irian.¹³ According to the population census in 1990, there were 1,648,708 inhabitants in West Irian. The inter-censal population survey in 1995 recorded a population of 1,942,627 people in West Irian. In 1998, this increased to 2.1 million people. At the end of 2000, there were 2,219,500 people, forming less than 1 percent of Indonesia's total population of more than 225 million. In 2003, the official statistics indicated that the West Irianian population stood at 2,469,785 people.¹⁴ According to official projections, the population of West Irian is expected to increase to 2,556,419 and 2,646,489 in 2004 and 2005 respectively.¹⁵ Even though as a province, West Irian has a population density of about 5 persons per square kilometer, in reality, the distribution is quite uneven with Biak Numfor having a density of 229.26 per square kilometer, Yapen Waropen, 33.74 and with Fak-Fak and Mimika only 2.30 and 2.98 respectively. Due to the government-sponsored transmigration programmes, the province has seen one of the fastest growths in population figures in the last two decades or so. There are more than 770,000 migrants living in West Irian, most of who are from the over-populated islands of Java, Bali and Sulawesi. The most heavily populated parts of the province are the Paniai Lake district and the Baliem Valley to the east, areas that are also the most highly cultivated. Even though the demographic size of West Irian is relatively small, its complexity and cleavages are marked and dominant. This has always made reaching consensus on any issue a trying project and partly explained Indonesia's, and for long, the Dutch's belief that the one man one vote system will have great difficulties in being operational in West Irian.

Social-Cultural

The West Irianian culture is diverse, reflecting the hundreds of ethnic groups that occupy the territory. West Irianians are in general Melaneans, though they are further divided into more than 240 smaller ethnic and cultural groups. Despite the wide and varying cultures that can be found in West Irian, the residents of West Irian can be generally divided into three main groups, the coastal dwellers, the forest dwellers and those who live on plateau areas. Accordingly, the coastal dwellers depend on sago cultivation as well as fishing for food and income. Those in the forest obtain food from hunting, fishing from lakes as well as small cultivation while those living on plateaus depend mainly on small agricultural cultivation.

Religion

Due to Dutch, British and German colonialism, the majority of West Irianians are Christians even though animism continues to be widely practiced. In terms of religion, in 1998 out of a population of 2.164 million, West Irian had 1,171,297 Protestants, 478,609 Catholics, 452,214 Muslims, 5,600 Hindus and 3,780 Buddhists. This works to about 85 percent being Christians and 15 percent Muslims. In the main, the general trend has been sustained over the years as is evident from the statistics for religious denominations in the province from 1995 to 1999 in Table 1 and from 2000 to 2003 in Table 2.

Table 1: Statistics of Religious Denominations in West Irian, 2000-2003

Year	Protestants	Catholics	Muslims	Hindus	Buddhists
2000	1,171,297	478,609	452,214	5,600	3,780
2001	1,171,030	530,643	452,030	6,640	4,085
2002	1,235,670	543,030	498,329	7,249	4,123
2003	1,338,064	505,654	491,811	6,869	3,400

Source: Papua in Figures 2003, p.200.

According to the provisional 2000 population census, 58.31 % of the population was Protestants, 24.08 % Muslims, 17.30 % Catholics and 0.31 % others.¹⁶ In 2003, the figures were as follows: 57.0 % Protestants, 21.55 % Catholics, 20.96 % Muslims, 0.43 % others. As the main religious divide in West Irian between Christians and Muslims, the main concentration of Muslim population is found in the regencies of Sorong, Merauke, Jayapura, Manokwari as well as in the capital city of Jayapura.

What is clear from the above is the conflicting religious figures for West Irian and this merely confirms the earlier statement by Bishop Leo that there is a lot of 'politicking' and 'manipulation' as far as the actual figures are concerned. However, what is clearly evident is the dominance of the Christians, both Protestants and Catholics, compared with the Muslims. The former are a dominant minority, even though there is a strong suspicion that the number of Muslims is far greater than is officially admitted.

Table 2 : Population Concentration by Religion in 2003 in West Irian

Regency/Town	Christians	Muslims	Total (plus others)	% of Muslims
Merauke	270,395	84,593	355,549	23.79
Jayawijaya	434,157	3,155	437,363	0.72
Jayapura	127047	53065	180805	29.34
Paniai	147267	400	147690	0.27
Puncak Jaya	80904	680	81681	0.83

Nabire	92642	28050	121286	23.12
Fak-Fak	40521	52274	92966	56.22
Mimika	61066	38010	99259	38.29
Sorong	55089	34940	90719	38.51
Manokwari	154575	48762	205025	23.78
Yapen Waropen	90040	9802	99967	9.80
Biak Numfor	105794	12023	118213	10.17
Jayapura (capital)	107417	76143	186460	40.83
Sorong (town)	76804	49914	128815	38.74
Total	1,184,371	491,811	2,345,798	20.96

Source: Papua in Figures 2003, p.202.

These figures show that, unlike East Timor, the non-Christian population has always been rather substantial. This is not only due to the transmigration or voluntary migration from outside West Irian but also due to the fact that the western part of West Irian was historically, for long, under the reign of the Sultan of Tidore, the oldest Islamic sultanate in eastern Indonesia. This accounts for the sizeable Muslim population in western West Irian, especially in places such as Sorong, Manokwari and Fak-Fak.

Languages

The province is home to more than 250 sub-groups. Due to the rugged topography, historically West Irian has been a divided country, leading to the development of many separate tribal cultures, each with its own unique customs and languages. The main languages spoken are Dani, Asmat, Ekari, Amungme, Mey Brat, Waropen, Nimboran, Jagai, Auwyu, Tobati, Biak, Arfak, Moi, Segel, Karabra, Kebar, Amberbokem, Sarmi, Sentani, Marindanim, Yahray, Mandobo and Afyat. Politically speaking, stemming from language differences and other attributes, one can identify more than 20 cultural footprints in West Irian. In turn, these can be sub-divided into 6- 7 cultural areas.

Political System

Prior to the division of West Irian into three provinces, as far as administrative divisions were concerned, there were two municipalities (Jayapura and Sorong), 12 regencies (Merauke, Jayapura, Jayawijaya, Nabire, Fakfak, Manokwari, Yapen Waropen, Biak Numfor, Puncak Jaya, Paniai, Sorong, and Mimika), 173 districts, 91 sub-districts and 2,803 villages. Since the 1950s, the territory had a number of governors as follows: Zainal Abidin Syah (1956-61); P. Pamudji (1961-62); Elizer Bonay (1963-64); Frans Kaisiepo (1964-73); Acub Zainal (1973-75); Sutran (1975-81); Busiri Suryowinoto (1981-82); Izaak Hindom (1982-88); Barnabas Suebu, (1988-93); Jacob Pattipi (1993-98); Freddy Numberi (1998-2001); and J.P.Solossa (2001-present).

On 13 October 1999, the Acting Minister of Home Affairs, Feisal Tanjung installed Abraham Oktavius Ataruri as West Irian Jaya Governor and Herman Monim as Central Irian Jaya Governor. Earlier, on 16 September

1999, the House had passed a bill on the establishment of three provinces (North Maluku, West Irian Jaya and Central Irian Jaya) and 32 regencies into law. Under this law, Irian Jaya was split into three provinces of West, East and Central Irian Jaya. Even though this was later rescinded due to West Irianians' opposition, President Megawati resurrected the separation of West Irian into three provinces in 2003.

Following the 1999 general elections, the two leading political parties in West Irian were GOLKAR and the PDIP. As for representation from West Irian to the House of Representatives, Provincial and Regional Parliaments, GOLKAR controlled 38.09%, 37.81% and 36.66% of the seats respectively while the PDIP controlled 33.43%, 33.22% and 32.66% of the seats respectively.¹⁷

Economy

Despite being the fourth richest province in Indonesia after East Kalimantan, Jakarta and Riau, the economy of West Irian is still essentially dominated by primary industries and the majority of the population continues to be engaged in agriculture and are stalked with poverty. Extraction of minerals and agriculture dominates West Irian's economy. In particular, the extraction of oil, gas, copper and gold is particularly significant. The largest transnational mining companies active in exploiting minerals and oil in West Irian include Union Oil, Amoco, Agip, Conoco, Phillips, Esso, Texaco, Mobil, Shell, Petromer Trend Exploration, Altantic Richfield, Sun Oil and Freeport, Oppenheimer, Total, Ingold, Marathan Oil, Kepala Buring, Dominion Mining, Aneka Tambang, BHP, Cudgen RZ and CRA. Most of the mining concessions are situated in the Ertsberg and Grasberg mountains, the Paniai and Wissel Lakes region, Fak-Fak, the Baliem Valley, the Bird's Head western tip and the PNG border area. In 1967, Freeport McMoRan Company of Louisiana, secured mining rights at Mt. Carstenz, where it started to exploit the huge gold and copper reserves that had been explored before. Presently, Freeport's Mt Ertsberg mine is the second largest copper mine in the world and contains the largest proven gold deposits in existence. As far as oil deposits are concerned, the Anglo-Dutch firm Shell has been mining it for sometime.

On the agricultural side, cultivated land constitutes 2.49 % or 1,020,800 hectares of available land. West Irian's main agricultural produce includes rice, corn, coconut, cocoa, palm oil and carrots. In 2002 alone, the total tonnage of these produce amounted to 400857 metric tonnes.¹⁸ Apart from these, chicken, duck, pig and cattle farming also constitute a large portion of West Irian's agricultural produce. Aside from its agricultural land area, much of West Irian's land area is heavily forested. The island of New Guinea is among the largest areas of tropical rainforest left in the world. West Irian's forests, rich in bio-diversity, account for approximately 34.6 million hectares or 24 % of Indonesia's total forested area of 143 million hectares. Of which, 27.6 million hectares have been designated as production forest.¹⁹ Forestry then is a big source of income for the Indonesian government. Among the numerous timber logging countries operating in Indonesia includes PT Djayanti Group, PT Barito Pacific Timber

Group, PT Porodisa Group, PT Kayo Lapis Indonesia Group, PT Mutiara Group, PT You Lim Sari, PT Astra (Indonesia), Marubeni, Sagindo (Japan), and Mamberamo (Australia).²⁰ The timber business in West Irian alone is estimated at US\$85.68million²¹ annually. The huge profits that is generated, not only exemplifies the massive deforestation that is taking place, but have also raised concerns about the environmental degradations that have resulted.

Culture as the base of West Irian's political anatomy.

While the facts on West Irian's anatomy are meant to shed light into the general backdrop of West Irian, they are by no means extensive. Clearly, West Irian is as complex and diverse as any other society. It would only be prudent that any attempt to delve into the issue at hand must comprehend the general traits and structures that have been briefly described above. However, what is increasingly discernable is the utmost importance of culture as the basis of West Irianian politics. Since time immemorial, tribal architecture has always formed the basis of West Irian and its politics. Failing to appreciate this will lead to a failure to understand the West Irianian worldview and will amount to nothing more than touching the superficial aspects of West Irianian society. Worse still, it can and has led to misunderstandings and this can have disastrous consequences on politics and governance. To that extent, tribal cultural beliefs and practices form the basis of West Irianian politics. One can posit that tribal politics or 'tribalitics', for short, form the basis of West Irianian politics.

According to Willy Mandowen, one of the key West Irianian leaders at present and the Mediator of the Papuan Council, whatever transpires in West Irian, one must take note of the fact that there are essentially 132 tribes, 257 languages that can be deconstructed into 60 proto-type of languages and in turn divided into two main groups (Austronesian and Papuan or non-Austronesian) and in turn, the whole cultural basis of West Irian can be divided into 6 to 7 cultural areas.²² At any one time, due to the importance of culture, the traditional political structure remains vitally important and this needs to take note of four main structures, namely, the patriarchal system, the Heads of tribes, the Big Man and the Royal system. In order to maintain a semblance of peace at any one time, all the four elements of West Irianian society must be integrated in order to achieve a political equilibrium based on traditions and culture.²³ While much has been written on West Irianian culture and tribalism, there are a number of key aspects that have bearings on politics and should be taken cognizant of. Four particular ones are noteworthy.

First and foremost, there is the need to understand West Irianian diversity. West Irianians are spread out over the island with footprints also found in Papua New Guinea. Each tribe has its own unique features and tends to be self-contained. Second, West Irianians tend to be inward-looking with a worldview and life style premised on traditions, culture and various rituals and practices. The challenge for any political or social-cul-

tural authority is how to co-exist with these culture and traditions. West Irianians do not like to be confronted and due to history and geography, have developed a simple approach and attitude towards external ideas and even authority. According to Bishop Leo Laba Ladja, the unwritten and unstated code of conduct and principle of all West Irianian is a simple one : 'Asal jangan gangu ketenangan kami' or 'as long as you do not threaten our peace', translated into "do not threaten our life style, beliefs and value system", the West Irianians do not really care and are more than prepared to accept whatever or whoever is the 'Payung'(umbrella) or over-arching authority.

Third, West Irianians, due to their culture, religion and value system are always in quest of harmony between man and nature, and between the micro and macro cosmos. As long as their life style, culture and traditions are not threatened, West Irianians believe that they are successful in their pursuit of harmony and in peace with the cosmos. Finally, even though there are sharp cleavages among the West Irianians, stemming from different tribes, religion, language, belief systems, between the highlanders and lowlanders, between the north and south, islanders and mainlanders, broadly speaking, West Irian can be divided into a number of cultural areas on the basis of ethno-linguistic characteristics. Even though within a particular cultural area, there might be differences, as long as there are broad compatibilities, a basis of unity and coexistence can be obtained and if there are conflicts, these can be resolved through traditional means of resolutions. The Dutch, due to their understanding and appreciation of West Irianian anthropology divided the territory into a number of regencies, which were largely coterminous with the cultural areas.²⁴ Today, leading West Irianians also value the importance of cultural areas and see them as important and appropriate 'governing units'. What this also implies is that like the Dutch, if West Irian is to be effectively governed, it should also be split up along cultural areas rather than some other determining mechanism. Don Flassy, a leading West Irianian nationalist and ethno-cultural specialist, has identified seven main cultural areas in West Irian as follows: Saireri, Doberai, Bomberai, Ha-Anim, Tabi, Lani-Paqo and Me-Pajo.²⁵

What the above discussion has demonstrated is that the key to understanding and appreciating West Irianian politics is their culture. If West Irian is to be compared to a painting, then culture is the canvass regardless of what is being drawn. While the drawing can change, what will remain critical and largely permanent is the canvass, and this is the ethno-cultural attribute of West Irian.

Suharto and the West Irianese issue

Suharto's role can be best highlighted by analysing his involvement in the different phases of the political evolution of West Irian.

1945-1949 : the phase of revolutionary war against the Dutch

In this phase, Suharto was minimally involved in the West Irian issue as, like other nationalists, he was more preoccupied with the military struggle focussed in Java. However, it is useful to note that during this period of revolutionary war, Suharto was appointed as commander of the third war area encompassing Jogjakarta region, then still occupied by the Dutch. His courageous action, with the help of the Sultan of Jogjakarta, to seize the capital of the Republic, albeit only for a mere 6 hours, helped to convince major powers that the Republic of Indonesia was not total in Dutch's hands. That particular Suharto's action eventually led to the Round Table conference in The Hague. Thus, Suharto emerged from the period of revolutionary war as a much applauded hero. Later his fame as commander of the third war region led him to the presidency.

Equally important, once the military struggle proved successful, the fact that West Irian remained a Dutch colony was something that continued to trouble many nationalists and this must be something that must have also impacted upon him. As he was later to elude, in Suharto's words, ever since the Round Table Conference failed to incorporate West Irian into the Republic of Indonesia, the West Irian issue has been "a thorn in the side of the republic".²⁶ The failure of the Dutch to transfer West Irian to Indonesia was considered a betrayal by the former colonial power and all sorts of allegations and conspiracies were alluded to as far as The Hague's motivations were concerned. Here, due to the Cold War and the West's, especially the Americans' reluctance to pressure the Dutch to decolonize the territory was viewed as an act of bad faith and where anachronistic acts were being condoned supposedly by a power, the US, that claimed to be anti-colonial in essence.

1950-1961 : the phase of diplomacy in recovering West Irian

During this phase, Suharto was also minimally involved in the West Irian issue. As a leading general, he was more preoccupied with the different internal challenges from various segments, be it the Darul Islam group, the Westerling revolt, etc. Increasingly, the inability and failure of Jakarta to regain the territory through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, especially at the United Nations, led to the heightening of militant nationalism and this was exploited by Sukarno to consolidate his domestic power base. This culminated in the collapse of Indonesia's democratic experiment, aided in part by the weak economy and American-supported separatist movements in Sumatra and Sulawesi. As Sukarno's militancy and brinkmanship with regard to the West Irian issue intensified and the public was mobilized in support of this anti-Dutch endeavour, nationalist fervour reached a new height and where all segments of society, including the military, were mobilized and united in regaining West Irian by force if necessary. Even though he was not directly involved in the West Irian conflict at this stage, Suharto's fame and prestige continued to rise. This period witnessed Suharto's rise to the prestigious post of Commander of Diponegoro division with the rank of Major General. Due to his fame as commander of the third war area (wehrkreise III), it placed him first amongst equals to the other generals. As such it was not surprising that

Sukarno appointed him as Commander of the Mandala Operation tasked with the recovery of West Irian from the Dutch.

1961-1963: the phase of military pressure and the successful recovery of West Irian

Against the backdrop of Sukarno's national mobilisation to recover West Irian by all means, Suharto directly entered into the West Irian fray. On 19 December 1961, Sukarno decreed the establishment of the People's Triple Command or Tri Komando Rakyat (Trikorra). The operational command of Trikorra was called Komando Mandala Pembebasan Irian Barat or the Mandala Command for the Liberation of West Irian with Major-General Suharto as its Commander. As Commander of the Mandala Command, Suharto's primary task was to mobilize and make preparations for the use of the military to regain control of West Irian by 1 January 1963. In preparation for this, the Mandala Command, which was a combined arms command, began land, air and sea infiltrations into West Irian. Suharto's main task was to plan for Operation Jayawijaya, "a full-scale joint amphibious assault to liberate West Irian by conquering Biak, the enemy's main power base".²⁷ The infiltrations and the various air and naval operations convinced the Americans that war was imminent and this forced Washington to pressure the Dutch to sue for a negotiated settlement. The Bunker 'deal' concluded on 15 August 1962 meant that Operation Jayawijaya was aborted and Suharto's planned military takeover of West Irian never eventuated. Still, in Suharto's view: 'Although the United Nations mediated the transfer of control over West Irian, the result should be attributed to our strong determination and drastic action taken. With the Jayawijaya Operation, we broke through the diplomatic impasse and returned West Irian to the protection of the Republic of Indonesia.'²⁸

1963-1965 : the phase of preliminary Indonesian domination

Having successfully overseen the initial incorporation of West Irian into the Republic, Suharto was deployed as the Commander of KOSTRAD. In this capacity, he had minimal involvement with regard to the West Irian issue. Though only minimally involved in the issue, he was fully aware of the implication that the government would face as a consequence of the Bunker deal and the New York agreement. He was also fully aware of the possible involvement of KOSTRAD in the implementation of the said agreements in the face that both civilian and military emplacement in West Irian as well as the rising opposition to West Irian's incorporation into Indonesia, especially from the nascent political elites trained by the Dutch.

1965-1969: the phase of challenge in the pre-Act of Free Choice Era

This period saw the rise of Suharto as acting president by decree that was issued by Sukarno and later, being constitutionally elected to the presidency. Psychologically, this represented a major transformation of Suharto, within a year, from a military man into a politician, having a Javanese cultural background. Against this backdrop of a politician-cum-Javanese-cum-military background, all his policies with regard to West Irian should be understood and analyzed. In this phase, three critical develop-

ments took place under the initial period of Suharto's political leadership in Indonesia. First, the West Irianians' opposition to Indonesian rule broke out militarily with the OPM becoming the sword bearer. Second, Jakarta signed the initial contract with Freeport, giving it concessions to exploit the copper and gold minerals. Third, the controversial Act of Free Choice was conducted that ended West Irian's legal and constitutional integration into the Republic of Indonesia and where the United Nations sanctioned this by taking 'note' of what had transpired.

1969-1998 : the phase of total Indonesian domination in the post-Act of Free Choice Era

As Suharto was directly involved in West Irian's integration into Indonesia through the Mandala Command, he had some knowledge of what the territory was all about. As he reflected later in his presidency: 'In matters of development, it is true that West Irian deserves special attention. In 1962, the region became a part of the Republic [factually not true as it was under the United Nations]. It was then the youngest province...that had chosen to integrate with us through a special process. When looking closely at the situation, West Irian was lagging 17 years behind other parts of Indonesia, a truly backward region. It was by chance that I came to know about the exact conditions there because as Mandala Commander I had to travel throughout the region. - - - When the New Order government began its national development program, I paid special attention to West Irian. I made the decision that the province must be able to equal the achievements of other regions. Subsequently, in addition to the development budget allocated for the provincial government, funds are now provided for the construction of development projects under Presidential Instructions such as for primary schools and health centres. In addition, there is a supplementary budget for the acceleration of regional development.

To this day, Irian Jaya is given special treatment in terms of development priority and funding in comparison with other provinces. Other regions need not envy this policy because West Irian is well behind them all in matters of development. The region really deserves a special policy and development assistance. This is carried out by the Minister of Home Affairs and is a political decision. West Irian must be able to taste the fruits of its freedom in the shortest possible time. Everyone is welcome to see for himself how the region is progressing.²⁹

In evaluating Suharto's role in West Irian, there are many approaches one can adopt. One useful method would be to analyse the political, economic, social-cultural, environmental and military-security policies that were adopted during the New Order era. What can one conclude about the impact of these policies? How effective have they been in addressing the special problems of West Irian, be it from the developmental or fruits of freedom perspective? Whatever position one takes, what cannot be denied is that there has been an ongoing conflict in the territory from the moment it was incorporated into Indonesia. The causes are many and what remains to be debated is the extent to which the Suharto govern-

ment was responsible for the problem? Or, are the roots more deep-seated in history or simply a function of the nature of the territory and its people. These will be examined in the following sections.

Suharto and the rise of West Irian's opposition.

The Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM or Organisation for Independent Papua's presence was the single most important testimony that there was opposition to Jakarta's policies, even legitimacy, in West Irian. For many West Irianians, the handover of the Dutch to Indonesia merely represented the passing of control from one 'colonial power' to another. The OPM and its supporters viewed Jakarta's relationship with the territory as nothing more than an exploitative one, and hence, the 'struggle'. In some ways, there is agreement among many analysts that large-scale exploitation has been taking place with very little benefits being accrued to the locals of the province. According to Adam Schwarz: 'In 1985, it (Irian Jaya) had the sixth highest per capita gross domestic product among Indonesia's 27 provinces but also had the highest incidence of rural poverty. Infant mortality in Irian Jaya is 133 per thousand, 85 per cent above the national average: life expectancy is just 48 years. "The people in the house called Irian Jaya feed those in other houses but are themselves starving. Do you think this is fair?" asked Irian Jaya's highly regarded governor Barnabas Suebu in a 1991 interview. The government must do more to make the investment climate in Irian Jaya more attractive. "I've asked for tax holidays, new credits, etc. but I'm still waiting for an answer", he said.³⁰

Against this backdrop, a number of problems and factors have fuelled the separatist challenge in West Irian. The main ones being :

1. Development of underdevelopment. In many ways, the grievances amongst the people began right after the integration of West Irian into the Republic of Indonesia stemming from economic reasons. In the period 1950 – 1962, the Dutch Government spent lavishly on infrastructure and other socio-economic projects, giving the locals what they have never experienced before, namely, economic prosperity. The much due and deserved largesse was very much appreciated particularly amongst the Irianese nationalist elites. However, right after the transfer of power, West Irian was placed under the administration of UNTEA which among other thing continued developing the area even though very little trickled down and this greatly angered the Papuan nationalists. With Indonesia in full control of the territory, the benefits from the 'economic tap' almost ceased and only the local cronies of Indonesia and key power holders from Jakarta benefited from the wealth of the province. This provided a major source of anger and is something that has continued to fuel the separatist struggle.
2. Feeling of racial discrimination. The West Irianians feel that they have very little freedom to manage their own communities and to actualise themselves, as the key and lucrative positions in government bodies and private companies are dominated by non-West Irianians. In short, there is a feeling of being 'colonised' by other Indonesians, many who unfortunately also happened to be non-Christians.

3. The aggressive exploitation of natural resources (copper, gold, timber) irrespective of local interests and traditions. This is best symbolised by Freeport Indonesia, an American company that literally dominates the West Irian economy and which has been operating in collusion with the Indonesian Government, especially during the Suharto era. Not only are the interests, traditions and land ownership rights of the West Irianians ignored, what is worse, very little benefits have accrued to them, with West Irian described as a 'treasure house' but where the locals are trapped in the cycle of poverty'.
4. Growing demographic imbalance between ' transmigrants' and the locals, with the former being given all the privileges and access, very often at the expense of the locals. There is fear among the West Irianians that there is a danger of them becoming minorities in their own land, especially to the more aggressive and capable ethnic groups from other parts of Indonesia, especially the Bugis and Balinese.
5. Growing unhappiness in the manner West Irian became part of Indonesia with the Act of Free Choice being described as nothing more than 'The Act of No Choice', thereby challenging the legal basis of West Irian's integration or restoration into Indonesia.
6. Gross violations of human rights by the security apparatus, especially the military when conducting operations against the OPM and other groups opposing Indonesia's political and economic presence in the province. The murder of Theys Eluay and other leading nationalists was symptomatic of this abuse.

Evaluating Suharto's role in the West Irian issue.

In hindsight, the manner Suharto approached the West Irian issue had varied consequences and implications for Indonesia, the territory and people of West Irian, and in turn, this had ramifications for Indonesia's image and standing world-wide. One can find both protagonists and antagonists toward Suharto's West Irian policy.

Successes

1. Succeeded in keeping West Irian within the NKRI fold.
2. Initiated large scale political, economic and social-cultural transformations of West Irian, making it a modern society along the lines of other provinces within a relatively short time frame.
3. Undertook massive infrastructure development in the province, especially in terms of building roads, schools, hospitals and places of worship.
4. Changed West Irian from a strategic backwater into a key centre of economic development by plugging it into the national and global economy.
5. Terminated the West Irian issue in domestic and international politics (at least initially), signalling the 'end of the revolution' and achievement of Indonesian territorial unity.
6. Within limits brought West Irian civil servants and military personnel to the national level by giving them an opportunity to participate in decision making at the various levels.

Failures

1. As integration was largely achieved through military means, the TNI was given a dominant role in West Irian and its society, and this was to have dire consequences in the long term in terms of Jakarta-West Irian relations due to the dominance of 'security' rather than 'prosperity' approach in managing West Irian.
2. Was unable to appreciate the complexity of West Irian society, in particular, the embedded nature of its tribalism.
3. Underestimated the extent and depth of West Irian nationalism, especially due to policies of the last Dutch Governor, Plateel, which provided the locals with a hope of self-determination and independence.
4. Undermined traditional *Adat*-oriented society through political, economic and social-cultural policies, especially by establishing a highly centralised administrative structure, perceived as a Javanese transplant (Bupati, Camat, Lurah, etc) that had no root in West Irian and worse still, undercut and marginalised the traditional leaders.
5. Was unable to integrate West Irian into the larger Indonesian society, signalling a failure in winning the 'hearts and minds' of the people.
6. Failed to control the Indonesian Armed Forces and other elements of the central government that harmed West Irian and its people.
7. Despite integrating West Irian into the national economy, economically the people barely benefited as there was minimal trickle-down effect. Developmental-oriented policies backfired as the people perceived them as being 'neo-colonised' by Jakarta.
8. Adopted Dutch policies of 'divide and rule' without understanding the paradigm of West Irian society and this had disastrous long term consequences in terms of centre-regional relations.
9. Adopted an attitude of superiority and ethnic stereo-typing, in effect, adopting a civilising mission to modernise the people of West Irian, in turn, creating massive disaffection in the territory.
10. Failed to act decisively against the rampant corruption in West Irian at almost every sector and level of the local government.
11. Failed to transpire good governance in the province.

Conclusion

In summary, the emergence of West Irian as a flashpoint in Indonesia has a longstanding history and is caused by a number of factors, the main ones being the perceived political hegemony of Jakarta that undermined the locals, the perception of the mainly 'Christian' West Irianians that 'Islamic' Indonesia is threatening their life style and culture, the insensitive manner various government-sponsored transmigration programmes have been implemented at the expense of the locals, the growing marginalisation of the locals, especially their access to traditional lands that are being occupied by foreign multinationals and non-West Irianians, the indiscriminate use of force by the security apparatus, with the Indonesian military being increasingly viewed as an 'occupation force' and most important of all, the rise of distrust of Jakarta at all levels of society. It is

against this background that many have argued, even fear, that there is the danger that West Irian may go the same way East Timor was lost.

In view of these strongly held grievances, from the perspective of the West Irian nationalists and opposition, their challenge to Jakarta is a legitimate one as the territory had already declared its intention to become a self-governing territory. This, according to the West Irian opposition was evident in the 1961 proclamation of independence, the unveiling of the West Irian flag and national anthem. West Irian nationalists argue that they are not secessionists, as dubbed by Jakarta and the security apparatus as they are only legitimately reclaiming what belongs to them, namely, their sovereignty that has been unjustly usurped from them. The West Irian opposition has argued that both the Dutch and Indonesia, with the support of the United Nations, United States and its allies such as Australia betrayed the trust of the West Irianians and for geo-political and geo-strategic reasons handed the territory to Indonesia. Hence, the suit against both the Netherlands and Indonesia, the former and present occupying power. The West Irian opposition has argued that both the Dutch and Indonesians are at fault and the source of the present problem in West Irian as they did not take cognisance of the situation and aspirations of the West Irianians as were expressed in 1961, namely that they wanted independence. To that extent, the issue of perception is an important one as the West Irianians nationalists' object being labelled as secessionist as they believe that they are only claiming what is their inalienable right to independence and sovereignty in West Irian.

ENDNOTES

- 1 In this study, West Irian refers to the piece of territory that the Dutch earlier referred to as Netherlands New Guinea. This was later renamed West Irian or Irian Barat. In 1973, Suharto renamed the territory Irian Jaya. In the post-Suharto period, the province was renamed Papua. Since then the territory was split into three provinces, first by President B.J. Habibie and later, President Megawati Sukarnoputri. The territory has been collectively referred to as Irian Jaya or West Irian as Papua is merely one of the three new provinces within it. The people of the territory can be referred to as West Irianians, Irianians or even Irianese. Some have collectively referred to them as Papuans.
- 2 See Jan H. Ramandel, *Dari Samudranta Ke Irian Jaya*, (Jayapura, Irian Jaya: CV. Bulan Bintang, 1999), p. 9.
- 3 *Ibid*, pp. 20-21.
- 4 *Ibid*, p. 3 and pp. 81-84.
- 5 For details, see *Irian Jaya in Figures 2000*, (Jayapura, Irian Jaya: Badan Perencanaan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan Daerah Propinsi Irian Jaya dan Badan Pusat Statistik Propensi Irian Jaya, 2001), pp. 3-9.
- 6 *Ibid*, p. 29.
- 7 This thinking was aptly captured by J.A.C. Mackie when he argued: "The rationale behind Indonesia's case was perfectly straightforward: her claim to Irian Jaya derived from the central principles of nationalism and anti-colo-

- nialism upon which her revolution against the Dutch had been fought. To abandon the claim would have been to deny those principles at a time when the very unity of the fragile new state depended on maintaining the principles of nationalism as paramount in the face of potentially secessionist regional dissident movements. Indonesians believed that in pursuing their claim to Irian Jaya they were merely trying to gain control over territory that should have been recognized as rightfully theirs from the outset. The Dutch were thought to be holding on to West New Guinea for no better reason than to use it as a base from which they could subvert and fragment the new Republic of Indonesia especially by stirring up trouble in the Moluccas and the other eastern islands of the archipelago. The Dutch tried to deny Indonesia's claim by stressing the racial differences between Indonesians of Java or Sumatra and the Melanesian inhabitants of West New Guinea, but Indonesia regarded this as irrelevant, since they themselves were ethnically a heterogeneous bunch and they did not regard racial affinities as the determining criteria of their nationhood". See J.A.C. Mackie, 'Does Indonesia have expansionist designs on Papua New Guinea?', in R.J. May (ed.), *Between Two Nations: The Indonesia-Papua New Guinea Border and West Papua Nationalism*, (Bathurst, N.S.W.: Robert Brown and Associates, 1986), p. 69.
- 8 This was articulated by the Australian Foreign Minister Percy Spender as follows: The Australian Government does not regard Dutch New Guinea as forming part of Indonesia. We believe that the peoples of West New Guinea have little in common, except a past common administration, with the peoples of Indonesia. Their developmental problems are separate and the level of political development necessitates placing them in a category quite different from the United States of Indonesia. In fact, we regard Dutch New Guinea as having much in common from an ethnic, administrative and development point of view with our own territories of New Guinea and Papua". See Cited in C.L.M. Penders, p. 301.
 - 9 This was clearly stated by Percy Spender in the following terms: "Experience has shown to the Australians how strategically vital to Australian defence is the mainland of New Guinea. I have pointed out before that we cannot alter our geography which for all times makes this area of supreme consequence to Australia. Quite apart from its military and strategic significance, one cannot disregard the ever-increasing Communist pressure in Asia. Communism has not got any foothold yet in Australian New Guinea. Australia is determined in so far as it can to ensure that it will not". Cited in L. Metzemaekers, "The Western New Guinea Problem", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 24, No. 2, (June 1951), pp. 139-140.
 - 10 Foreign Minister Percy Spender argued in August 1950: "If the claim of Indonesia to Dutch New Guinea were conceded to any degree at all, it would be a matter of time, no matter how genuine may be assurances to the contrary, when the claim will be pushed further so as to include the trust territory of Australian New Guinea and its people". Cited in C.L.M. Penders, *op cit*, p. 306.
 - 11 Cited in Peter Edwards (with Gregory Pemberton, *Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts, 1948-1965*, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1992), p. 201.
 - 12 See Audrey R. Kahin and George McT.Kahin, *Subversion As Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia*, (New York: The New

- Press, 1995).
- 13 Author's interview with Bishop Leo Laba Ladjar in Jayapura, 18 April 2005.
 - 14 See Papua in Figures 2003, (Jayapura: Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua, 2003), p. 90.
 - 15 Ibid, p. 97.
 - 16 Ibid, p. 129.
 - 17 Ibid, p. 54.
 - 18 See <http://eng.papua.go.id/profil/?halaman=8&ids=3>
 - 19 See <http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/cline/papua/deforestation.htm>
 - 20 See <http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/cline/papua/deforestation.htm>
 - 21 Estimates are derived from the value of timber per metric tonne multiplied by the average annual timber production in Papua.
 - 22 Interview with Mr. Willy Mandowen in Jayapura, Papua, on 18 April 2005.
 - 23 Ibid.
 - 24 During the reign of Governor P.J. Platteel, the Dutch divided Papua, first into four and later, six residencies. The seventh 'residency' referred to those regions that were under observation and their fate was yet to be decided. The six residencies were Hollandia, Geelvinkbaai, West Nieuw Guinea, Fak-fak, Zuid Nieuw Guinea and Centraal Bergland. The regions under observation were known as Exploratie-ressort included Westelijk Bergland, Midden Bergland, Bokondini en Swartvallei, Noord-Oost en West Baliem and Oosttelijk Bergland. See John RG Djopari, *Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 1993), p. 28.
 - 25 See Don A.L.Flassy, *Sinkronisasi UU-RI Untuk Papua: Indonesia Tampil Beda Provinsi-Provinsi Otsus Diurus Menteri Khusus Papua*, (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 2004), p. 11. For a more detailed study, see Don A.L.Flassy, *Ethnografi Papua: Pengetahuan Sosial Budaya Bagi Manajemen Pembangunan dan Pemerintahan*, (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 2002), pp. 48-59.
 - 26 Soeharto: *My Thoughts, Words and Deeds: An Autobiography*, as told to G.Dwipayana and Ramadhan K.H., (Jakarta: PT.Citra Lamtoro Gung Presada, 1991), p. 85.
 - 27 Ibid, p. 89.
 - 28 Ibid, p. 91.
 - 29 Ibid, pp. 91-92.
 - 30 Cited in Adam Schwarz, *A Nation In Waiting: Indonesia's Search For Stability*, (St.Leonards, N.S.W. Allen and Unwin, 1999) p. 64.

My experiences as a civil servant in West Papua (New Guinea)

Amapon J. Marey

The involvement of Papuans in the administration

The first School for Public Administration in Kota Nica was founded in 1944 by the Commanding Officer of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA), Captain Jan van Eechoud. It fell under the responsibility of General Douglas MacArthur and was supervised by Lieutenant General R.A. Wheeler, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander A.L. Moffit of the State Department, and the Senior Officer of NICA (SONICA), Colonel Raden Abdulkadir Widjoatmodjo. At that time, New Guinea was part of the South West Pacific Area; the war zone run by the United States. It explains why so many Americans were around in these parts of the world. Among them were Colonel Lyndon B. Johnson and Air Force Officer Richard Nixon. Lieutenant John Fitzgerald Kennedy had been rescued a year earlier, on 2 August 1943, by the Melanesians of the Solomon Islands. His gun-boat PT 109 was torpedoed during the night by the Japanese destroyer Amagiri.

Marcus and Frans Kaisiepo, Lucas Runkorem, Nicolaas Jouwe, Filemon Jufuway, Frans Djopari and August Matani were among the first students of the School for Public Administration in Kota Nica. They were to replace the Moluccan civil servants. Concerted efforts were made under Resident van Eechoud to develop the territory. Later on, in the 1950s, New Guinea was administratively divided into 6 divisions, 38 sub-divisions and 72 districts, respectively led by residents (divisional commissioners), sub-divisional heads (Hoofd Plaatselijk Bestuur), and district heads. Though the top officials were exclusively Dutch till the end, the lower echelons were increasingly staffed with well trained Papuan civil servants.

The foundation of village communities

These civil servants were responsible for pioneering and implementing vast development projects. The population was persuaded to carry out its share of building villages and constructing roads and airstrips. They did so in cooperation with the village heads, traditional tribal chiefs, preachers, missionaries and teachers. Throughout all this, the civil servants had to take the traditional law, the 'adat' of the local population, into consideration. That was especially so in matters related to the use of tribal lands. These were the traditional sacred lands in Papua and Melanesia that had to be handed down to the next generation. They are the food sheds, the supermarkets, of a rural society.

The link between the democratization process and independence

The decades between 1944 and the transfer of New Guinea to the United Nations in 1962 saw the introduction of the principles of democracy in the administration of New Guinea. In doing so, the Government could link up with traditions already available in Papua and all of Melanesia. Tribal consultation was generally known. The essence was that a tribal chief or matai never decided alone.

In Biak the first trial Regional Council, the Kankain Karkara Biak, was established in 1948. In later years, advisory councils were established in the townships of Hollandia, Biak, Fakfak and Merauke.

The Regional Councils

The first modern Regional Council for Biak and Numfor was established on 24 June 1959. The area was split up into polling districts, which chose their representatives through a system of indirect elections. Both men and women had suffrage. This modern administrative body had its own budget and took care of the development of the region. Soon after, some five other regional centres got their regional councils as well.

The New Guinea Council

The principle of a New Guinea Council was laid down in the Administrative Regulations for New Guinea that acquired force of law on 29 December 1949. Yet, the real preparations only began in 1960, at a time when sufficient administrative potential was available. West Papua was divided into constituencies. Each constituency put forward its own candidates. These were elected through a mixed system of nomination, indirect voting and direct elections. The latter took place in some of the larger cities. Here the "one man one vote" system could be applied, with active and passive suffrage for men and women. In these places, real electoral campaigns were organized, together with horns, banners, flags and posters. It was a grand occasion when on 5 April 1961 the New Guinea Council of 28 members was inaugurated. Vice-Minister Theo Bot and members of the Dutch parliament were present. Among the guests of honour were representatives of the governments and members of parliament of the surrounding Pacific countries. West Papua then possessed a parliament of its own, with more powers than expected. These actually surpassed those of the Legislative Council (LEGCO) in Port Moresby.

In October 1961, in all freedom and on their own initiative, prominent Papuan leaders and tribal chiefs assembled in Hollandia and formed a National Committee. Out of the many different designs that were submitted for a flag, the one by Nicolaas Jouwe was selected. The well known song 'Hai Tanahku Papua' was accepted as the anthem. After approval by the New Guinea Council and the Dutch Parliament, these symbols were al-

lowed to be used per 1 December 1961, alongside the national red, white and blue flag and the Dutch national anthem, the *Wilhelmus*.

Surinam and the Dutch Antilles already had their own flags. Now West Papua had its own flag too. This was not a sign of colonialism but of a mature democracy!

New Guinea in the South Pacific Conference

After slavery in the years preceding the First World War, colonialism too had to be abolished after the Second World War. All colonized countries and peoples were to become independent. The principle was laid down in the Declaration concerning Non Self-Governing Territories, mentioned in the Decolonization Resolution 1514 of December 1960. In it, no distinction was made between countries under Trusteeship and countries under direct colonial rule.

On a more modest level, preparatory work had been done from 1946 onward in the South Pacific Conference. In its regular meetings, representatives of Australia, England, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the United States discussed administrative policies in their own territories and the possibilities for cooperation. The governments involved reported to the United Nations annually. The result was a fruitful cooperation in the areas of economics, health care, and social and cultural affairs in the countries under their trust. For the population of West Papua it was a source of confidence and hope for the future.

It was the close cooperation between Australia and the Netherlands in particular that mattered for Papuans from both parts. After all, the population of both territories had much in common, and one might even ask whether a national boundary had ever existed between this one people. The answer is no. As was the case with many other Papuans, I too participated actively in the work of the South Pacific Conference. I was involved in the Youth Policy of the Conference. And as a reporter for the weekly *Pengantara* and the monthly *Triton*, I also attended the annual sports meetings between the secondary schools of Wewak (PNG) and Hollandia. Delegations of Papuan leaders went back and forth between Port Moresby and Hollandia. They discussed a merger of both parts in an independent country and in combination with the other islands in a Melanesian Federation.

On an official journey with Vice-Minister Bot

In January 1962, one of the last visits of our highest-ranking superior from The Hague, Vice-Minister Bot, took place. For the Papuans in general, and for me personally, he was a very amiable and caring father figure. For the civil servants he was a stern man. Governor Platteel asked me to join him as an adviser and interpreter. Together with Bot's official secretary

Degens, we travelled to as many administrative centres as possible. Our task was to explain Dutch policy to the Papuan people.

In the service of the UNTEA administration.

On 15 August 1962, I arrived in Hollandia on board a Cessna plane from Nabire, the capital of my native region. From the onboard radio the message came in that the agreement had been signed in New York. Upon my arrival at Sentani airport, the departure hall was crowded with Dutch families who were preparing to leave. I saw heartbreaking scenes of Papuan families and friends bidding farewell. Arriving at the coast, the same scenes took place on the quay of the harbour of Hollandia.

At the Office of the Resident I was entrusted with handling immigration tasks, such as handing out visas. The first Indonesian civil servants poured into the country. For every Dutchman leaving, five Indonesians entered. They came from an economically weak country and received UNTEA-salaries with valuable New Guinea Guilders.

Goods, household furniture and possessions belonging to the population were removed under threat, mistreatment and manslaughter under the motto: the colonial goods have to go! Beds and medical instruments belonging to the modern hospital in Dock II disappeared into the holds of dozens of rusty ships that were moored on the quays. At protests people were mistreated and killed. During the UNTEA administration meetings and assemblies were forbidden. That applied to the meetings of the Regional Councils and the New Guinea Council as well. There was no freedom of press. The Papuan population, who worked hard and had lived together with the Dutch in peace and harmony, was totally taken by surprise and intimidated by the practices of the "liberators".

During the term of the UNTEA administration the Pakistani troops with their wooden guns proved to be incapable of protecting the population. But this was not mentioned in any of UNTEA's reports to the United Nations. Yet, despite this, Secretary General U Thant seemed to be satisfied with them. Apparently, these reports were drafted as desired. He is also supposed to have wanted the UNTEA administrative period to be shortened per 1 January 1963, instead of 1 May. Up until then we had experienced very capable Dutch residents and the administration and civil services were fully Dutch-speaking. Now things changed, which led to many misunderstandings. The UN-administrators did not know the Dutch language and, except for the Englishman Gordon Carter, no Divisional Commissioner spoke Malay either. Their quality was below par. With some exceptions, such as the New Zealander Johnson in Biak and the British man Cameron in Fakfak, they were simply unfit for a resident function.

