

# LIST OF DOCUMENTS

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BUITENLANDSE POLITIEK VAN NEDERLAND 1919 – 1945

(Documents relating to the  
foreign policy of the Netherlands 1919 – 1945)

September 1 1924 – August 31 1925

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**This book contains the complete text of the 'List of Documents' from:**

**Documenten betreffende de buitenlandse politiek van Nederland 1919 – 1945**

**Periode A: 1919 – 1930. Deel VI: 1 september 1924 – 31 augustus 1925**

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## List of documents\*

No.	Date; from/to	Description
1	2.9.1924 Van Karnebeek, notes	<i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment, etc.).</i> Notes on a talk with Hymans in Geneva. Status quo was to be maintained on the Wielingen issue, reservation of both parties' claims. The writer's appreciation of Prof. Bourquin's qualities as a negotiator; the writer willing to seek a settlement without retracting concessions already made, i.e. to proceed from what had already been achieved. Should the dissolved Commission of XIV be re-instituted? USSR's position in relation to Article XVII of the Political Convention (prior recognition by the powers concerned required). Importance of arrangement for Terneuzen. A Belgian-French-Netherlands military agreement undesirable in view of what might have happened had such an agreement existed in 1914 (possibility of direct German attack on Belgium via the Netherlands). Advisable that the majority of the 'Small Commission's' activities be concentrated in The Hague in view of the indiscretions committed in Brussels. Secrecy should be maintained until the publication of a communiqué.
1A	Annex 2.9.1924 from Hymans	Draft letter concerning the omission of the Wielingen issue from the settlement.
2	3.9.1924 Van Karnebeek's diary	<i>League of Nations Assembly.</i> Observations on foreign delegates (MacDonald anti-French? – Stauning and Lord Parmoor). The latter entertained little hope of the guarantee treaty eventuating ('They will never get it'). Benes' displeasure at MacDonald's comments on it.

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\* The numbers in the first column refer to the documents. The second column lists the date of the document, the name of the correspondents (save where the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs was sender or addressee) and the document's place of origin, if other than The Hague. Initials and titles have been retained only where omission of them could cause confusion. Some names have been shortened, e.g. *Beelaerts* instead of *Beelaerts van Blokland*. The omission of *from* and *to* indicates an internal or undispached document. The third column contains a summary of the documents, whilst reference to previous volumes is indicated by a Roman numeral followed by the number of the document.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
3	4.9.1924 Van Karnebeek's diary	<i>League of Nations Assembly.</i> MacDonald's speech demagogic, crude, vehement and largely negative; his remarks concerning the apportionment of blame for the war and Silesia were uncalled for. Van Karnebeek's own speech had met with approval from Loucheur, Sarraut, Hymans, ('c'était la chose à dire'), and Politis. During a dinner-party given by Drummond, Van Karnebeek had discussed socialism in which religion had a place, Marxism, the housing problem and financial aid to large families, with MacDonald. Socialism as 'public charity all wrong'. MacDonald considered Van Karnebeek's arguments in favour of a Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs inapplicable in the case of Great Britain, where the force of political conflict in parliament would render it liable to abuse. Van Karnebeek had attended a party given by Herriot, who had also expressed his appreciation of Van Karnebeek's speech and his intention of adopting its basic premise, while adhering to the view that a militarily organised means of coercion would be needed to make arbitration effective. Van Karnebeek's objections to international liabilities, in the interests of France as well as the Netherlands.
4	4.9.1924 from Loder	<i>Permanent Court.</i> Huber had been elected president after the vote had been taken no less than fifteen times. The writer felt aggrieved (he considered himself a victim of the 'professors - Anzilotti and the others' and of the positive reaction of Finlay and Moore to his rejection of foolish exception of Great Britain in a legal dispute). Weiss elected vice-president in the first round. Loder regarded himself as an exponent of the Court.
5	5.9.1924 Hooft, notes	<i>Germany (increased freight rates for flour).</i> Committee of importers of American and Canadian wheat requested the Netherlands to support Canadian-American steps against this measure. Suggestion that the envoy in Berlin discuss the matter with Stockhammern. German preferential (rail) freightage not considered harmful by Van der Berg because of the considerable difference between rail and shipping freight rates in Germany (shipping freightage Rotterdam to Frankfurt and Mannheim 100 cents per 100 kg.; rail freightage Hamburg/Bremen to Frankfurt, approximately 4 gold marks).

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6	5.9.1924 Van Karnebeek's diary	<i>League of Nations Assembly.</i> Herriot's speech had made a deep impression; the content of Parmoor's was quite good. Mention made of a conversation with Bratianu, who had had some interesting things to relate about conditions in the Middle East.
7	5.9.1924 Minutes of meeting of Dutch and German delegations	<i>Germany.</i> Discussion of an agreement to supplement the Coal Credit Arrangement of 1920 (foodstuffs and raw materials credits). Stockhamern did not fear arbitration, but he did not consider it the most sensible course. Impossible to grant credit until 1935 (Patijn). Stockhamern proposed redemption of five million on 1 January of the years 1927, 1928 and 1929, and the remainder on 1 January 1930. Germany had undertaken to meet the Dutch wish to get rid of the 'Ausnahmetarife' first, but had subsequently imposed new tariffs. Discussion of the connection between the two matters.
8	5.9.1924 from Loder	<i>Permanent Court.</i> Further to No. 5. The members of the 'Cour Mondiale' were worthless. Discussion of the 'roulements' idea. Weiss and Pessoa believed that the Huber interregnum would be short-lived and that Loder could then be reinstated. Further details about what he considered to be the plot against him.
9	5.9.1924 from Oudendijk (Peking)	<i>China.</i> Hostilities broken out between the provinces of Chekiang and Kiangsi. No need for the Netherlands to send a warship ('il n'y a pas de danger pour Shanghai'). Situation still quiet in North China. Marshal Chang awaited further developments.
10	6.9.1924 Van Karnebeek's diary	<i>League of Nations Assembly.</i> Anglo-French motion concerning treaty (shown to Van Karnebeek by Hurst) adopted. It gave too little support to those who could no longer regard this treaty as a basis for the further handling of questions of security and disarmament. Herriot and MacDonald, notably the latter, had behaved theatrically. Herriot was unlikely to oppose Germany's membership of the League. Van Karnebeek feared a 'clumsy' German step in the matter of war guilt. Branting was said to have approached Ebert on this matter, and France and Great Britain were both to warn Berlin against protesting (cf. No. 37).
11	6.9.1924 from Ruys de Beeren- brouck to De Graaff	<i>Hejaz.</i> Consul-General Van der Plas objected to the Regent of Bandung, Raden Adipati, representing Mutahrah Hajib on Islamic committees at the Mona congress. It was all the more to be regretted in view of the fact that the Mecca government had failed to

No.	Date; from/to	Description
12	8.9.1924 Van Karnebeek's diary	<p>persuade a single Javanese mullah. The Regent's argument that he wished to follow events there in the interests of Javanese politics was invalid. Van der Plas had moreover stated that Adipati did not speak Arabic.</p> <p><i>League of Nations Assembly.</i> Talk with Parmoor, who feared that efforts would be made to use the guarantee treaty as the basic for the debates, whereas arbitration should be given priority. Discussed with Jouvenel the impossibility of the Dutch accepting obligations as referred to in the <i>guarantee treaty</i>, as that would entail 'exposing ourselves to reservations that were alien to us'. Long talk with Benes on the same subject at a luncheon given by Chapuisat. The object of these discussions was to reassure the French that the Netherlands was not pursuing an anti-French policy and to impress on them that it had no ulterior aims. There seemed to be a genuine desire to establish a form which would exonerate states such as the Netherlands from liabilities. Talk with Schanzer. Italy persisted in its objections to the guarantee treaty and to the American Shotwell-Bliss proposition.</p>
13	9.9.1924 from Loder	<p><i>League of Nations Assembly, etc.</i> Congratulations on Van Karnebeek's successful speech in Geneva. The mandatory submission of disputes to the Permanent Court was about to be accepted even by the great powers (just when the writer had been thrown out of that body). Whether or not advisable to send Hammerskjöld to Geneva for consultation on amendments to Article 36 of the Court's Statutes.</p>
14	9.9.1924 from Sweerts de Landas Wyborgh (Stockholm)	<p><i>Germany (Dawes report).</i> (Section C, Art. IX). Swedish interests also involved (which would be confirmed by Swedish industrialists). Exemption from the issue of debentures for companies with foreign capital in Germany, as under the Treaty of Versailles nationality was no longer determined by a company's location, but by the nationality of its component parts, capital or management. Great Britain, on the other hand, adhered to the <i>lex loci</i>.</p>
15	10.9.1924 from Fentener van Vlissingen	<p><i>Germany (Dawes report).</i> According to a decision of the Joint Court of Arbitration (Paris), the nationality of a company was determined by the nationality of the majority of its shareholders. Could non-Germans resident in Germany then not be held responsible for reparations? The Temporary Organisation Committee, responsible for working out</p>

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16	10,9.1924 from Van Swaay	the details in accordance with Art. V, could perhaps be approached. Dawes Committee's motives for proposing 'industrial debentures'.
16A-C	Annexes 1, 2 and 3 2.5, 26.6 and 16.6.1924 from Van Oordt (Zeeland) and Baucke (Limburg) to Van Swaay	<p data-bbox="536 359 1069 537"><i>Belgian questions (1839 treaties amendment)</i>. Further to volume V, No. 194. Arrangements pertaining to waterways largely acceptable, though the obligations ensuing from Articles I and II (section 8) could well prove too onerous for the Netherlands in view of the cost of maintaining its other big rivers. High cost of maintenance, as evidenced by dredging operations at Bath. Provisions relating to drainage in Belgian Flanders and the maintenance of the navigation channel in the Western Scheldt were too favourable to Belgium.</p> <p data-bbox="536 707 1069 946">Dutch interest involved in the stretch of the Zuid-Willemsvaart canal between Maastricht and the starting-point of the canal connecting the Meuse and the Scheldt at Bocholt (canal through the Kempen region), both at the present time and after the completion of the Maasbracht-Maastricht canal. This should be taken into account in sharing the costs. Technical details.</p> <p data-bbox="536 956 1069 1232">Normal maintenance of the navigation channel in the Western Scheldt would only be possible once the current had been partly regulated. No dredging had been carried out in the Scheldt between 1914 and November 1922. The expenses incurred by Belgium during this period were therefore negligible, relating solely to administration and sounding. This should be taken into account when determining assessment periods.</p>
16D	Annex 4 18.7.1924 from Van Heyst to Van Swaay	Under Art. I of the Statute of Barcelona, the following were to be deemed inland waterways of international significance: the Rhine (with arms to the sea, thus the Yssel as well), the Meuse and the Scheldt (including the Western Scheldt). Description and interpretation of the consequences. Prescribed duration of the work to be carried out (seven years) also applied to the link with the Meuse: 'Une énumération complète entraînerait des difficultés insolubles'.
16E	Annex 5 26.8.1924 from Baucke to Van Swaay	Further technical particulars concerning the application of Articles II, V (section 2) and VI of the draft agreement. Numerous technical details concerning the Dommel, Meuse and Zuid-Willemsvaart,

No.	Date; from/to	Description
17	10.9.1924 from Oudendijk (Peking)	<i>China (unrest)</i> . Further to No. 9. Shanghai threatened. Dispatch of Java-China-Japan line vessel requested ('présence continue') to protect Dutch nationals.
18	11.9.1924 to Oudendijk (Peking)	<i>China (unrest)</i> . Request contained in No. 17 accepted to, provided it was without prejudice to the treasury. Significance of Chinese armed conflicts exaggerated by the Consul-General ('more ammunition wasted than blood shed').
19	11.9.1924 to De Graeff (Washington)	<i>United States (trade agreement)</i> . (See volume IV, No. 308). Account should be taken of the resolutions of the conference of representatives of Great Britain and its dominions and colonies, held on 17 July 1924, concerning the scientific basis on which the international trade in plants and parts of plants should be conducted (question of health measures). With regard to the regulation of shipping (Art. VII of the draft agreement); the Netherlands should persist in conclusion No. 7 as contained in volume V, No. 198-A.
20	15.9.1924 from Oudendijk (Peking)	<i>China</i> . Further to Nos. 9 and 18. Dutch interests were considerably greater in view of the fact that substantial shipments of goods had failed to find a market and were now stored at the cost of the Dutch banks in Shanghai. It was essential that Dutch prestige be upheld locally. Consul-General Daniëls considered that a warship with a landing force of 100 men would be in the right proportion to Dutch trade and shipping interests in Shanghai and to the number of Dutch nationals who might need protection. Daniëls was convinced that one or more Dutch ships would be at not more than 36 or 48 hours' sailing distance from Shanghai until the end of the month. He presumed that the Dutch themselves would bear whatever costs would be entailed. British-Japanese-American-French warning to the Chinese government that acts of hostility would be met with force. Xenophobia stirred up by Bolshevik Chinese, who were said to be presenting the situation as an instance of imperialist capitalism.
21	17.9.1924 to Oudendijk	<i>China (tariffs)</i> . Van Karnebeek had no objection to a temporary increase of Chinese duties by 10%, which, however, had been rejected by the French in the control commission. Ministry of Foreign Affairs at The Hague deemed consultation of the labour and colonial ministries unnecessary as they were not concerned with control.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
22	18.9.1924 to De Marees van Swinderen and Van Rappard (London, Copenhagen, Oslo)	<i>Panama (consular service)</i> . USA required foreign consular officials stationed in the Canal Zone to be in possession of an exequatur issued by the US government. Though initially opposed by Great Britain, the Netherlands and other countries, this demand was yielded to when Panama itself became more accommodating. USA was able to claim this right on the grounds of Art. III of the US-Panamanian canal treaty of 18 November 1903.
22A-B	Annexes 21.7 and 11.9.1924 Themps and Beucker Andreae, notes	A thorny question that had never been settled. How had Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Switzerland reacted? Possibly connected with the American government's reluctance to issue an exequatur for Ecker, the Dutch consul and Swedish vice-consul in Colon, probably because he was coloured. Reference to Art. III of the 1903 treaty.
23	22.9.1924 from Doude van Troostwijk (Berne)	<i>Germany (Dawes report)</i> . Further to Nos. 14 and 15. Talk with Dinichert, director of the Political Department. No likelihood of Swiss support. (Non-Germans who had built up interests in Germany should bear the risks themselves).
24	23.9.1924 to Van Swaay	<i>Belgian question (railfreightrates Terneuzen)</i> . Doubts about the applicability of Art. IV of the draft treaty ( <i>transit traffic</i> ). It could be proposed that, in the matter of rail freightrates, Terneuzen be automatically treated as if it were a Belgian port. Van Swaay's objection that this could be deemed a tactic admission that 'Terneuzen should really be Belgian'. It was hoped, however, that Belgium would give a unilateral undertaking analogous to the assurances given verbally in 1920 in connection with the draft treaty.
25	23.9.1924 to De Marees van Swinderen (London)	<i>Tangier Statute</i> . Enclosure of volume V, No. 328. Distinction made by the French between protégés from the French zone of Morocco or Tangier on the one hand, and those from the Spanish zone of Morocco in the French zone and Tangier on the other. Possibility of redress being examined. What was Britain's attitude? The reliability of the Dutch lists could be stressed.
25A-B	Annexes 15 and 18.9.1924 Snouck Hurgronje and Van Karnebeek	Notes on the positive wording of a covering letter designed to persuade Great Britain to cooperate (without exercising too much pressure), by holding out the promise of the Netherlands' accession to the Tangier Statute if its reasonable demands were met. The impression that the Netherlands' object was to create difficulties was to be avoided.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
26	23.9.1924 from Schuller tot Peursum (Cairo)	<i>Hejaz.</i> Capture of the town of Taïf by Ibn Saud (after the first defeat suffered by the Transjordanian troops at Amman). After the 1914-1918 war the British had transferred their sympathies to Hussein on the advice of Lawrence. Ibn Saud had formed an alliance with Sheikh Idrissi, King of Asir, and Imam Yehia, Sultan of Yemen, against the combination of Hussein, Abdulla and Faisal (Wahhibis against the Hashemites). Did Ibn Saud wish to take Mecca?
27	25.9.1924 from Oudendijk (Peking)	<i>China.</i> Shanghai threatened. Further to Nos. 17, 18 and 20. Continued heavy concentration of troops in the north. Consul-General in Shanghai regretted that the cost of a ship could not be borne by the state and again urged that measures be taken.
27A	Annex 27.9.1924 Beelaerts, notes	Consul-General had not been long in Shanghai and had no experience of internal military conflicts in China. Neither Beelaerts nor Oudendijk attached much weight to his fears for the safety of the Dutch in Shanghai. Any danger to those in the International Settlement and the French Concession was not such that it could not be dealt with by the foreign forces there. In the unlikely event of its being necessary, they could undoubtedly find refuge on ships of other nationalities.
28	26.9.1924 Economic Affairs Department, notes	<i>Germany.</i> Further to Dawes report (cf. Nos. 14, 15 and 23). The Temporary Organisation Committee had already been dissolved, so that the Reconstruction Commission, on which the German government and the allies were represented, would have to be applied to. The basic aim of the legislation envisaged was to obtain the maximum assurance of profits, while at the same time providing for the greatest possible independence from foreign influence for German industry, and full autonomy for the Reich in respect of the collection of taxes. The burden of the debentures would not be borne by industry alone, but would also affect transport and shipping companies, smaller manufacturing enterprises, and state and municipal undertakings with a capital exceeding 20,000 gold marks. Little likelihood that Dutch nationals would be exempted.
29	30.9.1924 Van der Plas, Consul-General, Jeddah (The Hague)	<i>Hejaz.</i> Hostilities between Ibn Saud <i>cum suis</i> and Hussein <i>cum suis</i> . Coalition-forming among opponents. Great Britain's position complicated as, after the war, on the advice of Lawrence, it had dropped Ibn Saud in favour of Hussein. If he won, what were Ibn Saud's plans for Jeddah and Mecca?

No.	Date; from/to	Description
30	2.10.1924 from Snijders	Notes on possibility of ban on pilgrimages or withholding of pilgrimage passports for NEI pilgrims. <i>Belgian question</i> . Netherlands neutrality and <i>casus belli</i> declaration (armed action if Dutch neutrality were to be violated in general, thus not only by Germany). Guarantees should Belgium be threatened by Germany through Dutch territory.
31	3.10.1924 to Snijders	<i>Belgian question</i> . Reply to No. 30. The Netherlands had not given a special guarantee. If the <i>casus belli</i> declaration could be regarded as a guarantee by any of the powers, this could apply not only to Belgium but also to Germany and even Great Britain and, indirectly, to France. Snijders' interpretation could create the impression that more had occurred than the issuance of a general declaration when doubts as to Dutch intentions had arisen among the six foreign powers and the Netherlands had been suspected of connivance with Germany.
32	3.10.1924 from Loudon (Paris)	<i>League of Nations Assembly</i> . Profiles of a number of statesmen and delegates, based on their speeches (Loucheur, Rolin, Motta, Buxton, Boncour, Briand, Parmoor, Benes, Politis, Jouvenal and Schanzer). Far too much was expected from the <i>Geneva Protocol</i> ('a promising document'): 'it's a long way to Tipperary'. The British delegation had been instructed to re-elect all the non-permanent members of the Council, partly with a view to promoting friendly relations with France. The writer had refused Murray's request to make a speech on 'the lack of principle in repeatedly re-electing incumbents' (meant as a face-saving operation). List of the countries which would vote for the re-election of the Netherlands. The members of the Dutch delegation, notably Lynden and Van Eysinga, were highly respected.
33	4.10.1924 from Prawira, (Jeddah)	<i>Hejaz</i> . Hussein deposed (in favour of his eldest son, Alli). Instructions requested concerning recognition.
34	7.10.1924 to Prawira	<i>Hejaz</i> . Reply to No. 33. Instructions that receipt of report concerning Ali's succession be acknowledged. Had other consuls been authorised to recognise the new ruler? Consul Van der Plas would return to his post at the beginning of November.
35	7.10.1924 to Governor-General Fock	<i>Turkey (settlement agreement)</i> . Rejection of Fock's recommendation that if the agreement were to be declared applicable in NEI, any questions arising from the application of Art. 109 of the government

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35 A	Annex 10.8.1924 from Fock	<p>regulations should be submitted to the Permanent Court. No form of intervention whatsoever, including that of international arbitration, was admissible in questions concerning the classification of the inhabitants of NEI in the ethnic groups referred to in Article 109.</p> <p>Recommendation referred to in foregoing letter concerning Turkish claim that Turks in NEI should be treated as Europeans before the law, on the grounds of the most-favoured-nation status stipulated in the Netherlands-Turkish trade agreement in which NEI would perhaps be included. NEI should be excluded from the agreement. Concurrence with the view of the NEI Council that Article 109 be reviewed.</p>
36	14.10.1924 to Gevers (Berlin)	<p><i>Germany.</i> Conditions set by Germany itself for <i>joining the League of Nations</i> (non-involvement in application of measures taken in accordance with Art. XVI, active participation in the mandates system, a permanent seat on the League Council and membership not to be regarded as admission of guilt for the war). Was this correct, had other powers already replied, and if so, what?</p>
37	16.10.1924 to Council of Ministers	<p><i>League of Nations Covenant and guarantee treaty.</i> Both treaties compared with the <i>Geneva Protocol</i> on the following points: commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes (whether deemed by parties arbitrable or not); violation of this commitment; commitment to participation in sanctions. Guarantee treaty and Protocol: designation of the aggressor; participation in military sanctions; sanctions in the event of 'menace d'agression'; 'compétence exclusive' (of the State); special treaties; connection between guarantee and arms reduction; measures against non-signatories of the Protocol.</p>
38	16.10.1924 to Loudon (Paris)	<p><i>France (surtaxes d'origine et d'entrepôt).</i> Discussion with a delegation of the Strasbourg Chamber of Commerce. Alsace wished to see an end to the discrimination against the port of Strasbourg ('nous irons jusqu'au bout'). A Dutch move aimed at putting an end to the discrimination against Rotterdam in favour of Antwerp should be put to Alsace by Paris, which would provide an opportunity for the free expression of opinion. Van Karnebeek wished to make use of this (inestimably) valuable private action, and instructed the envoy to inform the Quai d'Orsay that public opinion in the Netherlands was</p>

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		critical of the discrimination still being practised against Rotterdam. He should at the same time point out, without creating the impression that the Netherlands and Alsace were acting in concert, that the continuation of this abnormal situation was all the more incomprehensible in that the failure to make full use of one of the seaports on which Strasbourg depended must inevitably have negative consequences for the wide region served by the port of Strasbourg.
39	16.10.1924 to Van Lennep (Berne), Van Rappard (Copenhagen) and Bentinck (Stockholm)	<i>League of Nations (Geneva Protocol)</i> . The governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland had been requested to make known their views on the Protocol. Did they intend submitting it to their parliaments (with or without reservations, should they become signatories)?
40	17.10.1924 Meeting of experts held at the Ministry	<i>Belgian question</i> . Draft of economic agreement with Belgium systematically reviewed (together with report on amendments to 1839 treaties). The proposed amendments pertained to technical details and wording (waterways and their maintenance, powers of the commissions to be instituted, etc.).
40A	Annex 1 from Schönfeld	Note with proposals and explanatory notes.
40B	Annex 2 from Schönfeld	Note on Art. III, section 8, subsection 2 (maintenance obligations arising from changes in the state of the river; its system of buoyage).
40C	Annex 3 20.10.1924 from Surie, Ram- bonnet and Schönfeld	Report of the subcommittee on Art. III, section 8.
40D	Annex 4 from Maren Bentz van den Berg	Proposal made in the meeting of 17 October regarding the matters which were not be made subject to the powers of the committee in question. The wording should be altered to omit reference to 'the Dutch section' and 'the Belgian section' so as to remove all uncertainty about the powers of the committee and to clarify such matters as the position of the Wielingen, shipping to and from Zeebrugge, and the shifting Thalweg constituting the boundary line between the Netherlands and Belgium above Bath.
41	17.10.1924 from Oudendijk (Peking)	<i>China-Russia</i> . Chicherin had instructed Karakhan, the Soviet ambassador in Peking (and thereby automatically doyen instead of the oldest envoy), to attend the meetings of the diplomatic corps, the object being, in Oudendijk's opinion, to frustrate the corps' activities, veto every decision and thus prevent unanimity. The Italian envoy advised that Ka-

No.	Date; from/to	Description
42	19.10.1924 from Patijn to 's Jacob	rakhan be excluded from the joint activities of the corps by requesting a definite statement from either China or the USSR on whether the USSR was or was not a treaty power with extraterritorial rights. Advice to support the view of the corps that the collective work of the representatives of the treaty powers should remain directed towards their common interests in China, and that there was therefore no place in it for a representative of the Soviet government. <i>Romania</i> . The Netherlands should state that it was willing to repay 75,000 guilders to Romania if the Committee considered this advisable. The Netherlands should not have insisted on payment which was contrary to the conditions laid down.
43	21.10.1924 from Van Lennep (Berne)	<i>League of Nations (Geneva Protocol)</i> . Reply to No. 39. The Protocol might well be signed before the December session of parliament, though no proposal had as yet been submitted to the Swiss Federal Council, probably pending the reception accorded the political department's report on the 5th Assembly. Uncertain whether ratification could take place before the date fixed in Article 17 (1 May 1925). Nothing known about reservations. Articles VI and XIX should, however, make adequate provision for the exclusion of Switzerland from armed conflict, leaving economic sanctions as the sole possibility.
44	22.10.1924 from Hughes (Washington) to De Graeff	<i>United States (Palmas-Miangas arbitration)</i> . Meaning of the phrase 'the principles of international law and any applicable treaty provisions'. The words 'and other agreements of this kind' should preferably be replaced by (= confined to 'agreements between the Colonial government and the Native Chiefs', while 'should be submitted to arbitration' should be replaced by 'may be submitted to arbitration'.
45	23.10.1924 Van Karnebeek's diary	<i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i> . Ligne's question whether Hyman's suggestion that the Wielingen issue be left in abeyance had been accepted in principle, answered in the affirmative. The treaties referred to therein should however be checked. The need for purely official consultations on what was still to be done with the treaties stressed. The mood in the Netherlands had changed in the past five years; objections were now likely to be raised to concessions made readily at that time.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
46	27.10.1924 to De Marees van Swinderen (London)	<i>Tangier Statute</i> . Further to No. 25. What was the extent of British interest in this question? Should it prove impossible to arrive at a more complete arrangement following this course, the Netherlands intended, if possible, to make separate arrangements with France so as to protect the interests of the protégés – if necessary without first settling the question of principle.
47	28.4.1924 from Van Vredenburg (Brussels)	<i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i> . Talk with Andriessen, who had urged the early signing of the treaty. Major changes were likely to take place in Belgian public opinion and time was working in the Netherlands's favour. Stupidity of the occupation of the Ruhr and Belgian neutrality. Why had this been relinquished by Hymans at the time? Why Hymans' 'volte-face', he now being prepared to sign at an early date? Andriessen believed that Hymans now realised the disadvantages of Belgium's dancing to France's piping. 'The spirit of Geneva' had had a beneficial effect on him; the Ruhr fiasco had also played a role.
48	30.10.1924 Beelaerts, notes	<i>League of Nations (admission of members)</i> . German memorandum on Germany's membership presented by Swedish envoy. It was in the interest of the countries not represented on the Council to consult with the Netherlands on this question. Swedish objections to German reservations concerning Art. 16 of the Covenant. Van Karnebeek of the opinion that Art. 11 appeared to meet German wishes sufficiently. The mandates question concerned only the Council. No other objections. Reply to Swedish envoy preferably in person.
48 A	Annex	Memorandum (in German) referred to in No. 48.
49	30.10.1924 from Loudon (Mexico City)	<i>Mexico (claims after the revolution of 1910)</i> . Further to volume V, No. 291. Specification of claims (La Corona, Kolff, Schoemaker de Nordeck and Das), some of which had been estimated. They were considered insufficient to justify the institution of a mixed Netherlands-Mexican special claims commission which, though it might deal with the claims, could not guarantee indemnification. Mexican treasury short of funds.
50	31.10.1924 Van Karnebeek's diary	<i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i> . Talk with Ligne, who had seen Hymans in Brussels. It was intended that the Netherlands-Belgian talks be kept as calm and simple as possible. Van Karnebeek had stated that there was no question of a draft

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51	31.10.1924 from Van Romburgh (Consul-General, Brussels)	<p>other than that of the Commission of XIV, which could be adjusted on technical points where required. De Visscher and Van Zuylen van Nyevelt to be the Belgian delegates; Bourquin not available. Date would be decided upon shortly, and the talks held in the Netherlands.</p> <p><i>Belgium (shipping tax)</i>. Tax for which Dutch barges were liable partly <i>taxe professionnelle</i> and partly <i>taxe mobilière</i>. Manner of levying. The intention was that the former patent tax be replaced by a tax on operating profits made in Belgium. <i>Taxe mobilière</i> would be levied only on barge owners.</p>
52	1.11.1924 Beelaerts, notes	<p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i>. Notes on the basis for the discussions in the 'Small Commission': acceptance of the status quo on the Wierlingen issue, mutual rights being reserved; no further discussion of any form of military agreement; no withdrawal of concessions already made; the talks to be confined to formal questions (Rhine-Meuse-Scheldt Canal), doubt about the construction of which had arisen. Details of the economic agreement to be discussed article by article. No amendments to the collective treaty on the initiative of either the Netherlands or Belgium.</p> <p>Difficulties had arisen concerning the Laroche report, which was of essential importance. How was this draft to be given an official character in view of the fact that the Commission of XIV had already been dissolved and could therefore no longer publish a report? The governments of the Netherlands and Belgium should inform the governments concerned that they had approved the draft report of the Chairman of the Commission of XIV, which had been unable to complete its work in 1920.</p>
53	1.11.1924 from Westerveld	<p><i>League of Nations (arms limitation)</i>. Points to be added to the 'general arms limitation plan' in the Benes report adopted by the League (amended wording). Consideration should be given to the Netherlands' geographical location and the strategic importance of the mother country and its possessions in East Asia. Establishment of the minima which could be expected was an important factor in determining the level below which arms limitation should not be allowed to fail. The powers of armed forces in transit on the one hand and of the national military authorities on the other should be further defined. Forces stationed in the colonies might have to</p>

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53 A	Annex 2.10.1924	be transported to the mother country, should its security be threatened, which would put neighbouring countries without colonies on an unequal footing. It was possible that the establishment of <i>zones démilitarisées</i> would result in certain important parts of the country being left to their fate if the country as a whole was small, narrow and had a relatively long border (South Limburg and Zeeland Flanders). ' <i>Accords régionaux de réduction des armements</i> ' was an obstacle to general armament rather than an advantage. The tonnage of warships below 10,000 tons had been left out of account in Rome, but not here. League of Nations document A-140 (I) 1924 – IX. Text of resolutions adopted by the 5th Assembly on 2 October 1924.
54	4.11.1924 from Forster de Pusztaker	<i>Hungary (trade agreement)</i> . Proposed amendments to the text (in French), with request that counter-proposals, if any, be communicated, with mention of the advantages accorded the allies in the Treaty of Trianon.
55	7.11.1924 from Forster de Pusztaker	<i>Hungary (trade agreement)</i> . Further to No. 54. Budapest felt little need for an arbitration clause as Hungary contemplated joining the League of Nations, which would entail acceptance of the arbitration principle.
56	7.11.1924 from Loudon (Paris)	<i>France (surtaxes d'origine et d'entrepôt)</i> . Further to No. 38. Thorbecke had talked with Serruys, director of the Trade Department, prior to taking steps at the Quai d'Orsay. Serruys had revealed that it had been intended to designate Rotterdam the seaport for Strasbourg after the war, with transport free of surtaxes because of the shorter traject and the relations between Rotterdam and Alsace. Serruys himself had drafted Art. 357 of the Treaty of Versailles, in accordance with which the Germans would transfer ownership of their installations in Rotterdam to France. This, however, was to be dependent on the trade route via Rotterdam and on a customs union (which had not materialised) between Luxembourg, one of Alsace's lungs, and France. The choice had fallen on Antwerp as transit port after the referendum that had decided in favour of a customs union between Luxembourg and Belgium. The idea had been 'to preserve the relationship between Alsace and Luxembourg'. Thorbecke had remarked that the virtual closure of the Rhine route had excised the other lung. It was not possible to put back the clock.