The population was supposed to be informed about the New York Agreement and the Act of Free Choice. However, the Divisional Commissioners

had no contact with the population whatsoever. Some checked the food supplies while others filled their refrigerators with whisky. A lot of siestas took place during office hours. It was therefore understandable that the Papuan population was completely sceptical about the UNTEA administration. We witnessed the fact that neither Governor Djalal Abdoh nor the Divisional Commissioners were effectively in charge of West Papua after 1 January 1963. Administratively, UNTEA was a complete failure!

At the UN during the presentation of the Ortiz-Sanz Report in 1969 During the Act of Free Choice, that lasted from 14 July until 2 August 1969, the 1,026 people whom Indonesia had selected all chose for accession to Indonesia. This had taken place in the presence of Mr Ortiz Sanz, the United Nations representative. With the Act of Free Choice accomplished, his only remaining task was to report to the General Assembly in September 1969. For us, Papuans, it was a last chance to have our voices heard. Papuan delegations led by Nicolaas Jouwe and Marcus Kaisiepo went to New York. We hoped for a fair discussion of that dubious event, and even that the Papuan people would get a new chance for an honest plebiscite. We were not the only ones who were dissatisfied with the way in which Indonesia and the UN had handled the matter. Many African, South American, and Scandinavian countries as well as France had their doubts about the process and the result.

However, we were very taken aback and fearful when we observed so many diplomatic mafia practices in the UN. In a resolution during the process of dealing with the Ortiz-Sanz Report on Wednesday 19 November 1969 in the General Assembly, Dr Richard Akwei, a Vice Chairman of the UN and Ambassador of Ghana, asked to give the Papuans the opportunity for a plebiscite in 1975. Unfortunately, the resolution was rejected. With that, the Papuan people were propelled back to the beginning of the 20th century. We, who witnessed the settlement of the Ortiz-Sanz Report, were forced to spend the rest of our life in the diaspora.

Conclusion

At the beginning of my speech I have shown you that in 1944 American leadership was involved in the formation of the Papuan leadership. Yet, in later years it was that same leadership under President Kennedy, that bartered away the American ideals of freedom and democracy as far as the Papuans were concerned. After that, the Netherlands, led by Luns and Udink, shirked out of the essential chapter of an international agreement that had been made without the Papuans. The *conditio sine qua non* of self-determination had obviously lost its relevance.

Finally, the Secretary General of the United Nations U Thant and his administrators were responsible for the administrative failure of UNTEA and for the first wave of inhumane and anti-democratic treatment of the Papuan people.

As civil servants of the Dutch administration we taught a primitive people to end their tribal wars, to trust the amberis and the white men. We encouraged them to take part in the modern world. So they had been used to the democratic system since the 1950s. The only result is that we have caused them prolonged misery.

However, the democratization process in Indonesia offers opportunities for a peaceful dialogue between Papuans and Indonesians. I am convinced that a democratic Indonesia will recognize the human dignity of the Papuans and offer them an opportunity to enter into a new future together with the Papuans.

Papua, a multi-faceted history

Pieter Drooglever

The old German TV-production *Anatomie einer Krise*, just introduced and shown to us by Rogier Smeele, gave us a look into the life of Papua in the period preceding the transfer of the administration from the Netherlands to the United Nations. It might be true that a film does not have the power to replace a written text, but it certainly has a narrative quality of its own. The medium confronts us very directly with the affairs and sentiments of the past. We saw the hoisting of the Morning Star and the parading of the Papua Volunteer Corps through the streets of Hollandia. We also saw the members of the New Guinea Council discussing the future of their country. All of them, events that tended to underline the policies of the day. The Papuans seemed to be well on the way towards a future as an independent nation. That remained the parole for the months to come. Even in the final days of the Dutch administration the Vice-Minister, Theo Bot, assured the public that it was still possible that the future would develop along the lines set out by the Netherlands. Though it was stipulated in the New York Agreement that the Papuans had to pass through an Indonesian interim-administration first, in the end they would have the opportunity to speak for themselves in an Act of Free Choice.

It was also the approach adopted by members of the Papua elite, though most of them had serious doubts about the viability of the plans. These were demonstrated during the interim-administration of the United Nations. A small group of Papuans that had been among the key players in the Dutch approach was offered a safe haven in the Netherlands. Most prominent among them were Nicolaas Jouwe and Marcus Kaisiepo. Those who remained in New Guinea had to face Indonesian rule and find ways and means to come to terms with it. It would prove no easy thing to do and, for the Papua population as a whole, much disappointment and misery was in store. Their introduction to the wider world, that had only begun during the first decades of the twentieth century, now took a turn for the worse. The question for them was and still is, how to define a position towards the Indonesian state that would be conducive to their survival and further development as fully entitled members of the human race.

The book that is launched today tells the story of the entrance of the Papuans into the modern world. The beginnings can be traced right back to the sixteenth century. During the first three hundred years of their presence in Asia, the Dutch were not very interested in the island at all. For them, New Guinea represented little more than a borderland that delineated their sphere of influence in Asia. It was only much later that the inhabitants became the object of their economic and educational aspirations as well. From 1949 on, different opinions on the future of the Papuans led to an increasingly bitter conflict between the Netherlands and the newly

created Indonesian state. In my book I tried to give a full account of these developments. For that reason it had to cover many aspects of life. These included international affairs, Dutch internal policies, internal rivalries in Indonesia and in New Guinea and the adaptation of the Papuans to Western culture. I had to cover the tactics of colonization and decolonization and the way these worked out for those involved. In telling the story, I based myself as much as possible on verifiable written information of the time. Moreover, I listened to the tales as told by those who were involved in the process, trying to check their memories with the written sources and vice versa. In other words, I took refuge in the time-honoured techniques of the historical trade, in which the hope of coming to a trustworthy reconstruction of the past has not succumbed entirely to the post-modern conviction that such a thing is completely impossible.

Here a word has to be said about a misunderstanding that is still very much alive today. It is the idea that I should have written a 'report'. Using that term, one is easily led to believe that what we have to deal with here is an analysis, leading up to clearly defined conclusions adapted to the needs of policymakers, lawyers and administrators. This was certainly not laid down in the terms of reference that were defined by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Institute of Netherlands History. Nor was it my intention. I was only asked to explain, as clearly as possible, the meaning of the Act of Free Choice, how it came about and the way in which it was executed. The result is an historical study that focuses on the history of West New Guinea in the twentieth century, carried through in full strength up to the year 1970 and rounded off with a few lines on the main developments up until the turn of the century. The approach is that of an ongoing story, presented in a chronological order. Yet, that order is regularly interrupted by excursions into the background of the various themes that determined the course of events. In this way, the different fields of diplomatic, political, cultural, economic, military and administrative history are linked together, making it possible to discuss them separately and yet detect the links that kept them together.

Notwithstanding the narrative approach, the story inevitably must lead to conclusions as well, and I have not hesitated to formulate them to the best of my knowledge. Yet, I took care not to enter too much into the field of speculation. The danger here lies in the fact that too specific statements on one aspect of the story inevitably must have consequences for one's opinion on the others. For that reason, I preferred to study these separate fields in a detached way, emphasizing the relevant forces within their own context. History, more often than not, is not the result of a grand conspiracy or some great and inescapable development towards a predetermined goal, but the result of the workings of many unequal forces, the outcome of which could have been rather different if one of them had reacted differently. So, history remains an open-ended story, and I took care to give the reader ample opportunity to be aware of it.

Within these limits, my reconstruction sheds light on many points that up to now were more or less shrouded in darkness. That certainly is largely attributable to the fact that I was offered ample access to the most relevant archives. That was not only true for the Netherlands. The kee-

pers of the archives in the United States, Australia, and the United Nations were very helpful as well. Moreover, the project matched precisely with the other project I was working on during these five years, namely the digital edition of documents on Dutch Indonesian relations during the years 1950-1963. This combination made it possible for me to focus fully on the affairs of New Guinea and Dutch-Indonesian relations during that period. As always, I profited much from the cooperation with Marian Schouten, who was my partner in the documentary project and whose factual knowledge and shrewd analyses were of great help. Moreover, the case of New Guinea has attracted attention from many different quarters recently, and I felt immensely stimulated by the work of various colleagues in many places of the world. Some of them are among the contributors to this seminar. Such an international setting creates a stimulating atmosphere, and for me it was a pleasure to take part in it. It is only unfortunate that, despite demonstrating a keen interest in the project, the Indonesian Government was not willing to support it. I hope to have found some compensation for the resulting loss from my many previous contacts with Indonesian politicians, students and just simple citizens. Moreover, there were instructive meetings with many Papuan informants and, not to be forgotten, there was the work of colleagues who had interviewed them before. Here I should mention the names of Richard Chauvel, John Saltford and Dirk Vlasblom, who have been prolific in the field. Effective cooperation can take place by progressing separately. It must be added, that much help and fruitful information was given by Leontine Visser and Jos Amapon Marey, who have an intimate knowledge of things going on in the land of the Papuans. Initially, Jos Amapon Marey tended to define our collaboration as one of a colonial civil servant with his Papuan adviser. We learned very soon, however, that such words had outlived their utility and that it would be better to replace them with the simple term of 'friends'.

The rise of Papua nationalism

Having said all this, you might expect me to give at least some idea of the content of the book. I will try to do so. My first remark must be on the decades preceding the Second World War. Most authors on the subject take it for granted that in these times it was all backwardness and neglect on the part of the Dutch. Yet, in my opinion that idea needs some amendment. Actually, it is largely a reflection of the frustration of contemporaries who had more ambitious plans with the territory than could be realised at the time. Yet, it does not imply that nothing at all was done. Ample reading in the files and reports of the period has convinced me that the results were far more far-reaching than is generally accepted. In 1941, at the beginning of the war in Asia, much of what was typical for the latter-day Papua-world was already present. Since the arrival of the first protestant missionaries in the second half of the 19th century and the establishment of the first administrative centres around the turn of the century, missionaries and government officials had steadily worked for the gradual introduction of the inhabitants of the coastal zones of Papua

into the complexities of the modern world. The work had been carried out slowly and with limited means, but it had been done effectively. It is doubtful whether more speed would have led to greater results. As it was, western thoughts and ways had penetrated the Papua world gradually, without disturbing its ways of living immediately or completely.

The effect, nevertheless, was that in 1941 in some of the coastal zones an elementary lettered society existed and the first traces of a modern elite could be found. Contacts had been made between people of different tribes and Christianity was taking root as the new religion. The Second World War indeed caused stagnation, but not a complete breach with that development. The withdrawal of Dutch control led in many places to a revival of magic modes of thinking. Yet, these too showed signs that some of the new elements had already been introduced. Such was the case on the island of Biak. Here, a messiah arose who promised to reshape the golden past. His followers ran into the thousands. His program contained many traditional elements. Yet, it included modern ideas as well, such as proto-nationalistic representations of a new Papua State with a flag and new modes of organization. It reflected a longing for social justice and modern techniques. The leaders of this Koreri tried to adapt their traditional way of living to the promises of a new world through magic means. It happened not only in Biak, but in other places as well.

This episode of what we may call 'naïve adaptation' did not last long. Already in April 1944 the western penetration began anew. It did so in a spectacular way with the arrival of the land, sea and air forces of the American general Douglas MacArthur on the shores of Hollandia. They dropped huge quantities of all the riches of the world along the coast and in no time constructed a vast network of roads, harbours, airfields, warehouses and buildings. To the onlooking Papuans it was the fulfilment of the old prophesies on the return of the golden age of yore. Yet, the element of modernity was not lost on them either. It was stimulated by the fact that American negroes, who were as black as the Papuans themselves, apparently played an important role in the incoming armies. They even asked them to lend a hand. It strengthened the self-confidence of the Papuans and kindled their ambition to become like them.

They were stimulated to do so by the incoming Dutch administration that started a development program which was speeded up after 1950. The following successive governors were linked to this administration: J.P.K. van Eechoud, S.L.J. van Waardenburg, J. van Baal and P.J. Platteel. In retrospect it was a rather effective enterprise that was gladly supported by most of the population within its reach. Yet, the Dutch administrators demonstrated a considerable restraint in speeding up the process of 'pacification' and development too much. That was evident in the discussions from the 1950s on the need for a rapid introduction of the administrative system into as yet unknown parts of the interior. Some of the most prominent officials pleaded for a slowing down of the process. According to them, such expansion was only allowed to happen once the government had sufficient numbers of trained civil servants, teachers, police, military personnel and missionaries at its disposal. When the follow-up would fall short, it would be difficult to control the process. Therefore, it was only

in the second half of the 1950s that more attention was paid to the pacification of the Central Mountains. In 1962, when West New Guinea was transferred to the United Nations, the process was far from complete.

That restraint was not only the result of a lack of means and men. Essentially, it was a deliberate policy based on earlier experiences with the phenomenon of regression. When a new administration began pressing too hard for change, people would increasingly be forced into opposition. This was patently evident in the so-called Obano Revolt that took place in the Wissel Lakes region in 1956. It was not a modern-political revolt, but primarily a matter of resistance by a traditional society towards incoming influences from outside that upset the universe the population had known for ages. In later years, under Indonesian rule, such revolts took place again. The logic of the theory obliges us to ascribe these at least partially to the same causes. Yet, by then the revolts were stronger and more difficult to suppress. That must be attributed to the tendency of the Indonesian administration to enforce its policies with an unrelenting fierceness. Yet, there were other differences as well. By the 1960s, the champions of the resistance were members of a new elite who had experienced the workings of a modern administration. From 1965 on, such revolts happened against the background of the impending Act of Free Choice, giving them distinct political overtones.

Seen from a greater distance, developments in West New Guinea did not differ essentially from those in the rest of the former Netherlands Indies. Everywhere, a process of modernization took place that changed the mindset of the inhabitants, the character of the state and the attitude of the inhabitants towards it. Sure, the Papuans had a culture that differed markedly from that of the rest of Indonesia. It had its effect on the kind of nationalism that developed here. Yet, it was the matter of phasing that added much to the differences. In New Guinea, everything happened decades later. Indonesian nationalism as it had originated on Java during the 1920s did not touch the Papuans. The Korori might have had some proto-national undertones, but these certainly did not include the concept of an independent Indonesia. It was still so at the time of the proclamation of that independence on 17 August 1945. Moreover, at that time there were additional factors that contributed towards setting the Papuans apart from the rest of Indonesia. New Guinea had already been free from the grip of Japan for more than a year and Papuans had actively participated in crushing the remaining Japanese troops. The coming of MacArthur with his black soldiers had kindled a pride in their identity as black men. Moreover, the sufferings of the war had come to them mainly through the hands of Ambonese officials of the pre-war Dutch administration. It had sharpened already existing anti-Indonesian feelings. Curiously enough, these 'anti-amberi' sentiments were not transferred to the returning Netherlands administration. The renewed Dutch interest was much appreciated and Jan van Eechoud, the leading official of the time, saw fit to tap into these sentiments. He opened for them the prospect of further development and managed to stir enthusiasm for it under the tiny elite of young Papuans from the North Coast. It was for that reason that Van Eechoud was baptized by them the Bapa Papua, the father of the Papuans.

The sentiment was to grow stronger with the years to come. That was especially so after 1950, when West New Guinea from one day to another was cut off from the rest of Indonesia and became a separate government, placed directly under The Hague. The Dutch presence was now much more visible than before. The resulting active development policies and the increasing budgets were welcomed by the Papuans and strengthened their self esteem. Conversely, Indonesia was now beginning to show an inimical face. It made itself felt through small military pin-pricks. The infiltrating Indonesians were seen by most Papuans as enemies that formed a threat to their security. That feeling was strengthened by the Indonesian propaganda that came to them through the radio-stations in Ambon and Makassar. It was directed against the Dutch administration, but most Papuans felt it as meant for them too. So they actively participated in the defence of their country. Small wonder such things intensified their own sense of identity. It was also strengthened by the mutual contacts of the youth of the various Papuan tribes through common schooling and the common participation in the institutions of the colonial state. It was stimulated moreover by the policies of the Government, that pointed towards further development and, maybe, to a common future with the inhabitants of the eastern half of New Guinea that was administered by Australia. Indeed, the Netherlands and Australian administrations were discussing such programs and the small but gradually expanding group of better educated Papuans applauded them.

The rising national sentiment was voiced clear and loud in the debates in the New Guinea Council and in the newly formed political parties of the early 1960s. Here Papuans asked to have a flag and national anthem of their own. Their National Papua Congress, held in Hollandia in October 1961, can be compared with the Congress of the Indonesian Youth of 1928. On that occasion, the young nationalists of Indonesia pledged themselves to the ideal of a free and independent Indonesia. The meeting in Hollandia was a prelude to a free Papua. In doing so, the participants set themselves squarely against the ambitions of their predecessors on Java, thirty-four years earlier. This antithesis was further deepened after the transfer to Indonesia. In the early 1960s the Papuans had smelled the taste of a better future in freedom. The reality since 1962 meant a bitter disappointment, and it has been difficult for them to come to terms with it ever since.

West New Guinea and Indonesian decolonization

So far for the development of a Papuan identity. To a certain extent it was a rather normal process under the conditions of twentieth century colonial administration. Without a doubt it was accelerated by the exclusion of New Guinea from the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949. In most academic studies, this exclusion is attributed to resentment on the part of the Dutch and an inability to accept the end of their Indonesian empire gracefully. By 1966 the term Trauma of Decolonization had already been coined by the political scientist Arent Lijphart. There is some truth in the statement, but the reality is more complicated. The split of the country

was not only the result of Dutch traumas. We have already seen that the Papuans had remained outside the mainstream of Indonesian nationalism. For the pre-war period, that was certainly not the result of Dutch manipulation or pressure. There simply was no need for it. For the years that followed, the answer is more complicated. In my book I have tended to accentuate the Dutch preference for a federal construction in the era of decolonization in Indonesia. The approach is open to the suspicion that it was meant as a system of divide and rule and to continue Dutch supremacy in a different form. There are indeed elements of truth in this. Yet, at the time of its conception, it was also the obvious instrument to unite again the various parts of the country that had fallen to pieces through the forces of war and revolution. In it, the component parts would be united, though having a considerable degree of autonomy themselves. In Linggarjati, a rather elementary blueprint of a sovereign Indonesian federation was discussed with the leaders of nationalist Indonesia in November 1946. The outcome was laid down in a draft contract. The guiding principle was the right of self-determination, not only for Indonesia as a whole, but also for its component parts.

The draft that had been negotiated in Indonesia was a bridge too far for the Dutch policymakers in The Hague. It was criticized on many points. In the case of New Guinea it was argued that self-determination was not practicable for the time being since the population had not developed far enough to make such far-reaching decisions. The agreement was amended accordingly. It probably was not an act of great statesmanship by the Dutch parliament to do so, but it was nevertheless a defensible thesis and had nothing to do with a trauma or a psychological deviation of any kind. In this provision of 1946 we can already discern the outlines of the later Act of Free Choice. The Papuans had to speak for themselves when the time was right. It meant the starting point of the dispute with the Indonesian nationalists, who refused to accept the Dutch amendment. At the Round Table Conference (RTC) of 1949 that laid down the conditions of the transfer, much pressure was needed to have it accepted by the Indonesian negotiators. The exemption of New Guinea could only enter the treaty after heated discussions and in a rather imperfect form. In my book I examine the manoeuvres that led to that outcome, among others those of Van Eechoud who at that time was still the administrator of the territory. He did so with the support of the first generation of Papuan nationalists.

Yet, even then, the exemption did not necessarily imply separation from the rest of Indonesia. In the RTC-agreements the possibility for a solution within the larger context of the Indonesian federation and the Netherlands-Indonesian Union was held open. This option faded away in the following years as a result of the developments in Indonesia where new political realities created their own priorities. The federation was pushed aside for an Indonesian unitary state, the Union came to nothing and the Netherlands applied itself to the development of Western New Guinea according to its own ideas. For the rest of the 1950s the government got full support for this policy from large majorities in the Dutch parliament.

In this way, the conditions were set for a serious conflict between Indonesia and the Netherlands. The question has been asked before: was New Guinea the cause or consequence of the two countries drifting apart? A definitive answer is difficult to give, but the outcome of my research tends to confirm the thesis that it was part of a conflict that would have happened anyway. The Hague defended its interests in Indonesia against Indonesian claims to the contrary. Actually, New Guinea was both subject and catalyst in the conflict. For leading circles in Jakarta the fight for New Guinea was both an end in itself and a readily available tool in the internal struggle for power. Territorial claims are often a welcome asset in the public debate. For the Dutch, resentment over failed policies was certainly a stimulating factor. Here, Lijpharts trauma may find its place. Yet, many in the Netherlands seriously felt that there was work to do for the good of the Papuans, and that they had an obligation to do so. For the explanation of this sentiment psychiatry hardly seems applicable.

Seen from a legal point of view, both the Dutch and the Indonesians had some good arguments on their side. Indonesia could easily argue that the territory had been a part of the Netherlands Indies and that full and complete sovereignty had been handed over to Indonesia under point one of the Charter of the RTC Agreements. The Dutch could claim, with good reasons as well, that the second point stipulated that New Guinea was left out of the transfer, and that the status of the territory still had to be discussed between the two contending parties. Initially, the conflict was conceived as one of interpreting the text of the RTC Agreements. Indonesia, however, rejected a proposal made by the Netherlands to leave the decisions in the hands of the International Court of Justice. That refusal was the expression of a mixture of uncertainty, unwillingness, hurt pride and, last but not least, political opportunity.

The dispute became near to insoluble when Indonesia from 1951 onwards defended its position with the argument that the island had been a part of the Indonesian Republic ever since the Proclamation of Independence of 17 August 1945. So, a discussion on sovereignty in terms of the RTC-agreements was a bygone affair. What mattered now was to make arrangements for the handing over of the administration to Indonesia. From an Indonesian point of view it might have been a logical thing to do, since they increasingly tended to regard the proclamation as the single birthmark of their state. Yet, for the Dutch, setting aside the complete discussion leading up to the RTC Agreements was quite unacceptable. So further negotiations came to nothing. I have mapped out the subsequent events rather fully in my chapter on the Geneva Conference of 1955/56, where all the sore points in the relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia were discussed. My central argument is that in Geneva neither of the two parties was willing to make even the slightest move on the point of New Guinea, while in Jakarta political forces that were intent on a complete break were gaining ground daily. The way out was a break on the less dangerous point of arbitrage in conflicts on economic affairs. It can be argued that it was the best option for the two negotiators, the foreign ministers Joseph Luns and Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung. Through it, they could limit the damage as much as possible. The weak spot in my argument, however, is that neither of them ever said so and continued

to blame each other. However that may be, events in Geneva made clear that Indonesia was entering its second revolutionary phase, marked by the concentration of power in the hands of president Soekarno, balanced against that of the army and the communists.

Wavering doubts in Washington

The position of the United States of America is the third central theme in my book. Here, too, the story is too complicated to explain in a few words. During most of the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration took a rather neutral stand in the conflict between the two contending parties. That changed after the misfire of a reckless CIA-intervention in the internal Indonesian politics in 1958, which led Washington to conclude that the army was the strongest force within the Indonesian state. From that time on, it started a project to reconstruct the Indonesian armed forces, providing them with all kinds of weapons. It did so in competition with the Soviet Union, that had already started a program of its own earlier. As a result, the offensive capabilities of the Indonesian forces increased sharply in the following years. It created a direct threat for the Dutch. To counter that effect, the Americans asked Indonesia for assurances not to use the weapons provided by them against the Dutch on New Guinea. Though lightly given by the Indonesians, these were of small solace to the Dutch. Somewhat more assuring were promises made by the Americans to the Dutch to provide assistance in the event of such an assault materialising. For a while these promises looked rather reassuring. Taken to the letter, they were formulated strongly enough to have political meaning. It must be added that foreign minister Joseph Luns kept the Dutch cabinet informed, as was his duty. The trust put in these promises was the joint responsibility of the cabinet. However, when the assault came in 1962 the American promise for military assistance had shrunk to one of solely providing help with the evacuation of the territory.

In these critical years of changing American attitudes and increasing Indonesian strength, the Netherlands was governed by a conservative alliance led by the catholic prime minister, J. de Quay. Together with his Vice-Minister for Overseas Affairs, Theo Bot, he worked for a breakthrough in the impasse that had existed since the failure of the conference at Geneva. To this end, both came with suggestions for the internationalisation of the administration of New Guinea. In this way they hoped to share responsibility with more partners, preferably under the umbrella of the United Nations. The weak point in this policy was that it almost inevitably implied that new negotiations would have to be held with Indonesia. It was only with great hesitation that in the middle of 1961 foreign minister Luns decided to join De Quay and Bot on this road. He did so with the firm resolution to keep Indonesia at bay as far as possible.

The incongruity of that policy became clear during the ensuing negotiations in the General Assembly of the United Nations, in which the United States assumed a leading role. In the end it led to a statement from the Dutch Government on 2 January 1962 that it was willing to resume negotiations with Indonesia. The government in Jakarta did the same.

The direct result was a series of long, drawn out discussions on the pre-conditions for such talks. The remarkable thing is that both Luns and the Indonesian president Sukarno followed parallel policies. Both were bidding for time. Sukarno, because he hoped to have his assault forces in full swing before real talks would begin; Luns because he speculated that either the political system within Indonesia would collapse or the military expedition would crumble on its road towards the shores of New Guinea. It was again mainly American pressure that brought them back to the conference table before one of these options materialized. It led to the New York Agreement of 15 August 1962, which laid down the conditions for the transfer of the administration of West New Guinea to Indonesia. The matter of sovereignty was left out completely since further talks on it would lead to no results. According to the agreement, the Netherlands would transfer full administrative responsibility to the United Nations, which after a couple of months would hand over these responsibilities to the government of Indonesia. Upon insistence from the Netherlands and the United Nations it was further agreed that after some years of Indonesian administration a plebiscite would take place in which the Papuans could make a choice for continued Indonesian administration or some other solution. It was the most the Netherlands had been able to make from their promise of self-determination that had begun in Linggarjati fifteen years earlier. In the terms of the New York Agreement, the plebiscite was styled the Act of Free Choice. What it really meant is discussed in the closing chapters of the book.

An Act of Free Choice

The UN administration that replaced the Dutch in October 1962 was not much of a success. It was grossly understaffed and was lacking in quality and motivation. It could only act as a buffer that enabled the Netherlands to withdraw its personnel from New Guinea and allowed Indonesia to introduce its own officials and soldiers. The latter were very soon in a position to do as they liked, intimidating at will the Papuans in the streets. The administration soon acquired military overtones. In 1969, with the coming of the Act of Free Choice, the number of soldiers had increased to about 18,000. The period in between was marked by violence and plunder. The first revolt took place in Manokwari in 1965. It was suppressed for a while, but from that time onwards more Papuans tried to prepare themselves for the coming Act. Yet, their possibilities to do so were very limited. In that same year, 1965, the high-ranking UN-official José Rolz-Bennett visited the territory to discuss the forthcoming plebiscite with the local functionaries. For leading Papuans it seemed a golden opportunity to have their voices heard, but they were given no chance. Rolz Bennett simply refused to talk with them. His visit was also in vain as far as the Indonesians were concerned: at the time of his arrival both Sukarno and his foreign minister Subandrio left for a visit to China. It was a clear demonstration of the fact that, for them, the Act of Free Choice had no priority at all.

The attitude of the Indonesian Government changed somewhat after the rise of General Suharto to the presidency in the following year. One of his first acts was to declare publicly that in the province of Irian Barat a plebiscite would be held. He did this not because he had any sympathy with the plight of the Papuans but rather because he wished to improve his international reputation. Economically, Indonesia was in ruins and international credit was the first thing that was needed for its survival. Suharto made clear that he certainly meant no separation and that the Papuans had to stick to the rules set by Indonesia. An outcome that was anything less than full-fledged support for integration with Indonesia would be unacceptable.

In my book I explain in some detail the way in which Indonesia organized the Act, the reactions of the Papuans as well as those of the international world. The research is based mainly on UN archives and those of Australia and the United States. Additional use has been made of interviews with Papuans and other persons who, in some way or another, had played a role in the episode. A word has to be said on the dissertation of John Saltford that had been published at about the same time I started my research. Since the chapters on the subject can be regarded as the essential parts of my book, I wanted to form my own opinion first. So I only consulted his book after I had finished my own concept. After that, I read John's writings and found that his was a fine piece of work from which I could still profit. The most important thing, however, was that essentially the outcome of our two research studies run parallel with each other, which strengthens the validity of both works.

That outcome necessarily was a negative one on the point of self-determination. We both could note that Suharto certainly lived up to his words. The Indonesian diplomats and military firmly took the lead and did not allow others to intervene in what they regarded as their exclusive domain. The Act of Free Choice was carried through under conditions that denied the Papuans even the smallest chance to speak for themselves. The procedures more or less followed the lines laid down in the New York Agreement, but all things were explained to the advantage of the Indonesian point of view, leaving not the smallest room for that of others. To a certain extent that was made possible by the fact that the formulations of the New York Agreement had left many essentials in the dark. The other reason was that the will to make the best of it was completely lacking on the side of the most interested powers, the policymakers in Washington and New York in the first place.

That can be demonstrated by the way the matter was handled. During the implementation of the Act of Free Choice in 1968 and 1969, the members of the UN staff in Indonesia and New York increasingly felt cornered by Indonesian ruthlessness, but did not dare to risk a clash with Indonesia. It was appreciated by them that the country at least outwardly was willing to operate through the United Nations again. In the autumn of 1969, when the Act of Free Choice had been brought to its predictable end, the leader of the UN-team in New Guinea, Fernando Ortiz-Sanz, reported to the secretary general of the United Nations, U Thant. He did so in rather high spirits, passing over all the things that had gone wrong and dwelling largely upon petty events that could be construed as victories

for his own mission. The Secretary General U Thant followed suit and in his own report to the General Assembly he observed with diplomatic refinement that in West New Guinea Indonesia had carried through an Act of Free Choice. Note the indefinite article! In such half-hearted terms U Thant indicated that he was not willing to discuss the merits of the event and the way his organization had lived up to the terms of the New York Agreement of 1962.

Notwithstanding its many shortcomings, that agreement had at least laid down that the Act of Free Choice had to be in accordance with international custom. In 1969 it seemed to be forgotten by most parties for convenient reasons. Only a limited number of African and Latin American countries seriously censured the way Indonesia had handled matters. Joseph Luns, still the Netherlands foreign minister, vented his dismay in the most careful words. He too took care not to antagonize Indonesia. On 19 December 1969, the General Assembly of the United Nations 'took note' of the Ortiz Sanz report with an overwhelming majority, thus giving its sanction to the ending of a conflict that had haunted the relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia for decades. It also left the Papuans to the care of the Indonesians.

In my book, I have revisited the history of the Papuans of West New Guinea from the old days of fragmentation and simple tribal life through the days of colonial administration to those of being a plaything in international politics. I have described the proceedings during the infamous Act of Free Choice as well, that made a mockery of the elementary principles of any consultation that is worth its salt. With its acceptance by the General Assembly of the United Nations, the question regarding the sovereignty over the land of the Papuans had disappeared from the agenda. If it will ever be revived or not is not for a historian to decide. It is a question that has to be left to lawyers more versed in the legal principles of the United Nations. The most important thing, however, is the development of future relations between the government of Indonesia and its easternmost subjects. Discussions on the subject will continue in the years to come. Throughout these discussions, elements from the past will pop up again and again. I hope that at such moments my book will render the services the initiators had in mind when they requested it, and which the author set out to provide during the long and pleasant days of writing.

An Act of Free Choice: Summary

Pieter Drooglever

In this book, we have followed the fortunes of the inhabitants of western New Guinea from the first exploration of their territory by the Spanish in the sixteenth century. This formed part of the voyages of discovery by means of which the maritime European nations extended their claims to authority overseas. The first chapter summarises the history up to the Second World War. The key point made is that the area was gradually drawn under the sphere of influence of the Dutch centre of power in Batavia. The interest in the capital of the Netherlands East Indies was not really commercial in nature, because New Guinea had too little to offer the world economy at that time. The reason for involvement was primarily political/strategic in nature; fixing the eastern border of the Dutch sphere of influence in Asia. An attempt was initially made to establish this under international law by supporting the vaguely defined claims to authority of the East Indian principality of Tidore, which had in turn recognised Dutch sovereignty. During the nineteenth century, with the arrival of positive international law, the emphasis was in addition increasingly placed on exercising actual deeds of authority as a reason for justifying the sovereignty of the Netherlands. From 1865 onwards, the Dutch government made it clear to the outside world that it regarded the 141st meridian as the eastern border of its sphere of power. In this way, a border was created which was subsequently accepted by the English and the Germans without discussion and thereby gained international legitimacy.

Up to the end of the nineteenth century, these European claims meant little to the local population. There was some coastal trade and in 1855, the first missionaries settled on the north coast, although initially without much success. This changed when permanent Dutch administrative centres were established in three locations around the turn of the century. These were located in Manokwari, Fakfak and Merauke. Although only limited resources were available for these centres, this did however signal the start of the reformation of the crumbled world of the Papuans of western New Guinea. Hand in hand with the work of the missions and administrative centres, there was a steady expansion of Western cultural and economic influence in the coastal areas, and the inland region was also explored and mapped out bit by bit. By the time the Second World War broke out, the conditions for the development of a new Papuan society had been created. This had a Christian orientation. This Dutch penetration had also led to closer contact between the Papuans and the population of the Indonesian archipelago, who were involved in these activities on New Guinea. Predominantly Amboinese in the north and Kai in the south, they came from the training centres established by the missionaries on their own islands. This also created a demarcation between a Protestant north and a Catholic south, even if this never became a hard and fast border.

There was a large gap between the Amboinese and Kai officials, teachers and clerics on the one hand and the Papuan population on the other. The first group looked down on the less developed Papuans and treated them accordingly. For their part, the Papuans, already suspicious of outsiders or 'amberi' who had, in earlier years, plundered their coasts as participants in the hongi tours from Ternate and Tidore, found their existing aversion deepening. This did not as a rule extend to the Europeans, who were ultimately responsible for the arrival of the Moluccan middle management, without whose help they could not have carried out their development programme for this area. This anti-amberi sentiment was the negative form of the Papuans' own sense of identity.

The development of Indonesian nationalism entirely passed the Papuans by. This was not just because of their low level of development, but also because of the related one-way communication with the rest of the Netherlands East Indies. The inhabitants of the latter visited New Guinea, but apart from some traffic with the closer islands, the Papuans did not travel to the centres of the Netherlands East Indies, which had little to offer them. In the single case where Papuans were indeed sent to Java as school pupils, they felt like fish out of water.

The Second World War and its aftermath increased this gap. The anti-amberi sentiment was strengthened because the Moluccan officials were used as enforcers of the Japanese coercive measures. In this respect, the position was similar to that in the rest of Indonesia, where comparable situations arose. This was the only point of similarity, however. New Guinea had no nationalist movement, the anti-Dutch nature of which could be encouraged by the occupiers. The disorganisation that accompanied the war did however lead to a revival of old cultural patterns in a number of locations. In Biak, this took the form of a messianic movement, which also incorporated elements of the new era. For the first time, people talked about a Papuan flag and a Papuan state, but embedded in ancient ideas. This was the Koreroi, which is discussed in chapter two.

This chapter also shows that New Guinea had, in most respects, a different occupation history than the rest of Indonesia. It was only partially occupied. The Dutch influence continued to prevail in the south and in the interior. The occupation was also shorter and the island was liberated by the American army in the middle of 1944 already. The Dutch were also involved in this, and quickly took the administration back into their own hands. As a result, the restoration of power took place well before the independent Indonesian Republic was proclaimed on Java on 17 August 1945. With a few exceptions, the Indonesian revolution passed New Guinea by. Under the firm hand of the enthusiastic Commissioner Van Eechoud, the thread of the pre-war administration was once again picked up, but with a new emphasis. As an authority on the world of the Papuans, he was fully aware of its special character. Partly in view of the revolution underway in the other parts of the Netherlands East Indies, he started creating a Papuan elite who could lead their own people during a complex period. This administrative policy was continued, with far

more resources than before, after the transfer of sovereignty in the rest of Indonesia. Chapter six follows this development until around 1958. Armed with the knowledge and experience gained in Indonesia, efforts were made to create a model colony which was, from the Dutch side, increasingly regarded as a unit which should be separate from Indonesia.

The Indonesian revolution and the ensuing transfer of sovereignty on 27 December 1949 determined the development of western New Guinea in the following decades. Chapter three outlines the policy followed by the Netherlands in respect of these historical events and discusses New Guinea's place in this in somewhat greater detail. It is argued that the concept of the right of self-determination was the key to the Dutch policy. This right was propagated at the beginning of the Second World War, particularly by the Americans, as one of the aims of the war. It was a particular instance of the older emancipation policy, which was, as far as the Netherlands was concerned, geared towards the archipelago as a whole during the first decades of the twentieth century. The different kinds of developments which occurred within the archipelago did not hamper this at the time, because the view was that the time had not yet come to take this policy to its ultimate conclusion. The wish to retain permanent relations - the Dutch variant on the theme of European imperial ambitions - also acted as a brake. After 1945, these hesitations were set aside one by one. Under the leadership of Lieutenant Governor General Van Mook, tailor-made solutions were sought, with good use being made of the right of self-determination recently included in the Charter of the United Nations. A distinction was at the time made between the right to self-determination of Indonesia as a whole and that of the constituent parts. This was not only the result of the unequal social development in the various parts of the archipelago and the divergent degrees to which the revolution had made headway in these, but was, from the Dutch point of view, also a usable tactical instrument to channel the revolution in an acceptable direction. The right of self-determination could therefore be made to serve Dutch interests and ambitions.

This led to the system of federalism, which would, within the larger relationships of a Dutch-Indonesian Union and an Indonesian federation, leave room for the right of the constituent parts to be able to decide on their own place. The outlines of this structure were laid down in the agreement of Lingadjadi between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. The draft was initialled by both parties in November 1946. This already gave the names of the federal states that would have to make up the federation, but whether these could in fact be created was still uncertain. It was therefore stipulated in article 3 that if the population of certain areas 'democratically' indicated that they did not yet want to accede to the federation, such an area would be granted a special relationship with the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

During the further discussion of the draft by the Dutch cabinet, it was established that separate provision would have to be made for New Guinea, since its population could not yet be regarded as capable of deciding

on their own fate. The Dutch guardianship would have to be continued for a longer period there. This immediately created a complication since, precisely because the Papuans could not be regarded as being capable of deciding on their own fate, this exceptional situation could not be brought about for them by democratic means. Article 3 had shot itself in the foot. The Dutch government and the parliament wanted to rectify this by incorporating this exceptional position directly in the agreement, but this was rejected by the Republic. The agreement of Linggadjati was therefore signed in March 1947 by both parties out of desperation without agreement having been reached on this point.

The ensuing period was one of intensive consultation between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic, interrupted by periods of military campaigns, which would continue until the end of 1949. What was at stake was, among other things, the organisation of the future independent Indonesia, with the Netherlands hanging onto the federal concept and the Republic, although it had agreed to this on paper, in reality not wishing to let go of the idea of a unitary state. During these discussions, the place of New Guinea always played a role in the background. The Dutch reasons for the exceptional treatment of this area were the very low level of development, the entirely different national character and the virtual absence of Indonesian nationalistic sentiment among the population. A supplementary argument was that the Indonesia-born Dutch would be able to have their own place in the tropical sun here, even after the Dutch flag had ceased to fly over the rest of the archipelago.

It was also of importance that Commissioner van Eechoud, in consultation with opposition groups in the Netherlands, saw a chance to keep attention focused on the special position of the area entrusted to him. In doing so, he was able to make skilful use of the mining opportunities offered by New Guinea. The significance of these and a number of other arguments is elaborated in chapter four. Not one argument was strong enough on its own to risk the failure of an agreement with the Republic, but in combination they proved strong enough to clinch matters. As a result, the Netherlands dug in its heels on this point during the Round Table Conference (RTC) of 1949 and New Guinea was for the time being excluded from the transfer of sovereignty. This was laid down in the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty. Article 1 stated that the Netherlands transferred full sovereignty over Indonesia to the United States of Indonesia, while article 2 stipulated that New Guinea was excluded from the transfer for the time being. The solution for the dispute that had arisen because of this would have to be found within a year.

The wording was ambiguous, and could be interpreted in several ways. As would become apparent, and as the experts had expected, the Netherlands had saddled itself with a multitude of problems. The initial reaction was not so pessimistic, because a solution could possibly have been found within the relationships between the Dutch-Indonesian Union and the Indonesian federation which would have made a certain distribution of tasks possible. This never got off the ground, however, because the

federation was abolished by the Indonesian parties six months after it came into existence and there was little or no inclination on their part to give more substance to the Union. Under these circumstances, it was not possible to devise a position for New Guinea which was acceptable to all parties. This course of events is discussed in chapter five. The Dutch government clung to an interpretation in terms of which the text of the RTC agreement guaranteed its right to continue exercising sovereignty. The Indonesian government took the opposite view and refused to cooperate in eliciting a ruling from the International Court of Justice. Indonesia then took up an even more fundamental position, namely that New Guinea had been included in the proclamation of the independent Indonesian Republic of 17 August 1945 and that discussion with the Netherlands was only possible on that basis. Negotiations could therefore only be held about the manner in which control would be transferred to Indonesia, not about the principle of sovereignty or the rights of the Papuans. Under these circumstances, the successive discussions came to nothing. This conclusion could in fact have been drawn in the spring of 1951 already, but the final nail in the coffin was the failure of a conference held in Geneva around the end of 1955/beginning of 1956. The story is sketched against the background of the internal developments in Indonesia and the rapidly deteriorating relationship with the Netherlands. The statement, often made by the Dutch, that New Guinea was not the reason for the conflict but was being used by the Indonesian government to drive it forward, is, in the main, endorsed here. This statement does not of course detract from the fact that New Guinea did indeed form part of the conflict. Without New Guinea, it would have lost part of its focus.

In chapter seven, the attention shifts to the developments in Indonesia and to the international situation in the second half of the fifties. The end of an uprising in the outlying areas of Indonesia against the authority of the central government in Jakarta and a failed American attempt to intervene in favour of the rebels constituted the turning point in the position of the United States. From that time onwards, Indonesia could count on more international support, which was intensified by the Cold War. All this led to an arms race on the equator, as both Russia and the United States, each supported by a number of their allies, outbid one another to provide Indonesia with weapons under favourable conditions. The pressure that built up as a result was effectively aimed at the Netherlands. Separate attention is paid to the relationship between the Netherlands and the United States, which shows that the American government was, until around 1960, still prepared to exercise considerable pressure on the Indonesian government to dissuade it from acting against its European ally. The successive American Secretaries of State, Dulles and Herter, assured their colleague Luns in fairly general terms that the Netherlands could count on America's assistance in an emergency. It is shown that these guarantees were not without significance, but that they were always worded in such a way that the American government was free to determine, when it came down to it, how far it actually wanted to go.

Nonetheless, with its simultaneous and much more extensive support for Indonesia, the State Department found itself doing the splits, a position that it could only maintain with difficulty. In Washington, there was intensive internal discussion about an alternative policy. The conflicting American actions were also raising doubts in the Netherlands, but Minister Luns was able to, more or less, reassure the Dutch cabinet by keeping them meticulously up to date about the guarantees given to him by Dulles and Herter. The cabinet did however learn the lesson that international support could only be counted on if the Netherlands also took the necessary steps itself. This led to the dispatch of the aircraft carrier *Karel Doorman* in 1960, which was required to temporarily strengthen New Guinea's defences. In addition to America's attitude, Australia's position is also discussed. As the ruler of the eastern half of New Guinea and Indonesia's closest neighbour, Australia saw itself as a party closely involved in the affairs of the Dutch part. The government in Canberra was generally on the side of the Netherlands, as can be seen from the plans developed for administrative cooperation. It was however very aware that it could not support the Netherlands if America did not unconditionally hold the same view.