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57	8.11.1924 from Oudendijk (Peking)	<p>The question now arose whether the principles on which the new Navigation of the Rhine Act was based were compatible with the surtaxes system. The Netherlands had forfeited much goodwill in Alsace by its attitude to the lateral canal, to which that province attached great importance. The French nonetheless wished both to serve the interests of Alsace and to retain the old ties of friendship with the Netherlands.</p> <p><i>China (unrest)</i>. Soldiers had entered the Imperial Palace. When the Imperial Family had appealed for protection, Oudendijk, together with his British and Japanese confrères, had requested the intervention of the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Emperor had been driven out of the palace. Authorisation from Van Karnebeek to participate in a 'représentation éventuelle'.</p>
58	8.11.1924 from Oudendijk (Peking)	<p><i>China (unrest)</i>. Dispatch further to No. 57. The matter was being dealt with in its own (revolutionary) way by the government of four persons which had been formed after the coup d'état of 23 October. Talk with new Minister for Foreign Affairs, C.T. Wang, who had proffered sarcastic thanks for the interest shown in the Emperor (who had abdicated). The Emperor had gone to the house of his father, the former Prince Regent. Further interference by foreign powers would exacerbate the difficulties of the Emperor. Internal military situation precarious.</p>
59	9.11.1924 from Van der Plas (Jeddah)	<p><i>Hejaz (trade agreement)</i>. Could the most-favoured-nation status to be bargained for also be offered? Reasonable chance that the country would be able to maintain an independent or semi-independent existence. Opportunity should be seized of utilising the difficult situation in which the government found itself. Preparatory and non-committal talks held pending further instructions.</p>
60	10.11.1924 Beelaerts, notes	<p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i>. Beucker Andreae's objections to Hymans' proposals on the Wielingen summed up by Beelaerts as follows: 'Maintient souveraineté' implied more than maintaining claims. The text should be amended to 'Maintient qu'il lui revient le droit de souveraineté' or something similar. The other version dated from the time when this issue had been urgent. The phrase 'with the reservations of 1866 and 1881' was not altogether logical; there was no mention in the Belgian</p>

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60A	Annex	<p>Note of the status quo agreed upon (whatever that might be). The lists of buoys and lights in Art. III, paragraph 8, should be replaced by 'as this (= situation) now is', in order to preclude any later use of these lists as an argument for sovereignty. No change should be made in Art. II, paragraphs 7 and 8, in which the situation as laid down in earlier treaty provisions was confirmed, i.e. that the Wielingen was part of that section of the river and sea-arms for the buoyage of which the Netherlands was responsible; the term 'Wielingen' was used too loosely, as what was actually means was 'la partie de la passe de Wielingen qui fait face au littoral belge jusqu'à la pleine mer'. Pertinent as these comments were, Beelaerts considered it inadvisable that the recommended amendments be proposed to Belgium, which would not accept an encroachment on 'ses droits de souveraineté'. Beucker Andreae objected to other amendments as well.</p>
61	10.11.1924 to Van Swaay and Westerveld	<p>Beucker Andreae's comment as described above. <i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i>. During consultations with other Ministers strong objections had been raised to the provisions of Art. III, paragraph 8 of the 1920 draft economic agreement in which the Netherlands was required to bear the cost of maintaining the waterway in the state of navigability indicated on the map. Enclosure of a new draft article.</p>
61A	Annex 1 8.11.1924 Beelaerts, notes	<p>Notes on a meeting with Surie, Rambonnet and Schönfeld held on 7 November, during which the objections referred to in No. 60 had been discussed. The same objections were made to the acceptance as norm of a channel of a certain breadth and depth, as no guarantee could be given that these dimensions would remain constant. The arrangement as given below in Annex 2 was proposed.</p>
61B	Annex 2	<p>Draft of Art. III, paragraph 8, stating that the Netherlands would bear the maintenance costs of its part of the waterway up to a sum to be calculated at intervals of ten years and not to exceed the sum spent on the maintenance of that part of the waterway during the period 1904-1914.</p>
62	10.11.1924 from Van Dijk	<p><i>League of Nations (arms convention)</i>. Objections to some points in the report of the Commission Temporaire Mixte (see Volume V, No. 329). The quantities of arms and ammunition purchased by the importing, and usually smaller, countries was common</p>

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63	10.11.1924 from Van Vredenburg (Brussels)	<p>knowledge owing to the system of registered permits, but nothing was known, nor any notification required, of the stocks of arms and ammunition of the greater producers. Nowhere were the contracting parties required in so many words to forbid the export of arms by their <i>nationals</i>. Opportunity was provided by Art. 25 for arms-exporting countries to supply arms without restriction to rebels, revolutionaries and other groups (<i>once recognised as 'combatants'</i>) in armed conflict with established authority. The universal application of the convention was eroded by the provision that each state could take what it wished from the convention on the conditions of its choice. National control was not only insufficient but dubious as to accuracy and reliability. The Netherlands, as a non-combatant state, should not be prevented from purchasing the arms needed for its national defence or from promoting the development of the national industries it required for preparations for war.</p> <p><i>Belgium</i>. Prime Minister Theunisse intending resigning should the Belgian budget (raised because of salary increases) be rejected by parliament. He was pleased at the turn Netherlands-Belgian relations had taken, but had commented forcefully and bitterly on the annexationists. The writer had asked him if 'he could not use his influence to put a stop to the advertising by large industrial concerns' in Nothomb's paper (the mouthpiece of the annexationists). Theunisse agreed, and the writer offered to send him a list of the firms concerned.</p>
64	10.11.1924 from Van Rees to François	<p><i>League of Nations (mandates: France in Syria)</i>. First paragraph of the Order of the High Commissioner for Syria of 3 April 1924 (instituting a 10% increase in import duty on goods from Germany (30% as against 15%) 'to prevent evasion') was contrary to Art. 11, paragraph 1 of the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon. It was feared that this would lead to imports from Germany via foreign ports (Hamburg and London, for instance) and thus foster the evasion it sought to prevent (cf. volume V, No. 335).</p>
65	13.11.1924 from Chamber of Commerce, Leyden	<p><i>The Netherlands (fewer obstacles to exports)</i>. There were still a number of countries with which no trade agreements on a most-favoured-nation basis had as yet been concluded. Sometimes the text of agreements was worded in such a way that they were contrary to the most-favoured-nation principle. Had</p>

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65 A	Annex 20.11.1924 from Colijn	the Netherlands procured sufficient special arrangements (on a quid pro basis) which could boost exports? Proposal that maximum and minimum tariffs be introduced, the latter to be offered only to countries which themselves offered substantial advantages. Short-term agreements were to be preferred, possibly with automatic extension in case of non-termination.
66	13.11.1924 from Gevers (Berlin)	<i>Ditto.</i> Comments on No. 65. As pending tariff legislation had reached its present stage with difficulty, a new proposal based on the wishes of the Leyden Chamber of Commerce would give rise to problems. Should it prove necessary to meet the wishes of the Chamber, thought could be given to retaliatory measures. Aalberse suggested a tariff increase of 50% to 100% for countries with which no agreement had been concluded.
67	13.11.1924 from De Marees van Swinderen (London)	<i>Germany (trade agreement: tariffs).</i> Wolff was of the opinion that an effort should be made to establish a right to unconditional most-favoured-nation status and a tariff for special Dutch export commodities, laid down in an agreement. The Auswärtige Amt should be sounded out on these points without delay, as the rights based on the Order of 29 September 1924 could end at any moment. Once assured of most-favoured-nation status, the Netherlands could observe the development of Germany's trade system – currently being forged – with equanimity. It would probably be more difficult to embody a tariff for export goods in an agreement. More concessions might have to be made by the Netherlands for luxury goods (arboricultural) products, flower bulbs and oysters). <i>Great Britain and the League of Nations.</i> Talk with Sir Eyre Crowe, who was by no means a fervent admirer of 'l'atmosphère de Genève' where, in his opinion, only double-dealers and fanatics were to be found. The League of Nations would be ineffectual as long as the US was not a member. He objected to the principle of compulsory arbitration as laid down in the Protocol; it was unacceptable to Britain, which did not wish to have its vital interests subjected to the arbitration of a Czech or a Cuban. The so-called sanction provisions rejected (economic boycott = blockade with all that might entail). The present British government would not accept the Protocol; Crowe was not even sure of MacDonald's approval.

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68	14.11.1924 to Forster de Pusztaker	<i>Hungary (trade agreement)</i> . Further to Nos. 54 and 55. Reiteration of the Dutch Government's desire for an arbitration clause in the treaty, referring to recent treaties with Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, and to the uncertainty surrounding the Geneva Protocol. Proposal for a mutual declaration not to undermine the intended most-favoured nation status by detailed product specifications in customs regulations.
69	14.11.1924 from Van Dijk	<i>League of Nations (chemical warfare)</i> . The report of the Commission Temporaire Mixte pour la Réduction des Armements had little scientific or military value, being no more than a compilation of replies received from academics, with some speculative reflections on the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population. No comparison was made with the danger to which civilian populations would be exposed by aerial bombing with high explosives. Were chemical weapons de facto so much more inhumane than others that they should be condemned on those grounds? Concurrence with the general condemnation of bacteriological warfare. In principle the writer shared the view that efforts should be made to ban the import of new weapons unless they could alleviate the sufferings of war. In the meantime the use of chemical weapons should not be completely renounced unless it was absolutely certain that they would not be used against the Netherlands. Further observations, leading to the conclusion that it was not yet possible to take a decision on signing the Treaty of Washington. A wait-and-see attitude should be adopted.
70	14.11.1924 from De Ligne	<i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i> . Hyman's thanks for receipt of the Explanatory Memorandum on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' estimates. He had no comment to make, assuming as he did that the Netherlands 'dans le cas où la frontière hollandaise serait violée, en ferait un casus belli'. The meeting of the 'Small Commission' delayed (cf. No. 50).
71	14.11.1924 from De Graaff	<i>League of Nations (arms limitation)</i> . There was little need for amplification of the Benes report as proposed by the Minister for the Navy (in No. 53). Account had already been taken of the 'situation géographique et stratégique' in Art. 8 of the convention, while Art. 11 of the Protocol left decisions about the forces to be contributed to a joint action

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72	17.11.1924 from De Marees van Swinderen (London)	to the signatories themselves (on the assumption that they would fulfil their obligations faithfully and effectively). Under these circumstances there could be no question of setting a minimum, as all available resources could be requisitioned should national security so require. View a) that the regulation of relations between the commander of a combined force and the authorities of the state granting right of passage was in no way relevant to arms limitation and should therefore not be placed on the agenda of the conference; and b) that when the means of defence of states were discussed, those both in the mother country and in the colonies should be dealt with. <i>Tangier Statute</i> . Talk with Villiers about No. 46. British government's principal aim was to enable the Tangier Convention to come into force on 1 December 1924. At the same time it would continue its efforts to persuade the French government to come to an arrangement whereby the protégés in one of the zones of Morocco would not be subject to the jurisdiction of local courts in the other zones. British view that the Netherlands' accession would be the most effective way of achieving this. A Note would be sufficient for an undertaking from the French government. The Convention could thus come into force before long, after which joint Anglo-Dutch steps could be taken concerning the law under which protégés would be tried. The British government did not intend to allow British protégés from the Spanish zone to be brought to trial in the French zone.
73	18.11.1924 to Michiels van Verduynen (Budapest)	<i>Hungary (trade agreement)</i> . Further to Volume V, No. 151, and to No. 54 above. Forster de Pusztaker had stated in a telephone conversation that Hungary insisted on a clause that provided for disputes to be submitted to the Permanent Court. The agreement should be concluded at an early date. The specifications in the system of Dutch trade agreements were of great practical importance, though this should not be emphasized strongly.
74	18.11.1924 from Van Eysinga	<i>France (surtaxes d'origine et d'entrepôt)</i> . Further to No. 56. Serruys' arguments based on factual inaccuracies. Had France to choose between Antwerp and Rotterdam? The preference accorded Antwerp dated from 1919, whereas the Belgian-Luxembourg customs union had not come into being until 25 June 1921. The writer contested Serruys' remarks

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		<p>about the Netherlands' attitude in the matter of the lateral canal (the original French plans submitted to the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine had been inadequate as regards navigation, necessitating substantial changes on the initiative of the Netherlands. The surtaxes referred to here did not date from long before the Mannheim Treaty, but from 1892.</p> <p>Doubts as to whether matters could be improved for the Netherlands by means of an amendment to the Rhine Navigation Treaty. It would perhaps be easier to put an end to differentiation in Rhine traffic by demanding equality of treatment, which was part and parcel of modern fluvial law. The matter would probably not be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the Central Commission, as Germany had requested that it be postponed.</p>
75	[18].11.1924 from Marling	<p><i>Tangier Statute</i>. France was not in favour of the early coming into force of the new Statute or the Netherlands' accession to it. Paris sought to retain its authority in the new Tangier Assembly as elsewhere. 'It is clearly in the best interests of the Netherlands government and of Tangier that the Assembly and the Committee of Control should enjoy the advantage of including a Netherlands representative, particularly during the critical initial period which will see the birth of the new régime'. The Netherlands urged to accede, leaving the subsidiary question (<i>protégé</i>) to later negotiation.</p>
76	18.11.1924 from Van Eysinga	<p><i>Belgium (shipping tax)</i> (cf. No. 51). Would it be possible to invoke the most-favoured-nation clauses in the 1863 and 1866 treaties? This would, however, make no difference in the case of France (no mention of exemption in the Franco-Belgian <i>modus vivendi</i> of 30 October). Was this tax also to be levied on sea-going vessels entering Belgian ports?</p>
76A	Annex 28.10.1924 Kikkert, notes	<p>The Rhine Navigation Treaty was territorially not applicable on this point. Should this standpoint be rejected, it could still not be concluded from the free navigation referred to in Art. 1 of the Rhine Navigation Convention that no taxes could be levied on anything relating to the Rhine.</p>
77	19.11.1924 from Benoist	<p><i>Navigation of the Rhine (nomination of delegates to the Central Commission)</i>. French view that 'les membres allemands des commissions fluviales constitueraient une délégation unique de l'Empire Allemand et des Etats riverains, chacun des délégués</p>

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78	25.11.1924 from De Marees van Swinderen (London)	<p>étant spécialement désigné pour représenter un des Etats riverains (2 à la commission de l'Elbe)'. The German Reich should not be accorded a 'représentation propre' to which it had no right under the terms of the treaty of Versailles.</p> <p><i>League of Nations (Geneva Protocol)</i>. Different views on this subject had been expressed in the columns of <i>The Times</i> (the standpoint taken by ex-Minister Grey of Fallodon as against that of Gilbert Murray and Sir Valentine Chirol).</p>
79	25.11.1924 Van Karnebeek's diary	<p><i>Vatican</i>. During a formal call, the internuncio Orsenigo had expressed the Vatican's wish that the internunciate be raised to the status of nunciature (not immediately, but with a view to the future possibility of embassies being established in the Netherlands, so that the Vatican would be able to claim precedence on the grounds of prior establishment). Discussion with Marling on the <i>Tangier Statute</i>. The Foreign Office had assumed (see No. 74) that France would make no effort to secure the Netherlands' accession, whereas his French and Spanish confrères had apparently been instructed to urge the Netherlands to accede. In view of this Van Karnebeek preferred not to defer the issue of courts for the protégés. The arrangements already made with France regarding the French zone and Tangier itself were satisfactory. He attached importance to a general settlement (and not one advantageous to the Netherlands alone).</p> <p><i>Sweden</i>. Talk with Adlercreutz, who had requested on behalf of his government that a conciliation treaty be concluded. Van Karnebeek was willing to cooperate, but had stated that he wished to await the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Matters of International Law.</p>
80	25.11.1924 Beelaerts, notes	<p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment: Art. V, paragraphs 1 and 2)</i>. Objections had arisen to indefinite commitment in the economic agreement to the granting of permission to construct canals on Dutch territory. The situation that had obtained in 1920, when Belgium had not been prompted by financial considerations to make an early start with construction, had now changed. The canal from the Rhine to the Scheldt and Limburg was already subject to a time limit (25 years, five of which had already elapsed) under the Treaty of Versailles. It would be advisable to stipulate a similar term (say 20 years) for the canal from Antwerp to Moerdijk.</p>

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81	27.11.1924 to Van Eysinga	<i>Germany (preferential rail freight rates and Rhine traffic)</i> . The principles governing the granting of preferential freightage – already granted by Germany in principle – had been established at a meeting of the Netherlands Railways and German technicians held at Utrecht on 11 July 1924, but had not yet been approved in Berlin. Doubts as to whether it would be possible to abolish preferential rail freight rates in general at that point. It was feared by those concerned that such preferential freight rates would be prejudicial to Rhine traffic. The following questions now arose: 1) could the granting of such freight rates be considered contrary to Art. XIV of the Mannheim Treaty; and 2) if not, should freightage granted to Dutch sea ports be extended do transport to ports situated on the Rhine?
81 A	Annex 21.11.1924 from Kalff	No need to fear harmful effect of preferential rail freight rates on Rhine traffic in view of the fact that Rhine freightage was so much cheaper than rail freight rates (see No. 6). If Germany was prepared to treat Dutch ports on the same footing as Bremen and Hamburg, there was no reason for abolishing preferential freight rates which could, after all, be expected to stimulate trade. The Netherlands would be unable to prevent a certain amount of traffic being diverted to Belgian ports once preferential freight rates had been granted to both the Belgian and the Dutch railways, partly because Belgium had certain prerogatives under the Treaty of Versailles.
82	27.11.1924 to De Marees van Swinderen (London)	<i>Tangier Statute</i> . The British envoy had expressed himself in terms similar to those reported in No. 72. French predominance assured in the Committee of Control and the Assembly even if all other nationalities concerned were represented. Joint action by the British and Netherlands governments after the accession of the Netherlands to the new Statute was no longer expected to achieve much. Instructions to say no more in London than that The Hague had raised the question of the protégés from the Spanish zone with Paris.
83	28.11.1924 Beucker Andreae, notes	<i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i> . As almost all the beacons and lights marking wrecks were in or at the entrance to the Wielingen, it was the Netherlands which was primarily responsible for safety measures. The Dutch had stated in both 1919 and 1920 that they accepted responsibility for the buoyage in accordance with the protocol to Art. 70 of the

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84	28.11.1924 from Van Vredenburg (Brussels)	1843 treaty. Indeed, the Netherlands' sovereignty claims were based chiefly on that point. It was regrettable that there had been Belgian beacons there for some years (in any case since 1921). <i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i> . The writer had discussed the Wielingen issue with the War Minister, Forthomme. Memorandum from the Belgian General Staff stating that Belgium required full sovereignty there in order to be able to defend Zeebrugge, which was to be enlarged to function as a supply and landing port in time of war. Belgium would endeavour to find a formula by virtue of which it would have the right to organise the Wielingen's defence as it saw fit.
85	28.11.1924 from Hymans to Van Vredenburg (Brussels)	<i>Belgium (certificates of origin)</i> . The writer was willing to come to a 'mise au point' in this matter following the Belgian-German negotiations then in progress, notably in regard to the request that the Netherlands Chambers of Commerce be authorised to endorse such certificates, provided that the most-favoured-nation aspect relating to import, export and transit left Belgium free in its 'choix des moyens de justification d'origine à produire à cette fin'.
86	28.11.1924 from Haersma de With (Oslo)	<i>League of Nations (Geneva Protocol)</i> . The Norwegian government had not yet decided on its standpoint, but was awaiting Britain's response (Esmarck expected Britain to reject it). Norway feared that it would be obliged to intervene in the event of a conflict between USSR and Finland.
87	[28].11.1924 to Loudon (Paris)	<i>Tangier Statute</i> . In a talk with Beelaerts on 25 November, the French Secretary, Dubail, had urged the accession of the Netherlands. It had been made clear to him that the Netherlands government did not wish to have to defend it in the States-General without a satisfactory answer to the question of what had been obtained for Dutch protégés from the Spanish zone. Dubail had undertaken to suggest to his government that it accept the list of persons under Dutch protection in the Spanish zone. It would be advisable to allow France to take the initiative in arriving at such a solution. France had indeed agreed (in a telegram from Herriot on 29 November), and had at the same time urged the earliest possible posting of a career consul in Tangier.
88	28.11.1924 from Colijn	<i>Spain (trade agreement)</i> . The writer had no intention of raising the duty on wine of Fl. 20 per hectolitre (including a surtax of 20 cents valid up to 1933: Fl.

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89	29.11.1924 to Hubrecht (Madrid)	<p>24 per hectolitre), but had no wish to commit himself on the matter. Lowering the duty would not remove the danger of fraud, which had been practised before the duty was doubled. No objection to a provision in the agreement confirming the existing exemption from import duty of fresh oranges and mandarines, and, if necessary, of fresh lemons and bananas, nor to lowering by agreement the ad valorem duty on raisins and currants referred to in the new tariff act. With regard to the latter, he would prefer, say, a 5% lowering of the ad valorem duty to specific duties. This was the only real reduction in duties which the Netherlands could offer to Spain, even though currants and raisins were imported on a small scale (more from Greece, Turkey and USA).</p> <p><i>Spain (trade agreement)</i>. At that moment regulated by not altogether identical Notes exchanged on 5 and 6 January 1922, the Spanish Note stating that the Netherlands would not alter the duties 'actuellement' imposed on Spanish goods, and the Dutch referring to the <i>lowest tariff</i> ('le tarif le plus réduit'). No particular importance was attached to this, as the modus vivendi referred to was regarded as a temporary, short-term arrangement, and it was not wished to emphasize the tariff revision in the Netherlands. Most-favoured-nation treatment was the main point in the 1922 modus vivendi.</p>
90	29.11.1924 Swedish government to Sweerts de Landas Wyborgh	<p><i>Sweden (Germany and Dawes report)</i>. Further to No. 14 in Note verbale. No reason to take the step recommended by The Hague, which would probably not have the desired effect.</p>
91	1.12.1924 to French, Spanish and British envoys	<p><i>Tangier Statute</i>. A Bill providing for accession had been presented to the States-General. As the Netherlands was not a party to the Treaties of Versailles, St.-Germain-en-Laye or Trianon, there was no reason for it to subscribe to Art. 9 of the Statute. A return to the status quo ante would follow if the Statute became inoperative. The envoy in London had been instructed to avoid giving the impression that the Netherlands had yielded to British pressure (see also No. 82).</p>
92	1.12.1924 from Van Eysinga	<p><i>France and navigation of the Rhine (surtaxes d'origine et d'entrepôt)</i>. Talk with Gout, Chairman, Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine, who was of the opinion that discussion of the viewpoint that differentiation as a consequence of</p>

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93	1.12.1924 from Gevers (Berlin)	<p>surtaxes was not part of fluvial law, which was based on complete equality (see No. 74), could still be postponed. After a journey down the Rhine, Gout had come to the conclusion that it would be wise to promote good relations between the excellent port of Rotterdam and France. This practical consideration was of greater importance to him than questions of principle. The writer stated that as the customs question was not likely to be discussed, the Dutch delegation did not intend to raise the matter on this occasion.</p> <p><i>Germany (preferential rail freight rates and Rhine traffic).</i> Talks with Baron Maltzan and Von Pannwitz, who had understood that the Netherlands would no longer require preferential freightage because of opposition from Rhine shipping interests (which, incidentally, had been denied by the Auswärtige Amt). A meeting of the 'Verwaltungsrat' of the German Railways was scheduled for that month to decide on the matter. Several exceptional (rail) freight rates to which Belgium was entitled under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles would come into force at an early date. (Instructions [10 December] that Gevers should inform Berlin that the Netherlands continued to urge the immediate application of preferential freight rates for traffic to Dutch sea ports).</p>
93 A	Annex 1 24.11.1924 from Chamber of Commerce, Amsterdam	<p>Acquisition of the right to preferential freight rates urged. Unfavourable effect on Dutch Rhine traffic of little significance or merely temporary. Difficult to foresee to what extent Belgian ports would profit more from such rates than Dutch ports (perhaps as long as they were not also introduced for traffic to Rhine and Main ports).</p>
93 B	Annex 2 10.12.1924 from Chamber of Commerce, Rotterdam	<p>Its views (different from those of the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce) were as follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Preferential rail freight rates would always be prejudicial to Rotterdam because traffic on the Rhine would decrease, depriving the city, as a major Rhine port, of its tremendous advantage over foreign ports.</li> <li>2) Diversion of traffic to Belgian ports must certainly be expected because lower rail freight rates would mean less transport by water and more by rail, and because such increased transport by rail would benefit Antwerp rather than Rotterdam in view of the shorter distance.</li> </ol>