Chapter eight discusses how the estrangement of Indonesia, the way in which Indonesia was arming itself and the half-hearted attitude of Washington led to uncertainty among the Dutch public. This was strengthened by the behaviour of the Dutch Reformed Church and a separate, many-hued opposition in which journalist Oltmans, businessman Rijkens and Professor Duynstee from Nijmegen set the pace. Indonesian contacts played an undeniable role in this regard. Moreover, decolonization gained momentum internationally as well because of the hasty withdrawal of the Belgians from the Congo. All these factors together weakened support in the Netherlands for the policy followed by the government up to that time. This happened at a time when the Red-Roman coalition, under the leadership of Prime Minister Drees, dropped out of the picture and was replaced by a centre-right coalition led by J. De Quay of the Roman Catholic People's Party. The Social Democratic Party disappeared into the opposition, where it could freely express the doubts existing among its members about the policy followed up to then. The new Prime Minister and some of the members of his cabinet had the same doubts, however. The aims of the policy were not abandoned, but new ways of achieving these were sought. In this regard, an important role was set aside for State Secretary Th. Bot, who had already, as an official involved in the Round Table Conference and its aftermath, played with the idea of internationalising the government of New Guinea in one way or another in 1950. In this way, he hoped to get international support for the policy pursued by the Netherlands. After taking office as State Secretary, charged with special administrative responsibility for New Guinea, he raised these ideas again, this time in discussions and in a number of policy documents from 1960. He found Prime Minister De Quay a willing listener.

Initially, this was very much contrary to what Luns wanted, but the Minister was forced to go along with this, at least partially, when it became

clear that the cabinet was not prepared to support him through thick and thin, and given that the American attitude at the time of the voyage of the Karel Doorman was anything but reassuring. Luns did not want a war either, especially not without firmer American guarantees. An uncertain factor was furthermore that the elections in the United States in November 1960 had brought a new president to power. This was the democrat John F Kennedy, and it was not certain what his attitude to the New Guinea question would be. The first cautious steps towards the possibility of a limited form of international involvement were taken in the late summer of 1960. A year later this led to the drawing up of the Luns Plan, which was submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations. This contained the offer to place New Guinea under international rule, however on condition that Indonesia would play no part in this. This plan was however withdrawn, because it became apparent during the preliminary talks that this was a step too far for the General Assembly. The general feeling was that the Netherlands would first have to talk to Indonesia. Immediately after the end of the meeting, President Soekarno announced that an operational commando was being set up whose task was to occupy New Guinea by force of arms. This meant that the Netherlands came under pressure from a number of sides at the same time. After thorough discussion of the possibilities and objectives, the Dutch government hesitantly declared on 2 January 1962 that it was prepared to include Indonesia in the discussions on the future of New Guinea. This also meant that it would immediately be faced with the Indonesian assumption that it had had sovereignty over the area since 1945, so that all that needed to be discussed was how to arrange the transfer.

The progress of the ensuing negotiations under American pressure and the threat of Indonesian military action are sketched in chapter nine. First there was a period where the parties sounded each other out, with neither party wanting to let go of its known starting position right at the outset. Luns showed himself to be ready to talk, but subject to a large number of conditions. This was partly because he expected Indonesia to collapse either politically or militarily during the negotiations, after which he could persuade the Americans to take up a position more favourable to the Netherlands. To ensure that it was prepared for all eventualities, the Netherlands substantially strengthened the defence system on New Guinea. The matter turned out differently than Luns had wished, however. The Kennedy government proved to be of little help in strengthening the Dutch defences on New Guinea and brought political pressure to bear on the Netherlands. It also became clear that Indonesia was in fact in a position to continue its military build-up. Intelligence services reported that the country would be in a position to send a large force to New Guinea in the second half of 1962. In April, the deadlock was broken by an American proposal that had been hatched in the State Department long before. This was known as the Bunker Plan, under which New Guinea would be transferred to Indonesia after a short interim period during which it would be administered by the United Nations. The question of how to react to this divided the cabinet, but not to such an extent

as to cause a rupture. After extensive discussion, the Dutch government accepted this plan as the point of departure for the negotiations, even if they would have to try to hold onto the right of self-determination for the Papuans as far as possible.

The drama ended with the Agreement of New York of 15 August 1962, which laid down the more or less immediate transfer of power over New Guinea to the United Nations, followed some time later by a transfer of power to Indonesia. As a concession to Dutch wishes, an Act of Free Choice would take place before the end of 1969, by means of which the Papuans would be able to indicate whether they wanted to continue with Indonesia or not. This was, like all the previous agreements with Indonesia, a document that was vaguely worded on a number of essential points, to the detriment of the Netherlands. This was a reflection of the weak Dutch negotiating position. These uncertainties related in particular to the duration of the transition period and the guarantees for the implementation of an internationally acceptable referendum. The responsibility for the latter was left entirely in the hands of Indonesia, with the United Nations only having the task of lending a helping hand if Indonesia requested this. The vagueness also had its advantages, however. The Netherlands could console itself with the thought that, as matters lay, it had done its best for the Papuans. This opinion was in any event eagerly put forward by the Dutch government to the outside world. Internally, people knew better. When the agreement was signed on 15 August 1962, the Dutch Council of Ministers was disillusioned about the poor outcome of the consultations, while Luns publicly vented his spleen on the American government.

The last chapters deal mainly with the events on New Guinea. The account is, where necessary, interrupted by considerations about international developments and the reactions to these in the Netherlands. Chapter ten gives an outline of the last years of Dutch rule. After Bot took office, a great deal of effort was put into the accelerated education of the Papuans. They were now involved as a political factor. To this end, district councils were set up in the separate residencies and a New Guinea council for the entire area. From the platforms provided in this way, a small group of Papuans was able to develop new initiatives for their political future and introduce themselves to the Dutch public. How this was done is explained in chapter eleven. In doing so, they developed their own, supplementary, organisational forms. In their statements, they showed themselves to be enthusiastic advocates of the right of self-determination, but they also indicated that they hoped that the Netherlands would not abandon them just yet. Immediate independence was the last thing they wanted. Their attitude towards Indonesia was generally guarded, although there were some exceptions to this.

On the whole, this attitude reflected the policy followed by the Dutch government. This was geared towards greater independence, but developed in the context of the conflict with the aggressive Indonesia. Key points of this policy were the formation of the New Guinea Council in April 1961, followed the same year by the adoption of a flag and a national anthem.

Setting up the New Guinea Council required careful preparation in order to achieve as representative a body as possible. Adopting a flag and a national anthem went more quickly. This initiative came entirely from the Papuan side, but was taken up by the Dutch authorities and laid down in ordinances surprisingly quickly. We must remember that this took place during the period when Luns was trying, and failing, to sell his plan to the United Nations. The first hoisting of the flag on 1 December 1961 was greeted with joy everywhere. The Papuans of western New Guinea now had a widely accepted symbol of their own identity. It was also understood as such, not just in the Netherlands but also in Jakarta. Soekarno saw the raising of the flag for what it was: a direct rejection of the proclamation of 1945 and the unmistakable beginning of the formation of a Papuan state. The Trikora speech in which he announced the attack on New Guinea was therefore, in so many words, directed against this as well.

It is however also shown that this interpretation encountered objections from the Dutch side. The flag was expressly intended as a regional flag, not by definition as the flag of a new state. The final decision about this would have to be left to the Papuans themselves, via the right of self-determination. Furthermore, it was at that time becoming ever clearer that discussion with Indonesia could not be avoided, and that it was desirable to point this out to the Papuans. This did indeed play a role in the information given to the Papuans, even if the Dutch found it hard to be overly explicit, especially since the vast majority of Papuans did not like the idea. After all, Indonesia had been seen as the enemy for years, an enemy that not only made negative comments about what was going on on the island, but was also always needling them with military incursions which had to be warded off by the Dutch with the assistance of the Papuan police. From the end of 1961 onwards, Jakarta's behaviour, both in word and deed, was outright threatening. It was not easy to maintain a high degree of neutrality in these circumstances. Nevertheless, the Papuan elite finally also became aware of the need to do so. Once it had become clear on 15 August 1962 that the days of Dutch rule were at an end, there was intensive discussion among this elite about their own position. Self-determination remained the primary aim, but to achieve this it was necessary to reach a workable relationship with Indonesia. It is therefore possible to state at the end of chapter eleven that the top layer of Papuan society, albeit small and still in the initial stage of development, had a notable understanding of the reality. At the beginning of September, a hastily convened Papuan congress decided to accept the consequences of the agreement. Those present accepted the arrival of the Indonesians, but also decided to hold on to the Act of Free Choice laid down in the Agreement of New York.

In chapter twelve we discuss the transition period under the flag of the United Nations and the first years of Indonesian rule from 1962 onwards. The UN administration lacked the necessary power, the will and the expertise to bring about a truly neutral interim phase. It did however make the organised withdrawal of the Dutch administration possible as well as the transfer of its tasks to the Indonesian successors. Initially, the Pa-

puan officials and policemen took over many of these tasks, particularly at local government level. At the same time, Indonesian soldiers and officials were pouring into the country in far larger numbers than planned and quickly took control. They exerted heavy pressure on the Papuans to choose their side publicly and to give up the dream of self-determination. Furthermore, the first signs of the violent action taken by the Indonesian military, which would also characterise the new administration in the coming decades, soon appeared. Rapid impoverishment ensued, together with a substantial decline in legal certainty and a loss of civil rights across the board. This was accompanied by a systematic breaking down of everything that harked back to the Netherlands, to be replaced with the Indonesian body of ideas on planned democracy. This led to increasingly negative reactions from the Papuans. The hinterland of Manokwari, in particular, was in a permanent state of opposition from 1965 onwards, which was combated with hard-handed military action. The number of victims quickly rose into the thousands.

Initially, the most politically aware Papuans pinned their hopes on the Act of Free Choice. The Indonesians, however, showed little interest in actually implementing this. Jakarta's attitude changed when Soeharto took office as the new president of Indonesia. He found the country in a state of disorganisation and economic upheaval and urgently needed international credit. To get this, Indonesia needed international respectability. Indonesia had to show that it could keep to international treaties. Implementing the Act of Free Choice, the last part of the Agreement of New York, offered the opportunity to do just that. Nevertheless, the new president did stipulate a proviso, namely that no outcome other than a ruling in favour of Indonesia would be acceptable to him.

The process got underway in the summer of 1968 with the arrival of Ortiz Sanz, who, as the representative of the secretary-general of the United Nations, was supposed to assist Indonesia in implementing the Act of Free Choice. How this played out is discussed in chapter thirteen. Initially, Ortiz Sanz was in good spirits and hoped to be able to organise a referendum which would be credible by international standards. His expectations in this regard were strengthened by the attitude of the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adam Malik, who had already visited New Guinea previously and who had been forced, after his return, to admit that there had been serious mismanagement. Malik indicated that he wanted to improve matters, not just the administration as such but also the way in which the Act of Free Choice was to be implemented. The limits of this willingness were however determined by the position of the president.

The reality was accordingly a bitter disappointment to Ortiz Sanz. Indonesian pressure meant that his team was kept very small. After his arrival on New Guinea in September 1968 he was overrun with petitions from Papuans complaining about Indonesian mismanagement in all kinds of areas. He took these complaints seriously and passed them on to his Indonesian counterpart Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro, asking him to take the

required action. Sudjarwo regarded this as inappropriate interference, which meant that their relationship was on a bad footing virtually from the outset. Indonesia disregarded his advice about the form of the referendum and chose instead the system of *musyawarah*, labelled as a traditional Indonesian system. This term had only been referred to in the agreement for the interpretation of one part, but now became the leading principle for the entire referendum. Under this system, only collective decisions were possible and perfect consensus was a prerequisite.

Chapter fourteen discusses the formation of the consultative councils, as well as the ensuing execution of the Act of Free Choice. Ortiz Sanz was not allowed to play any part in putting together the electorate and was given the smallest possible role in the implementation of the referendum itself. The course of events is followed based on the reports of diplomats and journalists, who were able to be present at or observe various parts of the process. Papuans who were involved in the execution of the Act of Free Choice also have their say. The reports from the United Nations and Indonesian government are also used. In the opinion of the Western observers and the Papuans who have spoken out about this, the Act of Free Choice ended up as a sham, where a press-ganged electorate acting under a great deal of pressure appeared to have unanimously declared itself in favour of Indonesia.

The implementation of the Act of Free Choice was supervised from New York by top United Nations officials. They exerted hardly any counter-pressure against the Indonesian plans and practices, however; nor, for that matter, did The Hague or Washington. In The Hague, Minister Luns, still active as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, took the view that the Netherlands did acknowledge a moral responsibility, but did not, according to the text of the agreement, have the scope to take action itself. Dutch action remained limited to being understanding about the Indonesian behaviour without publicly endorsing this. In the meantime, the tide had turned in The Hague and all hopes were pinned on good cooperation with Indonesia. Nevertheless, the Lower House did put some pressure on the government to make an effort to support an open referendum for the Papuans. This led to a meeting between Dutch and Indonesian ministers in Rome in May 1969. In a statement made after the meeting, the Dutch ministers took cognisance of the Indonesian approach, and expressed the expectation that there would be full agreement between the Indonesian government and the secretary-general of the UN about the implementation of the referendum. Malik, Luns and Udink furthermore announced their joint intention to collaborate in the economic development of the area. The Rome declaration confirmed the basic assumption that had applied up to that point, namely that the United Nations would ultimately have to come to an understanding with Indonesia about the approach to be followed. It gave Ortiz Sanz no foothold from which he could influence the direction of events.

The final report of the secretary-general of the United Nations was entirely based on a very rosy-hued report from Ortiz Sanz on his role in the im-

plementation of the Act of Free Choice. It contained only weak criticism of the opposition from the Indonesian side. On the basis of this, U Thant could do nothing other than conclude that an Act of Free Choice had been held. He was unable to use the definite article, because the representative value of the operation had been far below the standards laid down in the Agreement of New York. Although this could be interpreted as a scathing judgement, the vagueness of the wording also made it possible, for those who wished to do so, to simply pass over it in silence.

The final round took place in October and November 1969 in the General Assembly of the United Nations, where the Netherlands and Indonesia worked together to shepherd the secretary-general's report through the meeting. The United States also lent a helping hand. Although in pragmatic terms the latter was to a large degree responsible for the course of events that had led to the Agreement of New York and therefore to the Act of Free Choice, the United States, like the Netherlands, hid behind the United Nations, which had therefore drawn the short straw. There was however strong criticism from a group of African countries which had been sympathetic to the problems of the Papuans since 1961. It was of little use. An amendment submitted by them to the effect that a new referendum should be organised in a number of years was rejected with a clear majority of votes. The result was that the council accepted the resolution jointly submitted by the Netherlands and Indonesia, in which it declared that it took cognisance of the report, with thirty abstentions but no 'nay' votes. The 'New Guinea question' had therefore been settled in accordance with the text of the agreement and could be removed from the agenda of the United Nations.

Finally, attention is paid to the concluding discussions in the Dutch parliament in 1962 and 1969. These took place after the conclusion of the agreement and the implementation of the Act of Free Choice, respectively. In both cases, the question of sovereignty came up for discussion, a question which had divided Indonesia and the Netherlands since 1950. It was not dealt with in the text of the agreement. After the Agreement of New York was concluded, all the parties took the position that the rounding off process in the United Nations would be the final phase of the transfer of sovereignty. This would then have taken place *de facto*, if not *de jure*. This was emphatically underlined by the Dutch government in both 1962 and 1969 in a number of statements before parliament. Accordingly, once the General Assembly had taken cognisance of the final report of the secretary-general about the completion of this final part of the agreement, this signalled the end of the conflict about the sovereignty of western New Guinea. This did not mean that there was no future involvement on the Dutch side. This was expressed in a pledge, signed by Indonesia and the Netherlands, to collaborate in the development of western New Guinea. The Dutch government took the view, both then and later, that the Netherlands would only be able to do something for its former subjects by collaborating effectively with Indonesia.

The above was a summary of the content and principal conclusions of this study. The end of the Act of Free Choice meant the start of an Indonesian administration that was fully accepted by the international community. The feared general rebellion of the Papuans failed to materialise, but there was nevertheless continued unrest. In 1971, the militant resistance movement OPM declared independence. This resistance was however harshly dealt with and in any case remained a marginal phenomenon. West Irian, now renamed as Irian Jaya (the victorious Irian), was declared an autonomous province which was under the responsibility of the Minister of the Interior. In reality the situation remained as it had been since 1963: an area under rather unsuccessful military rule, that continued to show all the characteristics of the preceding period. A forced cultural offensive came to nothing. Indonesia imposed its own norms on the Papuan population. Criticism or opposition was not tolerated and was harshly punished. It is difficult to estimate the number of people who fell victim to this. Figures running into the tens of thousands have been mentioned.

A legal research group linked to Yale University found, in their report from 2003, the facts which had become known to them sufficiently serious to use the ominous word genocide to describe the situation. This implied that in the group's opinion, the behaviour of the Indonesian government suggests that it was out to destroy the Papuans as such. This pronouncement was however accompanied by the requisite doubts. These doubts are, in my opinion, correct, to the extent that this group should not have come to this conclusion. Of course, the violence of the Indonesian administration pointed out by the group is a real fact. It is indeed apparent already from the account given by us of the first years of Indonesian rule. According to the statements of Papuans with a considerable knowledge of what was going on, not a day went by during the following decades when no one died or no one was seriously mistreated. Furthermore, Indonesia now started using the area, on a larger scale than before, to soak up the overflow of its own fast-growing population. The Papuans usually came off worst in this regard. During this process, they lost more and more ground, with most of the jobs also going to the immigrants. These were processes which were also apparent elsewhere in Indonesia, but were most oppressive in West Irian. The cities became replicas of the average Indonesian city: densely populated and dirty.

On the positive side, however, the previously stable and slowly growing Papuan population increased by more than 50% under Indonesian rule. Furthermore, the Indonesian government continued to support education, not just via its own bodies, but also via the existing church institutions. This meant that the education of the Papuan youth continued to progress. Furthermore, more contact with the rest of Indonesia via contact with the newcomers, via the media and by means of personal visits outside the island, ensured a broadening of the Papuans' horizons. Integrating the Papuans into the body of the state remained problematic, however. Officials educated during the period of Dutch rule usually remained in the lower ranks. The arrival of the Indonesian administration had put an end to the formal professional structure of the government organisa-

tion, where education was closely linked to career development. Now appointments were all about having the right friends and connections, and this meant that the Papuans lost out. The financing of the government machinery was shaky, which meant that the government officials had to find part of their income locally themselves. This was also the case for the army, which, it is estimated, only received thirty percent of its financing from the treasury. Added to all this was the fact that West Irian was not, and had never been, a popular post, which led to a high turnover of Indonesian officials.

It goes without saying that such a system paves the way for all kinds of abuses. The Papuans had little chance of succeeding. After the retirement of Frans Kaisiepo in 1973, Izaak Hindom became the next Papuan governor in 1982. His arrival made little difference to the balance of power. Nor did it lead to any noticeable integration of Papuans into the business world, even if the latter was flourishing. Once the Act of Free Choice had taken place, the extraction of oil once again got going and the copper already discovered in the Carsztens mountains before the war could be exploited under the more stable conditions of the Soeharto administration by the American mining company Freeport. This constituted a rich source of income for the Indonesian treasury and for the elite in Jakarta, insofar as the latter was involved in the management and central administration of the company. The positive effects on the local economy remained negligible, however; the disadvantages, in the form of pollution and land loss, were therefore all the greater. The Papuan population is one of the poorest groups in Indonesia.

The organisational and mental integration into the Indonesian state was not achieved. When the tide turned in 1998 and Soeharto's regime came to an end, this created a power vacuum during which the population of New Guinea could once again speak freely and the problems of the area became visible to the outside world for a while. One thing was clear: Indonesia had not succeeded in winning the hearts of the Papuans. Their behaviour showed that their own national consciousness had in the meantime increased sharply. By means of their own disciplined behaviour, the leading Papuans in church and society managed to prevent serious riots, and were able to bring the voice of the Papuans to the attention of the Indonesian government and the world in a dignified yet insistent manner. The result was that during a visit to Jayapura on New Year's Day 2000, the Indonesian president Abdurrachman Wahid promised to improve the government and conceded that the name Irian Jaya, which was seen as a symbol of Indonesian domination, could be replaced by the name Papua. This was a key point in the series of events with which we opened this book. Since then, the clock has to a large extent been turned back. Papua is, however, still waiting for the genuine fulfilment of the promises made about broad autonomy. This is no one-sided affair, and what the Papuans themselves have to say will have to weigh heavily in the implementation of this promise. The first condition for this is freedom of speech and movement. This immediately brings to mind the words of the Indonesian minister Adam Malik, who publicly announced, during his visit to the

area in 1996, that the army would first have to be withdrawn before Papuan society would be able to develop. Since he spoke these words, the pressure exerted by the army and police on the population has, however, only increased.

This book tells the story of the entry of the population of New Guinea into modern times. The Netherlands acted as the intermediary in this process until 1962. A great deal of attention has therefore been paid in this study to the objectives of the Dutch policy. These were initially strategic in nature: establishing the eastern border of Batavia's sphere of authority. With the creation of the first administrative centres in 1898, the Dutch went a step further. The aim was now, to use the words of Commissioner Plate, 'to turn savages into people'. The terminology chosen fitted in with the idea of guardianship prevalent at the time, which gave the colonial administration the task of educating those under its rule. Once Dutch rule had been established, the coastal population slowly but surely came under the sphere of influence of the modern world. This became much more urgent with the onset of decolonization. More explicitly and in modern language, the move towards self-determination became the main aim of the Dutch policy in respect of New Guinea from 1945 onwards. Efforts to achieve this were intensified after 1950. The exclusion from the transfer of sovereignty in 1950 resulted in an additional twelve years of Dutch rule, during which a great deal was done for the country and its population. The Papuan world of 1962 differed radically from that of 1950, let alone 1900. Broad development had taken place and a small but high calibre upper class had been formed, who would, if given the chance, be able to lead society as a whole in the long term. Under the Indonesian regime, this development continued in fits and starts, however without offering the prospect of this elite actually being able to play the leading and guiding role intended for it.

It could be argued, given the last point, that it would in fact have been better to transfer sovereignty in 1950. The society would indeed have developed more slowly, but via the influence of the missions, which were also able to continue their work elsewhere in Indonesia, the direction followed would nevertheless have been the same. Perhaps then the mistrust and enmity, which still characterises the relationship between Papuans and Indonesians today, would not have arisen. This argument is an attractive one, but does not do justice to the scope and power of the constructive work that took place between 1950 and 1962. Furthermore, it all too easily assumes that the split between the Papuans and Indonesians could then have been avoided. This is not at all certain, however. The anti-amberi sentiment was already present in full force in 1950, and the negative Indonesian attitude towards the Papuans was likewise well established. A speedy transfer would not have prevented the formation of a military regime, nor the accompanying violence. In social terms, the Papuans would, in 1950, have had much less chance to establish their own identity. As matters were, they undoubtedly found themselves in an extremely difficult position in 1963, but Papuan society was better able to defend itself than it would have been without the extended Dutch rule.