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93 c	Annex 3	<p>3) The introduction of a detailed system of preferential freight rates to and from the German Rhine and Main ports would certainly be a matter for rejoicing as it would promote shipping on the Rhine and thus transport via Rotterdam.</p> <p>Comments by the German Ministry of Transport (in German).</p>
94	<p>2.12.1924 from Van Eysinga (Strasbourg)</p>	<p><i>Germany (preferential rail freight rates and Rhine traffic).</i> Talk on the substance of No. 91 (with reference to No. 56) with the French delegate in the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine, Mahieu, who had stated that the Germans had urged the abolition of the surtaxes on goods transported from <i>Mannheim</i>. France would never agree to such a policy, which would have the principal effect of benefiting Hamburg and Bremen. A 'port de mer' such as Rotterdam was a different matter. The British Commissioner Balfour was of the opinion that the exclusion of every form of differentiation on the river would mean that Mannheim could not be denied what Antwerp, and possibly Rotterdam as well, had been granted. This view was correct.</p>
95	<p>2.12.1924 from Oudendijk (Peking)</p>	<p><i>Yap cables. China</i> was still creating difficulties about the transfer of property belonging to DNTG, even after the coup d'état (see Nos. 57 and 58), when the Ministry of Transport in Peking had had no authority whatsoever. The transfer had at last taken place on 6 November, after the sales contract with the Danish Great Northern Telegraph Company had been regulated on 4 November. Some observations.</p>
96	<p>4.12.1924 to Gevers (Berlin)</p>	<p><i>Germany (trade agreement).</i> Enclosures of Annex containing Nederbragt's report on 1) the situation at that moment, and 2) the ideas of the head of the Economic Affairs Department which the Trade Treaties Negotiations Committee had unanimously adopted in its recommendations to Van Karnebeek. Instructions that the following line be followed in the discussion of principles with the German government. 1) Attention to be drawn to the substantial advantage accruing to Germany from Dutch trade policy. 2) It should be pointed out that this policy was constantly under attack internally, being compared with the policies of other countries which did not appear to appreciate the Netherlands' liberal system. 3) It should be explained how Germany itself would be put at a considerable disadvantage in</p>

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96A	Annex 3.12.1924 Minutes of the 16th meeting of the Trade Treaties Negotiations Committee	<p>the event of the Netherlands being obliged to relinquish a policy which guaranteed as great a measure of freedom as possible.</p> <p>Dutch desiderata: 1) Most-favoured-nation status, independent of every other country (thus also Belgium). 2) This to include the lifting of all restrictions and bans on imports or exports (this referred to the latest German-Swiss agreement). 3) The allocation of import quotas (not necessarily all of the same size). 4) Special reductions for commodities of interest to the Netherlands not covered by the most-favoured-nation provision. 5) No specifications which could have an unfavourable effect as compared with more favourable tariffs for analogous articles of other countries. Restrictions relative to these points touching, inter alia, the coal question. Reasons why the envoy was instructed to handle this matter. He was to guard against acting too hastily, but at the same time it was deemed to be of primary importance that a general statement be obtained.</p> <p>Résumé by Nederbragt of the state of affairs as explained by Wolff, the trade counsellor in Berlin. Twelve technical points, ending with the conclusion that pursuant to an Order of 29 September 1924, the Netherlands had acquired most-favoured-nation status in Germany, but that it had been granted unilaterally and could also be unilaterally rescinded, even without parliamentary consent.</p> <p>The Netherlands' liberal policy was not appreciated, as evidenced by the following: a) Greece intended imposing heavier duties on Dutch goods; b) Switzerland had received better treatment in the German-Swiss agreement; and c) negotiations between France and Germany had been preceded by various tariff increases (some by 100%) which had first been forged as a weapon and later (to the detriment of the Netherlands) relaxed for Germany in exchange for pseudo-concessions. Redeeming features were that such practices did not occur universally, and that a resolution had been adopted at the last League of Nations Assembly which was aimed at combating bans on imports and exports which merely obstructed free trade and had not been introduced for reasons of health protection or security. The steps to be taken in Germany as referred to in the covering letter. Negotiations to be conducted in Berlin, Gevers and Wolff being fully equipped for the task.</p>

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97	[4.12.1924] François, notes	<p><i>League of Nations (Geneva Protocol)</i>. Some comments. Summary of the points on which the League Covenant, the draft guarantee treaty (1923) and the Geneva Protocol differed.</p> <p><i>Covenant</i>: Disarmament through security; safeguards enhanced by a) a system of peaceful settlement of disputes; b) a system of joint sanctions against any country which violated the obligation to settle disputes peacefully by waging war; c) disputes to be submitted to arbitration (Permanent Court or League of Nations Council); should the council fail to arrive at a unanimous decision, war was permitted after a period of three months. Legal warfare was thus still possible and the sovereignty of member states in large measure respected.</p> <p><i>Draft guarantee treaty</i>: Aim to achieve greater security solely by strengthening the machinery of power. All war declared illegal; right of judgment transferred from individual member states to Council, whose decision was binding. Joint power of the members, notably the military, governed by the Council, to be used against any state designated the 'aggressor'.</p> <p><i>Geneva Protocol</i>: Aim here likewise to ban war. Effective exclusion of individual action considered possible only if settlement by peaceful means assured. Should the Council fail to reach an unanimous decision, disputes to be referred to the binding decision of arbitrators, on condition that the arbitrators who were to request a binding decision from the Permanent Court or the Council were to decide whether under international law the dispute was solely the concern of the parties involved, in which case they would give no decision. Cases involving amendments to agreements or frontiers would not be submitted to arbitration, but settled as specified in Article 19 of the Covenant. From time to time the Assembly could invite members to review agreements that had become unworkable and examine conditions representing a danger to world peace. Machinery of power not entrusted to a central political body; a police force was constituted by the armed forces of the signatories, stationed in their respective countries and subject to the requirements of national security and to their governments. Obligation to participate 'faithfully and promptly' in economic and military sanctions, though in the</p>

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		<p>latter case account would be taken of security, geographical location and state of military preparedness.</p> <p>The non-universality of the League was a grave obstacle to the achievement of the goal envisaged in the Protocol; virtually no prospect of US membership. Non-signatories of the Protocol could be invited to accept its terms, and sanctions applied in the event of their refusal. In their case the 'designation as aggressor' would however not be binding. Many powers, notably the Dominions of Australia, New Zealand and Canada, had nonetheless raised objections, partly because of relations between US and Japan. The Protocol would open the way to arms reduction through the medium of a special conference to take place in the event of sufficient ratifications; the Protocol would lapse if the conference failed to achieve its aim.</p>
98	4.12.1924 from Oudendijk (Peking)	<p><i>China.</i> New coup d'état imminent by Marshal Feng, together with Sun Yat Sen, with the object of forming a communist government. Representatives of the nine powers were inclined to support the present administration by issuing a statement to the effect that they 1) had established relations with it 'en vue de son intention de respecter les traités et droits des étrangers' and 2) wished to implement the Washington treaty and resolutions at the earliest possible date, this by way of warning Sun that the Western powers did not wish to establish contact with him and as counterpropaganda against communism. The writer requested authorisation to participate in this move even if France were to hold back ('à cause de question franc or').</p>
98 A	Annex 4.12.1924 Beelaerts, notes	<p>The prestige of the Western powers would not be enhanced by such a step. Situation in China up to that point not such that it warranted hasty implementation of the Washington resolutions. The statement referred to would mean little more to the Chinese than proof of impotence and weakness in addition to denunciation of the policy pursued earlier by the powers. On the other hand it would be inadvisable for the Netherlands to keep aloof when the other powers, whose interests were so much greater, wished to issue such a statement.</p>
99	4.12.1924 to Oudendijk (Peking)	<p><i>China.</i> Authorisation referred to in Nos. 98 and 98 -a deferred until the powers concerned had been consulted. It was feared that the statement would create an impression of impotence and weakness.</p>

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100	5.12.1924 from Doude van Troostwijk (Berne)	<p><i>League of Nations (Geneva Protocol)</i>. Further to No. 39. The Swiss government had not yet reached a decision. Motta, head of the political department, was positive about the aim and scope of the Protocol, which was still being studied by the Federal government. In Berne emphasis laid on the special position of Switzerland with regard to League of Nations obligations; in point of fact only Art. 11 of the Protocol and the definition of 'aggressor' in Art. 10 had a direct bearing on the country. It was precisely in the matter of arms limitation that Switzerland wished to have a free hand; the right it reserved to allow armed forces participating in a joint action to pass through its territory had been specially requested by the League Council. Vehement opposition could be expected from some quarters in the Swiss parliament. Reticence considered particularly advisable in Berne, where it was presumed that the resignation of MacDonald's cabinet could lead to amendments to the Protocol.</p>
101	5.12.1924 from Oudendijk (Peking)	<p><i>China (unrest)</i>. Political report further to Nos. 98 and 98-A. Marshal Tuan Chi Jui was acting as head of government in Peking. The writer had had two talks with Marshal Chang Tso Lin, who was concerned about the troop concentrations of General Feng Yü Hsiang and Sun Yat Sen, and their possible collusion with Huang Fu, C.T. Wang and the Russian ambassador Karakhan. Bolshevik propaganda in China constituted a threat to relations between China and the foreign powers. It was assumed that Sun intended harassing the temporary government, whose formation had been fraught with difficulties, and winning support with his motto 'abrogation of all unequal treaties' that had been adopted 'by henchmen and hotheads'.</p> <p>Oudendijk had called on the British, Japanese and French envoys to inquire whether they would agree to study the situation jointly. The Japanese envoy requested a day's respite. The British envoy suggested that the Washington treaties and resolutions be taken as the point of departure. The French envoy doubted whether his radical government would wish to undertake anything that might be interpreted as taking sides against an extreme left-wing group (a second difficulty was that France had not yet ratified the treaties of Washington because of the question of the gold franc). The representatives</p>

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		of the nine powers had met at Oudendijk's house on 4 December. Discussion had resulted in a draft of the statement referred to in No. 98 (approved later by the American chargé d'affaires). Oudendijk had pointed out that the Bolsheviks in China 'were conducting an increasingly abusive campaign, not so much with a view to making communist principles acceptable to this extremely practical people, but with the object of arousing hatred in the whole Chinese nation of all foreign powers and their nationals in China, and forcing a breach, and preferably a war, with them'. Chaos could be expected if Sun Yat Sen were to extend his 'appalling misrule' from Canton to Peking and take over the government there. The powers could not refuse the moral support requested by Chang Tso Lin.
102	5.12.1924 from De Graeff (Washington)	<i>United States (Bryan arbitration and conciliation treaty)</i> . Talk about exchange of ratification with Hughes, who objected to the protocol of explication (containing what amounted to an amendment to the treaty) being added without the prior consent of the Senate. It was not clear whether the document referred solely to future disputes or also to those in the past. Were the protocol to be submitted to the Senate, the question of which disputes were meant would probably be raised there. Hughes advised that the treaty by signed and the protocol abandoned.
103	5.12.1924 from Van Vredenburg (Brussels)	<i>China (unrest)</i> . Further to No. 57. Proposal probably originated with British envoy in Peking. Belgian representative there in favour of it. No decision taken as yet.
104	5.12.1924 from De Marees van Swinderen (London)	<i>Ditto</i> . Further to No. 99. British government very much in favour of the proposed statement ('absolument nécessaire contrecarrer intrigue Russe'). 'Aussitôt qu'il sera possible de la faire' had been misinterpreted in The Hague as 'le plus bref délai'. Treaty of Washington not yet ratified by France.
105	5.12.1924 from Oudendijk (Peking)	<i>Ditto</i> . Chang Tso Lin had stated that he would offer resistance provided the powers would support him, but would otherwise leave things to take their course. The representatives had pledged their support as requested.
106	6.12.1924 from [Loudon] (Paris)	<i>Ditto</i> . Discussion on 5 December with director of Asian Affairs at the Quai d'Orsay, who saw neither loss of prestige nor weakness in the statement (cf. Nos. 98-A and 99). Implementation of the Treaty of Washington required that China meet its former

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107	6.12.1924 from De Marees van Swinderen (London)	obligations (notably those relating to the Boxer indemnity). Situation would be completely changed if a Russian coup were to succeed, in which case Japan, backed by the other powers, would probably take action. French envoy in Peking authorised to sign statement. <i>Ditto</i> . Repetition and paraphrase of what had already been communicated in No. 104, after talks at the Foreign Office with Sir William Tyrrell and Waterlow, the official responsible for Chinese affairs. The sooner the central government in China was armed with an assurance from the powers that they would put into effect the Treaty and resolutions of Washington the better, as it would then be in a better position to combat the intrigues of Bolshevik elements and notably of the Russian envoy (Karakhan) (cf. No. 100). In view of this the French government had been urged to ratify the Treaty of Washington. The institution of a committee for the revision of customs duties as provided for in the Washington documents was considered necessary in order to provide the Chinese central government with revenue now that its income from the provinces was gradually dwindling.
108	6.12.1924 from De Graeff (Washington)	<i>Ditto</i> . The Netherlands' participation in the nine-power statement urged. Agitation in Moscow to separate China from the powers. Joint Anglo-American pressure on the Netherlands.
109	6.12.1924 from Van Royen (Rome)	<i>Ditto</i> . Statement (cf. No. 98) not considered a sign of weakness in Rome. Envoy authorised to express solidarity with these 'bilateral steps' provided that US, Great Britain and Japan signed. On the strength of this and other telegrams Oudendijk was authorised to participate (telegram 7 December).
110	6.12.1924 from Van Dijk	<i>League of Nations (Geneva Protocol)</i> . Commodities of such great moral value as peace and arms limitation had never been free. The Protocol had brought about changes in the political and military situation in the Netherlands in that such options for neutrality as had still been possible had been lost because of the overwhelming emphasis laid on joint action. The principle of territorial integrity enshrined in the Protocol had been given sharper relief by the sanctioning of the Treaty of Versailles. This was not without danger for the Netherlands 1) as long as not all the signatories of that Treaty had joined the League of Nations and accepted the Protocol, and

2) because 'most disputes occurred in the Balkans or in the north'.

The predominating influence of the Council on the promotion of the vital interests of the League members could only be acceptable in the long term if the Council's composition ensured equal treatment for all the member states of the League of Nations and membership did not remain the prerogative of the major allies and their associates (Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan) plus six members nominated by the League Assembly.

Objection to the fact that not only troops but countries as a whole would wage war against an aggressor, thus making their territory a theatre of war. Complete detachment meanwhile inadvisable, as the provisions of the Protocol would in any case become binding for the Netherlands at some future date in the event of its being incorporated in the League of Nations Covenant after amendment.

Some comments on arbitration and legal procedure: some terms required clarification ('recourir à la guerre' = armed action only after declaration of war?; 'agresseur' = actual or presumed aggressor?). Acts of violence (blockades of states, confiscation of property or sanctions, as in Corfu und the Ruhr) while the parties committing such acts denied the intention to commit acts of war or violence. Objection to presuming aggression in cases where one of the parties invoked national competence. The partial quarantine treaties, with all their attendant dangers, again loomed large in Art. XIII, paragraph 2.

Not only the peace-time force should be taken as the basis for assessment, but also the strength of the mobilised army and the duration of training and military service. The general plan for arms limitation should include the right or duty of self-defence in the event of a sudden unlawful attack or raid. The number of troops a country could be permitted to retain for defence purposes pending joint action ordered by the Council should be put forward for discussion. The legal position of military units on alien territory should be clarified (in view of the Wilna affair). It might be advisable to give the unlawfully attacked country leadership of the troops made available by the League. The demilitarisation of projecting, highly vulnerable and easily cut-off regions could be considered (South Limburg and the Belgi-

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111	7.12.1924 from Van Eysinga	<p>an demand for fortification of the Meuse bridges, and perhaps Zeeland-Flanders), <i>provided that</i> the League of Nations Covenant and Protocol could be counted on to work.</p> <p>Points 1 and 2 of the 'récommendations' regarding special regional treaties as defence pacts were out of the question and should be dropped.</p> <p><i>France and Rhine navigation (surtaxes d'origine et d'entrepôt)</i>. Nos. 92 and 94 discussed with Fromageot, who had lent a willing ear. He feared that the 'liberty and equality' of fluvial law could well steer all the traffic of eastern France through foreign, notably German, ports. Though perhaps cheaper, this would be opposed by other interest groups. Further discussion of the surtaxes which had existed before 1892. Fromageot had not failed to notice that Art. XIV of the 1868 treaty had been omitted from that of 1831. In his opinion, it was only when the 1868 treaty came into force (1 July 1869) that the surtaxes became incompatible with the Rhine Navigation Treaty; the whole question had lost its significance with the outbreak of the Franco-German war in 1870. Cf. No. 74.</p>
112	8.12.1924 from Marckx (Consul-General, Frankfurt)	<p><i>Germany (occupation of the Ruhr)</i>. Talk with French General Guillaume's successor, Degoutte, whose attitude was conciliatory, and who had requested the writer's cooperation in efforts to improve relations between the population and the French occupation authorities. Van Karnebeek made no objection (15 December) to Marckx doing what he could without compromising his position.</p>
113	9.12.1924 from De Marees van Swinderen, note to Chamberlain	<p><i>France and Rhine navigation (surtaxes d'origine et d'entrepôt)</i>. Antwerp's favourable position compared with that of Rotterdam emphasized. Support requested for the abolition of surtaxes when the Rhine Navigation Treaty was reviewed ('no levying of discriminating duties to be authorised by modern river legislation').</p>
113A	Annex from Lampson (Foreign Office)	<p>Comments. He himself was not well versed in the subject. British Navigation Control Commissioner Baldwin was of the opinion that a provision such as that envisaged by the Netherlands would cause difficulties.</p>
114	9.12.1924 from representatives of the nine powers (Peking)	<p><i>China (unrest)</i>. Text of the Note (as sent) containing the statement of the representatives of US, Belgium, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the Netherlands, as referred to in No. 98, submitted to the pro-</p>

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115	12.12.1924 from Westerveld	visional Chinese government in Peking. Unanimity reached after wording changed (English text). <i>Belgian question (Scheldt and Wielingen)</i> . Buoyage arrangements had been left to the Belgians in some cases, with reservation of Dutch sovereignty rights. Unless a more conciliatory attitude was adopted by the Dutch on the question of Zeebrugge, Belgium could be expected to take a harder line on the Wielingen issue. The usual consultations between the Dutch and Belgian permanent commissioners, largely about financial matters.
116	12.12.1924 from Pienaar to Nederbragt	<i>South Africa (trade agreement and racial discrimination)</i> . The writer referred to his meeting with Heringa and Nederbragt. He had already requested Pretoria's authorisation to sign as soon as agreement was reached. He remarked that in view of South African legislation, which imposed restraints on Asians and other non-whites, his government wished the word 'subjects' in Art. I to be replaced by 'white subjects', and to add at the end of this article something along the lines of 'subject, however, to any statutory provisions, regulations or restrictions which apply to certain classes of persons or races in the territory of either of the parties', such to be independent of nationality. The natives of certain races in some parts of Mozambique and Rhodesia were indeed admitted in order to work in the gold and other mines. This concession could not, however, be granted to other alien non-whites. ted to other alien non-whites.
116A	Annex 1 9.1.1925 Nederbragt	Draft of reply to No. 116. Concurrence with view expressed by Pienaar that 'the Netherlands and the NEI governments apply a policy that is approximately analogous'. In connection with the point raised, it would scarcely be necessary to deviate formally from the most-favoured-nation principle, nor was it at all likely that any difficulties would arise between the two governments on the question. Nederbragt suggested that the matter be settled in a private exchange of letters, as it would be inadvisable to accentuate the racial question in a treaty or a Note.
116B	Annex 2 14.1.1925 Beucker Andreae	Grave objections to draft letter (No. 116-A). What had been rejected for cheese (detailed specification of the different kinds) would be found acceptable for people. The explicit provision proposed by Pienaar, which made unqualified mention of the racial question, would cause trouble and could not be

accepted. Tacit acceptance was equally unacceptable. If an agreement was concluded for the whole of the Kingdom, the colonial subjects must be able to count on enjoying the advantages contained in Art. I, and could not be excluded therefrom on the grounds of race. The difficulties which would undoubtedly arise in NEI were enumerated. One of two solutions was possible:

a) A statement that the agreement was applicable solely to the Kingdom in Europe and to subjects and commodities from that part of the Kingdom.

b) Limitation of the agreement to a most-favoured-nation arrangement regarding shipping, trade, commodities, imports and exports, etc.

The second course was preferable as it afforded no occasion for questions in parliament, nor did it tacitly recognise South Africa's right to refuse entry to Dutch Asian subjects. The addition of such a general provision in Art. I as 'in so far as the country's laws permit' was not appropriate in a most-favoured-nation clause, but only in the case of certain rights being granted; moreover, it opened the door to all kinds of exception. The policy pursued in NEI was not analogous to that of South Africa. There was absolutely no question of racial discrimination in the Kingdom in Europe, and the distinctions made in NEI between Europeans, the native population, alien Asians and those accorded the same status were totally different from the South African laws which defined the position of Europeans, Asians and non-whites. (In NEI, for instance, there were regulations governing the ownership of land by individuals aimed solely at protecting the native population). The privileged position of Mozambique and Rhodesia clearly deviated from the most-favoured-nation principle. Was it really certain that no NEI subjects would go to South Africa later?

The only counter-argument to all these objections was the fact that it would be impossible to demand more for Dutch Asian subjects. In view of this it would perhaps be possible to accept most-favoured-nation status for persons as well, though it would have little significance for Asians. In that case a clause along the following lines ('third solution') could be inserted: c) 'The laws and regulations of both parties governing immigration, police powers and public law and order shall not be affected, disre-

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116C	Annex 3 20.2.1925 Nederbragt	<p>garded or amended in any way for the purposes of this agreement', which would place the subject of non-white NEI immigrants outside the agreement, as it were, and the most invidious point – the refusal of entry for so large a category of Dutch subjects – would be removed from the most-favoured-nation arrangement. Further information on the application of South African immigration laws and exceptions to them would first be required.</p>
116D	Annex 4 24.2.1925 from Beucker Andreae	<p>Solution a) in No. 116-B considered the most rational. Pienaar willing to accept it. What could be substituted for the unfortunate word 'subjects'?</p> <p>More information on South African regulations required. Solution c) in No. 116-B more easily defensible for the Minister. Should Art. I pertaining to the Kingdom in Europe (alone) be retained and the agreement be declared applicable to the colonies, a clause could be inserted (option 4) along the following lines: d) 'All reference in this agreement to territory or subjects shall be understood to mean not only the Kingdom in Europe and the subjects whose country of origin it is, but also the territories outside Europe and the subjects whose countries or origin they are, except in Art. I, which shall be understood to mean only the Kingdom in Europe and its subjects'.</p>
116E	Annex 5 3.3.1925 from Nederbragt	<p>Comments on the four compromises (a, b, c and d) in Nos. 116-B and 116-C.</p> <p>a) Of no possible benefit to NEI subjects or (of greater importance) NEI commodities. Difficult to accept with a view to important NEI-African interests.</p> <p>b) Acceptable from the point of view of Economic Affairs Department (an agreement pertaining solely to trade and customs had already been concluded with Canada, for example). The awkward racial question could thus be avoided.</p> <p>c) Here too the difficult point had been removed from the agreement and most-favoured-nation status explicitly excluded. Likelihood that others (French, English) would be granted what Dutch Asian subjects were refused. As a restriction this was considered to be more dangerous.</p> <p>d) Allowed South African to apply the desired restrictions. Could convey the impression that the Netherlands at least wished to reserve the right to apply differential treatment to South Africans.</p> <p>Final recommendation: Either 1) the draft could be</p>

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116F	Annex 6 13.3.1925 from Nederbragt	<p>accepted unamended; advantages: nobody would consider demanding the right of entry for Dutch Asians by invoking most-favoured-nation status; or 2) the agreement could be confined to trade, shipping and customs.</p> <p>Notes on a meeting between Van Karnebeek, Beucker Andreae and Nederbragt, at which it had been decided to adopt 'solution' 1 (unamended draft) provided no letter was written and Pienaar was satisfied with Nederbragt's verbal assurance that 'of course we should do nothing foolish on the grounds of the most-favoured-nation status accorded in Art. I'.</p>
117	19.12.1924 to De Graeff (Washington)	<p><i>United States (Palmas-Miangas arbitration)</i>. The manner in which the State Department conducted negotiations smacked of enforced solutions. Objections to continued exchange of Notes concerning each other's meaning (notably about the insertion of 'and other agreements of this kind'), as this might confuse the arbitrators in the event of their wishing to consult the correspondence. Acceptance of Hughes' proposal of 22 October (No. 44) recommended, as both governments had agreed to give the arbitrator a free hand. Dutch text of the preamble could perhaps be made 'more reasonable' by rearrangement. There were three maps in the Archivo General de Indias in Seville which might repay examination (perhaps they could provide information on whether any European or Asian country had ever exercised sovereignty over Palmas).</p>
118	20.12.1924 from Gevers (Berlin)	<p><i>Germany (occupation of the Ruhr)</i>. The authorisation granted Marckx (cf. No. 112) should be moderated somewhat so as not to encourage him to play a role in the development of Franco-German relations in occupied territory (this being incompatible with his office of Consul-General of the Netherlands). There was no objection to Marckx making private use of his acquaintance with the French and Germans. Van Karnebeek approved.</p>
119	22.12.1924 to Westerveld	<p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i>. Concurrence with No. 115. The permanent commissioners were to meet on 23 December. Changes in the actual situation of the lighting and buoyage in the controversial part of the Wielingen which could invite further Belgian interference should be avoided, even if sovereignty rights were reserved. It was better that the matter be given a wide berth for the time</p>

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120	22.12.1924 from De Marees van Swinderen (London)	<p>being (draft and despatched letter). Beucker Andree's postscript to the draft, proposing that wreck buoys be set out by the Netherlands outside the 3-mile zone as well.</p> <p><i>League of Nations (Geneva Protocol)</i>. The writer was convinced that London would not sign and would put the blame on the Dominions for not doing so. Yet there was a fairly strong feeling in Great Britain that it should sign, resulting in noteworthy praise of the League of Nations by Chamberlain. Hardinge, head of the British delegation in Geneva, considered that Japan had made the Protocol completely unacceptable. 'Patching up' could not have saved it. Rumour that an extra Imperial Conference would be held after failure of telegraphic exchange of ideas with Dominions.</p> <p><i>Writer's opinion of Chamberlain</i>: painstaking, extremely courteous, 'pas poseur pour un sou', fluent speaker but lacking Curzon's brilliance. For the Netherlands there could be no better man at the Foreign Office than Chamberlain, with his interest in small countries and his approachability, on more personal matters. The writer had discussed the <i>royal visit</i> quite openly with him, and intended to present it in a political light before going on leave in January.</p> <p>Discussion of the question of a possible future husband for the Princess should not be forced.</p> <p>'Farce' of British embassies springing up like mushrooms (Chile, Poland, Romania). Denmark would not be considered less important than the Netherlands. Observations on the Belgian question.</p>
121	29.12.1924 from Aalberse	<p><i>Germany (import and export duties)</i>. Special steps to prevent the re-introduction of duty on flour from US and Canada shipped in transit to the Netherlands (10.20 marks per 100 kg the pre-war agreement tariff, and 18.75 marks the general tariff) doomed to failure, partly because of the failure of the harvest in Germany. Perhaps something could be achieved in cooperation with Canada and US. In the meantime preference should be given to matters of more general interest (<i>most-favoured-nation status</i>) which, following a German order of 29 September, would no longer be a right but a favour as from 10 January, and the <i>system of import restrictions</i> in operation in Germany).</p>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
122	31.12.1924 from Gevers (Berlin)	<i>Germany (trade agreement)</i> . Initial talk with Von Schubert (Von Maltzan's successor as Secretary of State at the Auswärtige Amt) and discussion with Köpke (cf. No. 121), who was well-disposed towards most-favoured-nation status for the Netherlands, which was not less important than any other country. Enclosure of annex, for which approval requested.
122A	Annex Wolff, draft note to German government	Most-favoured-nation status as it now stood. The Netherlands' continuation of the trade policy it had pursued up to that time would also be in Germany's interest. Desiderata (cf. Nos. 96 and 96-A): a) general, unconditional and immediate most-favoured-nation status for both imports and import duties; b) its application to every lowering or abolition of an import or export ban or restriction; c) most-favoured-nation status to include the right to import quotas, which were to be commensurate with the quotas allocated to third parties.
123	31.12.1924 from Van Eysinga	<i>Navigation of the Rhine (Mannheim Treaty)</i> . The ex-allies now also appreciated the objections to a general revision (not just on points of detail) of the Treaty. Unimportant points, such as changes in the areas subject to the jurisdiction of Rhine Navigation tribunals, had received exaggerated attention at the last meeting. The writer feared that general revision would upset too much. Points for next meeting were Articles 6 and 14 (surtaxes) and the completion of 'travaux'. Little enthusiasm for placing the question of the effectiveness the Treaty of Barcelona (which had not been accepted by the Netherlands) on the agenda. The matter had already been discussed at the Danube conference, where the British view that the Treaty applied to the Danube in Romania and Serbia had not been accepted. The other delegations had never been informed of the talks of the four entente delegations in the office of the President (of the Commission). Incorrect behaviour of the French delegates Claveille and Gout after occupation of the Chair. The protests were expected to have a salutary effect.
124	31.12.1924 from Oudendijk (Peking)	<i>China (unrest)</i> . Enclosure of Chinese reply to No. 114 (English text). Oudendijk objected to the second point, stating that the measures envisaged in the Washington treaties and resolutions were deliberately limited to those which were eligible for immedi-