It is however also clear that the desired ultimate aim of the Dutch policy has not been achieved, nor the integration desired by Indonesia. This book was not written to speculate about what could have been, nor to say what the future should look like. The aim is to give as faithful an account as possible of the complex process of the entry of the population of western New Guinea into the world of the twentieth century. This does not mean that this story can be told or read without any emotions or feelings. Those who have become engrossed in the impossible position that the Papuans have found themselves in over the course of this history, can only hope, with the author, that their fate will take a turn for the better in the new century. The factors on which such a fate can be based can be found in the above. They lie in the possibilities of Papuan society itself, which has produced the necessary self-control, wisdom and resilience to ensure its survival. They also lie in the interest shown by the international community, which has interfered with the course of events in all kinds of ways and, in doing so, has often been the primary driving force behind change. This was most clearly expressed in the processes that led to the conclusion of the Agreement of New York and the regulations based on this. For those who are able to bear it, historical responsibility should also have significance under international law.

The possibilities for a better future for the inhabitants of western New Guinea can also be found in Indonesia's interest in the area, for Indonesia not only has a tradition of military and authoritarian rule, but also of cultured interaction and efforts to provide good government. We can only hope that the latter two aspects gain the upper hand. Finally, there is the consideration that the interests of Indonesia and the Papuans, because they are neighbours and have a shared history, are, in the main, the same. The two primary motives for establishing the administrative centres in 1898 were to secure the eastern border of the archipelago and to develop the Papuans and their country. These can still go together, by hook or by crook. A solution should be found that combines a better future for the Papuans with the proper regulation of the eastern border of Indonesia. It would, however, appear to be difficult to combine an open window onto the Pacific with a grumbling, misunderstood and maltreated population on the Indonesian side of the 141st meridian.

Suatu Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat (Pepera); Ringkasan

P.J. Drooglever

Dalam buku ini kami mengikuti secara cermat nasib penduduk bagian barat pulau New Guinea, dimulai dari eksplorasi yang pertama kali dilakukan oleh bangsa Spanyol pada abad ke-16. Ekspedisi Spanyol ini merupakan bagian dari serangkaian penjelajahan yang dilakukan oleh bangsa-bangsa maritim Eropa, yang kemudian mereka gunakan untuk memperluas klaim kekuasaan mereka di wilayah asing. Bab pertama memuat ringkasan sejarah sampai pada masa Perang Dunia Kedua. Hal kunci yang dikemukakan dalam bab tersebut adalah bahwa bagian barat New Guinea secara lambat laun ditarik ke dalam lingkaran pengaruh kekuasaan pusat kolonial Belanda di Batavia. Kepentingan Batavia, yang merupakan ibukota pemerintahan Hindia Belanda, bukanlah soal komersial, karena pada waktu itu New Guinea tidak memiliki banyak hal untuk menarik perhatian perekonomian dunia. Alasan utama keterlibatan Belanda lebih bersifat politik/strategis, yaitu untuk memantapkan batas timur pengaruhnya di Asia. Pada awalnya hal ini diupayakan di bawah hukum internasional dengan mendukung klaim kabur yang dibuat oleh Tidore, yang adalah kaki tangan Hindia Belanda, dan yang telah mengakui kedaulatan Belanda. Sepanjang abad ke-19, atas dasar hukum positif internasional, klaim yang digunakan adalah ada-tidaknya kegiatan-kegiatan nyata yang dilakukan oleh penguasa – hal yang digunakan Belanda untuk membenarkan kedaulatannya di bagian barat New Guinea. Sejak tahun 1856, pemerintah Belanda menyatakan dengan jelas kepada dunia luar bahwa Belanda memandang batas meridian 141 sebagai batas paling timur kekuasaannya. Dengan cara ini suatu batas telah diciptakan, yang kemudian diterima oleh Inggris dan Jerman tanpa melalui perundingan, dan oleh karena itu memperoleh legitimasi internasional.

Sampai pada akhir abad ke-19, klaim-klaim yang dibuat oleh bangsa-bangsa Eropa hanya memiliki arti yang kecil bagi masyarakat setempat. Memang terjadi sejumlah kegiatan perdagangan di daerah pesisir, dan pada tahun 1855 misionaris pertama tinggal di pantai utara tanpa banyak kesuksesan pada awalnya. Keadaan ini berubah ketika pada pergantian abad pusat-pusat pemerintahan Belanda didirikan secara permanen di tiga tempat. Pusat-pusat tersebut berlokasi di Manokwari, Fakfak, dan Merauke. Walaupun hanya sedikit sumberdaya yang tersedia untuk menyelenggarakan kegiatan di pusat-pusat pemerintahan ini, perkembangan ini menandai dimulainya reformasi dunia orang-orang Papua di bagian barat New Guinea yang sebelumnya terpisah-pisah. Seiring dengan pelayanan para misi dan

pusat-pusat pemerintahan, terjadilah secara bertahap ekspansi budaya Barat dan pengaruh ekonomi di daerah pesisir pantai, sementara daerah pedalaman juga dieksplorasi dan dipetakan sedikit demi sedikit. Ketika pecah Perang Dunia II, terciptalah kondisi-kondisi bagi terbentuknya suatu masyarakat Papua baru. Perkembangan ini berorientasi kekristenan. Masuknya Belanda juga mengakibatkan kontak yang lebih erat antara orang-orang Papua dengan masyarakat di kepulauan Indonesia yang lain, yang melakukan kegiatan-kegiatan di New Guinea. Mereka ini adalah orang-orang Ambon di utara dan orang-orang Kai di bagian selatan. Mereka bertugas di Papua setelah menyelesaikan pelatihan di lembaga-lembaga yang didirikan oleh para misionaris di pulau-pulau mereka. Hal ini juga menciptakan garis pemisah antara masyarakat Protestan di utara dan Katolik di Selatan, walaupun garis ini tidak secara tegas menunjukkan perbedaan itu.

Ada jarak yang lebar antara para pejabat, guru, dan petugas gereja orang Ambon dan Kai di satu pihak dan masyarakat Papua di pihak lain. Kelompok yang disebutkan pertama ini memandang remeh orang-orang Papua yang kurang maju dan memperlakukan mereka dengan remeh pula. Orang-orang Papua, yang sudah lama menaruh sikap curiga kepada orang-orang pendatang, atau disebut 'amberi', yang merampok daerah pesisir mereka dengan pelayaran hongri Ternate dan Tidore, semakin tidak suka kepada kaum pendatang ini. Ketidaksukaan ini tidak begitu terjadi terhadap orang-orang Eropa yang sebenarnya bertanggung jawab terhadap kehadiran orang-orang Maluku yang menduduki posisi menengah ini. Tanpa orang-orang Maluku ini, berbagai kegiatan pembangunan tidak mungkin dilakukan. Sikap anti-pendatang ini adalah bentuk negatif dari kesadaran identitas diri sendiri orang-orang Papua.

Perkembangan nasionalisme Indonesia tidak menyentuh orang-orang Papua sama sekali. Hal ini tidak saja karena tingkat perkembangan mereka yang masih rendah, tetapi juga terkait dengan komunikasi satu-arah dengan seluruh kawasan Hindia Belanda. Mereka yang disebutkan belakangan mengunjungi New Guinea, tetapi kecuali beberapa pelayaran ke pulau-pulau yang dekat, orang-orang Papua tidak mengunjungi pusat-pusat Hindia Belanda yang memang memiliki sangat sedikit untuk ditawarkan kepada orang-orang Papua. Hanya ada satu kasus di mana orang-orang Papua dikirim ke Jawa untuk disekolahkan, dan pada waktu itu mereka merasa seperti ikan yang dikeluarkan dari dalam air.

Perang Dunia Kedua dan peristiwa-peristiwa sesudahnya semakin memperlebar jarak ini. Sentimen anti-amberi diperkuat karena para aparat Maluku digunakan sebagai eksekutor tindakan-tindakan paksa orang-orang Jepang. Keadaan tersebut mirip dengan keadaan di bagian Indonesia yang lain, di mana hal yang sama juga terjadi. Ini adalah satu-satunya kejadian yang mirip antara yang terjadi di New Guinea dan di Indonesia. Tidak ada gerakan nasionalis di New Guinea yang terbentuk karena sikap anti-Belanda akibat pendudukan oleh pihak luar.

Keadaan serba kacau akibat perang mengakibatkan timbulnya gerakan-gerakan kebudayaan lama di sejumlah tempat. Di Biak, hal ini muncul dalam bentuk gerakan mesianis, yang juga memasukkan elemen-elemen zaman baru. Untuk pertama kalinya masyarakat Papua membicarakan suatu bendera Papua dan suatu Negara Papua, tetapi merupakan bagian dari ide-ide lama. Inilah Koreri, yang dibahas dalam bab dua.

Bab dua ini juga menunjukkan bahwa New Guinea, dalam banyak hal, memiliki sejarah penjajahan yang berbeda dengan bagian-bagian lain di Indonesia. Hanya sebagian New Guinea yang dijajah oleh Jepang. Pengaruh Belanda terus berlangsung di daerah selatan dan di pedalaman. Pendudukan Jepang pun hanya berlangsung singkat, dan pulau-pulau ini sudah dibebaskan oleh tentara Amerika pada pertengahan tahun 1944. Belanda juga terlibat dalam pembebasan ini, dan segera mengendalikan pemerintahan. Akibatnya, penyelenggaraan kembali pemerintahan di New Guinea terjadi jauh sebelum proklamasi kemerdekaan Indonesia di Jawa pada tanggal 17 Agustus 1945. Dengan beberapa pengecualian, revolusi Indonesia tidak menyentuh New Guinea. Di bawah kendali kuat dan bersemangat Komisaris Polisi Van Eechoud, dimulailah kembali gagasan-gagasan pemerintahan yang dikembangkan sebelum masa perang, tetapi dengan suatu penekanan baru. Sebagai pemegang otoritas atas dunia orang Papua, ia memahami dengan baik keadaan-keadaan khusus yang dihadapinya. Dengan mempertimbangkan revolusi yang sementara berlangsung di wilayah-wilayah lain Hindia Belanda, Komisaris Van Eechoud mulai menciptakan kelompok elit Papua yang diharapkan dapat memimpin masyarakat mereka sendiri selama masa yang kompleks itu. Kebijakan pemerintahan ini dilakukan dengan dukungan sumberdaya yang lebih baik dibandingkan sebelumnya, dan terjadi sesudah penyerahan kedaulatan atas bagian Indonesia yang lain. Bab enam membahas perkembangan ini sampai sekitar tahun 1958. Dengan berbekal pengetahuan dan pengalaman yang diperoleh di wilayah yang sekarang bernama Indonesia, dilakukanlah sejumlah upaya untuk menciptakan suatu contoh koloni yang semakin dianggap oleh Belanda sebagai suatu kesatuan yang harus dipisahkan dari Indonesia.

Revolusi Indonesia dan penyerahan kedaulatan pada tanggal 27 Desember 1949 berpengaruh terhadap perkembangan di bagian barat New Guinea dan dalam dekade-dekade sesudahnya. Bab tiga menjelaskan dengan agak terinci tentang kebijakan yang diambil oleh Belanda mengenai peristiwa-peristiwa sejarah ini, dan hubungannya dengan New Guinea. Dalam bab ini juga dibahas bahwa konsep hak penentuan nasib sendiri adalah kunci kebijakan Belanda. Hak penentuan nasib sendiri dikembangkan pada awal Perang Dunia Kedua, khususnya oleh Amerika, sebagai salah satu tujuan perang. Hal tersebut adalah salah satu bentuk kebijakan emansipasi dalam bentuknya yang lebih awal, yang, menurut Belanda, diberlakukan di wilayah nusantara pada beberapa puluh tahun pertama abad ke-20. Perkembangan yang terjadi berbeda, karena pandangan yang berlaku waktu itu adalah bahwa belum saatnya kebijakan ini diberlakukan

secara penuh. Keinginan untuk mempertahankan hubungan yang permanen – yaitu versi Belanda atas ambisi-ambisi imperial Eropa – juga merupakan salah satu penghalang diberlakukannya kebijakan ini. Sesudah tahun 1945, keenganan ini mulai satu per satu ditinggalkan. Di bawah kepemimpinan Letnan Gubernur Jenderal Van Mook, dicarilah jalan keluar dengan menggunakan perangkat hak penentuan nasib sendiri yang baru saja menjadi bagian dari Piagam Perserikatan Bangsa-bangsa. Pada waktu itu dibuat pembedaan antara hak menentukan nasib sendiri Indonesia secara keseluruhan, dan hak menentukan nasib sendiri daerah-daerah bagiannya. Hal ini tidak saja merupakan akibat dari kemajuan yang tidak merata dan perbedaan derajat revolusi yang terjadi di berbagai tempat di kepulauan nusantara, tetapi juga, dari sisi pandang Belanda, merupakan suatu instrumen siasat untuk menyalurkan revolusi itu ke arah yang dapat mereka terima. Hak penentuan nasib sendiri itu dengan demikian dibuat sesuai dengan kepentingan dan ambisi Belanda.

Hal ini kemudian menghasilkan sistem federalisme, yang kemudian, di dalam hubungan yang lebih luas antara Belanda-Uni Indonesia dengan suatu federasi Indonesia, memberikan ruang hak bagi kawasan-kawasan untuk menentukan posisi mereka sendiri. Kerangka struktur ini termuat dalam persetujuan Linggadjadi antara Belanda dan Republik Indonesia. Konsepnya dimulai oleh kedua belah pihak pada bulan November 1946. Negara-negara bagian itu diberi nama, dan diharapkan mereka akan membentuk federasi. Tetapi tidak jelas apakah hal ini memang bisa terjadi atau tidak. Akibatnya, dalam pasal 3 perjanjian itu diatur bahwa apabila penduduk di suatu daerah menunjukkan secara `demokratis' bahwa mereka masih belum mau mengikuti federasi, maka daerah tersebut akan diberikan hubungan khusus dengan Republik Indonesia Serikat dan Kerajaan Belanda.

Ketika draft tersebut dibahas oleh kabinet Belanda, diputuskan bahwa pengaturan yang terpisah akan dibuat untuk New Guinea, karena penduduknya dianggap masih belum mampu untuk menentukan nasib mereka sendiri. Proteksi Belanda masih dilanjutkan untuk waktu yang lebih lama. Anggapan bahwa orang-orang Papua belum dapat menentukan nasib mereka sendiri langsung menciptakan masalah, karena alasan itu tidak ditetapkan melalui cara-cara demokratis. Pasal 3 dengan demikian menciptakan masalah bagi dirinya sendiri. Pemerintah dan parlemen Belanda berupaya untuk meluruskan hal ini dengan cara memasukkannya langsung ke dalam persetujuan, tetapi ditolak oleh Indonesia. Karena kedua belah pihak membutuhkan, Perjanjian Linggadjadi ditandatangani pada bulan Maret 1947, walaupun belum dicapai kesepakatan atas soal New Guinea.

Sesudah itu berlangsunglah konsultasi intensif antara Belanda dan Republik Indonesia, yang sempat terhenti oleh masa-masa konflik militer sampai pada akhir 1949. Salah satu masalah yang dipersoalkan adalah organisasi Negara Indonesia merdeka di waktu akan datang. Belanda terus berpegang pada konsep negara federal, sementara

Republik, walaupun di atas kertas menyetujui konsep Belanda ini, dalam kenyataannya tidak mau melepas ide Negara Kesatuan. Selama perundingan-perundingan ini berlangsung, persoalan New Guinea selalu menjadi latar belakang. Alasan-alasan yang dikemukakan oleh Belanda tentang perlunya memberikan perlakuan khusus kepada New Guinea di antaranya adalah sangat rendahnya kemajuan, karakter nasional yang sama sekali berbeda, dan hampir tidak ada paham nasionalis Indonesia di kalangan orang-orang Papua. Selain itu, alasan lain yang disampaikan adalah bahwa orang-orang Belanda yang lahir di Indonesia memerlukan tempat mereka sendiri di bawah cahaya matahari tropis di New Guinea, walaupun bendera Belanda sudah tidak lagi berkibar di seluruh kepulauan nusantara.

Komisaris van Eechoud, melalui konsultasi dengan kelompok-kelompok oposisi di Belanda, melihat kesempatan untuk tetap fokus pada posisi khusus wilayah yang telah dipercayakan kepadanya ini. Ia memanfaatkan dengan baik peluang-peluang pertambangan di New Guinea. Bab empat membahas tentang pentingnya hal-hal ini serta sejumlah alasan lain. Masing-masing alasan itu secara terpisah-pisah tidak cukup kuat sehingga mengandung resiko tidak tercapainya persetujuan Belanda dengan Republik. Tetapi kombinasi dari semua alasan itu terbukti cukup ampuh. Belanda memiliki posisi yang kuat selama Konferensi Meja Bundar (KMB) tahun 1949, dan untuk pertama kali New Guinea tidak dimasukkan dalam pengalihan kedaulatan, sebagaimana tampak dalam Perjanjian Penyerahan Kedaulatan. Pasal 1 menyatakan bahwa Belanda menyerahkan secara penuh kedaulatan atas Indonesia kepada Republik Indonesia Serikat, sementara pasal 2 mengatur bahwa New Guinea tidak dimasukkan ke dalam penyerahan kedaulatan pada masa itu. Jalan keluar bagi persoalan ini diusahakan untuk dicapai dalam jangka waktu setahun.

Walaupun begitu, kata-kata yang digunakan tidak cukup tegas dan dapat ditafsirkan dalam beberapa cara. Sebagaimana akan tampak jelas kemudian, dan sebagaimana telah diduga oleh para ahli, Belanda membebani diri dengan banyak masalah. Reaksi berbagai pihak pada awalnya tidak terlalu pesimistis, karena mereka berharap bahwa jawaban terhadap masalah-masalah tersebut mungkin dapat diperoleh melalui hubungan erat antara Belanda-Uni Indonesia dengan federasi Indonesia. Tetapi, hal ini tidak pernah terjadi, karena federasi yang diharapkan itu dihapus oleh pihak-pihak di Indonesia enam bulan sesudah federasi tersebut dibentuk, dan tidak ada atau sangat sedikit keinginan Indonesia untuk membuat Uni berfungsi. Dalam keadaan seperti ini, tidak mungkin untuk merancang suatu pengaturan mengenai New Guinea yang diterima oleh semua pihak. Berbagai peristiwa yang terkait dengan hal ini dibahas dalam bab lima. Pemerintah Belanda berpegang pada penafsiran bahwa dalam naskah KMB hak Belanda tetap dijamin untuk melanjutkan pelaksanaan kedaulatan. Pemerintah Indonesia mengambil pandangan yang berbeda, dan menolak untuk bekerjasama melalui keputusan yang ditetapkan oleh Mahkamah Internasional. Indonesia kemudian

mengambil posisi yang lebih mendasar, yaitu bahwa New Guinea telah dimasukkan ke dalam proklamasi kemerdekaan Indonesia pada tanggal 17 Agustus 1945, dan bahwa perundingan dengan Belanda hanya bisa dilakukan atas dasar kenyataan tersebut. Dengan demikian, perundingan yang akan dilakukan hanyalah tentang bagaimana kontrol atas New Guinea dialihkan kepada Indonesia, tetapi bukan tentang prinsip kedaulatan atau hak-hak orang-orang Papua. Karena keadaan seperti inilah, maka pembicaraan-pembicaraan selanjutnya antara Belanda dan Indonesia tidak menghasilkan apa-apa. Hal ini sebetulnya sudah dapat diketahui pada musim semi 1951, tetapi paku terakhir yang dibenamkan ke dalam peti mati itu terjadi ketika konferensi di Jenewa gagal diselenggarakan pada akhir tahun 1955/awal tahun 1956. Penyebabnya adalah berbagai perkembangan internal Indonesia dan hubungan Indonesia dengan Belanda yang memburuk dengan begitu cepat. Pada bagian ini ditekankan tentang pernyataan yang sering dibuat oleh Belanda bahwa New Guinea bukanlah alasan terjadinya konflik, tetapi bahwa New Guinea selalu digunakan oleh pemerintah Indonesia untuk memperuncing masalah. Pernyataan Belanda ini sudah barang tentu tidak bisa mengingkari fakta bahwa New Guinea memang bagian dari konflik antara Belanda dan Indonesia. Tanpa New Guinea, sebagian fokus sengketa Belanda dan Indonesia sudah lama hilang.

Dalam pasal tujuh, perhatian diarahkan kepada perkembangan-perkembangan di Indonesia dan situasi internasional pada paruh kedua tahun-tahun limapuluhan. Berakhirnya pemberontakan daerah-daerah luar di Indonesia terhadap pemerintah pusat di Jakarta, dan gagalnya upaya Amerika untuk mengintervensi dengan mendukung para pemberontak, memiliki peranan yang besar terhadap berubahnya posisi Amerika Serikat. Sejak saat itu, Indonesia memperoleh lebih banyak dukungan internasional, dan dukungan internasional itu kemudian menjadi semakin intensif selama masa Perang Dingin. Semua perkembangan ini berujung pada perlombaan senjata di katulistiwa, karena baik Rusia maupun Amerika Serikat yang sementara mendukung sekutu masing-masing berusaha saling mengalahkan dalam memberikan senjata kepada Indonesia, sepanjang sejumlah kondisi terpenuhi. Tekanan yang terus meningkat itu benar-benar mendesak Belanda. Dalam bab ini dibahas secara terpisah hubungan Amerika Serikat dan Belanda, yang menunjukkan bahwa pemerintah Amerika, sampai tahun 1960, masih siap untuk melancarkan sejumlah tekanan kepada pemerintah Indonesia agar tidak melakukan tindakan bermusuhan terhadap sekutu Amerika Serikat di Eropa ini. Dua Menteri Luar Negeri Amerika Serikat, yaitu Dulles dan Herter, berturut-turut memberikan kepastian kepada rekan mereka Menlu Belanda Luns dalam pernyataan-pernyataan yang agak umum bahwa Belanda dapat mengandalkan bantuan Amerika dalam keadaan darurat. Dalam bagian ini ditunjukkan bahwa jaminan ini memang mempunyai arti yang penting, tetapi jaminan itu sendiri selalu dikalimatkan sedemikian rupa sehingga pemerintah Amerika Serikat sendirilah yang bebas untuk menentukan kapan ia akan memberikan bantuan, dan sejauh mana campur tangan itu akan dilakukan.