No.	Date; from/to	Description
		<p>ate implementation. The envoys had decided not to reply to the Chinese memorandum.</p> <p><i>Question of the gold franc.</i> Report of the Japanese envoy on what he had undertaken as intermediary between the French legation and the Chinese government on the instructions of his government (dispute concerning the payment of the French, Italian, Belgian and Spanish shares in the Boxer indemnity). 'National aspirations of the Chinese people': withdrawal of foreign military forces, closure of foreign institutions for wireless and telegraphic communications, ending of consular jurisdiction, return of leased territory, concessions and settlements, tariff autonomy, abrogation of agreements concluded and Notes exchanged with Japan in 1915, election of the non-permanent members of the League Council in accordance with the principle of geographical distribution. Chinese demands considered exorbitant by the writer.</p>
125	2.1.1925 to Van Swaay	<p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment).</i> Proposal (corresponding to Beelaerts' ideas expressed in No. 80) that permission for the construction of a number of canals across Dutch territory be limited to a period of twenty years and be granted on a reciprocal basis.</p>
126	2.1.1925 to Van Swaay	<p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment).</i> Concurrence with the suggestion regarding the wording of Art. III, paragraph 8 (see Annex). The words 'the Scheldt below the port installations of Antwerp' and 'the Western Scheldt and its entries from the open sea' could be replaced by 'the Belgian section' and 'the Dutch section' of the waterway respectively. Denial that Belgium had demanded such fundamental amendments as would render the existing draft unworkable as a basis for negotiations. The complaint about Van Karnebeek's haste dismissed; it was always advisable to act quickly when a matter had reached the stage of negotiations between two governments. Difficulties arising from further consultations with the provincial engineers could be dealt with by his confrère.</p>
126A	Annex	<p>New text (in Dutch) of Art. III, paragraph 8 (buoyage and lighting). The Netherlands was responsible for the cost of dredging operations in the Western Scheldt up to a ceiling, to be calculated every ten years, not exceeding the sum spent during the period 1904-1914. Should this be exceeded, the parties would examine each case separately.</p>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
127	4.1.1925 from Van Eysinga	<p><i>Germany (preferential rail freight rates and Rhine navigation treaty).</i> Reply to No. 81. 1) Preferential rail freight rates could not be considered contrary to Art. XIV of the Rhine Navigation Treaty. The purpose of that article could never have been to bind the signatories to maintain their rail freight rates at a higher level than the widely fluctuating Rhine shipping freight rates over which they had no control and which were determined solely by supply and demand, even though the same customs facilities could be guaranteed to Rhine shipping as were granted on other routes, in addition to exemption from surtaxes, which were not levied on other routes either. 2) It could not be concluded from Art. XIV that the preferential freight rates for seaports should be extended to Rhine ports – Art. XIV had been drawn up with reference to traffic <i>on</i> and not <i>to</i> or <i>from</i> the Rhine – however desirable that might be. An attempt to achieve this by amending the Rhine Navigation Treaty would probably meet with insuperable opposition from Germany. In the event of failure to reach agreement, the latter was required to accept the Treaty under the terms of Art. 354 of the Treaty of Versailles, but would certainly not be inclined to allow the inclusion of matters which had no place in the treaty (such as employment legislation, reciprocal recognition of customs measures and free transit to and from the Rhine). The meetings on a trade agreement with Germany were probably a more appropriate forum for discussing equal freight rates for Rhine and sea ports and the extension of free navigation rights to all waterways accessible from the Rhine.</p>
128	5.1.1925 from Van Eysinga	<p><i>Revision of the Rhine Navigation Treaty (customs provisions).</i> The major question at the last meeting (end of 1924) was whether the prior permission of the Central Commission was required for maintenance work on the river in the Franco-German border section as stipulated in Art. 359 of the Treaty of Versailles and as stated in general terms in Art. 10 of the Treaty of Barcelona. Art. 10 was the Netherlands' main argument for not acceding to the Treaty of Barcelona, as it did not wish the prior <i>announcement</i> of the intention to carry out maintenance work to be interpreted as meaning that prior <i>approval</i> of the Commission would also be required. This conclusion – made as palatable as possible – was even-</p>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
129	6.1.1925 Van Karnebeek's diary	<p>tually adopted with the smallest possible majority (10 votes to 9, the nine being the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland: voting at the first reading, though the Treaty itself required unanimity). France irritated that Switzerland had dared to vote against the motion (German and Dutch opposition understood by all).</p> <p>It was very likely that an effort would be made at the next meeting to extract as much as possible from the article on navigation channels. This would be acceptable, provided it was applied on equal terms and did not concentrate too heavily on certain stretches of the river. Great interest displayed by the entente countries in 'Binger Loch' (a short, rocky stretch of the Rhine, extremely difficult for maintenance operations).</p> <p><i>Vatican</i> had repeated its wish for precedence (cf. No 79), i.e. to be accorded the right of precedence in the event of ambassadors being appointed to the Netherlands, which the writer still considered purely hypothetical. Even then, this did not mean that every country would be willing to come to such an arrangement (Bulgaria, for example, and similar states). Orsenigo had inquired whether the Netherlands might not accept a nuncio because the Vatican itself did not wish to appoint an ambassador. It was unlikely that the Netherlands would refuse a nuncio on principle if diplomatic missions were raised to the status of embassies. The internuncio was urged to proceed cautiously on this question of precedence, as the discussion of diplomatic relations with the Vatican had only just been settled ('<i>quieta non movere</i>'). Orsenigo had not insisted; he just wanted to make sure that he didn't miss the boat. He had told Van Karnebeek that the British government had not yet accepted a representative of the Vatican, and that the British representative at the Vatican had only the rank of envoy.</p>
130	8.1.1925 from Consulate- General, Lima	<p><i>Peru (progress of country and diplomatic service).</i></p> <p>The country afforded tremendous opportunities for Dutch capital. Irrigation works and railways were to be constructed in the near future. A diplomatic representative should be appointed, if necessary accredited to Ecuador and Bolivia as well. The somewhat unfortunate impression created by the failure of the Netherlands to send a representative to the last commemorative celebrations would then soon be forgotten.</p>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
131	9.1.1925 from Oudendijk (Peking)	<p><i>Chine (Boxer idemnity)</i>. Reply to inquiry made by Van Karnebeek. The writer referred to his proposal, made in 1919, that after March 1923, half of the indemnity be cancelled and the other half used to establish scholarships for young Chinese at Delft (cf. Volume I, Nos. 19, 97 and 97-c). Developments since then. Only Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands had not yet cancelled their share. The US had cancelled the remaining debt and established scholarships; France had used its share partly to rehabilitate the Banque de Chine and partly for grants to various French educational establishments in China and France; the USSR for 'Bolshevik propaganda in the guise of education' (in so far as it had not been used for an internal Chinese loan). The money still owing could best be used for civil engineering works in China, carried out by Dutch engineers. The difficulty of finding a project that could be financed from the available funds; suggestion to construct a good road for the transport of persons, goods and coal either between Peking and Tsientsin, or from Peking to the Western Mountains. A Dutch engineer, J.C. Deking Dura, was already in China as agent for the company 'Bitumenweg', which meant that there might well be a possible outlet for bitumen from NEI. If the resources were too limited for such a project, the writer advised endowing a Chair at the University of Tsingtao, to be held by a Dutch national who would teach a subject in which the Dutch were specialised.</p>
132	10.1.1925 from Limburg	<p><i>Arbitration and conciliation</i>. Report in response to three ministerial questions. Introductory remark that many disputes were not submitted to the Permanent Court because of the reservation made by the Netherlands when accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, on the grounds that the four categories of disputes referred to in Art. 36, paragraph 2 of the Court Statute were largely subject to arbitration under the four arbitration treaties of limited scope (with Great Britain, France, US and Portugal) and the three unlimited arbitration treaties (with Denmark, Italy and China).</p> <p>Positive reply to the first question as to whether it would be advisable to <i>extend the competence of the International Court</i>, viewed both in the light of the Geneva Protocol and without regard to it. Even if the protocol did not come into force, the Nether-</p>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
		<p>lands had accepted the optional clause of the Court. It would entrust to the Court's jurisdiction all disputes which might arise in the future with states with which it had not yet concluded arbitration treaties. There was no reason not to confirm this confidence in the Court's jurisdiction by submitting to it disputes of the type for which arbitration treaties had already been concluded.</p> <p>A negative reply to the second question ('Is there any reason to follow the example of the German-Swiss treaty and to exclude those disputes which involve the independence, territorial integrity or other vital interests, or those which have substantial political significance?'). It was here a question of arbitration 'in so far as it could be maintained'. The Committee was not in favour of a treaty which stipulated that <i>every</i> dispute should be submitted to conciliation. It preferred a conciliation procedure conducted by a conciliation commission to the efforts at conciliation of the (political) League of Nations Council.</p> <p>Question 3. Unanimous opinion of the Committee that the conciliation procedure could play an important role, but that it should not be made compulsory for <i>every</i> dispute (before the parties had submitted their case either to the Permanent Court or to arbitrators).</p>
133	13.1.1925 to De Graaff and Aalberse	<p><i>Hejaz (pilgrimage and quarantine)</i>. Enclosure of letter from British envoy proposing that a Dutch medical officer be appointed in Kamaran for the Dutch pilgrims. Van Karnebeek considered that the Netherlands had a right to participate in the administration, control and supervision of the station. Objections to the present structure. The station was supposed to be under international supervision in accordance with the 1903 Sanitary Convention (amended in 1912), and not under that of British India as was the case at that moment. A system could well be devised whereby Kamaran would be administered jointly by Great Britain and the Netherlands under international supervision.</p>
134	14.1.1925 from Van Oordt to Van Swaay	<p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i>. Fixing the dredging cost to be borne by the Netherlands (under Art. 8) not accepted by Belgium. Belgian counter-proposal unacceptable to the Netherlands (depth of navigation channel at least 8 m, width 2.50 m, and at low water depth 6.5 m, width 2.50 m),</p>

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135	16.1.1925 from Oudendijk (Peking)	<p>being a considerable addition to the existing demands. This was compounded by the fact that the Belgian proposal also provided for the continued payment of the costs of the subsidiary channels by the Netherlands. These demands were likely to exceed the present maintenance costs and would therefore not be consistent with A1.1 and 2 of Section 8. <i>China (import and export duties)</i>. Surtaxes had been imposed by the Chinese authorities for a period of six months on train tickets, consignment notes, telegram and postage stamps, and on telephone and electricity charges, in order to establish a fund for aid to victims of the 1924 floods. The diplomatic corps was of the opinion that this levy could be regarded as a purely temporary increase as long as it remained confined to government services, but that it would be in the nature of a consumer tax if it were to be extended to the services of private firms. Moreover, foreign telegraph services were not permitted to add a surcharge to their normal charges on behalf of the Chinese government.</p> <p>The note presented by Oudendijk as doyen of the diplomatic corps had been accepted by the Chinese government after some hesitation, but only in regard to the surtax on telegrams.</p>
136	19.1.1925 from Van Swaay	<p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i>. The agreement would have to undergo considerable amendment before it could be found acceptable to the Netherlands. Some changes had been made in the wording, as given in the two annexes (cf. No. 134), to preclude objections from Van Karnebeek. Amended wording Art. III, paragraph 8.</p>
136A	Annex 1, undated	Explanatory notes to No. 136 A.
136B	Annex 2, undated	Proposed text of Article 3, section 8, second and third paragraphs.
136C	Annex 3, undated	<p><i>France (surtaxes d'origine et d'entrepôt)</i>. The Lampson note received from the Foreign Office (cf. No. 113-A) by the British Rhine Navigation Commissioner had been forwarded to Van Eysinga. Van Karnebeek mentioned several points on which Lampson had not reported his talk with Van Swinderen altogether correctly. Concerning the surtaxes question, for instance, the problem did not concern Dutch goods, but foreign goods imported into France via Dutch ports and the Rhine. The question was whether draft Art. IV, paragraph 2 did indeed exclude the surtaxes for the Rhine. The imposition of sur-</p>
137	21.1.1925 to De Marees van Swinderen (London)	<p><i>France (surtaxes d'origine et d'entrepôt)</i>. The Lampson note received from the Foreign Office (cf. No. 113-A) by the British Rhine Navigation Commissioner had been forwarded to Van Eysinga. Van Karnebeek mentioned several points on which Lampson had not reported his talk with Van Swinderen altogether correctly. Concerning the surtaxes question, for instance, the problem did not concern Dutch goods, but foreign goods imported into France via Dutch ports and the Rhine. The question was whether draft Art. IV, paragraph 2 did indeed exclude the surtaxes for the Rhine. The imposition of sur-</p>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
138	21.1.1925 from Van Rees	<p>taxes on the traffic of all ports situated on or connected with the Rhine could imply continued exemption for traffic via French seaports. Enclosure of Nos. 92, 94 and 111.</p> <p><i>League of Nations (mandates: France in Syria)</i>. Further to Volume V, No. 335 and No. 64 above. Measure originally taken by the High Commissioner and embodied in Art. VII of the Order of 3 April 1924 was assuredly contrary to Art. 11, paragraph 1 of the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon in that:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. the measure demanded unequal treatment of goods imported from countries bordering on Germany and those imported from other countries;</li> <li>2. the measure obviously did not apply to France, although that country also bordered on Germany.</li> </ol> <p>Though the new version of the article contained in the Order of the High Commissioner of 14 October 1924 did indeed abolish this privileged position, it had perhaps created another inequality within the meaning of Art. 14 of the Mandate in that it made a distinction between the stamps required from a Chamber of Commerce and those required from a French consul. Free stamp later permitted by French government.</p>
139	24.1.1925 from Loudon (Paris)	<p><i>France (surtaxes d'origine et d'entrepôt)</i>. These surtaxes had already been mentioned in customs regulations in 1863 and had come into force in 1872. Further consultation with Seydoux better left to Van Eysinga. French ports opposed to exemption for both Rotterdam and Antwerp. Regarding the Luxembourg connection referred to in No. 72, the writer believed that the French were influenced by special economic and political considerations, namely that if a new highway were built from Strasbourg via Luxembourg to the sea, it would provide an additional argument for the Franco-Luxembourg customs union desired by the French.</p>
140	26.1.1925 to De Graeff (Washington)	<p><i>United States (Bryan arbitration and conciliation treaty)</i>. Further to No. 102. Hughes' objections to 'protocol of interpretation' incomprehensible, as they added nothing to the substance of the treaty and did not broaden its scope. All that was intended was to indicate that the English text was the correct one. It was trusted that Hughes would accept this point after De Graeff had personally explained the matter to him. The early exchange of the instruments of ratification would be welcomed.</p>

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140A	Annex, undated	Draft letter cancelled. It was intended to eliminate the possibility that the Dutch text might create the impression that disputes existing on the date on which the treaty entered into force would remain outside its purview. Protocol had already been submitted to the States-General for approval; failure to sign it now would place the Netherlands government in an awkward position.
141	27.1.1925 from De Graeff (Washington)	<i>United States (requisition and exchange during World War I)</i> . US had rejected Dutch claim for full compensation for all the damage sustained by the requisition of war material purchases in US in 1916 and 1917. The compensation in question was to include a certain sum over and above the 5,780,492,53 dollars already paid for the requisition of machine-guns, thus reimbursing the Netherlands government for the price paid in guilders for that material. The writer proposed that the matter be submitted to arbitration.
141A	Annex 24.1.1925 from Hughes to De Graeff	Text of Note (in English)
142	28.1.1925 to Westerveld, De Graaff and Van Dijk	<i>League of Nations (arms limitation)</i> . Further to Nos. 53, 69 and 110. The Council had temporarily postponed preparations for the Disarmament Conference in view of the dismissive British attitude to the Geneva Protocol, and the matter was to be left in abeyance for the time being. It was expected that sufficient attention would (then) be paid to the question of what constituted effective armed forces in times of peace and war. Van Karnebeek did not entirely agree with the view that 'accords régionaux de réductions d'armements' should be deemed fundamentally inadmissible, in view of the agreements between small groups of states proposed by the Scandinavian countries pertaining to arms limitation without pledges of mutual aid or guarantees.
143	29.1.1925 from Van Rappard (Oslo)	<i>German (Dawes report)</i> . Enclosure of Note from Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connection with No. 15. Inquiries had revealed that <i>Norwegian</i> interest were not important enough to justify steps being taken. The writer had earlier reported that the <i>Danish</i> government considered it extremely difficult to find a way of helping non-German shareholders to attain a privileged position.
144	31.1.1925 from De Vogel	<i>International Health Office</i> . Enclosure of Norman White's report on his journey to the far East, with

a draft sanitary convention for that region. International interests would be served by sanitary measures in view of the increasing movement of goods and persons throughout the world. NEI, administered as it was by a small country and completely surrounded by territories belonging to the great powers, was apt to be regarded as unimportant, and national shipping had already felt the unfavourable effects of this attitude. Efforts should be made to make Batavia a centre where these measures could be prepared and put into effect.

Singapore had been named (partly because an office for epidemiological data had been set up there) as it was situated on the main route between East and West. There were more cogent arguments for the choice of Batavia as the more important medical centre, as its location 'at the heart of the Australasian Orient' was even more favourable than that of Singapore. In addition, the radio station at Malabar had one of the widest ranges in the world, so that epidemiological reports received from East Asia and Australia could be passed on to Europe and America without delay.

Governor General Idenburg had put forward proposals at the congresses of the Far Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine held in Saigon in 1913 and Batavia in 1921. The latter had resulted in widespread recognition of what Batavia had achieved as a medical and scientific centre in the field of health care in the East.

145      1.2.1925  
            from Beelaerts

*Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)*. The Belgians had appeared in the 'Small Commission' on 31 January (cf. Nos. 1 and 52). The Belgian insistence on a *casus belli* declaration had begun to assume unreasonable proportions in Dutch eyes but could not be disregarded. Agreement reached on the cost of maintenance in the Scheldt (though Belgian experts had still to check the figures). Lengthy discussion of buoyage and lighting of the navigation channels along the Belgian coastline. Difficult for the Belgians to give way on this point, as Hymans had 'fallen' on the Wielingen issue in 1920 and was not obliged to smooth the way for his return in Brussels by exacting concessions from the Netherlands. The writer did not expect Belgium to allow negotiations to strand on this point, but if it did not obtain satisfaction it would draw out the proceedings so

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146	4.2.1925 from Van Eysinga	<p>that the matter could no longer be discussed in the present parliamentary session. The problem was the more delicate in view of Terneuzen (which had not actually been included in the 1839 treaties); it was again difficult for the Belgians to concede what <i>the Dutch</i> needed, considering that it related to a connection for which the Belgians had abrogated the 1874 treaty. In the writer's opinion, the Terneuzen issue was far more important to the Dutch – now that the sovereignty problem had been settled – than the question of who was to place four buoys in the Wielingen on the instructions of the Scheldt Commission. It was not Minister Westerveld but his 'sea lions' who might put a Dutch concession at risk by giving undue importance to the matter. Bourquin and Van Zuylen Van Nyevelt had been warned that their lack of progress did not allow a day more to be lost if they were to complete their discussions during the current parliamentary session. The Council of State and the two Houses would certainly not relish a rush order.</p> <p><i>France (surtaxes d'origine et d'entrepôt).</i> The writer did not share Van Karnebeek's negative view of the incompleteness of Art. IV-D (cf. No. 137). Direct transport from the country of origin had been put on the same footing as the transshipment of commodities of other provenance transported via French ports to Strasbourg. Van Karnebeek not yet entirely convinced. Van Eysinga suggested the inclusion of an article additional to Art. IV, making provision for equal treatment as now referred to in Art. XIV.</p>
147	5.2.1925 Minutes of 25th Meeting of the Trade Treaties Review Committee	<p><i>Trade policy and the incidental lowering of tariffs.</i> The members were informed that the Trade Treaties Negotiations Committee did not, for the time being, wish to make use of the incidental <i>lowering of tariffs</i> as a means of achieving an agreement, a view with which the majority concurred. Such incidental lowering of tariffs was a novelty which could in turn lead to incidental tariff increases aimed at achieving advantageous most-favoured-nation agreements. The use of tariffs as a means of extracting trade agreements was generally regarded as a threat to free trade. Posthuma, Heldring, Meyers, Veder and Van Lier declared themselves opposed to incidental lowering, even if it should result in an agreement not being concluded, while Van Voorthuysen, Heringa, Waanders, Mansholt and Kortenhorst would be</p>

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148	10.2.1925 from De Graaff	<p>more flexible. The chairman, Nederbragt, was on the whole against it, though at the same time aware of the need to make concessions in specific cases. <i>China (unrest and despatch of warship to Shanghai)</i>. Van Karnebeek had requested that a warship stationed in NEI call at Shanghai if presently taking part in exercises, to which the writer replied that although naval exercises had not been planned, the <i>Zeven Provinciën</i> could be sent should it be considered politically expedient. Failure to send a Dutch ship could seem negligent in view of the forthcoming visits of American and British squadrons in March and April; however, this could be attributed to budgetary problems.</p>
149	11.2.1925 from De Graeff (Washington)	<p><i>United States (trade agreement)</i>. The reservation in the US-German agreement limiting the US undertaking not to introduce differential tariffs to only one year was entirely unacceptable to the Netherlands. This proposal had been made after prolonged opposition from Hughes, and the Senate's insistence that it and not the President was vested with this power. The agreement to be concluded with the Netherlands was even less favourable than that of 1853. No agreement at all was preferable to one in which equality of rights was no longer certain, but subject to the whims of Congress.</p>
150	12.2.1925 from Van Vredenburg (Brussels)	<p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i>. Meeting (at his request) with Hymans. Elections on 5 April. If the agreement was not signed soon, the Netherlands would have to await the pleasure of a new Belgian government and parliament. Besides technical questions, the major stumbling block was the <i>casus belli</i> declaration. The wording proposed by the Netherlands, based on the old Laroche report, was unacceptable to Hymans as it reopened many disagreeable questions. The writer believed that Hymans wished to have the <i>casus belli</i> declaration in a form with political implications or which could in any case be endowed with such implications in times of need. This opinion was strengthened by Hymans' statements about a 'Pacte de Sécurité' between Great Britain, France and Belgium which guaranteed mutual support against Germany, considered essential in Paris for peace, evacuation of the Ruhr, etc. According to Hymans' this 'Pacte' had been upset by Poincaré ('ce que je ne lui pardonnerai jamais') when it had almost been concluded. The <i>ca-</i></p>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
151	12.2.1925 from Lampson to De Marees van Swinderen	<p><i>ius belli</i> declaration wanted by Hymans was an integral part of his political system (as 'une amorce au traité militaire').</p> <p><i>France (surtaxes d'origine et d'entrepôt)</i>. Further to Nos. 113 and 113-A. English text of the British view of equality of treatment. Refusal of request that Baldwin, the British Rhine Navigation Commissioner, support his Dutch colleague in his efforts 'to secure the abrogation of the 'surtaxes d'entrepôt' insofar as it affects Rhine ports, by a provision in the revised convention for the Rhine'.</p>
152	16.2.1925 Beucker Andreae, notes	<p><i>Great Britain (extension of arbitration treaty)</i>. The 1908 treaty (containing reservations regarding disputes touching upon the honour, independence or vital interests of the parties) was due to expire on 1 June. If a new treaty (which should be based on the report of the Committee on Matters of International Law, No. 132) could not yet be signed, the existing treaty could be extended temporarily by an exchange of Notes.</p> <p>In view of the development of autonomy in the Dominions and British India, care should be taken to ensure that a new treaty covered disputes arising in relations with self-governing parts of the British Empire. On the basis of the text (couched in vague terms) of the 1923 Anglo-American extension, it could be assumed that Great Britain was willing to accord the Permanent Court a certain competence, and thus with respect to the Netherlands as well. Advice that – as in the case of Germany – a declaration be signed or Notes exchanged on the conclusion of the treaty, stating that it was applicable to disputes arising prior to its entry into force.</p>
153	17.2.1925 from Van Rappard (Oslo)	<p><i>League of Nations (Geneva Protocol)</i>. Talk with Norwegian Minister Mowinckel, who hoped that the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries would take the same position in this important matter. If Scandinavia joined forces with Switzerland and the Netherlands on League of Nations affairs, this group of countries of the second rank could exercise a beneficial influence on the group of great powers who, unfortunately, continued to judge all issues from the point of view of the power groups that had emerged after the war.</p> <p>Mowinckel hesitated to sign the Protocol, but expected that Sweden would ultimately do so. Approval by Britain would make a Norwegian refusal dif-</p>

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154	18.2.1925 to De Graeff (Washington)	<p>ficult. Mowinckel feared that Denmark would regard the Protocol as a means of strengthening its position vis-à-vis Germany.</p> <p><i>Law of war. General report of the Jurists' Committee, Washington conference.</i> (Cf. Volume IV, No. 196). Discussion of Annex 1 (Tobin's Note), proposing that the countries represented on the Jurists' Committee should first conclude treaties to which others could then accede, or that those others should be involved in the matter right from the beginning either by means of written consultation or a new conference. The latter method could be highly advantageous to the Netherlands because it would be there, in a conference, that the most support could be expected from countries such as Denmark, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland for the promotion of the interests of the smaller powers and the neutrals. The Netherlands had had to act alone in the Jurists' Committee, which fact had exercised a negative influence on the outcome in respect of those interests. Many of the provisions formulated by the Committee were acceptable, though there were strong objections to several others.</p>
154 A	Annex 1 12.2.1925 from Tobin	Note containing proposal as referred to above (English text).
154 B	Annex 2 12.2.1925 to Tobin	Reply to Note as above (French text).
155	18.2.1925 from De Graeff (Washington) to Hughes	<i>United States (Bryan arbitration and conciliation treaty).</i> Further to No. 102 (Hughes informed of the content of No. 140).
156	19.2.1925 to Van Swaay	<p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment).</i> Further to Nos. 134 and 136. Belgium had not accepted the Dutch counterproposal, which had offered less than the 1920 draft with the attached maps. Failure to reach agreement during the discussion between Belgian technicians and Van Oordt which had taken place afterwards. Van Oordt had proposed that dredging operations (designed to maintain the navigation channel at the required depth and width) carried out after the channel had become shallower and narrower be accounted maintenance costs to be borne by the Netherlands. This proposal was not rejected out of hand by the Belgians, but agreement could not be reached on the actual wording. Which text would Van Swaay consider acceptable, bearing in mind that a situation favourable to Belgium had</p>

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157	23.2.1925 from Van Starcken- borg Stachouwer (Berlin) to Nederbragt	<p>deliberately been taken as the norm in the 1920 version, and that this could not now be reversed? Van Swaay's memorandum of 10 September 1924 (cf. No. 16) had mentioned no conditions in this respect. <i>Germany (trade agreement)</i>. Both Wolff and the writer were of the opinion that it would be unwise to introduce the subject of special tariff arrangements in the forthcoming discussions on general trade policy relations and preferential rail freight rates. Berlin should not be given the idea that it could demand return concessions. View expressed in No. 66 should be maintained. The negotiations being conducted at that moment by Belgium were a reason for the Netherlands to wait and see what was achieved (for the Netherlands as well), without itself entering into the arena or making concessions (the Netherlands legally entitled to equal treatment with Belgium on the point of customs tariffs). It would in any case be difficult to stipulate low tariffs for plants without granting a reciprocal concession (cf. No. 66). Question of the too detailed specifications (cf. No. 96) could be raised in the discussions at this point.</p>
157 A	Annex, undated Gevers and Wolff, report	<p>Discussion with Marckwald and Von Pannwitz, who had raised no objections to points a) and b) in No. 122-A. Re point a) (most-favoured-nation) reservations would be required only in respect of 1) frontier traffic and 2) countries with which a customs union was to be formed. Difficulties arose regarding point c) (quotas) in which Germany did not have a free hand and could perhaps be forced to accept important quotas (France for Alsace-Lorraine, Poland for Upper Silesia, Luxembourg and other states) which it could not accept for other countries.</p> <p>It would make an unfortunate impression if the Netherlands were to be treated disadvantageously on the point of quotas, as this would strengthen the hand of those who were calling for retaliatory measures. Marckwald had promised to seek an acceptable form for the Netherlands, and had stated that most of the import bans would be lifted as soon as the tariffs were amended.</p> <p>Prospect of a reply to No. 122-A for further consultation. Reichstag's permission required for definitive version of that reply. The Reichstag did not intend to leave the fixing of tariff items to the govern-</p>