Dengan begitu banyak dukungan yang diberikan pada saat yang sama kepada Indonesia, kementerian luar negeri Amerika Serikat terpaksa berusaha memuaskan kedua belah pihak – suatu keadaan yang tidak gampang untuk dipertahankan. Pembahasan internal tentang kemungkinan adanya kebijakan alternatif dilangsungkan di Washington. Tindakan-tindakan Amerika yang saling bertentangan ini juga menimbulkan ketidakpercayaan di Belanda, tetapi Menlu Luns dapat meyakinkan kabinet Belanda dengan secara teratur menginformasikan kabinet tentang jaminan-jaminan yang diberikan oleh Menlu Dulles maupun Herter itu. Walaupun begitu, kabinet Belanda telah belajar bahwa dukungan internasional hanya dapat diperoleh apabila Belanda sendiri mengambil langkah-langkah yang diperlukan. Hal ini kemudian berujung pada keputusan untuk mengirim kapal induk Karel Doorman pada tahun 1960 untuk memperkuat pertahanan New Guinea untuk sementara waktu. Selain membicarakan tentang sikap Amerika, di dalam bab ini juga dibahas tentang posisi Australia. Sebagai penguasa bagian timur New Guinea, dan sebagai tetangga Indonesia yang paling dekat, Australia memandang dirinya sebagai pihak yang terlibat secara erat dalam masalah ini untuk Belanda. Pemerintah Canberra umumnya berpihak pada Belanda, sebagaimana terlihat dari rencana-rencana kerjasama antarpermerintah. Walaupun begitu Australia menyadari bahwa ia tidak dapat mendukung Belanda apabila Amerika Serikat tidak memiliki pandangan yang sama tanpa syarat.

Bab delapan membahas pengucilan terhadap Indonesia, bagaimana Indonesia mempersenjatai diri, dan sikap setengah hati Washington yang mengakibatkan ketidakpastian di kalangan rakyat Belanda. Hal ini semakin diperkuat oleh perilaku Gereja Reformasi Belanda dan banyak oposisi terpisah yang dilakukan oleh wartawan Oltmans, pengusaha Rijkens, dan Profesor Duynstee dari Nijmegen. Lebih dari itu, momentum dekolonisasi juga semakin mantap secara internasional karena Belgia mundur tergesa-gesa dari Congo. Semua faktor ini secara bersama-sama memperlemah dukungan di Belanda terhadap kebijakan yang diambil oleh pemerintah pada waktu itu. Keadaan ini terjadi ketika Koalisi Merah-Katolik di bawah pemerintahan Perdana Menteri Drees mundur, dan diganti oleh koalisi tengah-kanan yang dipimpin oleh J. De Quay dari Partai Rakyat Katolik. Partai Demokratik Sosial menjadi oposisi, di mana para anggotanya secara bebas mengkritik kebijakan yang diambil pemerintah. Perdana Menteri yang baru, dan beberapa orang anggota kabinetnya, juga tidak terlalu yakin dengan efektivitas kebijakan itu. Tujuan kebijakan itu tidak ditinggalkan, tetapi cara-cara pencapaian yang lebih efektif harus dicari. Dalam kaitan ini, peranan penting diserahkan kepada Sekretaris Negara Th. Bot, yang terlibat dalam KMB dan sesudahnya, dan yang memiliki ide untuk menginternasionalisasi pemerintahan New Guinea pada tahun 1950. Melalui cara ini ia berharap untuk memperoleh dukungan internasional terhadap kebijakan yang diambil oleh Belanda. Sesudah menjadi Sekretaris Negara dan diberikan tanggung jawab administratif khusus

atas New Guinea, Bot mengangkat idenya kembali pada tahun 1960 dalam bentuk pembahasan-pembahasan dan pengembangan dokumen. Perdana Menteri De Quay bersedia untuk mempertimbangkan upaya-upaya Bot ini.

Awalnya, apa yang dikemukakan Bot berlawanan dengan yang diinginkan oleh Luns, tetapi sang Menteri tetap didesak untuk maju dengan gagasannya ini, walaupun tidak memperoleh dukungan penuh kabinet, dan karena ketidaksetujuan Amerika pada waktu itu terhadap pelayaran kapal induk Karel Doorman. Luns juga tidak menginginkan perang tanpa ada jaminan yang lebih kuat dari Amerika Serikat. Di Amerika Serikat sendiri tampil seorang presiden baru ke tampuk kekuasaan. Ia adalah John F Kennedy dari Partai Demokrat, dan waktu itu tidak jelas bagaimana kira-kira sikapnya terhadap persoalan New Guinea. Langkah-langkah awal tentang kemungkinan keterlibatan internasional secara terbatas mulai dibuat secara hati-hati pada tahun 1960. Satu tahun sesudahnya mulai dikembangkan Rencana Luns, kemudian diajukan ke Majelis Umum PBB. Rencana Luns ini berisi tawaran untuk menempatkan New Guinea di bawah pemerintahan internasional, dengan syarat bahwa Indonesia tidak terlibat di dalamnya. Walaupun begitu, rencana ini ditarik kembali karena pembicaraan-pembicaraan awal di Majelis Umum menunjukkan bahwa rencana ini terlalu jauh untuk dibicarakan oleh Majelis. Pada umumnya para anggota berpendapat bahwa Belanda harus berdialog terlebih dahulu dengan Indonesia. Segera sesudah pertemuan itu berakhir, Presiden Sukarno mengumumkan bahwa ia sementara mempersiapkan komando operasi yang bertugas untuk menduduki New Guinea dengan kekuatan bersenjata. Hal ini berarti bahwa Belanda berada di bawah tekanan beberapa pihak sekaligus. Sesudah melakukan serangkaian diskusi yang cermat tentang kemungkinan-kemungkinan yang bisa terjadi dan tujuan-tujuan yang ingin dicapai, dengan terpaksa Belanda mengumumkan pada tanggal 2 Januari 1962 bahwa Belanda bersedia untuk melibatkan Indonesia dalam pembicaraan-pembicaraan mengenai masa depan New Guinea. Hal ini juga berarti bahwa Belanda akan langsung berhadapan dengan asumsi bahwa Indonesia telah memiliki kedaulatan atas wilayah tersebut sejak tahun 1945, sehingga hal-hal yang perlu didiskusikan hanyalah tinggal bagaimana penyerahan kedaulatan itu dilakukan.

Kemajuan negosiasi antara Belanda dan Indonesia di bawah tekanan Amerika, dan ancaman tindakan militer Indonesia dibahas dalam bab sembilan. Pertama, ada kurun waktu di mana masing-masing pihak saling bertahan dan tidak mau mundur dari posisi masing-masing. Luns menunjukkan bahwa ia siap untuk berbicara, tetapi dengan sejumlah syarat. Salah satu faktor penting yang mempengaruhi sikapnya ini adalah karena ia berharap bahwa Indonesia akan runtuh entah secara politik atau militer selama masa perundingan, sehingga sesudah itu ia dapat mempengaruhi Amerika untuk mengambil posisi yang lebih menguntungkan Belanda. Untuk memastikan bahwa Belanda siap menghadapi semua kemungkinan, sistem pertahanannya di New

Guinea semakin diperkuat. Tetapi, apa yang terjadi ternyata tidak sesuai dengan harapan Luns. Pemerintahan Kennedy ternyata tidak banyak memberikan harapan untuk memperkuat pertahanan Belanda di New Guinea. Sebaliknya, Kennedy bahkan menekan Belanda secara politik. Juga menjadi jelas bahwa justru Indonesialah yang mampu meningkatkan kekuatan militernya. Laporan-laporan intelijen menunjukkan bahwa Indonesia akan siap untuk mengirim sejumlah besar angkatan bersenjata ke New Guinea pada pertengahan tahun 1962. Pada bulan April, kebuntuan ini dapat dipecahkan oleh suatu usulan Amerika Serikat yang telah lama dikembangkan di Kementerian Luar Negeri. Usulan ini dikenal dengan nama Rencana Bunker, di mana New Guinea akan diserahkan ke Indonesia melalui suatu masa singkat pemerintahan PBB. Persoalan tentang bagaimana seharusnya Belanda menanggapi usulan Amerika Serikat ini mengakibatkan kabinet Belanda terpecah. Sesudah pembicaraan yang berlangsung cukup lama, pemerintah Belanda menyetujui rencana ini sebagai titik awal negosiasi dengan Indonesia, walaupun mereka akan berupaya untuk tetap memperjuangkan hak penentuan nasib sendiri orang-orang Papua sejauh mungkin.

Drama ini berakhir dengan ditandatanganinya Persetujuan New York pada tanggal 15 Agustus 1962, yang berisi kurang lebih mengenai suatu pengaturan tentang penyerahan kekuasaan sesegera mungkin kepada PBB, yang kemudian dilanjutkan dengan penyerahan ke Indonesia beberapa waktu kemudian. Sebagai konsesi, seperti yang diharapkan oleh Belanda, suatu Tindakan Pemilihan Bebas akan dilakukan sebelum akhir tahun 1969, yaitu melalui cara di mana orang-orang Papua akan memilih apakah mereka ingin tetap bersama Indonesia atau tidak. Persetujuan New York ini, sama seperti semua kesepakatan yang dibuat sebelumnya dengan Indonesia, adalah suatu dokumen yang pengkalimatannya dibuat kabur untuk sejumlah hal prinsip, sehingga merugikan Belanda. Hal ini merupakan cermin dari lemahnya posisi tawar Belanda. Ketidakpastian ini khususnya mengenai berapa lama transisi berlangsung, dan jaminan mengenai pelaksanaan referendum yang diterima secara internasional. Tanggung jawab mengenai hal yang disebutkan terakhir ini diserahkan sepenuhnya kepada Indonesia, dan PBB hanya memiliki tugas untuk membantu apabila Indonesia memintanya. Kekaburan ini sebetulnya ada manfaatnya juga bagi Belanda, karena dengan begitu Belanda dapat menghibur diri dengan mengatakan bahwa ia telah berusaha berbuat yang terbaik bagi orang-orang Papua. Pendapat seperti ini selalu disampaikan oleh Belanda dengan bersemangat kepada dunia luar dalam berbagai kesempatan. Tetapi, di dalam negeri semua orang tahu bahwa bukan seperti itu keadaannya. Ketika persetujuan itu ditandatangani pada tanggal 15 Agustus 1962, Dewan Menteri Belanda kecewa dengan hasilnya yang jelek itu, sementara Luns secara terbuka mengkritik pemerintah Amerika Serikat.

Bab-bab akhir dari buku ini membahas tentang kejadian-kejadian di New Guinea. Di sela-sela pemaparan tersebut, dibahas juga mengenai

berbagai perkembangan internasional dan bagaimana reaksi di Belanda. Bab 10 membahas tentang tahun-tahun terakhir pemerintahan Belanda di New Guinea. Sesudah Bot menduduki jabatannya, berbagai upaya dilakukan untuk mempercepat pendidikan bagi orang-orang Papua. Akibatnya mereka bisa terlibat sebagai faktor politik. Dewan-dewan daerah dibentuk untuk masing-masing wilayah, dan Dewan New Guinea dibentuk untuk seluruh New Guinea. Melalui panggung-politik ini sejumlah kecil orang-orang Papua mampu mengembangkan inisiatif-inisiatif baru untuk masa depan politik mereka dan memperkenalkan diri kepada publik Belanda. Bab 11 menjelaskan perkembangan ini. Melalui inisiatif-inisiatif dimaksud, orang-orang Papua mengembangkan organisasi-organisasi mereka sendiri. Di dalam pernyataan-pernyataan yang mereka buat, tampak bahwa mereka dengan penuh semangat memperjuangkan hak penentuan nasib sendiri. Dalam pada itu, mereka juga mengindikasikan harapan mereka kepada Belanda untuk tidak meninggalkan mereka dahulu. Kemerdekaan serta merta adalah hal paling terakhir yang mereka inginkan. Sikap mereka terhadap Indonesia pada umumnya sangat hati-hati, walaupun ada sejumlah pengecualian.

Secara umum, sikap ini mencerminkan kebijakan yang diambil oleh pemerintah Belanda. Sikap ini diarahkan untuk mencapai kemerdekaan yang lebih luas, tetapi dikembangkan dalam konteks konflik yang begitu agresif dengan Indonesia. Pokok-pokok kunci dari kebijakan ini adalah pembentukan Dewan New Guinea pada bulan April 1961, yang diikuti dengan penetapan bendera dan lagu pada tahun yang sama. Pembentukan Dewan New Guinea dilakukan dengan persiapan yang cermat dengan tujuan agar badan politik ini memiliki tingkat keterwakilan sebaik mungkin. Penetapan Bendera dan Lagu berlangsung lebih cepat. Inisiatifnya sepenuhnya berasal dari pihak orang-orang Papua, tetapi kemudian diterima oleh penguasa Belanda. Dan secara mengejutkan bendera dan lagu itu dengan cepat disahkan dalam suatu ordinansi. Harus diingat, bahwa peristiwa ini terjadi ketika Luns berusaha, namun gagal, untuk menjual idenya itu kepada PBB. Pengibaran bendera pertama kali dilakukan pada tanggal 1 Desember 1961, yang disambut dengan sukacita di mana-mana. Orang-orang Papua di bagian barat New Guinea ini sekarang memiliki simbol identitas mereka sendiri yang diterima secara meluas. Tidak saja Papua yang memiliki pemahaman seperti itu, tetapi juga Jakarta. Soekarno memandang pengibaran bendera itu sebagai penolakan langsung terhadap proklamasi 1945, dan pasti merupakan awal pembentukan negara Papua. Pidato Trikora yang dikumandangkannya, di mana ia mengumumkan serangan ke New Guinea, bertujuan untuk menghantam perkembangan ini.

Di dalam bab ini pula ditunjukkan bahwa penafsiran sebagaimana dimaksud itu ditolak oleh Belanda. Bendera yang dikibarkan itu dianggap sebagai bendera daerah, bukan dalam pengertian sebagai bendera negara baru. Keputusan akhir mengenai hal ini haruslah sepenuhnya diserahkan kepada orang-orang Papua melalui hak

penentuan nasib sendiri. Bahkan, menjadi sangat jelas pada waktu itu bahwa perundingan dengan Indonesia tidak bisa dihindari, dan bahwa hal ini lebih baik segera diberitahukan kepada orang-orang Papua. Dalam kenyataannya hal ini memang dilakukan, walaupun sulit bagi Belanda untuk menyampaikan hal tersebut secara terbuka dan lugas, terutama karena begitu banyak orang Papua yang tidak menyukai gagasan ini. Selama jangka waktu bertahun-tahun, Indonesia telah dipandang sebagai musuh – musuh yang tidak saja membuat komentar negatif tentang apa yang terjadi di Papua, tetapi juga musuh yang terus menerus memprovokasi keadaan dengan penyusupan-penyusupan militer yang harus dihalau oleh Belanda dengan bantuan polisi Papua. Dari akhir tahun 1961, tingkah laku Jakarta, baik dalam bentuk kata-kata maupun perbuatan, jelas tampak sebagai ancaman. Sulit sekali untuk secara tegas bersikap netral dalam keadaan seperti ini. Walaupun begitu, para elit Papua akhirnya menyadari tentang pentingnya bersikap seperti itu. Ketika menjadi jelas pada tanggal 15 Agustus 1962, bahwa hari-hari pemerintahan Belanda akan segera berakhir, dilangsungkanlah pembicaraan yang intensif di kalangan para elit Papua ini tentang posisi mereka. Tujuan utama masih tetap berupa penentuan nasib sendiri, tetapi untuk itu harus dicapai hubungan yang baik dengan Indonesia. Oleh karena itu, kami mengemukakan pada bagian akhir bab sebelas, bahwa lapisan teratas masyarakat Papua, walaupun jumlahnya sedikit dan baru dalam tahap awal perkembangan, memiliki pemahaman yang mengagumkan tentang realitas ini. Pada awal bulan September, kongres Papua yang diselenggarakan secara cepat memutuskan untuk menerima konsekuensi dari persetujuan ini. Mereka yang hadir dalam kongres itu menerima kedatangan Indonesia, tetapi juga memutuskan untuk tetap berpegang pada Tindakan Pemilihan Bebas yang termaktub dalam Persetujuan New York.

Dalam Pasal 12 kami membahas tentang kurun waktu New Guinea di bawah bendera PBB dan tahun-tahun pertama di bawah pemerintahan Indonesia, mulai dari tahun 1962 ke depan. Pemerintahan PBB tidak memiliki kekuasaan sebagaimana yang seharusnya. Mereka tidak memiliki kemauan dan keahlian untuk menjalankan masa peralihan itu secara netral dalam pengertian yang sebenar-benarnya. Walaupun begitu, PBB mampu mengorganisir mundurnya pemerintahan Belanda dan mengalihkan tugas-tugas tersebut ke pihak Indonesia yang menggantikan Belanda. Pada awalnya, para pejabat dan polisi Papua menyelenggarakan banyak dari tugas-tugas ini, terutama pada tingkat pemerintahan lokal. Pada saat yang sama, para petugas pemerintah dan serdadu Indonesia masuk dalam jumlah yang jauh lebih besar dari yang direncanakan, dan secara cepat mengambil alih kontrol. Secara terbuka mereka menekan orang-orang Papua untuk berpihak kepada Indonesia, termasuk untuk melupakan impian penentuan nasib sendiri. Lebih dari itu, tanda-tanda pertama tindakan kekerasan oleh militer Indonesia segera terlihat. Hal ini terus mewarnai tindakan pemerintahan yang baru ini dalam dekade-dekade selanjutnya. Kegagalan ekonomi terjadi secara cepat bersama-sama dengan menurunnya kepastian hukum, serta hilangnya hak-hak masyarakat sipil di semua bidang. Selain itu,

semua yang terkait dengan Belanda dihancurkan secara sistematis, dan digantikan dengan paham-paham Indonesia sesuai dengan demokrasi terpimpin. Hal ini mengakibatkan semakin meningkatnya reaksi negatif orang-orang Papua. Daerah pedalaman Manokwari, khususnya, terus menerus melawan sejak tahun 1965, yang kemudian diperangi dengan tindakan militer yang keras. Jumlah korban dengan cepat meningkat menjadi ribuan.

Pada awalnya orang-orang Papua yang paling sadar politik menggantungkan harapan pada Tindakan Pemilihan Bebas. Tetapi, ternyata Indonesia hanya menunjukkan sedikit sekali minat untuk melaksanakan Tindakan Pemilihan Bebas ini secara benar. Sikap Jakarta berubah ketika Soeharto memegang tampuk kekuasaan sebagai presiden Indonesia yang baru. Ketika ia mulai memerintah, negara dalam keadaan kacau dan ekonomi porak poranda, sementara ia sangat memerlukan kredit internasional. Untuk itu, Indonesia harus memperoleh respek internasional. Indonesia harus menunjukkan bahwa ia mampu untuk patuh kepada ketentuan-ketentuan internasional. Tindakan Pemilihan Bebas, yang merupakan bagian terakhir dari Persetujuan New York, menawarkan kesempatan itu. Walaupun begitu, presiden yang baru ini memberikan syarat bahwa satu-satunya hasil yang bisa diterimanya adalah keputusan yang berpihak pada Indonesia.

Proses ini dimulai pada tahun 1968 dengan kedatangan Ortiz Sanz, yang dalam kapasitasnya sebagai wakil Sekjen PBB harus membantu Indonesia melaksanakan Tindakan Pemilihan Bebas. Hal ini dibahas dalam bab 13. Awalnya Ortiz Sanz bersemangat dan berharap bahwa ia akan mampu untuk menyelenggarakan suatu referendum yang kredibel sesuai dengan standar-standar internasional. Harapannya itu diperkukuh dengan sikap Menlu Adam Malik yang baru saja mengunjungi New Guinea, dan yang sesudah kembali dari kunjungannya itu berhasil didesak untuk mengakui bahwa ada masalah salah-kelola yang serius. Malik menegaskan bahwa ia ingin agar keadaan tersebut diperbaiki, tidak saja dalam hal pemerintahan tetapi juga dalam hal bagaimana seharusnya Tindakan Pemilihan Bebas dilaksanakan. Walaupun begitu, keinginan Menlu Adam Malik ini diberikan batas oleh presiden.

Yang terjadi adalah kekecewaan pahit bagi Ortiz Sanz. Karena tekanan Indonesia, Tim PBB yang dipimpin sangat kecil jumlahnya. Sesudah tiba di New Guinea pada bulan September 1968, ia dibanjiri oleh berbagai petisi dari orang Papua yang memrotes salah-urus yang dibuat oleh Indonesia di semua bidang. Ia menanggapi dengan serius protes-protes ini dan meneruskannya ke mitra Indonesianya, Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro, dan meminta Sudjarwo mengambil tindakan. Sudjarwo menganggap hal ini sebagai intervensi yang tidak perlu, yang berarti bahwa hubungan mereka sudah jelek dari awal. Indonesia menolak tentang bentuk referendum yang disarankan oleh Ortiz Sanz, dan sebaliknya memilih sistem musyawarah yang disebut sebagai tradisi Indonesia. Istilah ini, yang pada awalnya merupakan salah

satu interpretasi terhadap persetujuan New York, sekarang menjadi prinsip utama dari keseluruhan referendum. Di dalam sistem ini, yang dimungkinkan hanyalah keputusan kolektif, atas dasar persyaratan konsensus yang sempurna.

Bab 14 membahas tentang pembentukan dewan-dewan musyawarah, dan juga pelaksanaan Tindakan Pemilihan Bebas yang berlangsung sesudah itu. Ortiz Sans tidak diizinkan untuk memainkan peranan apa pun dalam pembentukan dewan, dan diberikan peranan yang sekecil mungkin dalam implementasi referendum itu sendiri. Kejadian-kejadian yang dibahas dalam bab ini didasarkan atas laporan para diplomat dan wartawan – yaitu mereka yang hadir dan/atau mengamati berbagai bagian dari proses itu. Orang-orang Papua yang terlibat dalam pelaksanaan Tindakan Pemilihan Bebas juga menyampaikan laporan mereka. Laporan-laporan dari PBB dan pemerintah Indonesia digunakan pula. Menurut pendapat para pengamat Barat dan orang-orang Papua yang bersuara mengenai hal ini, Tindakan Pemilihan Bebas berakhir dengan kepalsuan, sementara sekelompok pemilih yang berada di bawah tekanan luar biasa tampaknya memilih secara mutlak untuk mendukung Indonesia.