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158	25.2.1925 from De Marees van Swinderen (London)	<p>ment, with a committee drawn from the Reichstag and the Reichsrat, but would decide itself. Consequently, negotiations with the Netherlands on the matter could not be entered into at present.</p> <p><i>Great Britain (relations with), Geneva Protocol and exchange of royal visits.</i> Serious discussion with Chamberlain, during which the writer had given the assurance that 'the Netherlands, while continuing to pursue an independent policy, sincerely wished to seek cooperation first and foremost with Great Britain in those cases in which cooperation could promote the achievement of the desired aim'. He had cited the Opium Conference and the Geneva Protocol as examples of this. Chamberlain had agreed that 'in many cases more or less regular cooperation and joint consultation between the Netherlands and the British governments might well be of benefit'.</p> <p>It was not yet possible to say what Britain's attitude to the Protocol would be. Its structure was far too heavy for such a youthful organisation as the League of Nations, which was still in the first years of its existence. To reject it without further consideration would, however, be irresponsible. This being the case, a clear-cut British proposal could not be expected at the March meeting of the League Council. Van Karnebeek was therefore advised to hold back a little longer. Ratification of the Protocol with reservations considered inadmissible by Chamberlain (a solution advocated by Mussolini). Chamberlain had expressed himself with great caution on the subject of the alliance treaties; efforts were being made to persuade the Dominions to take a more positive view of them.</p> <p>The Netherlands would greatly appreciate a visit by the British sovereign. The main obstacle was King George's shyness and his dislike of official state visits. Chamberlain had expressed himself in flattering terms when speaking of the Netherlands and its art treasures. On the subject of a visit by H.M. The Queen to London, he said: 'Nothing would give me more pleasure than that I may be the minister in attendance on Her Majesty when that visit takes place'.</p>
159	26.2.1925 to Van Eysinga	<p><i>France (surtaxes d'origine et d'entrepôt).</i> Enclosure of No. 151 with request for advice. Would it not be better to divorce the argument from 'égalité de traitement' and to base it on the principle that Rhine</p>

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		traffic was in no way to be considered inferior to traffic on other routes (Art. XIV)? Nos. 113 and 151 laid too much emphasis on Antwerp being given preferential treatment compared with Rotterdam, and did not refer to the neglect at French seaports of Dutch imports destined for transport on the Rhine. The French denied that the surtaxes were purely import duties, despite the fact that they were part and parcel of French customs regulations.
160	27.2.1925 from Van Vredenburg (Brussels)	<i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i> . The government would not resign after the dissolution of parliament, but would remain in office until after the elections on 5 April. 'M. Hymans aura qualité de signer éventuellement les traités Hollando-Belges'.
161	2.3.1925 to Ruys de Beerenbrouck and Colijn	<i>Belgium (shipping tax)</i> . According to the Belgian Ministry of Finance this tax did not fall under Section 27 of the regulations and was not levied on the captains of seagoing vessels. The Consul-General in Antwerp considered it a duty on shipping in disguise and not purely a 'taxe professionnelle'; it was a return to the pre-war tax levied in proportion to the size of the vessels. Steyn Parvé was of the opinion that it should be deemed contrary to the Treaty of 19 April 1839 (Art. 9), the Treaty of 5 November 1842 and the Mannheim Treaty of 17 October 1868, to which Belgium had acceded on 14 December 1922.
161 A	Annex 1 12.2.1925 Steyn Parvé (Consul-General, Antwerp) to Van Vredenburg (Brussels)	Detailed arguments rejecting the Belgian Ministry's viewpoint.
162	3.3.1925 to Van Rappard (Copenhagen)	<i>USSR (recovery of property seized from the Dutch diplomat Sweerts de Landas Wyborgh)</i> . In response to a request for assistance, the Danish ministry had stated that success was not to be expected. Earlier efforts on behalf of French and Spanish diplomats had met with the reply that if their countries were to recognise the Soviet Union steps could be taken by their own representatives.
163	3.3.1925 from Gevers (Berlin)	<i>Germany and Yap cables</i> . Integral compensation for the damage ensuing from the liquidation of the 'Deutsch-Niederländische Telegraphen' Company had again been urged (Note in French).
164	3.3.1925 from Hughes to De Graeff	<i>United States (Bryan arbitration and conciliation treaty)</i> . Proposal contained in No. 154 rejected on the grounds set out in No. 102 (English text). Dutch

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165	4.3.1925 to Colijn	<p>text must, under the circumstances, be deemed to point to the limits of the undertakings of both contracting parties, which either might insist upon or invoke.</p> <p><i>China (Boxer indemnity)</i>. Inquiry whether indemnity could be cancelled (cf. No. 131) now that almost all the powers entitled to it under the 1901 Peking Protocol had done so. Slightly more than half of the Netherlands' share had been paid by 1 January (Fl. 1,537,938.05). The remaining Fl. 1,528,263.06 was to be paid in the period 1 January 1925-1940, representing a cash value of Fl. 999,656.44 after deduction of the compound interest on 1 January 1925. Colonial Ministry had proposed either cancellation or use of the money for a special purpose (political inclinations of the Chinese in NEI and their attitude to Dutch rule a matter of importance).</p>
166	4.3.1925 to De Graaff	<p><i>China (Boxer indemnity)</i>. Enclosure of No. 131. The positive proposals it contained were not especially commendable. Letter to Ministry of Finance and the sums involved, of which Schrieke's statement had given a false idea.</p>
167	4.3.1925 from Röell (Peking)	<p><i>China (diplomatic service)</i>. American envoy (acting doyen) urged that the Russian ambassador be recognised as doyen 'pour tous les questions générales et protocollaires'. Approval already expressed by Spain and Portugal. Röell authorised on 6 March 'd'adhérer attitude ministre américain'. (Van Karnebeek's comment that this was probably inevitable was made with the former doyen, Oudendijk, in mind).</p>
168	5.3.1925 from Van Swaay	<p><i>Netherlands-Belgium (engineering works)</i>. Waterway connecting Juliana canal and Maastricht-Liège canal to be constructed, as also a lock at St. Pieter linking Dutch waterways to the Upper Meuse. A system of roads for mass transport planned between the coal mines and the adjacent industrial areas in Limburg. Could this be done without conflicting with obligations under the Belgian treaties? Objections could be expected because these plans did not promote Belgian national interests (e.g. establishment of close links between Antwerp and Liège coal-mining and industrial areas). Reference to objections already raised to work on the Meuse, namely the dam at Borgharen and the water drained off from the Meuse. The cooperation of Belgium was not needed for the construction of the lock. Would this also</p>

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168 A	Annex 1 18.3.1925 Kikkert, note	<p>apply (after completion of the lock) to the lockage of vessels, which would require the use of water from a section of the canal situated partly on Belgian territory?</p> <p>Memorandum further to No. 168. Distinction should be made between construction and use. Unlike the other works referred to in the Treaty of July 1845 (S. 49), the lock would not be built 'at the cost of the Belgian government but in accordance with plans approved by both governments'. The Netherlands government was not bound by the Implementation Treaty of 5 September 1850 (S. 64) to consult Belgium. However, care should be taken to ensure that shipping would not be obstructed either during the construction of the lock or afterwards.</p>
168 B	Annex 2, undated Draft letter to Van Swaay	<p>Theoretically Belgium could object to the draining off of water, but the quantities in question would appear to be negligible. The actual amount could be calculated by the Ministry of Public Works. It was notable that no Belgian protest had as yet been heard. Consulting Belgium could however be enough in itself to engender protest. According to Beucker Andreae, consultation was not required provided the canal itself was not adversely affected.</p> <p>1. Technically speaking, would shipping in the canal be obstructed in any way by the lock or its construction?</p> <p>2. How much water was required for lockage? Could it affect the level of the canal? What would happen if the spillway, which was situated on Belgian territory and in constant operation, were to fail? Had anything else been agreed between Belgium and the Netherlands when the canal plan had been drawn up?</p>
169	5.3.1925 from Pelt (Geneva) to François	<p><i>League of Nations (chemical warfare)</i>. Aarts' original proposal had been to hand over to the League an invention of his which could be used in time of war. It would be a step forward if chemical weapons were to be banned under international law. The proposal, formulated as precisely as possible and accompanied by an exposition of his own ideas on the subject, should be sent to the Secretary General with a request that it be studied.</p>
170	17.3.1925 from Beelaerts	<p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i>. Comments on the <i>additional protocol</i> to the treaty (of 3 April 1925). Points on which complete agreement had not yet been reached, such as protection of</p>

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170A	Annex 17.3.1925 from Ministry of Public Works	<p>Dutch legal rights beyond the river banks; the extent of necessary dredging (5 million cubic metres over 10 years offered, 24 million over 20 years requested by Belgium; 7½ million, possibly increased to 8½ million over 10 years now proposed); improvements to Zuid-Willemsvaart and the Liège-Maastricht canal through the town of Maastricht to be determined by the Joint Commission (Belgium should not be involved in the matter of the Juliana canal); the entire map was based on obsolete data and not consistent with the actual situation. Beelaerts feared that Belgium would use this to gain the greatest possible advantage.</p> <p>Dutch and French text of Public Works additional protocol.</p>
171	6.3.1925 to Gevers (Berlin)	<p><i>Germany (trade agreement).</i> Exchange of ideas between Wolff and Nederbragt. <i>Strategy:</i> The German government to be repeatedly (but not aggressively) reminded of most-favoured-nation status and preferential railfreight rates; the negotiations were not to be put at risk by making an issue of special interests; care to be taken however that the government could never be accused in the Netherlands of missing the psychological moment when the time came to defend those special interests. With reference to point 3 (quotas; cf. No. 122-A), Berlin's 'conciliatory clause' to be awaited, the real objections for Germany being taken into account as far as possible. The question of the specifications to be introduced during the general negotiations (cheese, horses, cattle and horticultural products), and its importance to the Netherlands demonstrated by means the outcome of the Belgian-German negotiations.</p> <p><i>Procedure:</i> the question of the specifications would be raised and explained at the Ministry of Agriculture in Berlin by several Dutch experts in the presence of Wolff. Starckenborch and Wolff would have to return to The Hague for regular consultation.</p>
172	6.3.1925 from Van Eysinga	<p><i>France (surtaxes d'origine et d'entrepôt).</i> The writer was suprised at the substance of No. 151, sent to him with No. 159, which was not consistent with what his British counterpart Baldwin had told him. The British view was dictated wholly by the contrast between Antwerp and Rotterdam, which had been deliberately ignored at Strasbourg. The British had overlooked Articles 6 and 14 of the Rhine Navigati-</p>

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172A	Annex, undated Kikkert, note	<p>on Treaty, which aimed at preventing the Rhine route being placed in a less favourable position than other routes by measures taken by a riparian state. The British were to be urged to revise their standpoint.</p> <p>Comments. The British standpoint could perhaps be explained by the following: 1) Pressure exerted by France; on the whole London did not oppose Paris too much. 2) No advantage accruing to the British, as British ports would only profit by fixed prices for such goods as were transported from them down the Rhine; and 3) the fact that De Marees van Swinderen had made a point of raising the Antwerp-Rotterdam controversy. The matter should be discussed anew in London.</p>
173	11.3.1925 to Loudon (Paris)	<p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i>. In an interview with a correspondent of <i>Le Matin</i>, General Snijders had given information on the <i>casus belli</i> declaration which was not altogether consistent with the facts (or with the government's views; cf. Nos. 30 and 31). Violation of Dutch territory would indeed meet with resistance, but the alleged obligation to cover the Belgian right wing was incorrect. The government and the General Staff were free to decide where and how the Netherlands would resist, depending on conditions and circumstances, as set out in the Memorandum of Reply accompanying the report of the Lower House on chapter III of the 1925 budget.</p> <p>No special interest should be evinced for the time being in the defence pacts, the political implications of which were apparently being studied. All information on what was taking place would be appreciated.</p>
174	12.3.1925 to Gevers (Berlin)	<p><i>Guarantee treaty</i>. The envoy was reproved for not having spontaneously reported the proposals made by the German government to the French government on 9 and 20 February. It was not the Netherlands' policy to become embroiled in the international discussions then taking place. However, the plans were of such importance to the Netherlands' position, in particular because Germany now proposed to become involved, that the government should be kept informed as fully as possible. The envoy was to bear this in mind, making use of his numerous contacts. To what extent could the German initiative be attributed to a wish to join the League of Nations?</p>

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175	16.3.1925 from Wolff (Berlin) to Gevers	<p><i>Germany (trade agreement)</i>. No. 171 discussed with Marckwald, who had admitted that specifications could spell the end of the most-favoured-nation clause; it was precisely this point that was the bone of contention in the current Franco-German negotiations. Germany would not tolerate external interference on this question as the composition of the general tariff was closely related to the internal economic and financial situation. The Netherlands' wish not to be treated less favourably than other countries was fully understood.</p> <p>Export of flowers and plants discussed briefly. Marckwald suggested that talks at the German Ministry of Agriculture be proposed in a Note Verbale channelled through the Auswärtige Amt. Talk with Walter of the Ministry of Agriculture, who was acquainted with the problems of Dutch exporters and was willing to discuss them if requested to do so through the Auswärtige Amt.</p>
176	18.3.1925 from Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Van Rappard	<p><i>Germany (Dawes report)</i>. Further to No. 14. The matter would be followed with interest. Though no formal steps would be taken, an exchange of information was advisable 'afin de s'entretenir sur les mesures à prendre, éventuellement en commun, pour sauvegarder leurs intérêts'.</p>
177	18.3.1925 from Sweerts de Landas Wyborgh (Stockholm)	<p><i>League of Nations (Sweden and Geneva Protocol)</i>. The socialist Uden had expressed himself in extremely optimistic terms, even after the speech of the British representative who, after conducting what amounted to a post-mortem, had declared the Protocol ripe for interment. Uden was openly sympathetic towards 'Benes' dubious creation', despite the danger inherent in the Protocol that the independence of the small states would be pruned further. In Sweerts' view, the suicide urge, a common phenomenon in periods of decline, was not confined to individuals but also afflicted states. Uden was pleased that Rault's chairmanship of the governmental commission for the administration of the Saar had been confirmed by the League of Nations Council, though Sweden had been urging 'roulement' for some time.</p>
178	19.3.1925 from Buttingha Wichers (Cape Town) to Lorentz (Pretoria)	<p><i>South Africa (trade agreement)</i> (Cf. No. 116). Article entitled 'Our Foreign Trade Policy' in <i>Die Burger</i> of 18 March, based on a question asked by Wilson in the British House of Commons whether negotiations had been conducted between the Union and</p>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
178A	Annex, undated	<p>the Netherlands concerning a most-favoured-nation agreement. Butthinga Wichers had approached the South African government, which knew nothing of such negotiations, and had not authorised the trade commissioner Pienaar (who had recently transferred his office to Milan) to enter into them (sources were Steyn, who was General Herzog's private secretary, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Mines and Industry, and the private secretary of Minister Beyens of the same ministry).</p>
179	<p>20.3.1925 from De Marees van Swinderen (London)</p>	<p>Résumé of newspaper article, in which was mentioned the disappointment felt at Pienaar's transferring his headquarters to Milan, as 'the presence of a representative of South Africa, a kindred nation, was greatly appreciated in the Netherlands'.</p> <p><i>Guarantee treaty.</i> (Cf. No. 174). Sir Eyre Crowe had been informed of the relevant passage in the Netherlands Memorandum of Reply because the writer had thought it would please Chamberlain. Everyone (in London) in favour of multilateral treaty, though it was not yet certain who would be the contracting parties. Herriot thought the Netherlands might be included, but Chamberlain surmised that it would not be favourably received in The Hague. France's gain should not be underestimated, according to Crowe, as Germany had formally relinquished Alsace-Lorraine, which France had never wished to do before the war.</p>
180	<p>20.3.1925 from Gevers (Berlin)</p>	<p>Chamberlain advocated a guarantee treaty between France, Great Britain, and Belgium without Germany; the majority of the British cabinet, however, saw advantages only in a treaty which included Germany.</p> <p><i>Guarantee treaty.</i> Talk with State Secretary Von Schubert about the visit paid him by the French ambassador, De Margerie. The latter had evinced interest in the form and content of the treaties Germany was considering concluding with its neighbours to the east. Von Schubert had stated that they were not aimed at realigning the frontiers. He wished to know whether the Netherlands would be willing to conclude a treaty similar to that between Germany and Finland, which had not yet been ratified. There would be no reason to do so, in the writer's opinion, if Germany were willing to deal with the question of the preferential rail freight rates and the most-favoured-nation agreement at an early date.</p>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
181	23.3.1925 from Van Swaay	<i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i> . Information relative to Nos. 126 and 134 obtained from the chief engineers of Public Works in Limburg and Zeeland. 1 January 1945 should be set as the final notification date for the construction of the Rine-Meuse-Scheldt canal (without regard to Art. 361 of the Treaty of Versailles) and of the Antwerp-Moerdijk canal. Art. V, paragraph 4, section 2 should be tightened up to stipulate, for example, that the canals are to be completed by 1 January 1945.
182	24.3.1925 to De Marees van Swinderen (London) and Loudon (Paris)	<i>Ditto</i> . Text of a Note informing the British and French governments that the Belgian-Netherlands negotiations had ended in agreement, different only on a few minor points from what had been agreed in 1920. Belgian-Dutch preference for a single treaty instead of the <i>two</i> provided by the Laroche commission (US, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan). US, Japan and Italy were not signatories to the instruments of 1839. The arrangements concerning the end to Belgium's long-existing neutrality, the status of the port of Antwerp and the waterways, etc. to be in one text with a protocol of interpretation (motivation and definition). Proposal that the (second) treaty with the powers be replaced by a simple exchange of Notes with Great Britain and France, stating that the 1839 treaties had been abrogated. The same procedure could be followed at some future date with the USSR, subsequent to the recognition of that country. Belgium wished the treaty to be concluded before the elections of 5 April 1925.
182A	Annex 1, undated	Dutch text of No. 182 (draft).
182B	Annex 2, undated	French covering letter (draft) to the Note for Van Swinderen and Loudon.
183	26.3.1925 from Loudon (Paris)	<i>Ditto</i> . Uncertain whether No. 182 would be accepted, as Baron Gaiffier had not yet received instructions. The texts (no. 182) had been forwarded to Fromageot by Laroche, who had at first objected to an exchange of Notes in lieu of a treaty with the powers (this form inadvisable in the case of treaties as important as those of 1839 between Belgium and the Netherlands and the powers concerned, respectively). A short treaty (if necessary consisting of only a few articles) would be preferable to so dubious a precedent. He would consult the Prime Minister and Fromageot. He hoped to receive Beelaerts van Blokland and Gaiffier at 11.30 on Tuesday, 31 March.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
184	28.3.1925 from Loudon (Paris)	<i>Ditto.</i> The writer had again called on Laroche (Gaiffier and De Ruelle had also been present) to carry out the instructions contained in No. 182. Laroche had insisted on the form of a treaty with the powers. Loudon suspected that Fromageot and the French Council of Ministers shared Laroche's view.
185	28.3.1925 from De Marees van Swinderen (London)	<i>Ditto.</i> Report on execution of instructions contained in No. 182 (envoy received by Sir Eyre Crowe, Chamberlain being indisposed). The writer and De Moncheur had furnished Eyre Crowe with the necessary explanations. Eyre Crowe had inquired whether Germany should not be informed as Great Britain and France had been, to which Van Swinderen had replied that this was unnecessary under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. British undertaking given to examine the text at an early date (in case the settlement should contain regulations harmful to British shipping interests, in the event of which other ministries would have to be consulted). It would not be necessary for Beelaerts and Van Zuylen to come to London as the Explanatory Memorandum was sufficiently clear.
186	28.3.1925	<i>Ditto.</i> Press communiqué on amendment to 1839 treaties, based on No. 182 with several additional details.
187	29.3.1925 to De Marees van Swinderen (London)	<i>Ditto.</i> The British had requested receipt of the text of the treaty in quadruplicate ('possibilité d'entrer en détails'). Envoy instructed to make quite clear that Great Britain was only being consulted on the ending of the powers' guarantee. The right of Belgium and the Netherlands to settle their mutual relations themselves was not to be infringed upon.
188	31.3.1925 to Loudon (Paris)	<i>Ditto.</i> The treaty would be signed on Friday 3 April. Hymans would be dining with Van Karnebeek; Loudon invited to join them. It was more the Belgians' task to convince France that an exchange of Notes was to be preferred to a treaty, to which end pressure should be exerted on and support given to Brussels.
189	31.3.1925 to Doude van Troostwijk (Berne), Van Rappard (Copenhagen/Oslo) and Sweerts de Landas Wyborg (Stockholm)	<i>Germany (Dawes report).</i> Enclosure of Nos. 23, 143 and 176 (relative to Nos. 14 and 15). Report revised (in accordance with No. 28), giving the tax a different character (that of a general company tax for which all companies were liable), which thus excluded the eventuality that a mortgage on a firm could be foreclosed. The credit worthiness of individual concerns would scarcely be affected. It had been de-

No.	Date; from/to	Description
190	31.3.1925 from Van Swaay	<p>cided not to take steps, as Dutch nationals abroad were liable to general taxes. No further complaints received from those concerned.</p> <p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i>. Further to No. 181. A time limit on the duration of the right (construction of canals) accorded in Art. III, paragraph 12 was to be preferred to its indefinite continuation, with 1 January 1945 as the date on which the construction was to be completed. It was deemed not unimportant that the Liège-Maastricht canal be made navigable for vessels of 1000 tons. It was to be avoided that once the term had expired, this work should again become unregulated, allowing Belgium a free hand vis-à-vis the Netherlands. Difficulties which might arise if the work were not completed by 1 January 1945 could be avoided by stipulating the lapse of the rights.</p>
191	31.3.1925 from Loudon (Paris)	<p><i>Germany (occupation of the Ruhr and guarantee treaty)</i>. An editorial in <i>Le Matin</i> of this date hinted at the accession of the Netherlands to the guarantee treaty. Extraordinary report in the <i>Neues Tageblatt</i> of Stuttgart in which a 'sehr reservierte' attitude was ascribed to the envoy towards French probes in The Hague. Had these indeed taken place? Negative reply given on April 25.</p>
192	31.3.1925 from Beelaerts	<p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i>. Agreement had been reached in London on the Note to be addressed to the British government and its reply concerning concurrence with the abrogation of the 1839 collective treaty with the powers; the manner in which this would take place would be decided later. Request that Paris and London be informed by telegraph of the Netherlands government's approval. Chamberlain and the French ambassador were to meet that afternoon.</p>
192A	Annex 1, undated	French text of the Note to be addressed to the British government.
192B	Annex 2, undated	English text of the reply.
193	1.4.1925 from Beelaerts	<p><i>Ditto</i>. London opposed to exchange of Notes. The writer and De Marees van Swinderen had met Villiers and Hurst's deputy, Hurst himself being in Geneva (a Dutch initiative and not a British invitation). The tone of the British had not been friendly: 'We were to understand that this would not do at all'. The matter would first be thoroughly looked into in London by the War and Navy ministries and the Board of Trade (cf. No. 185). The 1839 settlement,</p>

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		<p>in which European interests were involved, could not be treated in such an 'off-hand way'. Van Swinderen had replied that agreement had already been reached in 1920, and inquired whether Great Britain had changed its policy. That was not the case; agreement had indeed been reached on the essence of the question, but the form was unacceptable and should be determined after proper consultation.</p> <p>New meeting on 31 March; the gentlemen had calmed down, and had accepted both the amended Note drawn up by Beelaerts (cf. No. 192-A) and the reply to be given by the British (No. 192-B), in the French and English texts. Van Karnebeek would probably not be altogether pleased with the last paragraph of No. 192-B, but it would be better not to prolong the battle on this point.</p>
194	1.4.1925 from Van Vredenburg (Brussels)	<i>Ditto.</i> Hymans had stated that the signing of the treaty might have to be postponed because of London's obstructive attitude (treaty with powers in lieu of exchange of Notes).
195	1.4.1925 to Loudon (Paris)	<i>Ditto.</i> Hymans to bring with him the Note on the reservation of rights in the Wielingen issue on Friday, 3 April (No. 201).
196	1.4.1925 to Van Vredenburg (Brussels)	<i>Ditto.</i> Agreement reached by Beelaerts in London (cf. No. 193), and his revised draft approved. He was to leave London for Paris that day.
197	1.4.1925 from Loudon (Paris)	<i>Ditto.</i> Laroche wished to see an article inserted in the Netherlands-Belgian treaty according Great Britain and France the right of approval. In reply to Loudon's protest, Laroche had stated that he would be satisfied with an annex to the treaty containing the Notes to be exchanged. Instructions requested.
198	1.4.1925 to Loudon (Paris)	<i>Ditto.</i> Laroche's first proposal unacceptable (No. 197), the second (addition of Notes to the Treaty) 'pas bien utile, étant donné que dans notes abrogation est prévue dans forme à destiner ultérieurement et qu' approbation parlementaire et ratification impossible avant que cela ait eu lieu'. What was understood by 'annexé'? Loudon authorised to concur only if the signing of the treaty would otherwise be put at risk.
199	2.4.1925 from De Marees van Swinderen (London)	The projected treaty and exchange of notes approved by the British and French Governments.
200	1.4.1925 from Van Vreden-	<i>Ditto.</i> Treaty received favourably by the entire Belgian press from the <i>Standaard</i> to the <i>Soir</i> (with the

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	burch (Brussels)	exception of the chauvinistic <i>Nation Belge</i> and the <i>XXe Siècle</i> : Nothomb's <i>L'Action Nationale</i> had made no mention of it). Delacroix, Van de Vijvere, Count De Kerchove (Governor of East Flanders) and the Ministers Neujean, Ruzette and Theunis were enthusiastic. Hymans had pointed out that the signing might have to be postponed in view of Great Britain's wish to be a signatory together with France, in which case the government's resignation would likewise have to be postponed.
201	3.4.1925 to Hymans	<i>Ditto</i> . Note stating that the Wielingen issue had been omitted from the treaty, rights and claims being reserved (identical Belgian Note (French text)).
202	6.4.1925 to Loudon (Paris)	<i>Ditto</i> . It was not understood why Loudon had sent a telegram on 4 April stating that Laroche had requested adjustment of No. 182-B. That draft had already been revised on 31 March, the revision accepted by Laroche on 1 April, and no longer admitted of alteration. It was surmised that the wrong draft had been sent to Laroche by the legation.
203	7.4.1925 from De Marees van Swinderen (London)	<i>Ditto</i> . Villiers presented with Note in which the representatives of Great Britain, France and Belgium were invited to meet at The Hague in the week of 11-18 April to discuss the form which the revocation of the 1839 could take. Though in principle willing, Villiers was of the opinion that too early a date had been proposed. Hurst was due in Strasbourg on 18 April where he proposed to discuss this matter, among others, with Fromageot; he would proceed directly to The Hague with Fromageot at the conclusion of the meetings of the Rhine Navigation Commission. Report in the <i>Daily Telegraph</i> that the British Admiralty had raised objections to the treaty which could result in Great Britain's 'revoking' only without prejudice to its rights was untrue.
204	8.4.1925 from Colijn	<i>League of Nations (Arms Trade Convention)</i> . for the provision of uniform statistical data on the import and export of arms, no changes to be made in trade statistics, but separate arms statistics to be compiled from import and export permits. This would be necessary because of the wide diversity in the trade statistics of the various states with regard to descriptions of the type, value, quantity, origin and destination of goods, direct or through sealed warehouses. The requisite expansion of the Fire

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205	9.4.1925 to Loudon (Paris)	Arms Act should be promoted in the Netherlands. Data on direct transit traffic incomplete and unreliable, as the provisions of various treaties, including the Rhine Navigation and the Scheldt treaties, permitted only the most summary checks of their accuracy. Art. 15, paragraph 4 of the Opium Convention should be applied to the control of direct transit traffic. <i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment).</i> The French envoy had expressed his surprise at No. 202 (Note enclosed with No. 182 had been rejected by Great Britain and France as being inconsistent with the aim in view). De Marcilly had been informed that there was no question of a difference of opinion, but merely of an error committed at the chancellery in Paris. Thorbecke's explanation was that he knew nothing of the matter and had received no instructions. The temporary chargé d'affaires was henceforth to be kept fully informed of the matters in hand.
206	11.4.1925 from Loudon (Paris)	<i>Ditto.</i> Beelaerts had not left a copy of the revised Note at the legation so that it had not been possible to give Thorbecke instructions, Beelaerts commented that he had handed the document to the envoy. Van Karnebeek did not wish to pursue the matter further, but remarked that Thorbecke had meanwhile not been informed of Loudon's departure from Paris.
207	11.4.1925 from Loudon (Paris)	<i>Ditto.</i> Repeat of substance of No. 203. The British government probably wanted additional provisions regarding free trade on the Scheldt and the prevention of warships entering the river in the guise of merchant vessels. Great Britain and France wished to be informed of any solution to the Wielingen issue that the Netherlands and Belgium might arrive at in the future.
208	15.4.1925 from Van Nispen tot Sevenaer (Vatican)	<i>Ditto.</i> Congratulations on the signing of the treaty. Not to have concluded it would have been dangerous, and could eventually have supplied Belgian fi-rebrands with a weapon against the Dutch. The interment of the <i>Geneva Protocol</i> viewed with satisfaction by the writer, who considered the efforts to bind the Netherlands to this document (with the cooperation of even Van Eysinga and Limburg) to be most dubious.
209	20.4.1925 from Marling	<i>Ditto (pilotage on the Scheldt).</i> The arrangement in the treaty of 2 April differed from 'the arrangement

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210	17.4.1925 Minutes interdepart- mental meeting	<p>existing under the treaty of London of 1839, which prescribes that it shall be at the choice of every vessel proceeding from the High Sea to Belgium or from Belgium to the High Sea to take what pilot she pleases'. Snouck Hurgronje believed that this unofficial letter had not been sent on instructions from the government but at the request of a shipowners' association. Van Karnebeek considered it in that case irrelevant to take steps and advises that the document be filed.</p> <p><i>League of Nations (Arms Trade Convention)</i>. Meeting of delegates from the ministries concerned at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prepare instructions for the Netherlands representative at Geneva, Doude van Troostwijk. The purpose of the convention was not so much arms limitation and the restriction of private arms manufacture (to be achieved respectively by the Geneva Protocol and a convention on the private manufacture of arms then in preparation) as 1) the prevention of clandestine arms deals without the knowledge of governments, and 2) greater knowledge of the ways in which the international arms trade was conducted. It offered no direct advantages to the Netherlands; considerations of international solidarity were the prime motives for accession. Possible disadvantages: the export of war material manufactured in the Netherlands would be hampered and Dutch military strength exposed, which would not be the case for self-producing states. This could be limited by restricting publication by the International Bureau and/or by making more effective the general obligation laid down in Art. 8, last paragraph, of the League of Nations Covenant.</p> <p>Surie: the security requirements of the League members who were unable to manufacture their munitions and material should be taken into account, analogous to the provisions of Art. 8, paragraph 5 of the Covenant. Where there was no actual ban on exports, the impeding of deliveries by delaying the issue of licences should be discouraged. Surie feared that a licensing system would result in the establishment of armaments factories in small countries; as their internal markets would be small, they would seek to supply others, which would increase the arms industry as a whole. France already practised discrimination against the Netherlands, as compa-</p>

red with the Little Entente. Paris would probably adopt a different attitude if the Netherlands was united with France and Belgium in a military alliance.