Pelaksanaan Tindakan Pilihan Bebas ini diawasi dari New York oleh pejabat-pejabat tinggi PBB. Jarang sekali mereka memberikan tekanan kepada rencana dan praktek-praktek Indonesia, demikian pula Den Haag dan Washington. Di Den Haag, Menteri Luns, yang masih aktif sebagai Menlu, berpendapat bahwa Belanda mengaku memiliki tanggung jawab moral, tetapi menurut teks persetujuan New York, Belanda tidak punya alasan untuk bertindak. Tindakan Belanda hanya terbatas pada memahami perilaku Indonesia tetapi hal ini tidak pernah disampaikan secara terbuka. Sementara itu, arus di Den Haag telah berbalik dan semua harapan sekarang terpaku pada kerjasama yang baik dengan Indonesia. Walaupun begitu Majelis Rendah memberikan tekanan kepada pemerintah untuk berupaya agar mendukung referendum terbuka bagi orang-orang Papua. Tekanan ini menghasilkan pertemuan antara menteri-menteri Indonesia dan Belanda di Roma pada bulan Mei 1969. Dalam suatu pernyataan sesudah pertemuan itu, para menteri Belanda mencatat pendekatan Indonesia, dan menyampaikan harapan bahwa akan ada kesepakatan penuh antara pemerintah Indonesia dan Sekjen PBB tentang pelaksanaan referendum. Malik, Luns dan Udink mengumumkan bahwa mereka akan bekerjasama dalam rangka pembangunan New Guinea. Deklarasi Roma ini menyanggahkan asumsi dasar yang telah diterapkan sampai kepada tahapan ini, yaitu bahwa PBB pada akhirnya harus sepaham dengan Indonesia tentang pendekatan yang akan digunakan. Hal ini mengakibatkan Ortiz Sanz tidak mempunyai pijakan sama sekali untuk mempengaruhi arah berbagai kejadian di New Guinea.

Laporan akhir Sekjen PBB seluruhnya didasarkan pada laporan Ortiz Sanz tentang peranannya dalam pelaksanaan Tindakan Pemilihan Bebas. Laporan ini hanya berisi kritik yang lemah terhadap oposisi dari pihak Indonesia. Atas dasar ini, U Thant tidak bisa berbuat lain kecuali menyimpulkan bahwa suatu (an dalam bahasa Inggris,

penerjemah) Tindakan Pemilihan Bebas telah dilaksanakan. Ia tidak bisa menggunakan kata depan yang tegas (seperti *the* dalam bahasa Inggris, penerjemah), karena nilai-nilai proses itu jauh di bawah standar yang diatur dalam persetujuan New York. Walaupun dapat ditafsirkan sebagai suatu penilaian yang mencibir, tetapi ada pihak-pihak yang justru mengabaikan pengkalimatan yang tidak jelas dalam persetujuan New York itu.

Babak terakhir dari keseluruhan proses ini terjadi pada bulan Oktober dan November 1969 dalam Majelis Umum PBB, di mana Belanda dan Indonesia bekerjasama mengarahkan laporan Sekretaris Jenderal PBB dalam pertemuan itu. Amerika Serikat juga membantu. Walaupun secara pragmatis Amerika Serikat lebih bertanggung jawab terhadap keseluruhan tahapan yang berakibat dengan penandatanganan Persetujuan New York dan sesudah itu Tindakan Pemilihan Bebas, tetapi Amerika Serikat, sebagaimana Belanda, berlindung di belakang PBB. Sekelompok negara-negara Afrika melancarkan kritiknya, yaitu mereka yang sejak tahun 1961 telah bersimpati terhadap persoalan-persoalan Papua. Tetapi apa yang mereka lakukan ini tidak banyak artinya. Amandemen yang mereka sampaikan kepada Majelis Umum PBB yang mendesak supaya suatu referendum dilaksanakan dalam beberapa tahun mendatang ditolak oleh mayoritas anggota dalam suatu pemungutan suara. Hasilnya adalah bahwa Majelis Umum PBB menerima resolusi yang disampaikan secara bersama-sama oleh Belanda dan Indonesia, dan di dalamnya dinyatakan bahwa Majelis mencatat/mengetahui adanya laporan tersebut, dengan 30 anggota abstain dan tidak ada yang menolak. 'Masalah New Guinea' dengan demikian telah diselesaikan sesuai dengan persetujuan New York dan dapat dikeluarkan dari agenda PBB.

Akhirnya, dibahas di dalam buku ini perdebatan-perdebatan akhir di parlemen Belanda baik pada tahun 1962 maupun 1969. Perdebatan ini dilakukan sesudah persetujuan New York ditandatangani dan sesudah Tindakan Pemilihan Bebas dilakukan. Di dalam kedua perdebatan itu persoalan kedaulatan dibicarakan – masalah yang telah memecah Indonesia dan Belanda sejak tahun 1950. Hal ini tidak dicantumkan sama sekali di dalam persetujuan New York. Sesudah persetujuan itu dilakukan, semua pihak berpendapat bahwa proses penyelesaian akhir di PBB adalah juga fase terakhir dari pengalihan kedaulatan. Hal ini setidaknya-tidaknya telah berlangsung secara de-facto, kalau tidak bahkan secara de-jure. Hal ini secara empatis ditekankan oleh pemerintah Belanda baik pada tahun 1962 maupun 1969 dalam sejumlah pernyataan di muka parlemen. Sejalan dengan itu, ketika Majelis Umum telah mencatat laporan akhir Sekretaris Jenderal PBB tentang rampungnya tahap terakhir dari persetujuan New York, hal ini menandai pula berakhirnya konflik mengenai kedaulatan atas New Guinea bagian Barat. Hal ini tidaklah berarti bahwa Belanda kemudian tidak terlibat lagi. Belanda dan Indonesia berjanji untuk bekerjasama membangun New Guinea bagian Barat. Pemerintah Belanda mengambil sikap, baik sebelum dan sesudah Tindakan Pemilihan Bebas, bahwa

Belanda dapat melakukan sesuatu bagi bekas daerah jajahannya itu hanya melalui kerjasama efektif dengan Indonesia.

Hal-hal yang dikemukakan ini adalah ringkasan dari isi, dan kesimpulan-kesimpulan utama yang ditarik dari penelitian ini. Berakhirnya Tindakan Pemilihan Bebas berarti dimulainya pemerintahan Indonesia yang diterima secara penuh oleh masyarakat internasional. Kekawatiran bahwa akan terjadi pemberontakan meluas di Papua ternyata tidak terbukti. Walaupun begitu, ketidakpuasan terus berlangsung. Pada tahun 1971, gerakan perlawanan militan OPM memproklamasikan kemerdekaan. Perlawanan ini ditangani dengan keras, dan dalam keadaan bagaimana pun tetap merupakan gejala marjinal. Irian Barat, sekarang disebut Irian Jaya (Irian berkemenangan), ditetapkan sebagai provinsi otonom di bawah tanggung jawab Departemen Dalam Negeri. Dalam kenyataannya, situasi di daerah ini tetap seperti pada tahun 1963 – suatu daerah di bawah pemerintahan militer yang jauh dari berhasil, yang terus menunjukkan keadaan seperti pada periode sebelumnya. Tekanan-tekanan budaya yang dilancarkan ternyata juga tidak berhasil. Tidak ada toleransi bagi kritik atau oposisi, dan hukuman yang dijatuhkan sangat berat. Sulit untuk memperkirakan berapa banyak korban yang telah jatuh karena keadaan ini. Angka sampai sejauh puluhan ribu telah disebut-sebut.

Sebuah studi hukum yang dilakukan oleh Universitas Yale pada tahun 2003 melaporkan fakta-fakta yang begitu serius sehingga membuat mereka menggunakan istilah genosida untuk menggambarkan keadaan yang terjadi. Hal ini berimplikasi bahwa menurut kelompok peneliti ini perilaku pemerintah Indonesia adalah dalam rangka memusnahkan orang-orang Papua. Ada juga yang tidak yakin dengan kesimpulan yang dibuat para peneliti ini. Dan, menurut kami, ketidakyakinan itu ada benarnya, yaitu dalam pengertian bahwa kesimpulan seperti ini tidak seharusnya dibuat oleh kelompok peneliti itu. Tentu saja kejahatan yang dilakukan oleh pemerintah Indonesia sebagaimana yang dikemukakan oleh mereka adalah fakta sebenarnya. Hal ini telah nyata sebagaimana yang kami kemukakan sejak tahun pertama pemerintah Indonesia di New Guinea. Menurut laporan-laporan orang-orang Papua yang memiliki pemahaman tentang apa yang terjadi, setiap hari pasti ada paling tidak ada satu orang yang tewas atau yang diperlakukan secara kejam. Lebih dari itu, Indonesia mulai menggunakan kawasan New Guinea dalam skala yang jauh lebih besar dibandingkan sebelumnya, untuk menampung banjir penduduk Indonesia yang tumbuh begitu cepat. Dalam kaitan ini keadaan orang-orang Papua menjadi lebih jelek. Selama proses ini, tanah mereka semakin banyak yang dirampas, demikian pula kesempatan kerja diambil oleh masyarakat pendatang. Hal ini juga terjadi di bagian lain di Indonesia, tetapi yang paling opresif adalah di Irian Barat. Kota-kota Irian Barat menjadi sama seperti kota-kota Indonesia lainnya: padat dan kotor.

Di sisi positif, penduduk Papua yang sebelumnya cenderung stabil dan

bertumbuh secara lambat, meningkat lebih dari 50 persen di bawah pemerintahan Indonesia. Lebih dari itu, pemerintah Indonesia terus mendukung pendidikan, tidak saja melalui badan-badan pemerintah, tetapi juga melalui lembaga-lembaga gereja. Ini berarti bahwa pendidikan generasi muda Papua terus meningkat. Lebih dari itu, lebih banyak kontak yang terjadi dengan bagian Indonesia yang lain melalui kontak dengan para pendatang baru, melalui media, dan melalui kunjungan perorangan ke pulau-pulau lain di Indonesia – hal-hal ini semua memperluas cakrawala orang-orang Papua. Walaupun begitu, mengintegrasikan orang-orang Papua ke dalam negara Indonesia tetap menjadi masalah. Para pejabat yang memperoleh pendidikan pada masa pemerintahan Belanda umumnya tetap berada pada tingkatan bawah. Kedatangan pemerintah Indonesia mengakhiri struktur formal profesional badan-badan pemerintah, di mana pendidikan terkait erat dengan pengembangan karir. Sekarang, penempatan pada jabatan tergantung pada pertemanan dan koneksi, dan hal ini berarti yang kalah adalah orang-orang Papua. Pendanaan untuk membiayai pemerintahan juga tidak memadai, hal mana berarti bahwa para pejabat pemerintah harus mencari tambahan pendapatan sendiri secara lokal. Hal ini juga terjadi pada militer, yang diperkirakan hanya menerima 30 persen pendanaan dari negara. Selain itu, perlu ditambahkan pula bahwa Irian Barat bukanlah, dan tidak pernah, merupakan lokasi penempatan yang disukai, sehingga sejumlah besar pejabat Indonesia meninggalkan tempat ini.

Jelas bahwa sistem ini mengakibatkan terjadinya berbagai macam pelanggaran. Kesempatan bagi orang Papua untuk maju sangat terbatas. Sesudah Frans Kaisiepo pensiun pada tahun 1973, Izaak Hindom menjadi Gubernur Papua pada tahun 1982. Tetapi, kehadirannya pun tidak banyak berpengaruh terhadap perubahan kesetimbangan kekuasaan. Termasuk pula tidak tampak orang-orang Papua yang masuk ke dalam dunia bisnis, walaupun bisnis di Papua berkembang. Begitu Tindakan Pemilihan Bebas telah dilangsungkan, penambangan minyak dimulai kembali dan tembaga yang ditemukan di pegunungan Carstensz sebelum perang dapat dieksploitasi oleh Freeport, sebuah perusahaan pertambangan Amerika, di bawah kondisi pemerintahan Soeharto yang lebih stabil. Pertambangan ini merupakan sumber pendapatan yang besar bagi keuangan Indonesia, dan bagi elit di Jakarta, sejauh para elit itu terlibat dalam pengelolaan dan administrasi pusat perusahaan tersebut. Walaupun begitu, efek positif pertambangan bagi ekonomi lokal tetap tidak bermakna; bahkan yang terjadi adalah dampak negatif dalam bentuk pencemaran lingkungan dan kerugian yang jauh lebih besar. Penduduk Papua adalah kelompok yang paling miskin di Indonesia.

Integrasi mental dan organisasional ke dalam negara Indonesia tidak tercapai. Ketika arus reformasi tiba pada tahun 1998 dan rejim Soeharto berakhir, timbullah kevakuman kekuasaan di mana penduduk New Guinea, sekali lagi, dapat berbicara dengan bebas, dan selama jangka waktu tertentu masalah-masalah yang terjadi di daerah tersebut dapat

disampaikan secara jelas kepada dunia luar. Satu hal yang pasti adalah: Indonesia tidak berhasil memenangkan hati orang-orang Papua. Dalam pada itu kesadaran nasional orang-orang Papua meningkat dengan tajam. Dengan disiplin mereka sendiri, para tokoh Papua dalam organisasi gereja maupun di masyarakat mampu mengelola keadaan ini sehingga kerusuhan dapat dicegah, bahkan mampu membawa suara orang Papua untuk didengar oleh pemerintah Indonesia dan dunia melalui cara yang terhormat namun tegas. Hasilnya adalah bahwa dalam kunjungan ke Jayapura pada hari tahun baru tahun 2000, Presiden Indonesia Abdurrahman Wahid berjanji untuk meningkatkan pemerintahan, dan setuju bahwa nama Irian Jaya, yang dipandang sebagai lambang dominasi Indonesia, dapat diubah menjadi Papua. Ini adalah salah satu titik kunci dalam urutan kejadian yang kami gunakan untuk memulai penulisan buku ini. Sejak saat itu, jarum jam, dalam banyak hal, telah diputar kembali. Walaupun begitu, Papua masih tetap menanti sejumlah janji, yang terkandung dalam otonomi luas, ditepati dengan benar. Hal ini bukanlah persoalan sepihak, dan apa tanggapan orang-orang Papua sangat tergantung pada sejauh mana janji-jani itu ditepati. Salah satu persyaratan penting adalah kemerdekaan berpendapat dan bergerak. Hal ini langsung mengingatkan kami kepada kata-kata Menlu Adam Malik, yang mengumumkan secara terbuka pada saat ia berkunjung ke New Guinea pada tahun 1969 bahwa tentara harus ditarik terlebih dahulu sebelum masyarakat Papua dapat membangun. Tetapi yang terjadi adalah sejak Adam Malik mengemukakan kata-kata ini, tekanan yang dilakukan oleh tentara dan polisi terhadap penduduk justru semakin meningkat.

Buku ini menceritakan tentang masuknya penduduk New Guinea ke dalam masa modern. Belanda bertindak sebagai perantara dalam proses ini sampai tahun 1962. Oleh karena itu banyak perhatian dalam penelitian ini yang diarahkan pada tujuan-tujuan dari kebijakan Belanda. Awalnya, tujuan kebijakan Belanda itu bersifat strategis: menetapkan batas timur dari pengaruh kekuasaan Batavia. Dengan menciptakan pusat-pusat pemerintahan yang pertama di tahun 1898, Belanda maju selangkah. Pada tahap ini tujuan yang ingin dicapai, dengan meminjam kata-kata Komisaris Plate, adalah 'untuk mengubah orang-orang liar menjadi manusia beradab.' Istilah yang digunakan cocok dengan gagasan Belanda sebagai penjaga/pembina, yang begitu berpengaruh pada saat itu. Belanda bertugas mendidik mereka yang berada di bawah pemerintahannya. Sesudah pemerintahan Belanda dimulai di New Guinea, masyarakat yang bermukim di daerah pesisir, secara perlahan namun pasti, mulai berada di bawah pengaruh dunia modern. Hal ini menjadi lebih penting dalam konteks dekolonisasi. Secara lebih terbuka, dan dengan menggunakan bahasa modern, langkah ke arah penentuan nasib sendiri menjadi tujuan utama kebijakan Belanda dalam kaitannya dengan New Guinea mulai dari tahun 1945 ke depan. Upaya-upaya untuk mencapai hal ini semakin intensif dilakukan sesudah tahun 1950. Tidak dimasukkannya New Guinea ke dalam pengalihan kedaulatan pada tahun 1950 berakibat adanya 12 tahun tambahan bagi pemerintahan Belanda untuk memerintah New Guinea. Selama

masa 12 tahun itu banyak hal telah dilakukan bagi kawasan ini dan bagi rakyatnya. Dunia orang Papua pada tahun 1962 sangat berbeda dengan pada tahun 1950, apalagi bila dibandingkan dengan tahun 1900. Pembangunan yang luas telah berlangsung, dan masyarakat kelas menengah yang kecil namun memiliki kaliber tinggi telah terbentuk. Mereka ini, apabila diberikan kesempatan, mampu untuk memimpin masyarakatnya secara bersama-sama dalam jangka panjang. Di bawah rejim Indonesia, perkembangan ini berlangsung tetapi tanpa memberikan kesempatan kepada para elit ini untuk memegang peranan sebagai pemimpin dan pembina sebagaimana harapan ketika mereka dibentuk.

Sebagai poin terakhir, bisa saja diperdebatkan bahwa lebih baik untuk melakukan penyerahan kedaulatan atas New Guinea pada tahun 1950. Memang masyarakat Papua akan berkembang lebih lambat, tetapi melalui pengaruh misi gereja, yang juga tetap dapat melakukan karya mereka di bagian Indonesia yang lain, arah yang diikuti akan sama saja. Kecurigaan dan permusuhan, yang tetap menjadi ciri hubungan orang-orang Papua dan Indonesia sampai hari ini, mungkin tidak terjadi. Argumen ini memang menarik, tetapi tidak adil apabila diterapkan terhadap berbagai kerja keras untuk membangun New Guinea dari tahun 1950 sampai 1962. Bahkan, terlalu gampang untuk mengasumsikan bahwa perpecahan antara Indonesia dan Belanda mungkin dapat dihindari. Semua hal ini tidak jelas. Sentimen anti-amberi sudah sangat kuat pada tahun 1950, dan sikap negatif orang Indonesia kepada orang Papua pun sudah kuat pada saat itu. Pengalihan kedaulatan secara cepat tidak akan menghalangi terbentuknya rejim militer, termasuk pula tidak akan menghalangi kejahatan-kejahatan yang menyertainya. Dalam istilah sosial, pada tahun 1950 orang-orang Papua mungkin memiliki kesempatan yang lebih sedikit untuk mengembangkan identitas mereka sendiri. Jelas bahwa mereka berada pada posisi yang sangat sulit pada tahun 1963, tetapi masyarakat Papua akan lebih mampu untuk mempertahankan diri dibandingkan apabila Belanda tidak memperpanjang pemerintahannya di New Guinea.

Adalah juga jelas, bahwa harapan sebagaimana tertera dalam kebijakan Belanda ternyata tidak tercapai, termasuk pula integrasi sebagaimana yang diharapkan oleh Indonesia. Buku ini tidak ditulis untuk menspekulasikan apa yang mungkin bisa terjadi di waktu lalu, atau bentuk apa yang harus terjadi di masa mendatang. Tujuan penulisan buku ini adalah untuk mengemukakan secara jujur peristiwa-peristiwa yang terjadi dalam suatu proses kompleks masuknya penduduk New Guinea ke dalam abad ke-20. Ini tidaklah berarti bahwa kisah ini bisa ditulis tanpa perasaan atau tanpa emosi. Mereka yang telah terlibat dalam keadaan yang serba tidak mungkin ini, sebagaimana yang dialami oleh orang-orang Papua selama sejarah mereka, hanya dapat berharap, sebagaimana juga harapan penulis buku ini, bahwa nasib orang-orang Papua akan berubah di abad yang baru kita masuki ini. Faktor-faktor yang berpengaruh terhadap nasib yang lebih baik

itu dapat ditemukan dalam pembahasan buku ini. Faktor-faktor itu termasuk kemungkinan-kemungkinan yang dimiliki oleh masyarakat Papua itu sendiri yang telah mampu menunjukkan penguasaan diri, kearifan, dan pertahanan diri untuk memastikan bahwa mereka tetap hidup. Faktor-faktor itu tergantung pula pada perhatian masyarakat internasional, yang telah terlibat di dalam berbagai peristiwa dan dalam berbagai bentuk, dan dengan bertindak seperti itu sering menjadi penggerak utama perubahan. Hal ini terlihat dengan jelas dalam proses yang berakhir pada Persetujuan New York dan berbagai aturan yang dibuat atas dasar persetujuan itu. Bagi mereka yang mampu mengupayakannya, tanggung jawab kesejarahan seharusnya mempunyai arti yang signifikan di bawah hukum internasional.

Kemungkinan-kemungkinan masa depan yang lebih baik bagi penduduk New Guinea Barat dapat juga ditemukan dalam kepentingan Indonesia di daerah ini. Indonesia tidak saja memiliki tradisi militer dan pemerintahan otoriter, tetapi juga budaya interaksi dan upaya-upaya untuk menghasilkan pemerintah yang baik. Kita hanya bisa berharap bahwa kedua hal yang disebut terakhir ini akan memperoleh perhatian. Akhirnya, perlu dipertimbangkan bahwa kepentingan Indonesia dan Papua pada umumnya sama, karena mereka adalah tetangga dan saling membagi sejarah. Dua alasan utama untuk membangun pusat-pusat pemerintahan pada tahun 1898 adalah untuk menjamin batas timur kepulauan dan untuk membangun orang-orang Papua dan wilayah mereka. Kedua hal ini tetap dapat bersama-sama, entah dengan cara baik atau jahat. Jalan keluar harus ditemukan dengan cara mengkombinasikan masa depan yang lebih baik bagi orang-orang Papua dan pengaturan yang tepat di wilayah batas timur Indonesia. Walaupun begitu, tampaknya akan sulit untuk mengkombinasikan suatu jendela terbuka ke Pasifik dengan rakyat di bagian garis meridian 141 Indonesia ini, yang terus menerus memrotes karena mereka telah salah dimengerti dan dilukai.

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- *Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity and Adaption* (East West Center Washington, 2005)
- “Australia's Strategic Environment: The Problem of Papua”, *Agenda*, Volume II, number 1, 2004, pages 37-49. March 2004
- *The Land of Papua and the Indonesian State: Essays on West Papua*, volumes I & II, Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Working Papers 120 & 121, 2003.

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