Comments on the *separate articles*. Summary in Art. I could better be deleted (this should not be too problematical as it was not restrictive). Transport from the mother country to the colonies was not meant to be included in Art. II; this should be made quite clear at the conference. Art. III: as it was important that Dutch industry (notably Fokker) should be able to continue supplying Russia, governments recognised both *de facto* and *de jure* were to be understood by the phrase 'gouvernement reconnu comme tel'. Direct purchase, without the intermediary of an agent was also to be permitted. Art. IV was important in view of the large quantities of spare parts imported into the Netherlands. A provision analogous to Art. XV, paragraph 4 of the International Opium Convention of 1925 should be added to Art. V, as it and Art. 2 of the Arms Traffic Convention made transport control compulsory, whereas the Rhine Navigation Treaty prohibited it. Art. VII: the prohibited zones should be designated before the signing of the convention, based on the principle that the territory of a sovereign state could be declared 'zone de prohibition' only with its permission. Shipping on the international sea routes should not be obstructed by the designation of maritime zones.

Transport of arms over a prohibited sea zone should be allowed. There was no reason to declare areas in NEI prohibited zones. The distinction made between prohibited zones in Africa and elsewhere in Art. IX, last paragraph, required clarification. Was the Central Office to have only administrative powers? Structure of the Office should not be left to the League of Nations, but regulated in the Convention itself, as in the Opium Convention. Loyal cooperation in furnishing the requisite statistics. The three-mile limit was to be maintained for territorial waters. It would be preferable that vessels of less than 500 tons sailing under a foreign flag should be tried only by the state to which the vessel belongs. Belligerents should be recognised as such by both the exporting country and the country through which arms are transported in transit. On the out-

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211	18.4.1925 from Van Eysinga	<p>break of war, the rule would cease to apply in respect of deliveries to belligerents, but not to non-belligerents. Soviet Union's participation <i>a conditio sine qua non</i> for Japan. No opposition from the Netherlands to deletion of the Soviet Union under Art. XXXII.</p> <p><i>France (surtaxes d'origine et d'entrepôt).</i> British Rhine Navigation Commissioner Baldwin had quite understood Dutch surprise at the Foreign Office Note (No. 151), which had emanated neither from him nor the Foreign Office but from the Board of Trade. Talk with French delegate Gout, who had stated that his delegation had urged Paris to enter into discussions with Belgium and the Netherlands on extending the application of the Antwerp regulation to Rotterdam. In Van Eysinga's opinion, this was not quite the same as equating the Rhine route with other routes in the new Rhine Navigation Treaty. Gout believed that the formula agreed upon by France, Belgium and the Netherlands could be embodied in the new treaty, to which Van Eysinga had replied that it should then be worded in such a way that traffic via Genoa-Basle-Strasbourg would not be classed as less important than that via Belgian and Dutch seaports.</p>
212	19.4.1925 from Van der Plas (Jeddah)	<p><i>Jeddah (diplomatic service and protection of Dutch interests).</i> Vice-Consul Prawira di Nata had been favourably impressed by Ibn Saud in Jeddah. Hakimov and the deputy Vice-Consul in Persia, Lari, had made efforts to persuade Ibn Saud to enter into an alliance of the East against Europe, and against the colonial powers in particular. The ruler had been required to give an assurance that he had nothing to do with Great Britain, but he wished to remain on good terms with the British. Undertaking given that the Russians would enjoy a special position in the Holy Land. Van der Plas suspected that the Soviet government would support Ali with a view to gaining predominance in the Hejaz. It was highly unlikely that Ibn Saud would appoint a Sanusi ruler of the holy cities or would promote his candidature for the caliphate. Ibn Saud's talk with and confidence in Prawira di Nata. Saud's demands of Ali, which Prawira could convey to Ali or Fuad. Secrecy requested vis-à-vis all consuls except the Dutch. Prawira (being without instructions) had urged that neither the Netherlands government nor he himself be</p>

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213	21.4.1925 from Van Leeuwen	<p>mentioned during any negotiations that might take place. The Vice-Consul had visited Mecca, though no other Western power had been given permission to send a representative. This would enhance Dutch prestige and more than compensate for the lack of a military presence.</p> <p><i>Belgium (Belgian-Netherlands treaty of 3 April 1925)</i>. Recommendations. No objection to granting the approval referred to in Art. 1 of the draft bill. It should be stated in the explanatory memorandum either that the treaty would not have notable disadvantages for the Netherlands, or that political consideration were of such weight as to require economic sacrifices.</p> <p>Addition of an interpretative memorandum (also referred to as 'mémoire interprétatif' although the terms were not identical) was not recommended, as it would not be legally binding so long as it had not been approved by parliament. The explanatory memorandum referred more than once to the interpretative memorandum. It was therefore not inconceivable that in the event of arbitration proceedings, Belgium would invoke the interpretative memorandum in disputing the text of the treaty.</p> <p>Serious conflicts of interest were not unthinkable in view of the fact that Art. IV of the treaty closed the Western Scheldt to warships (i.e. those of <i>all</i> nations), whereas the interpretative memorandum stated that the text of the treaty left open the question of the passage of Belgian warships in peace and war. The Council urged:</p>
214	22.4.1925 to De Marees van Swinderen (London) and Loudon (Paris)	<p>1) that it be stated unequivocally in the explanatory memorandum that in the event of dispute the treaty would prevail over the memorandum; and</p> <p>2) that the passages in the explanatory memorandum referring to the contents of the interpretative memorandum (to the treaty) be deleted.</p> <p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i>. Further to No. 193. The Notes referred to in the letter of 24 March (No. 182) still considered highly commendable by the Minister. It should not be forgotten that the German Reich, which had superseded Prussia, and Austria could no longer be among the contracting parties, while the Soviet Union could only become a party if its government were to be recognised <i>de jure</i> by Belgium and the Netherlands (cf. No. 182). The abrogation of the old treaties in the form</p>

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		of a treaty could therefore formally not be a complete replacement of the old arrangement. Did Great Britain and France really wish the US, Italy and Japan to be parties to the abrogation treaty, as had been the intention in 1919-1920? No steps to be taken, but the standpoint set forth here should be brought forward in London and Paris when the opportunity arose.
215	24.4.1925 from Beelaerts to Van Vredenburg (Brussels)	<i>Belgian question (Terneuzen)</i> . Enclosure of annex (memorandum in French) handed to Ligne by Van Karnebeek on 23 April. Belgium should understand that the Netherlands, which had made substantial financial sacrifices for Ghent and Antwerp and had brought pilotage dues for Antwerp into line with those for Rotterdam – which was so much nearer – could not abandon Terneuzen to its fate.
215A	Annex 23.4.1925	Text of memorandum referred to above.
216	24.4.1925 from Röell (Peking)	<i>China (diplomatic service)</i> . Further to No. 167. The Soviet ambassador Karakhan attended the meetings of the diplomatic corps, but not as doyen. It had been decided to regard these meetings as unofficial so that anyone could be admitted. How should the writer respond to Karakhan's wish 'to exchange cards' with the representatives of the powers with which Russia did not maintain relations? Röell authorised to receive Karakhan 'et ainsi assister à des réunions chez lui'.
217	25.4.1925 to H.M. the Queen	<i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i> . Reference made to No. 213. The Council of State's first reservation had already been met by the explanatory memorandum stressing the importance of the Netherlands' sovereign rights notably in the Scheldt regarding the issue of costs to be settled. The Council's observation that in arbitration proceedings a plea that the memorandum lacked legal force would be rejected, was correct. Indeed, this would certainly be the case, for such a plea could scarcely be deemed compatible with good faith. The Minister considered that the memorandum was to be regarded as as binding as the treaty, even prior to its approval by parliament. From the constitutional point of view, its contents, in so far as they gave more precise form to the provisions of the treaty, were to be regarded either as a separate agreement – as referred to in Art. 58 of the Constitution – which, not being expressed in the formal terms of a treaty, did not require parliamentary approval, or as an impe-

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217A	Annex 23.4.1925 from Beucker Andreae	<p>rative, and binding, explanation of the treaty. The danger of clashes of interests and legal disputes would not be increased by the addition of the interpretative memorandum. The Council's 'striking example' given here was not identical. Art. IV (free passage through the Western Scheldt) did not imply that warships would be denied passage, but only that the provisions relating to free passage could not be invoked for warships. The Netherlands' sovereign rights therefore still included control of the passage of warships through the Western Scheldt. The text of Al. 6 of the above document, which was missing from Beelaerts van Blokland's first draft (so that he had mistakenly taken no account of the Council of State's comment in his draft). Comments illustrating the somewhat ambiguous character of the memorandum, which consisted partly of binding details and partly of explanations which could not be regarded as such.</p>
218	28.4.1925 from Van Vredenburg (Brussels)	<p><i>Ditto.</i> Talk with Hymans. The writer had stated that the anti-Dutch Walloon liberals in a recent article in <i>l'Indépendance Belge</i> had, for internal political reasons, 'wished to do the Flemings a bad turn without taking account of the Dutch'. Hymans admitted that the Walloon liberals were anti-Flemish, and that some of them wrongly suspected that the Netherlands was sympathetic towards the activists. Would it be possible for Van Karnebeek to make a statement on the matter during the parliamentary debates on the treaty. Hymans would then be obliged to disavow annexionism in the Belgian parliament. Hymans had disapproved of the 'Congrès Pan-Néerlandais' held in Leyden. Why did the Dutch not establish 'amitiés belgo-néerlandaises'?</p>
219	25.4.1925 to the Netherlands delegation	<p><i>League of Nations (Arms Trade Convention conference).</i> Instructions for the Netherlands delegation, comprising a summary of the main points of the minutes of the meeting held on 17 April (No. 210).</p>
220	5.5.1925 to Loudon (Paris)	<p><i>Yap cables (Germany and Reparations Commission).</i> Germany had acknowledged to the Reparations Commission in Paris that Berlin had not been justified in taking unilateral decisions regarding the Yap cables, and had made known its approval of the writing off of the cables' value. The envoy was instructed to urge the Reparations Commission to effect the definitive transfer to the Netherlands as soon as possible. Reference made to the memorandum on</p>

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		the subject already submitted on 23 April 1920 (Volume I, No. 329). It was left to the envoy's discretion to decide whether he would approach the French government to discuss objections which it was perhaps reluctant to withdraw.
220A	Annex 6.4.1925 (excerpt)	Statement by the German Ministerialrat Ahrendt presented by the Government Commissioner Viehoff to De Graaff (Colonial Minister), describing the steps taken in Paris by Berlin (German text).
221	5.5.1925 from Loudon (Paris)	<i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i> . The writer had urged the Quai d'Orsay to expedite the conclusion of the matter. Fromageot did not wish to disclose the details of his talk with Hurst. He knew nothing about a meeting in The Hague (cf. No. 203), and had referred Loudon to Laroche. According to Laroche it was not necessary for them to go to The Hague now 'that they had reached agreement on the two treaties which would replace those of 1839'. Loudon had then referred to the contents of No. 214. Noting what was stated there regarding the U.S., Italy and Japan, Laroche had undertaken to give it his consideration. Loudon thought that Van Karnebeek would have instructed Loudon along the same lines, having regard to the possibility that the British would want 'the two treaties in question' to be signed in London rather than The Hague following the precedent of 1839.
222	6.5.1925 from Röell (Peking)	<i>China (diplomatic service)</i> . Of the Washington conference powers, Great Britain and Italy were of the opinion that the presentation of credentials in China implied <i>de jure</i> recognition, whereas US (and Japan?) held the opposite view. The writer and the representative of Portugal had not yet received instructions. Belgium and France proposed that, together with The Hague, Lisbon, London and Rome, the credentials be so worded as not to infer <i>de jure</i> recognition.
222A	Annex 9.5.1925 from Beelaerts	Notes. Since the events in Peking in November 1924, there was no legal Chinese government but only a provisional government with a temporary head of the executive, with which the legations should maintain relations 'on the understanding that this provisional government had been constituted with the concurrence of the Nation for the purpose of taking charge of the affairs of the Chinese Republic, pending the establishment of a formal government representing all the provinces and parties in the Repu-

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		<p>blic' (cf. No. 114). The 'concurrence of the nation' was here merely a rhetorical phrase. The American-Italian view was the correct one, and was probably shared by Belgium and France in principle; they, however, feared that their position vis-à-vis their American and Spanish counterparts would be somewhat false if they continued to perform their duties without presenting their credentials. The American view was a monstrum in that the presentation of credentials was a not unusual form of <i>de jure</i> recognition. De Ligne should be informed of the Dutch standpoint. The Netherlands should wait and see what course the governments would follow. The Americans probably considered that an inflexible attitude would be to the advantage of the Bolsheviks.</p>
223	6.5.1925 from Röell (Peking)	<p><i>Ditto</i>. Letter repeating information given in No. 222.</p>
224	7.5.1925 to De Marees van Swinderen (London)	<p><i>Great Britain (extension of arbitration treaty)</i>. The present treaty due to expire on 1 June. Treaties such as these, in so far as they were not concluded for an indefinite period, had up to that time always been extended in the original form. The increasing competence of the Permanent Court in the three years of its existence and the conciliation concept which was becoming ever more widely accepted had therefore not been reflected in them. In view of these developments, the Advisory Committee on Matters of International Law made the following recommendations:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. The conclusion of separate arbitration treaties should be promoted even after the League of Nations had become effective.</li> <li>b. Preference should generally be given in such treaties to arbitration by the Permanent Court rather than by ad hoc arbitrators.</li> <li>c. The Court should be declared competent to acquaint itself whenever possible with all disputes as defined in Art. 36, paragraph 2 of the Statutes, also at the request of only one of the two governments.</li> <li>d. The old distinction between disputes which involved honour, independence and vital interests and those which did not should be abolished.</li> <li>e. More opportunities should be created for seeking solutions through conciliation for all disputes which could not be resolved through diplomatic channels or did not lend themselves to resolution by the Per-</li> </ol>

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		<p>manent Court.</p> <p>f. The Permanent Court should decide whether a dispute was a dispute as defined in Art. 36, paragraph 2, Statutes.</p> <p>g. Parties should always have the opportunity of seeking a solution through conciliation.</p> <p>h. Appeal to the Permanent Court should be left to the discretion of the parties in the event of their not accepting the decision of the conciliation commission.</p> <p>i. The institution of conciliation commissions in individual countries should be promoted.</p> <p>The envoy was instructed to inquire whether the British government was willing to enter into discussions on the (enclosed) draft of a new treaty, as Chamberlain had stated his views on 'the objection to universal and compulsory arbitration, which might easily outweigh its theoretical advantages', in Geneva on 12 March. It was expected that London would seek strict limitations on the nature of disputes to be declared justiciable.</p> <p>A new arrangement should also include disputes between the Netherlands and such self-governing parts of the British Empire as the dominions and India. A transitional extension (e.g. by means of an exchange of Notes) would be advisable after 1 Juni 1925 in order to avoid a vacuum until the new treaty would come into effect.</p>
224 A	Annex 25.4.1925 from Beucker Andreae	Notes on several changes to the draft referred to in the foregoing.
225	7.5.1925 from De Marees van Swinderen to Chamberlain	<i>France (surtaxes d'origine et d'entrepôt).</i> Observations on No. 151 (English text).
226	8.5.1925 from the Netherlands delegation	<i>League of Nations (Arms Trade Convention conference).</i> The interests of the producing and non-producing countries differed. Doude van Troostwijk had made a statement in the 4th general meeting to the effect that the application of the Convention should stimulate the arms industries in various countries. British proposal that the whole framework be altered and American proposal banning poison gas.
226 A	Annex, undated	Statement as referred to above (French text).
227	11.5.1925 from De Marees van Swinderen (London)	<i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment).</i> The French government shared the objections to the exchange of Notes as referred to in No. 182. An instru-

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228	19.5.1925 from Beucker Andreae	<p>ment which had come into being with parliament's cooperation could not be abolished without its cooperation. (Marginal note by Van Karnebeek to the effect that a Note could also be presented to parliament). The French were opposed to the British wish that Germany be a party, which was the main reason for the delay. Meeting Fromageot and Hurst unnecessary (cf. No. 221). Once the two governments had reached agreement on the text, the French and British envoys in The Hague could be authorised to act.</p> <p><i>Ditto (waterways)</i>. Administrative and judicial concern with vessels in transit had not been precluded by either the Netherlands-Belgian treaty or the Treaty of Barcelona. The provisions of the transit traffic treaty lacked precision, expressly prohibiting only tax discrimination and differentiation and not the exercise of police powers and of criminal and civil jurisdiction on the waterways by the sovereign state. The Netherlands had consistently rejected Belgium's standpoint, expressed for the first time in 1875, that civil seizure was contrary to the 1839 treaty on the grounds of Art. IX, paragraph 3. Transit traffic defined in the <i>mémoire interprétatif</i> as 'Cesse d'être en cours de route un navire qui charge ou décharge dans les eaux prévues à l'alinéa 1 et avant d'arriver à destination une partie quelconque de sa cargaison ou qui y embarque ou débarque des passagers'. It was a fact that exemption from confiscation ceased when a vessel was no longer in the roadstead but in the port of Flushing, which was not, in the writer's opinion, on the Western Scheldt and its entries from the sea. The territorial jurisdiction in the Danube Convention of 23 July 1923 should also be left intact, with the guarantee that shipping would not be hampered, as laid down in Art. XXXI, paragraph 2. Beucker Andreae summed up as follows: non-attachment provisions should relate solely to the Scheldt itself (and not to the port of Flushing); seizure under writ of attachment of a seagoing vessel should be prohibited (as in the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 582); it was contrary to the interests of water traffic to accost a vessel when in transit on a river situated as was the Scheldt, rather than in the port of departure or arrival; cases of seizure of vessels in transit were rare; exclusion of seizure was not without precedent (treaty between Great Britain and</p>

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229	15.5.1925 from the Netherlands delegation	<p>France of 30 August 1890). The <i>NRC</i> newspaper story about roulette on board the steamboats plying between Ostende and Antwerp was not sufficient proof. There was at the present moment no intention of inspecting vessels on the Scheldt in order to ascertain whether criminal offences were being committed.</p> <p><i>League of Nations (Arms Trade Convention conference)</i>. Conference was still at the preparatory stage. It had been proposed that only governments be permitted to supply arms, and that private persons, with some exceptions, be prohibited from doing so. The Belgian delegation supported the Netherlands proposal that an addition be made to Art. V (as referred to in No. 210). There was disagreement on the point of publication. Should not a convention on the manufacture of arms first ensure the publication of information in that area? Others had raised the point of the freedom or otherwise of exporting countries to issue or refuse licences at will. Sweden, as an exporting country, held different views on the subject from the Netherlands. Lively debates as to whether or not warships should be brought within the purview of the Convention. British-American-Italian-Japanese proposal that warships be removed from the list in Art. 1.2 was adopted, though opposed by France, which had sought to have them included in Art. 1.1; Dutch Navy delegate would not oppose the British initiative.</p>
230	15.5.1925 from De Graaff	<p><i>Turkey (trade agreement)</i>. The Minister objected to forwarding the recommendations received from NEI, as the various points contained in those documents had only been of assistance to him in reaching his final conclusions after he had weighed them with the greatest care. It would cause confusion if these documents were to be consulted without knowledge of the special considerations underlying his decision. He objected to making documents of this nature public outside the circle of the ministry concerned in order to check the judgement of a minister against that of his advisers. An exception had been made in the case of the NEI dispatch of 10 August 1924, because it concerned only a single point, namely the idea, recommended by the Governor-General and rejected by himself, to include <i>casu quo</i> a clause in the treaty concerning appeal to an international court in matters relating to interpretation, with a</p>

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230A	Annex	view to possible difficulties in applying Art. 109 of the government regulations. Draft of document not forwarded.
231	20.5.1925 Van Karnebeek's diary	<i>Vatican</i> . Further to No. 129. Monsignor Schioppa (successor to Monsignor Orsenigo) had paid his first call on Van Karnebeek. All was quiet again after Monsignor Vicentini's actions (see Volume III), largely due to the calm manner in which Monsignor Orsenigo had conducted himself. Van Karnebeek had advised Schioppa to be cautious and to say as little as possible to the press. Schioppa had grasped the point and had not raised the question of precedence. Van Karnebeek had made it clear that it would not be accepted. Any small incident would be enough to reopen the controversy. (See also No. 79).
232	20.5.1925 to De Graeff (Washington)	<i>United States (Bryan arbitration and conciliation treaty)</i> . Further to No. 164. Instructions to request Hughes to take up the matter of the protocol with the Senate (which had not yet expressed its opinion). The abandonment of the protocol could not be defended in the Dutch parliament (which had already approved it).
233	24.5.1925 from the Netherlands delegation	<i>League of Nations (Arms Trade Convention conference)</i> . A 'Central Body' responsible for ensuring that data on imports and exports were published was a difficult point, because the US did not consider itself accountable to a body which, though not actually instituted by the League of Nations, would be controlled by it. The subject had been passed to a small committee for discussion, where it appeared that virtually nobody was in favour of such a 'body'. The 'commission générale' considered that the contracting parties should publish the data themselves. A British proposal (Art. V) that the obligatory examination of suspect shipments in transit be changed to the authority to examine shipments being transported through the territory of a state to a region placed under its sovereignty, jurisdiction or mandate or to a prohibited zone. Turkish amendment designed to prevent abuse and Dutch amendment designed to avoid obligations at variance with existing or projected treaties (the Scheldt treaty). Discussion of the feasibility of supervision and the question of how to act in the case of shipments from countries which were not signatories. Many were opposed to restricting existing powers. The transit arrangement should not allow of interference in

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234	25.5.1925 from De Marees van Swinderen (London)	<p>traffic between the parts of a single state. The Dutch amendment in question resulted in the addition of a new Art. XXIII to the general provisions. Both this and the new British Art. XXIV were referred to the Jurists' Committee.</p> <p><i>Great Britain (extension of arbitration treaty)</i>. Present treaty expired on 12 July and not on 1 June (cf. No. 224). Talk with Sir William Tyrrell, who had no objection to the substitution of the Permanent Court for the Arbitration Court (this being a formality, a technical detail). However, he was utterly opposed to the idea (and evinced no interest in a text) of a treaty which annulled reservations made in the past (= a general and unreserved treaty). If the Foreign Office were to be approached on the subject, this would certainly result in an unsatisfactory correspondence which would be prolonged far beyond 12 July in view of the widely differing views held by the Dominion governments on the point of arbitration and, <i>a fortiori</i>, on compulsory arbitration. Tyrrell advised going no further than the extension of the existing treaty.</p>
235	25.5.1925 from Sussdorff	<p><i>United States (customs attaché)</i>. A customs attaché with a staff of six was to be posted to the legation to ascertain the facts relative to the 'market value' of merchandise exported to the United States from the country to which he was assigned in order to combat fraud and dumping.</p>
235 A	Annex, undated Beucker Andreae, notes	<p>The writer objected to such partly informative, partly inquisitorial police tasks, which were not part of normal diplomatic work and which had consequences for immunity, etc. Other countries had already raised objections. This proposal transferred the examination which the US could require at its frontiers to the country of export, thus enabling it to enforce its measures in a way that was still more obstructive to trade and that could not be prevented by other countries from considerations of sovereignty.</p>
236	29.5.1925 Department League of Nations Affairs, notes	<p><i>League of Nations (Arms Trade Convention: ban on poison gas)</i>. Poison gas not mentioned in the draft. Proposal (two alternative texts) by US. Further suggestions in a report dated 20 May of the Commission Générale (which had not reached a decision) to the Commission Technique Militaire (vice-president Surie). Telegram published in the newspaper <i>NRC</i> of 26 May concerning a proposal by the Polish, British and Italian delegations that a</p>

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237	29.5.1925 from De Graaff	<p>new conference be held on the banning of chemical warfare. German delegate Von Eckhardt had stated 'que l'Allemagne serait prête à signer immédiatement une convention prévoyant l'interdiction de l'usage de la guerre chimique (emploi des gaz toxiques)'. In view of the interest recently evinced in this subject in the Netherlands, should not the Dutch delegation adopt a definite standpoint? The first stage of the activities in Geneva was now at an end; Saturday 6 June named as possible closing date.</p> <p><i>Second General Conference on Geneva Traffic Convention (Ports Convention).</i> In Art. 130 of the government regulations, NEI seaports were divided into ports open and ports closed to general trade. Willing to accede provided that:</p> <p>a) loading and unloading in the closed NEI ports remained the prerogative of native vessels (= rigged in native fashion);</p> <p>b) the arrangement concerning Mecca pilgrims (not to be regarded as immigrants) was not prejudiced;</p> <p>c) the levying of the duty on disembarkation permits to which non-Dutch nationals were liable in accordance with NEI Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees 1916, No. 47, was continued. If these reservations were not accepted NEI would, however reluctantly, be obliged to refrain from acceding.</p>
238	29.5.1925 from Heldring	<p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment).</i> It would be difficult to exaggerate the significance for political relations between the Netherlands and Belgium of the gratification of Belgium's legitimate demands regarding access from the sea to Antwerp. The construction of engineering works financed by the Netherlands might well harm Dutch harbour and traffic interests. Had measures been taken concerning the reciprocity of equal treatment of the flag? The proposed waterway connecting Liège with the Ruhr-Antwerp canal was unfortunate in that the share in the substantial traffic from Liège to the sea and vice versa, which would go through the canalised Meuse, would decrease considerably.</p>
239	30.5.1925 to Heldring	<p><i>Ditto.</i> Reply to No. 238. Arguments refuted. Art. VI, paragraph 5 stipulated that the two countries would come to a further understanding regarding construction costs. It was unclear on what grounds lack of reciprocity in the treatment of the flag could have been construed, as only jointly owned canals and those connecting the Scheldt and the Rhine net-</p>

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240	2.6.1925 to Doude van Troostwijk (Berne/Geneva)	<p>work, which were already governed by the 1839 treaties, were under consideration here. Plans for widening the Zuid-Willemsvaart between Maastricht and Bochtolt could be cancelled should this prove likely to become problematical. The cost arrangement would also be applicable in the case of the Antwerp-Liège canal.</p> <p><i>League of Nations (Arms Trade Convention)</i>. Further to No. 236. British Art. 24. It would be inadvisable to embody arms traffic between parts of the Kingdom in the convention, even if only partially. The Dutch delegation should insist on its amendment. The Dominions had objected to provisions under which the transport of arms to the Dominions would be governed by a regime different from that for the transport of arms between any two convention states. British proposals amended by the Jurists' Committee thus:</p> <p>a. For colonies for which the mother country had acceded, trade with private parties would be governed by the convention only as regards the obligation to publish;</p> <p>b. For colonies for which the mother country had not acceded, the convention would be applicable in its entirety.</p> <p>The League of Nations Affairs Department was prepared to accept this, as all shipments for the armed forces in NEI would then remain outside the convention. Could such a decision be taken without consulting the Colonial Ministry? British proposal acceptable if necessary.</p>
240A	Annex 1 30.5.1925 Department for League of Nations affairs, notes	<p>The difference between the Dutch and British proposals to regulate the arms traffic between the colonies and mother country in the convention. The Dutch delegation advocating to adopt a compromise reached by the Legal Commission, which distinguishes between 1. colonies signed for by the mother country, to which only the statutory obligation to publish details about the private arms traffic will apply, and 2. colonies not signed for by the mother country, the private arms trade of which will remain outside the convention. The department's support for the delegation's recommendation.</p>
241	4.6.1925 to Doude van Troost- wijk (Berne/Geneva)	<p><i>Ditto (poison gas)</i>. Delegation instructed to express its approval of an international, universally applicable ban on the use of poison gas.</p>

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242	4.6.1925 Beucker Andraea, notés	<p><i>Poland (arbitration treaty)</i>. Reasons for not defining the competence of the Permanent Court:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. the Court's workload should not become too heavy;</li> <li>b. obligatory jurisdiction allowed less freedom to refuse;</li> <li>c. one of the main elements of the Geneva Protocol should not be selected for separate treatment; should the Netherlands accede to the Permanent Court Statute, the writer was willing to exchange Notes in which arbitration would be replaced by the jurisdiction of the Court;</li> <li>d. arbitration was preferable in view of the publicity given everything that was handled in the Court;</li> <li>e. the Permanent Court of Arbitration should not be under-utilised.</li> </ul> <p>In regard to the structure of the treaty, Poland preferred a general enumeration, with several exceptions, to the enumeration method of Art 36, Statute. Arbitration and conciliation were to be preferred to jurisdiction because the latter was more apt to disrupt relations between countries.</p>
243	5.6.1925 from Doude van Troostwijk (Berne/Geneva)	<p><i>League of Nations (Arms Trade Convention)</i>. Instructions regarding poison gas contained in No. 241 had been followed. After a lengthy meeting of the conference, preference had been given to a draft protocol yet to be formulated rather than to the two proposals (American and Swiss) under consideration. The Netherlands had voted for the first of the two alternatives. France and Italy had declared that they would sign such a protocol despite Paul-Boncour's doubts 'whether even a binding protocol would prove powerful enough for a state not to act in violation of it if natural suspicions of the enemy made such a step advisable for purposes of self-preservation'.</p>
243 A	Annex 1, undated	Dutch support of Swiss proposal (French text).
243 B	Annex 2, undated	Draft protocol banning poison gas (French text).
244	8.6.1925 from De Graaff	<p><i>League of Nations (NEI members of delegation to Assembly)</i>. The Minister had no objection to NEI members, provided they did not enter into direct correspondence with Van Karnebeek or the NEI government. Internal and external responsibility to be borne only by the leader of the delegation; it was otherwise to be feared that the NEI experts might behave as if they were representing NEI rather than the Netherlands. Disunity in the Dutch delegation</p>

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245	8.6.1925 from Heldring	<p>was to be avoided. Objections of the same nature, though less weighty, to the Governor-General's proposal that a Dutchman (e.g. D.F.W. van Rees) be instructed to forward purely factual information of interest to NEI direct to the NEI government, with which Van Karnebeek had concurred. The unity of the state in international matters should also be formally maintained. False comparison with Great Britain in that it was the crown which held the Empire together, however loose the formal inter-relationship of the separate parts.</p> <p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i>. Apologies for the misconception in No. 238. Where he had written 'reciprocity of treatment of the flag' he had meant 'reciprocity of treatment of <i>traffic</i>', which he considered was not always the case (pilotage dues, free tug service for Rhine barges between Antwerp and Moerdijk).</p> <p>He saw more advantages than disadvantages in the treaty, though business people to whom he had spoken were almost all opposed to it. There was also strong opposition in the Rotterdam Chamber of Commerce because of the economic advantages accruing to Belgium from the extremely costly waterways. If an improved link between Maastricht and Bois-le-Duc was necessary there was no need to approach the Belgians, for the canalised Meuse at Maasbracht or Roermond could be linked up with the Zuid-Willemsvaart at Eindhoven through Dutch territory.</p> <p>After signing the treaty of 3 April 1925, it would be difficult to deny Amsterdam the connection it so badly needed with the upper Rhine.</p> <p>Preferential freight rates on German railways. New concessions to Hamburg and Bremen caused indignation in the Netherlands. French surtaxes d'origine et d'entrepôt. Value of the trade with Strasbourg (mainly articles of tropical origin) would seem to be of greater concern to Amsterdam than to Rotterdam.</p>
246	9.6.1925 to Heldring	<p><i>Ditto</i>. Reply to No. 245. Belgium's claim to sovereign rights the reason for not allowing Belgium to pay all the costs. This would also have strengthened Belgium's hand in future negotiations on the implementation of the treaty. In Van Karnebeek's view, the treaty would not deter Belgium from supporting traffic via Antwerp. The free tug service would die</p>

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247	9.6.1925 to De Graaff	<p>a natural death once the Antwerp-Moerdijk canal was completed (if not earlier, should it prove too onerous for the treasury). It was regrettable that there was so little awareness in the Netherlands of the political significance of the treaty. What would have happened in 1919, when the powers had to be resisted firmly on all political aspects, if the Dutch had also declined to discuss the economic aspects? From the political point of view the situation with regard to the canal to Ruhrort was precisely the same as that of the Scheldt. In order to safeguard Dutch territorial integrity against repeated threats, efforts had been made to arrange matters in such a way that 1) Belgium felt the consequences of the fact that the Scheldt estuary was not Belgian as little as possible, and 2) the Limburg enclave gave as little trouble as possible. Nobody in the Netherlands had objected to the Antwerp-Moerdijk canal at the time.</p> <p><i>Kamaran (quarantine station) and Hejaz (pilgrimage).</i> Résumé of Annex 1.</p>
247A	Annex 1, undated	<p>Report on discussions of the sanitary question held in London from 18 to 23 May. Great Britain wished to prevent all international discussion of the subject and to secure Dutch recognition of the quarantine station at Kamaran. (If Dutch pilgrims were to bypass Kamaran, Great Britain would have no control over their pilgrimage and would lose about half the revenue of the station). The proposals made by Great Britain to the Netherlands were unacceptable because they entailed the pretence of responsibility for control; in addition, the employment of a Dutch doctor in a position of subordination to the British Indian authorities would make an unfortunate impression on the pilgrims.</p> <p>Dutch minimum demands:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The Dutch doctor at Kamaran was to decide independently, in accordance with his instructions from the NEI government, what measures were to be taken for ships arriving direct from NEI. (The administration of such measures would be the responsibility of a civilian station director to be appointed by Great Britain and British India.)</li> <li>2. Annual budget and plan for improvements to be drawn up jointly by British Indian and NEI authorities.</li> <li>3. Supervision of the quarantine to be placed in the hands of an international body, for the promotion of international sanitary interests.</li> </ol>

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247B	Annex 2, undated	Further details of the conference on 19 and 21 May as incorporated in Annex 1.
248	10.6.1925 to Pleyte (Madrid)	<i>Spain (trade agreement)</i> . Most-favoured-nation agreements concluded by Spain with US and Japan. Belgium and Sweden had obtained quite favourable terms. The fact that the Belgian results were not solely attributable to retaliatory measures against Spain was a hopeful sign, as the Netherlands, with its liberal trade policy, did not possess the same economic weapons as Belgium. Spanish oranges and wines were already being treated favourably in the Netherlands.
249	10.6.1925 to Van Swaay	<i>International Convention on the Regulation of Aerial Navigation 1919</i> . The Netherlands had not yet acceded because of objections to Articles 5 (which left the Netherlands free to decide on the entry of foreign aircraft to its air space) and 34 (which ensured the predominance of the five great powers over the other signatories under all circumstances in the international commission). It was hoped that the proposed amendments to the two articles would be followed by the Netherlands' accession. (See Volume II, Nos. 177 and 335, and Volume IV, Nos. 63 and 72).
250	10.6.1925 from Witte to Nederbragt	<i>Argentine (consular agreement)</i> . Up to that time the Netherlands had concluded agreements a) for the colonies of both countries, b) for the Dutch colonies, and c) for the mother countries in Europe and America. No agreements covered both the colonies and the mother country, as those for the colonies were narrower in scope; a combined agreement would therefore be difficult to realise. After the four existing agreements for the mother country (with Spain in 1871, Italy in 1875, Portugal in 1880 and Serbia in 1881), no new agreements of this kind had been concluded. Should Argentine inquire, preference should be expressed for two separate instruments: one – which could be signed immediately – for the colonies, and one for the mother country, on which negotiations could be continued, preferably in conjunction with a trade agreement. The Argentine counterproposal was less acceptable. Two questions: Why no further agreements up to that time? What about Witte's idea for a trade agreement?
250A	Annex 1 [11].6.1925 from Snouck Hur- gronje to Nederbragt	Reply to No. 250-A. Question 1. Better to do nothing that would focus attention on how relatively
250B	Annex 2 12.6.1925 from Nederbragt	Reply to No. 250-A. Question 1. Better to do nothing that would focus attention on how relatively

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	to Snouck Hurgronje	ungenerous the Dutch were in NEI. No particular reason otherwise.
250c	Annex 3 15.6.1925 from Snouck Hurgronje to Van Karnebeek	Question 2. They had themselves suggested the idea of a trade agreement some time ago, in connection with the NEI agreement. No objection to trying it. Inquiry whether the Minister would agree to enter into discussions with the Argentine envoy on the basis of the foregoing. It was considered virtually impossible to proceed further in this matter by correspondence.
250D	Annex 4, undated from Van Karnebeek to Snouck Hurgronje	On no account was a single agreement to be concluded for the kingdom in Europe and the colonies. The possibility of keeping NEI apart – and thus separate – must be held open, notably with a view to Russia, should the question of agreements with that country arise. The minister was less concerned about how the matter would be arranged in Europe and America. (Agreement signed on 3 November 1925, but not debated in the Argentine Congress. New agreement: 6 September 1938).
251	13.6.1925 from Von Schubert to Gevers (Berlin)	<i>Germany (trade agreement)</i> . Enclosure of draft Notes to be exchanged, containing amendments and supplements to the agreement of 31 December 1851. Most-favoured-nation treatment not only for fisheries and agricultural products as in earlier agreement, but for all agricultural and industrial products, without prejudice to reservations (German text).
251 A-B	Annexes 1 and 2, undated	Draft of the Notes to be exchanged as referred to in the foregoing (German text).
252	15.6.1925 to Doude van Troostwijk (Berne)	<i>League of Nations (Arms Trade Convention)</i> . Authorisation to sign if necessitated by willingness of other powers to sign was changed, at the request of the Colonial Ministry, to authorisation to sign if Great Britain, and, in any case, US also signed.
253	(15).6.1925 Beucker Andreae, notes	<i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i> . The non-reciprocity pointed out by Van Eysinga in the <i>Economic and Statistical Bulletin</i> of 27 May 1925 required further analysis. The Dutch flag was not treated as inferior to the Belgian in Art. IV, paragraph 7, in which reference was made to both the Belgian and the Dutch sections of the Antwerp-Moerdijk canal and the Rhine-Meuse-Scheldt canal. The non-reciprocity referred to by Van Eysinga lay in a different sphere (facilities for free or cheap tug services, cf. No. 246) and, with the exception of the Liège-

No.	Date; from/to	Description
254	15.6.1925 from De Graaff	<p>Maastricht canal, was largely attributable to the fact that no Belgian canals were oriented towards the Netherlands and Rotterdam. It should be remembered that the existing tug facilities between Dordrecht and Antwerp were connected with economic relations between Belgium and France.</p> <p>The reciprocity referred to by Van Eysinga could perhaps be achieved by such a clause as 'On the canal connecting the Meuse and the Rhine, the Liège-Maastricht canal and the canals which connect Belgium with the Meuse and the Rhine network, the same privileges regarding tug facilities, etc. shall be accorded to vessels heading for Dutch ports as those accorded to vessels heading for Belgian ports'. This could only be construed as referring to Belgian waterways, which served as connecting routes for traffic between Limburg and Rotterdam, as did the Rhine and Dutch inland waterways for traffic to and from Belgium and the hinterland (the canals between Rhine and Scheldt and a possible Rhine-Meuse-Scheldt trunk canal on Dutch territory).</p> <p>The Netherlands had a claim to free navigation for traffic between France and the Netherlands (passing through Belgian canals) in the same way that Belgium enjoyed his right for traffic between Germany and Belgium (passing through Dutch territory). Belgium was after all in a position to make use of its canals to promote the interests of Antwerp.</p> <p>Concurrence with Heldring's view (cf. No. 245) that improvements to the Zuid-Willemsvaart between Maastricht and Bocholt would be disadvantageous to the Netherlands. According to Art. VII, paragraph 2, the Liège-Maastricht Canal was also to be improved. Which would be the better route, Liège-Maastricht-lateral Meuse canal or Liège-Maastricht-Bocholt-Antwerp?</p>
255	15.6.1925 from Wolff (Berlin)	<p><i>League of Nations (Arms Trade Convention)</i>. Only a ban on weapons, projectiles and substances which caused unnecessary suffering had been adopted at the second Hague peace conference. Had not public opinion been misled by intimidation in the draft protocol on poison gas? Still willing to sign provided US, Great Britain and Japan did. Some observations on Paul-Boncour's speech (cf. No. 243).</p> <p><i>Germany (tariff amending Act of 19 May)</i>. Meant as a transitional tariff to replace that of 1902, which had been repeatedly amended during and after the</p>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
256	19.6.1925 from Heldring	<p>war. Protectionist in character without political undertone. Domestic production to be increased and imports restricted with a view to redressing the extremely passive trade balance and balance of payments. The obligations contracted under the Dawes agreement could only be met from export surpluses. Greece, Austria and Spain had already stipulated lowering of tariffs in their agreements, which Belgium, France, Poland, Italy and other countries were also seeking.</p> <p>The interests of Dutch producers and exporters under great threat by the amending Act. The new, higher import duties would have a price-lowering and obstructive effect on Dutch exports. The Netherlands should link the amendments to the trade agreement (cf. No. 251) to the desired lowering of import duties. The new German tariff had also been prompted by the wish to adjust the duties to the post-war currency devaluation.</p> <p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment).</i> The writer persisted in his objections to the financial sacrifices made by the Netherlands (cf. No. 238), as opposed to Van Karnebeek's view that by its participation, the Netherlands virtually had control of the construction of the canals and was free to offer so little as to prevent it taking place. It would have been better to settle for the status quo if the Netherlands could not press for something better (either no contribution or a fixed one) without having to share sovereignty on the canals and the Scheldt with Belgium.</p> <p>The 'gentlemen from Rotterdam' who had called on him were vehemently opposed to the economic concessions and were particularly apprehensive of the Antwerp-Moerdijk canal, which put Antwerp on the same footing as Rotterdam and would render the Antwerp-Ruhrort canal superfluous. They feared the Belgian efforts to establish a good canal link with Maastricht through the Kempen region which, in conjunction with improvements to the Meuse in South Limburg and between Eysden and Liège, would direct water traffic to and from the Liège region via Antwerp. The Belgians also aimed at a waterway between the Kempen canal and the Meuse of such capacity that the Limburg coal-mining district would become dependent on Antwerp. Under these circumstances the Juliana canal and the canalisation</p>

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257	22.6.1925 to De Marees van Swinderen (London)	of the Meuse were virtually pointless. In regard to <i>German preferential rail freight rates</i> Berlin should be urged to change its attitude. The Dutch Central Bank also intended to use its influence on German credits for the purpose. <i>Great Britain (arbitration treaty)</i> . Further to No. 234. Great Britain's rejection of a more broadly-based treaty disappointing; the extension of the existing treaty (in London) was now the only remaining possibility. Instructions to urge the substitution of the Permanent Court for the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Preference for 1) British initiative and 2) extension by means of an exchange of Notes without the need for ratification.
258	22.6.1925 to Wolff (Berlin)	<i>Germany (customs tariffs)</i> . Discussion of amending Act (cf. No. 255). Lower duties should be obtained on articles for which the proposed duties were higher than the pre-war ones, with a 50% increase, and on agricultural products (flower bulbs) which the Netherlands exported but other countries did not. It would be difficult to grant <i>quid pro quos</i> , and the provision of credit should not be used as a means of coercion. Special items in the German amending Act. Transport via Dutch ports of goods purchased with Dutch credits a possibility. Had import quotas been abolished in the new tariff?
259	23.6.1925 from Beelaerts	<i>Poland (consular immunity and most-favoured-nation status in trade agreement)</i> . One of the alternatives in Annex 2 should be substituted for the statement in Annex 1, otherwise a more comprehensive Polish-Russian agreement would not be ratified by the Polish parliament.
259A	Annex 1, undated from Van Asbeck (Warsau) to Skrzynsky	Note stating that in view of the mutual consular facilities granted by Poland and USSR, the Netherlands renounced the most-favoured-nation status stipulated in Art. XVIII of the trade agreement (already ratified and in force), as long as Poland did not extend these facilities to a third party. (French text).
259B	Annex 2 25.8.1924 from Kozmyski	Poland's wishes explained in greater detail. It would not be enough merely to omit the final part of Annex 1. Alternatives proposed. (French text).
259C	Annex 3 26.6.1925 from Hooft to Beelaerts	Annex 1 had always been felt as a partial sacrifice of the most-favoured-nation principle. The new desiderata were much more comprehensive, and the concept of reciprocity they contained superseded that principle. It was difficult to understand why the

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259D	Annex 4 30.6.1925 from Beelaerts	Polish parliament did not wish to ratify the Polish-Russian consular agreement on the grounds of Annex 1. Enclosure of Annex 5. According to information received from the envoy, the difficulties arising from Art. XVIII of the Polish-Dutch trade agreement had not been fully recognised in Poland.
259E	Annex 5 from Kozmyski	Explanations referred to in No. 259-D, indicating a vicious circle. 'La convention consulaire avec la Russie n'est pas encore ratifiée et ne le sera pas; il n'y a donc pas de privilèges en question et il n'y en aura pas aussi longtemps que les pays intéressés, se basant sur la clause de la nation la plus favorisée, voudraient exiger ces privilèges pour leurs consuls'.
260	26.6.1925 to Tobin	<i>United States (customs attaché)</i> . Refusal of request contained in No. 235: 'Difficile à faire entrer dans le cadre des attributions diplomatiques les devoirs basés sur la section 402 de l'United States Tariff Act 1902'. (Similar replies had been made by Great Britain, France and Sweden).
261	26.6.1925 from Van Swaay	<i>Germany-the Netherlands (waterways, also with regard to Belgian-Dutch 1839 treaties amendment)</i> . Significance of the canal from Aachen to the Meuse lay chiefly in the fact that it would enhance the effect of the Maasbracht-Maastricht canal and of the canalisation of the Meuse and its feeder channels. Germany also had its eye on the Aachen-Rhine canal.
262	29.6.1925 from Beucker Andreae to Van Eysinga	<i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i> . Several points which might require reformulation should be discussed. 1) Assurance of reciprocity in the treatment of traffic (cf. No. 245), possibly to be added to Art. III of the treaty so as to ensure that the Belgian waterways south of Maastricht would be included. (Art. VI, paragraph 7 went further than Art. III); 2) Obstacles placed in the way of the Dutch flag on French canals; 3) Waterways had been declared free, but nothing had been decided about port dues (not even in Antwerp and Ghent); 4) Limitation of Art. IV, paragraph 2, conclusion; and 5) scope of the principle of 'free navigation' (did this not include bridge and lock dues and tolls?).
263	30.6.1925 to Colijn	<i>Belgium (shipping tax)</i> . Enclosure of the two annexes received from the Ministry of Internal Affairs with the request that, if necessary, a protest be lodged against the levying of this company tax or trans-

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263 A	Annex 1 20.3.1925 from the Fishing Board to Ruys de Beerenbrouck	fer duty in Belgium on commercial fishermen and fishtraders. Inquiries should be made about the position of other parties concerned. Request that protest be lodged against this tax on the grounds of Art. 9 of the Dutch-Belgian treaty of 19 April 1839 and the order implementing that treaty of 20 May 1843, Arts. 2 and 16-18.
263 B	Annex 2 1.4.1925 Ditto	Underlining of the standpoint expressed in Annex 1. Inquiries had revealed that Dutch fishermen and fish traders not resident in Belgium were liable to taxation there in many cases in which Belgian fishermen and fish traders not resident in the Netherlands were not liable in the Netherlands. This was therefore one of the cases where exemption was called for, consequent upon international agreements. It should be noted that Arts. 1 and 16 of the 1843 regulations stipulated equal treatment for 'the residents of both countries'.
264	30.6.1925 from Belgian legation	<i>China.</i> Opinion asked on Chinese wish that extra-territorial rights be abolished, imposed treaties be reviewed, joint courts abolished, leased territory and concessions returned, and customs tariffs freed (cf. No. 270 below). The Netherlands had always advocated the immediate implementation of the treaty and resolutions of Washington. A meeting of the tariff conference and the committee on extra-territorial rights should be called at an early date.
265	30.6.1925 from Van Son (Warsaw)	<i>Poland - Germany.</i> Coal crisis in Poland and Upper Silesia now that Germany's obligation to purchase 500,000 tons, assumed three years previously, had expired (this figure had been reduced by Berlin to 100,000 tons when Poland refused to conclude a trade agreement conferring most-favoured-nation status and to end the liquidation of German property in western Poland). Talk with Polish minister Skrzyzsky about the possibility of the Netherlands purchasing a certain quantity, partly to put pressure on Germany (source of half of Dutch coal imports). Skrzyzsky favoured the idea, and had mentioned the greatly reduced rail freight rates for the transport of coal from Upper Silesia to Danzig.
266	30.6.1925 from Van der Plas (Jeddah)	<i>British policy in Hejaz.</i> (Cf. No. 247). Great Britain sought to establish a protectorate in the Hejaz. The efforts of other consuls to get London to act in the matter of the capitulations and the estates of deceased pilgrims had failed. Nor was Great Britain pre-

No.	Date; from/to	Description
267	[30.6.1925] from Van Rees	<p>pared to take joint action against the slave trade. Position strengthened by the disappearance of the obstructionist Hussein, who had assumed control of the quarantine and had not recognised Kamaran. Ibn Saud was an anglophile bound by a treaty, and Ali was not in a position to oppose Great Britain. Prospects for an international station were therefore not favourable.</p> <p><i>League of Nations (Japanese mandate over the Mapia or David Islands)</i>. The Netherlands had not exercised sovereignty over these former dependencies of Tidore for many years. They had been given to Spain by arbitral award of Pope Leo XIII in 1885, transferred to Germany in 1899, and placed under the mandate of the Emperor of Japan after the war. On the map accompanying the latest annual report for 1923 submitted to the League of Nations by Japan, the borders of the mandated territory in the south east ran from longitude 140° East to approximately latitude 2.5° North. If that were the case, the Mapia Island would lie outside Japan's authority, which did not necessarily mean that Netherlands sovereignty over the islands would not be disputed (cf. Series B, Volume V, Nos. 282, 338 and 338-A (Incident with Spain in 1897)).</p>
268	1.7.1925 from Van Vredenburg (Brussels)	<p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i>. Talks with Ramaix and Van de Vijvere about how the great powers could be moved to act more expeditiously in this matter. Consultations between the Netherlands and Belgium on separate but similar steps to be taken by each. In view of the campaign against the treaty being conducted in certain quarters in the Netherlands, it would be better if it were not adopted before the Belgian parliament went into recess and if the debates did not proceed too smoothly (which could create the impression that the opposition had sized all the advantages). The Belgians agreed. Van de Vijvere saw no danger of the treaty being rejected in Belgium. De Ramaix was less sure, as the revision had been embarked upon with annexionist ideas and with the declared aim of acquiring Belgian sovereignty over the Scheldt (fine plans which had come to nothing). Van de Vijvere's view was probably the correct one.</p>
269	2.7.1925 from De Ligne	<p><i>Ditto</i>. Belgian Note on the step designed to expedite the handling of the matter by the guarantee powers in the spirit indicated at the beginning of No. 268.</p>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
270	2.7.1925 from Koung Sian	<p>(‘Inopportun que les ministres néerlandais et belge se présentent ensemble au Quai d’Orsay et au Foreign Office, ce qui donnerait trop de solennité à la démarche, mais il serait bon qu’ils agissent de concert le même jour’).</p> <p><i>China (traffic conference)</i>. Note containing Chinese desiderata already brought to the notice of the Netherlands by Belgium in No. 264 (French text).</p>
271	2.7.1925 from De Marees van Swinderen (London)	<p><i>Great Britain (arbitration treaty)</i>. Further to No. 257. Great Britain had undertaken to dispatch the extension Note at a sufficiently early date to ensure that the continued existence of the Netherlands-British arbitration arrangement would not be endangered. Some delay was possible, as the Dominions had to be consulted on the substitution of the Permanent Court for the Court of Arbitration. Great Britain did not recognise the mandatory competence of the Permanent Court. A compromise for each case to be submitted to the Court would remain necessary.</p>
272	4.7.1925 to Gevers (Berlin)	<p><i>Germany (trade agreement)</i>. Instructions concerning No. 251.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. On the whole satisfaction with the draft exchange of Notes.</li> <li>2. The word ‘Änderung’ should be deleted and ‘Zusatzabkommen’ remain unaltered, as the 1851 treaty, as amended in 1923, remained in force.</li> <li>3. The import and export restrictions should be included in section 2, A1.1.</li> <li>4. Further details to be requested on the ‘besondere Fälle’</li> <li>5. Point out that the desired declaration of tariff specifications was incorporated in the Anglo-German trade agreement of 2 December 1924.</li> <li>6. Attention to be drawn to the illogical formulation of the ratification article.</li> <li>7. ‘Niederländische Kolonien’ to be amended to ‘Ost-Indien, Suriname und Curaçao’.</li> <li>8. No steps to be taken concerning the above points which could put the arrangement at risk.</li> </ol> <p>The exchange of Notes should be in both languages.</p>
273	7.7.1925 from Marling to Beelaerts	<p><i>China (tariffs conference)</i>. Dangers of Chinese situation would be diminished if a joint declaration could forthwith be made publicly by nine powers signatory to Washington China treaties, indicating their readiness to expedite the tariff conference and warning Chinese factions of consequences if present</p>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
274	7.7.1925 from Röell (Peking)	<p>agitation should make meeting of conference impossible. Did the Netherlands approve? (cf. No. 264).</p> <p><i>Ditto.</i> The British endeavoured to delay the publication and notification of the Chinese of the sanctions decided upon by the diplomatic corps following the Shanghai riots (cf. No. 101). They underestimated the explosive nature of the situation there. If the diplomatic corps were not to have the last word, Great Britain should be left to negotiate an arrangement alone.</p>
275	7.7.1925 from Van Eysinga to Hines	<p><i>France (surtaxes d'origine et d'entrepôt).</i> In response to queries by Hines, who was making a tour on behalf of the League of Nations, Van Eysinga emphasized the disastrous effects of the post-war legislation introduced by France in Alsace-Lorraine on Rhine traffic proceeding from Dutch ports. For instance, certain advantages attached to goods delivered in Strasbourg via Nantes.</p>
276	7.7.1925 Minutes of 30th Meeting of Trade Treaties Review Committee	<p><i>League of Nations (Ports Convention).</i> Had it not been drawn up in good faith? Discrimination by Italy, Poland (Dantzig) and Great Britain, which seemed unlikely to end.</p> <p><i>Preferential rail freight rates in Germany.</i> Hines' visit was mentioned; he had been sent by the League to ascertain what possibilities were offered by the Rhine and the Danube and what possibilities were denied (preferential rail freight rates and 'Wasserumschlagstarife'). Rotterdam Chamber of Commerce: preferential rail freight rates of prime importance, and only when that question had been settled should attention be turned to Rhine navigation. Nederbragt stated that there were still a great many preferential tariffs for German ports (primarily Hamburg; Bremen and Stettin were less important); a relatively small number of these had been allocated to Belgium and, of these, an even smaller number to the Netherlands. It was believed in Germany that improvement was only in the interests of the railways, and not of the Netherlands in general.</p> <p>The question arose whether the Netherlands could not obtain what Belgium already had (and might acquire in addition). Nederbragt's view was that the Netherlands should not make use of Belgium. It could scarcely be demanded of that country that it press for full equality of treatment for the benefit of the Dutch. Van Lier disagreed. 'Wasserumschlags-</p>

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277	8.7.1925 from Chamberlain to De Marees van Swinderen (London)	tarife' should be kept separate. The Netherlands only had cheap money (as a means of coercion). Holding believed that Germany would yield on all points only if the Dutch Central bank were to refuse credits. <i>Great Britain, France (surtaxes d'origine et d'entrepôt)</i> . Explanation in a Note in English, which Van Karnebeek considered once again to focus too heavily on the differentiation regarding transport on the Rhine to Alsace from Dutch and Belgian ports, disregarding the wider Netherlands view and taking no account of the fact that Dutch imports via France and the Rhine were to be accorded the same treatment as imports via other routes.
278	9.7.1925 from Marling	<i>China (tariffs conference)</i> . Note, in English, containing brief analysis of the situation in China. The Netherlands' opinion and suggestions for handling the matter requested (Canton, Yangtze Valley and North China).
279	9.7.1925 to Van Son (Warsaw)	<i>Poland - Germany</i> . Further points concerning coal to be purchased in Poland by the Netherlands (cf. No. 265). Van Beuningen (Director, Steenkolenhandelmaatschappij (Coal Trading Company) Rotterdam) had stated that the longer distance to be covered probably rendered coal imports from Poland economically impossible for the Netherlands. Willing to adopt a cooperative attitude should it appear feasible after calculation of the cost price.
280	10.7.1925 from Marling	<i>China (tariffs conference)</i> . Note in English concerning the early convocation of a conference at which, by agreement between China and the nine powers, certain economic measures should be adopted for the benefit of China as a whole. Agitation now proceeding pregnant with graver possibilities than the mere disintegration of responsible authority (= to extort forcibly the unconditional abandonment of the rights and obligations conferred upon them by the present treaties).
281	[13.7.1925] from the Netherlands delegation	<i>1919 Paris Convention on the Regulation of Aerial Navigation</i> . Report on Copenhagen conference held 16-18 June 1925. Compromise reached on Art. 5. Still slight difference of opinion on Art. 34 (majority should always include at least three specific states). Decision that the operator of an air service between two places in two different countries would require permits from both countries.

No.	Date; from/to	Description
282	14.7.1925 from Gevers (Berlin)	<i>Germany (trade agreement)</i> . Instructions contained in No. 272 had been carried out. Germany had concurred with virtually all the Dutch desiderata, but was averse to the inclusion of a declaration as in the German-British treaty of 1924 (seen as evidence of unfounded mistrust).
283	16.7.1925 from Beelaerts	<i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i> . London had stated that the Fromageot-Hurst draft constituted the treaty to be accepted by the Netherlands and Belgium. In the text received from De Marcilly 'assent' had been translated by 'donnent leur assentiment'. Van Karnebeek would prefer 'prennent note'. Van Karnebeek had informed Marling and De Marcilly that the copy received from London took very little account of the last discussions. A completely different text should be drawn up. A 'national committee' was being formed in the Netherlands to agitate against the treaty.
284	16.7.1925 from Kellogg to Van Asch van Wijk	<i>United States (Bryan arbitration and conciliation treaty)</i> . Further to Nos. 164 and 232. 'Secretary of State finds himself unable to recommend to the President that he authorize the signing of the proposed protocol'. Incorporation of 'the Senate' (which had been omitted in error by the Netherlands legation in Washington (= 'the United States Senate' instead of 'the United States')).
285	18.7.1925 from Van de Sande Bakhuyzen (Budapest)	<i>Persia (diplomatic service and economic development)</i> . A reconnaissance tour on the instructions of Van Karnebeek. Consultations with Ministers of Finance, Public Works and Trade. Contact with many Persian merchants. Journey to Caspian provinces to learn something of the tea culture, for which a Dutch expert was sought. Substantial political changes as the government became aware of its independence of the two dominating neighbours (Russia and Great Britain). Strong recommendation that the Netherlands legation in Teheran be reopened; protection of Dutch interests (first by an Italian and later by an American, Smith Murray) unsatisfactory (e.g. the State Department in Washington unwilling to undertake 'enforcement of claims for and against Dutch subjects'). The Persian government regarded consular officials as merely promoters of trade who required the intermediary of a diplomatic representative in their contacts with the authorities. A Dutch consul would have opportunities for finding employment for Dutch experts (state and private plan-

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285 A	Annex 1 2.1.1926 from Nederbragt to Snouck Hurgronje	<p>tations, road construction, urban development and malaria control). Participation in opening up of Persia's resources would require much patience and hard work. The volume of trade was still modest, though it had increased quite substantially between 1917 and 1924. It was recommended that the legation be reopened for a three-year trial period, after which it could be decided whether the results justified continuation. A detailed plan of recommended measures would be submitted shortly.</p> <p>Objection to the appointment of a career consul in Teheran (economic interests insufficient to justify such a step). Good honorary consul there. Therefore appointment only if political reasons for posting a career consul-general with the title of envoy.</p>
285 B	Annex 2 11.1.1926 from Beelaerts to Snouck Hurgronje	<p>There were no sufficient <i>political</i> reasons for appointing an 'envoy' to compensate for the lack of <i>economic</i> reasons, yet there was a political aspect to the question. Persia was not unimportant as a lookout post now that agitation was increasing in Asia. Honorary consuls had no status whatsoever in the East. Persia had a new regime under Reza Khan, so the moment for accrediting an envoy was particularly favourable. It would increase opportunities for gaining a share in the development of the country.</p>
286	20.7.1925 to Oudendijk (Peking)	<p><i>China (tariffs conference)</i>. This was provided for in Art. 2 of the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington. Efforts should be made to achieve results from which a genuine improvement in the situation in China could be expected. To this end, account should be taken both of what had been pledged to China in the past and of what was necessary to safeguard the interests of aliens against injustice and arbitrary acts. The greatest possible restraint should be practised regarding intervention in China's internal affairs, combined with recognition, in the widest sense of the word, of China's administrative inviolability. The increased tariffs already agreed in Washington were to be permitted without attaching any restrictions to China's absolute sovereignty. Likin issue not to be reopened because of rejection on principle of renewed interference with China's laws and furthermore because the central government had little authority in the provinces. How the additional income was to be spent should be left to the government in Peking to decide. The envoy was to participate in joint consultations (with Chinese representatives) on measures to safeguard the funds from the un-</p>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
287	21.7.1925 to De Marees van Swinderen (London)	<p>principled practises of the warlords in the interior. The 9th resolution of Washington regarding the unification of the railways should be borne in mind as a means of shielding the Chinese network from unlawful military action.</p> <p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i>. Surprise and disappointment at the Hurst-Fromageot draft treaty. The renewed regulation of Netherlands-Belgian relations in a treaty with other powers was an unworkable basis (cf. No. 283). Envoy instructed to inform London that in the opinion of the Netherlands and Belgium, the most practical way to arrive at agreement on the form which the abrogation of the 1839 treaties was to take would be to arrange a meeting of representatives of the foreign ministries of the powers concerned. The draft justified doubt as to whether the results of the consultations in the Commission of XIV had been properly taken into account, and gave the impression of being based on a false conception of relations between the Netherlands and other powers. It was deemed unwise to defer the matter beyond September. Instructions to make clear to the senior officials at the Foreign Office that the draft was rejected because scarcely a single point was acceptable to the Netherlands and Belgium. The tone, however, was to be such as to avoid giving offence, which could endanger agreement. Belgium had instructed its ambassador along the same lines and France had been informed.</p>
287 A	Annex 25.7.1925	<p>English text of the Fromageot-Hurst draft of treaty replacing the treaties of 1839.</p>
288	22.7.1925 from the Provincial Executive of Zeeland to Van Swaay	<p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i>. Recommendations (made at the request of the minister) concerning the treaty of 3 April 1925. Nothing against the revocation of Belgian neutrality, provided it was not contrary to the rules of international law as laid down in a treaty or in some other way. The deletion of Art. XIV of the 1839 treaty was less acceptable: grave financial and other consequences could ensue from allowing Antwerp the possibility of becoming a naval port. An exception had been made in Art. 1 regarding warships, but on the other hand nothing had been regulated for Belgian warships in times of war and peace in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill. It was feared that the Netherlands could become involved</p>

in international incidents and, in order to be prepared for such a calamity, the necessary military measures should be taken immediately on the Dutch side of the Western Scheldt.

Concern that the provisions in Art. II of the treaty might give cause for complaints about polluted discharges.

Objection to Art. IV, paragraph 1, which exempted both foreign and Dutch vessels in transit from the jurisdiction of the Netherlands administrative and judicial authorities. Objections of a material nature to the demand (Art. IV, paragraph 2) that the Western Scheldt and its entries were at all times to be maintained at a standard of navigability fully consistent with both advances in shipbuilding and the growing needs of shipping. Moreover, decisions on the necessity for and nature of engineering operations to be carried out were in the hands of a commission composed partly of foreigners, even those relating to operations on Dutch territory financed by the Dutch treasury. All this was made more complex by the meandering course of the Scheldt, while the accepted expenditure would benefit foreigners. Criticism of the powers of the control commission provided for in Art. IV, paragraph 3, worked out in greater detail. The commission was, for instance, in no way required to take into consideration the bank protection of the polder and water authority districts situated along this sea-arm. Objections on constitutional grounds to the blunt decreeing that regulations of the national authorities should not run counter to the orders and regulations of the commission, with a chairman designated by the King of Denmark or Spain as chief arbitrator. Art. IV, paragraph 9, and notably the final paragraph, singled out for criticism, namely that pilotage dues from Antwerp to the open sea were not to exceed those from the open sea to Rotterdam and vice versa. It was expected that Art. IV, paragraph 11 would prove harmful to Dutch mussel fishing, and it would furthermore be inadvisable to rent stretches of the Eastern Scheldt to Belgian mussel fishers. The imperative mood used in connection with the construction of canals through Walcheren and South Beveland (Art. IV, paragraph 2) should be altered to allow for consultation.

It was feared that the new canals referred to in Art.

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289	22.7.1925 from Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce	<p>VI would have a negative effect on Dutch trade in general and that of Rotterdam in particular, while valuable ground would have to be sacrificed for their construction. Sacrifices demanded by the progress of technology would increase rather than decrease.</p> <p>It would not be impossible for one of the two contracting parties to give undue preference to its own barge skippers.</p> <p>Concern that Terneuzen would decline as no provision had been made for improving its situation.</p> <p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment).</i> The importance of resolving existing differences was sufficient reason for making sacrifices to maintain the navigability of the Western Scheldt and to improve the waterway from the Liège district to Antwerp. But too many sacrifices were unacceptable, as were cooperation on and the provision of land for the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) The Ruhrort-Antwerp canal which, because of the periodically recurring low water levels of the Rhine, constituted a not insubstantial threat that traffic from the Ruhr would proceed to Antwerp rather than to Dutch seaports.</li> <li>2) The canal between Antwerp and the Moerdijk, which constituted a direct threat to the transport of goods to Dutch seaports. These threats were even more serious in the light of the possibilities of the canals being constructed by Germany as part of the war reparations.</li> <li>3) The widening of the canals through Walcheren and South Beveland (while the Antwerp-Moerdijk canal had already been agreed upon).</li> <li>4. The commitment that the Terneuzen canal would at all times meet the requirements of shipping.</li> </ol> <p>In addition, there were other objections to the treaty's strong bias in Belgium's favour without <i>quid pro quos</i> having been agreed in such areas as Dutch rail and telephone connections with France, and without there being any possibility of preventing the special promotion of Belgian interests (free tug service Dordrecht-Antwerp; favourable pilotage dues for Antwerp).</p> <p>Other economic disadvantages proceeding from the treaty:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The widening, as laid down in Art. VII, paragraph 1, of the Zuid-Willemsvaart from Maastricht</li> </ol>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
		<p>to Neeroeteren and Bocholt respectively, even though the desired improvement between Antwerp and Liège could have been effected quite adequately via the Juliana canal (between Maastricht and Maasbracht), and further between Maasbracht and Neeroeteren via the canal provided for in Section 3, paragraph 3.</p> <p>2. The payment of the costs (maintenance and improvement) for the Scheldt estuary (regarded by the Chamber as a blank promissory note without an expiry date).</p> <p>3. Possible consequences of the arbitration procedure. Doubtful whether an understanding of the specific nature of Dutch water control problems could be expected from the kings of Spain and Denmark (cf. No. 288).</p> <p>It was feared that far from removing causes of friction, new grounds for perennial disputes would be created. Ways should be found of effecting the most essential amendments (cf. No. 256).</p>
290	24.7.1925 to Van Swaay	<p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i>. In order to meet the various objections raised, the Netherlands and Belgian governments would need to arrive at an arrangement regarding the maintenance costs of the Scheldt, taking account of what both sides considered reasonable. The sum Belgium itself had spent over the last five years on the maintenance of the Dutch Scheldt could serve as a basis. Present criticism was prompted largely by the fear that maintenance would be considerably more expensive in the future than it had been up to that time. In that case the maintenance costs over the last five years, doubled for a period of ten years, could be taken as a reasonable maximum.</p>
291	27.7.1925 from Stambaugh	<p><i>China (tariffs conference)</i>. Assessment of the situation. Instructions in English for the American delegation in Peking. (Further to No. 286).</p>
292	27.7.1925 from De Marees van Swinderen (London)	<p><i>Great Britain (arbitration treaty)</i>. (Further to No. 271). The promised Note on the extension had been delayed in London because of difficulties caused by one of the Dominions. The Dominions also had their obligations towards foreign powers, and the Netherlands' willingness to accept the British rejection of a more broadly-based treaty merited greater appreciation of the wish to avoid a vacuum (after 15 July 1925). Report of the exchange could be expected in a few days' time (it ultimately took place on 30 July).</p>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
293	28.7.1925 from Beelaerts to Van Vredenburg (Brussels)	<i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i> . Talk with De Ruelle about the utter unacceptability of the collective treaty (Fromageot-Hurst), which would bring the Netherlands and Belgium under the guardianship of the powers. The Dutch and Belgian representatives to be instructed to press for the exchange of Notes (cf. Nos. 188, 205, etc.).
294	28.7.1925 from Gevers (Berlin)	<i>Germany (trade agreement)</i> . Further to No. 272. German offer ('Der gegenwärtige Zustand bezüglich der noch auf den Verbotlisten stehenden Waren soll nicht zum Nachteil des Handels des anderen Vertragsteils geändert werden') insufficient and implied that the Netherlands tacitly accepted the situation as it was. This could only be the case if Germany either allocated higher annual quotas for coal or (if that did not prove feasible) pursued the same tacit consent policy vis-à-vis the Netherlands as towards Great Britain, while also taking into account the arrangements in force since before the war regarding the red lead industry, liqueurs and bones. There seemed little likelihood that all the Dutch desiderata would be met.
294A	Annex 4.8.1925 from Hooft	Comments. The Dutch had come a good deal further (no new import or export bans, at most the maintenance of several old ones in addition to lists A and B). The Germans were somewhat annoyed that the Netherlands' suspicions had not been allayed by Von Schubert's assurance that the German government did not intend undermining the most-favoured-nation status by introducing tariff specifications (cf. No. 175). Meanwhile Germany was actively discriminating in Belgium's favour. The Netherlands should stand firm, especially in view of the attitude of the Ministry of Agriculture, which was virtually only interested in <i>this</i> point.
295	31.7.1925 from Beelaerts	<i>China (tariffs conference)</i> . The British envoy had called on the writer. Several other countries besides the Netherlands had reservations about the form of the communication to be addressed to China (cf. No. 286). Marling had requested Dutch approval of making the events in Shanghai the subject of a judicial inquiry (in order to avoid an immediate decision in the dispute between the Shanghai Municipal Council and the diplomatic corps). Beelaerts had objected that the Municipal Council, backed by the British Consul-General, would consider its position strengthened by the proposal. It was essential that

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296	4.8.1925 to Gevers (Berlin)	<p>the diplomatic corps keep the upper hand in its relations with these usually extremely short-sighted merchants. Sir Charles agreed; the judicial inquiry would probably be even less favourable to Shanghai than the corps' inquiry. France and Japan already shared the British view. It had been decided that the Netherlands would await further information from London before sending instructions to Peking.</p> <p><i>Germany (trade agreement)</i>. Further instructions. A review of the situation at that moment, based on the contents of Nos. 272 and 294. Technical observations on each article in turn (white lead, liqueurs, bones, trees, plants, etc.). Von Schubert's statement, referred to in Nos. 272 and 294-A, accepted, but it was to be pointed out that the trade agreement between Germany and Belgium had caused some disquiet concerning the question whether the lowering of tariffs for various articles specified by the latter country would also be applicable to similar commodities of Dutch origin.</p>
297	4.8.1925 De Ruelle to Beelaerts	<p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i>. Note in French stating that, at Van Vredenburg's request, the documents (instructions, letters to be presented and explanatory arguments) had been sent to the Belgian representatives in London and Paris, Moncheur and De Gaiffier. The 'arguments' (Annex 3) were for the personal information of the representatives, who had been instructed to prepare the ground unofficially ('nous ferons le reste à La Haye'). The British would probably offer some resistance.</p>
297A	Annex 1 30.7.1925 from Van der Velde Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to De Gaiffier (Paris) and Moncheur (London)	<p>Instructions in the spirit referred to in No. 287. French text.</p>
297B	Annex 2, undated	<p>The letters to be presented by De Gaiffier and Moncheur in Paris and London. French text, largely in the spirit of No. 287.</p>
297C	Annex 3, undated	<p>Belgian 'Observations concernant le projet de Traité Franco-Britannique, destiné à remplacer les traités de 1839'. Detailed reasons in the spirit of No. 287, the <i>Leitmotiv</i> being that the 1839 treaties had become null and void when Belgium's neutrality was violated in 1914 (French text).</p>
298	4.8.1925	<p><i>Ditto</i>. Instructions carried out as also given to De</p>

No.	Date; from/to	Description
299	from Loudon (Paris) to Briand 4.8.1925 from Van Weede (Vienna)	Marees van Swinderen in No. 287 (French text).  <i>Religious persecution (XIVth Zionist Congress in Vienna)</i> . The envoy inquired how he should answer an invitation by the secretariat of the Congress to attend the opening, as he had doubts whether it would be opportune to accept. It was an awkward time for such a meeting. Most members of the government had gone on holiday, thus evading the issue of the Congress, which was unpopular in Vienna and perceptibly agitating public opinion. Van Karnebeek authorised the envoy to decline the invitation on private grounds if he deemed his appearance at the opening inopportune.
300	5.8.1925 to Oudendijk (Peking)	<i>China (tariffs conference)</i> . Further to No. 295. Authorisation to participate in the discussions on the basis of the British proposal 'dans un esprit de conciliation, mais en tenant compte qu'en principe le gouvernement Néerlandais peut se raillier au projet de note Britannique auxquels se sont aussi ralliés les gouvernements de Belgique, France, Espagne, Italie et Japon'.  Reference to the independent line taken by the US (cf. No. 291). Instructions to report should it prove a serious obstacle to reaching agreement.
301	6.8.1925 from Van Son (Warsaw)	<i>Poland</i> . Comprehensive measures pending, aimed at blocking the fraudulent import of German goods (mainly from Czechoslovakia and Germany itself), regardless of their country of origin. The entire quota from Germany would thus be stopped, and Dutch merchants would be unable to take the place of Germany in Poland. The Dutch quota had already been inordinately small in 1924. Every effort should be made to bring about the modification of these measures.
302	7.8.1925 from Snouck Hurgronje	<i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment; arbitration treaty)</i> . Van de Velde would perhaps be willing to conclude a general arbitration treaty with the Netherlands as he aimed to do with France, Great Britain and Germany. What was the minister's opinion? Van Karnebeek had intended raising the question in the previous autumn; Hymans had not been interested at the time. Enclosure of annex.
302A	Annex (3.8.1925) from Van Vredenburg (Brussels) to Snouck Hurgronje	De Ruelle's inquiry whether the treaty of 3 April would be approved by the States-General difficult to answer. Fairly strong opposition had been expressed in some papers. De Ruelle had no objection to a mo-

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303	7.8.1925 from De Marees van Swinderen (London)	<p>re specific interpretation of the treaty, notably in regard to the <i>casus belli</i> declaration, as De Marees van Swinderen (in accordance with Art. X of the convention on the rights and obligations of neutrals in time of war) saw no need for a declaration of war in the event of territory being violated but only for armed resistance. Once the attacker had been repulsed, a state of neutrality would again obtain. De Ruelle suggested a text along these lines. Should the Scheldt become hopelessly silted up, De Ruelle did not believe an arbitrator would require the Netherlands to keep the navigation channel open. He was willing to make concessions on the Terneuzen issue in the hope that the Netherlands would exert pressure on the railways which, after all, would also be in Belgium's interests.</p> <p><i>Ditto.</i> (collective treaty or exchange of Notes with powers). The writer had carried out the instructions in No. 287. His Note was not identical with that of the Belgians, as more freedom had been allowed him in its wording. His aim had been to avoid the sharper tone used by the Belgians so as not to cause friction.</p> <p>His impression was that the Fromageot-Hurst draft had been deliberately drawn up in its present form, the British view being that the great powers had acquired rights in 1839 which should not now be relinquished. It was obvious that the Belgian 'Observations' (cf. No. 297-C) would attribute the termination of the 1839 treaty to the violation of their neutrality in 1914; the Netherlands did not wish to be involved in this question. He and Moncheur intended each explaining separately the objections of the Netherlands and Belgian governments in the coming week. He expected a request from Villiers, with which he would not comply, to put these objections in writing. Attention should remain focused on the discussions in The Hague. He was afraid that the Anglo-French draft treaty would die hard, even if only as a guideline for the conference.</p>
303A	Annex [7.8.1925] from De Marees van Swinderen to Chamberlain	Note, as instructed in No. 287 and as referred to above (English text).
304	7.8.1925 from De Marees van Swinderen	<i>Ditto.</i> Further to No. 303. Had Van Karnebeek had a talk with Hurst (difficult to plumb or to see through and always retreating behind 'I have only to

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305	12.8.1925 to Koolen and Bongaerts	<p>follow my instructions') when he had been in The Hague for the Institute recently? The writer was increasingly afraid that Great Britain would cling more obstinately to the powers' right of participation than he had originally expected. There was no point in wasting ammunition on London. No progress made in the question of the royal visit (cf. No. 158). The King displayed little interest.</p> <p><i>League of Nations (Ports Convention)</i>. Art. XII was obviously meant to create opportunities for discrimination. The Netherlands reservation designed not to practice discrimination but to be armed against others was considered unnecessary by Van Karnebeek. If the Netherlands were to sign without reservations, this would not be prejudicial to its right to take other reprisals. The reservation could create the impression that the Netherlands had revised its liberal trade policy.</p>
306	12.8.1925 to Van Son (Warsaw)	<p><i>Poland (import restrictions)</i>. Further to No. 301. The measures were considered fatal for trade and contrary to the terms of the Dutch-Polish trade agreement. Instructions to do what seemed indicated. Would it be possible to act together with the British representative?</p>
307	13.8.1925 from De Marees van Swinderen (London)	<p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i>. The writer's first detailed talk alone with Villiers, head of the Western Europe department of the Foreign Office. Rejection of Dutch standpoint in Nos. 287 and 303-A. Conference at The Hague had some chance of success only if preceded by a written exposition of views, followed by a meeting of the Dutch, Belgian, French and British experts present in Geneva to try to reach agreement, or in any case to understand each other's objections before going to The Hague. The writer was prepared to accept this <i>ad referendum</i> without expecting much from it. Villiers had denied that the British government would consider a further conference unnecessary if agreement were not reached. What exactly were the Dutch objections? To which the writer had replied, 'See Note'. Villiers had stated that guardianship was inevitable if the great powers were categorically to refuse relinquishment of the rights acquired in 1839. He said there was a world of difference between the Dutch and Belgian view on the one hand and that of the powers on the other (he rejected the Belgian view concerning the termination of the 1839 treaties).</p>

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308	14.8.1925 from Sweerts de Landas Wyborgh (Helsingfors)	<p>The writer thought that Van Karnebeek would also hesitate to subscribe to it. However, this had been the central point of the talk between Moncheur and Villiers a few days before, (and at which Hurst, his assistant Malkin and Fromageot had also been present). Villiers believed that the treaty of 3 April would be rejected in the Netherlands.</p> <p><i>League of Nations (Geneva Protocol)</i>. Meeting at Helsingfors of the Norwegian Interparliamentary Union to discuss the position to be taken by the Scandinavian countries and Finland. Enthusiasm for Benes' protocol had considerably cooled, and many were more in favour of tackling disarmament problems (Stauning, Lykke). Vague final resolution calling for general compulsory arbitration and an international plan for general arms reduction, having due regard to stated positions.</p>
309	18.8.1925 from Thorbecke (Berlin)	<p><i>Germany (trade agreement)</i>. Talk with Vissering about his satisfactory discussions with Stresemann and Von Siemens (trade negotiations on the basis of reciprocal tariff concessions as soon as possible). Minister Neuhaus probably thinking in broader terms than specific Dutch-German relations. Instructions requested: <i>first</i> most-favoured-nation status, including import and export restrictions and specifications, and <i>then</i> the lowering of tariffs; or should the different aspects, including preferential rail freight rates, be handled en bloc?</p>
310	19.8.1925 from Röell (Peking)	<p><i>China (tariffs conference)</i>. Note of 18 August from Chinese government to Washington treaty powers requesting tariff increases and sympathetic treatment of tariff autonomy. A maximum tariff of 35% on luxury articles did not imply protectionist inclinations on the part of the Chinese.</p>
311	22.8.1925 from Van Welderen Rengers (Constantinople)	<p><i>Turkey (trade agreement)</i>. Willingness to accept lowest tariffs on reciprocal basis. Objections to most-favoured-nation clause, which was difficult to extend to third parties in view of the frontier traffic arrangement between Turkey and Persia.</p>
312	24.8.1925 to Colijn	<p><i>China (tariffs conference)</i>. The forthcoming discussions would be of importance to NEI. Oudendijk appointed Dutch representative. Request that he be joined by De Kat Angelino (ex-delegate to Washington conference and a capable man with a sound grasp of eastern affairs).</p>

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313	25.8.1925 from François to Limburg	<i>League of Nations (Sixth Assembly)</i> . Talk with Van Karnebeek about agenda. The minister would not go to Geneva as a delegate, but would perhaps spend several days there to meet other statesmen. He was against increasing the number of seats in the Council. Would the report of the Jurists' Committee be sent back for further discussion?
314	26.8.1925 Van Karnebeek's diary	<i>China (tariffs conference and League of Nations)</i> . Chargé d'affaires Koung Sian had explained No. 312 to Van Karnebeek, who had confirmed that the invitation to attend the conference had been accepted by the Netherlands. Koung Sian requested Dutch support for China's membership of the League of Nations Council. There were so many candidates for this seat that the Netherlands was unable to give any undertaking, but could only take cognizance of such requests.
315	26.8.1925 from Van Son (Warsaw)	<i>Poland (import restrictions)</i> . Further to No. 306. The writer had obtained the assurance that permits would be granted for further quotas if the quota for 1924 and the first months of 1925 had been exceeded by Dutch importers. Polish buyers were unable to obtain exchange owing to Poland's financial difficulties. The purchase of Polish sugar to the value of approximately Fl. 2,000,000 by the Polish Consul-General in Amsterdam, Bückmann, for the Centrale Suikermaatschappij (Central Sugar Company) had eased the situation and had favourably influenced the Polish decision regarding permits. A 20% reduction on sleepers would probably be granted to the railways.
316	28.8.1925 from Briand to De Vos van Steenwijk	<i>Belgian question (collective treaty or exchange of Notes with the powers)</i> . Reply to No. 298, on the lines of Villiers' suggestion in No. 307: first presentation of objections in writing, followed by meeting of experts in Geneva and, finally, meeting in The Hague (French text).
317	29.8.1925 to De Graeff (Washington)	<i>China (tariffs conference)</i> . Further to No. 314 and preceding documents. Identical telegram from the representatives of the nine powers in Peking regarding the powers to be granted the participants. 'Pleins pouvoirs' would be necessary in Van Karnebeek's opinion. De Graeff was instructed to contact the American government about the formulation (added in a footnote to the English text).
318	30.8.1925 from Van Rees	<i>League of Nations (Mandates Commission's report on temporary Slavery Commission)</i> . Objections to

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(Mandates Commission) to François		<p>sub-section 112 on page 13 of the Commission's report, proposing 'That it be recommended that the regulation applicable to B and C mandates likewise be applicable in all colonial territories, which regulation states that no compulsory services may be required of the natives other than those instituted by the Authorities for necessary public works and public services, and then only for fair wages', on the following grounds:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. the proposal was neither justified nor explained in the observations which preceded it;</li> <li>2. the Commission should not be allowed the right to concern itself with legal forms of taxation, of which corvée was still one in many colonial territories;</li> <li>3. the Commission should refrain from making recommendations on matters of which it in fact knew nothing;</li> <li>4. where there were abuses, these should not be represented as veiled forms of slavery;</li> <li>5. it was by no means the Commission's task implicitly to express disapproval of the policy of colonial governments concerning compulsory labour in territories where the regulation on the B and C mandates was not applicable.</li> </ol>
319	31.8.1925 from De Marees van Swinderen (London)	<p><i>Belgian question (1839 treaties amendment)</i>. Enclosure of annex. The writer had asked Villiers whether the 'if' in line 8 indicated his government's intention to make participation in the conference in The Hague dependent on the Netherlands government's concurrence with the two proposals in the annex. Reply: this was correct, in that the whole matter would have to be reviewed should the Netherlands government refuse. The envoy, being without instructions, had refrained from comment.</p>
319A	Annex 1 29.8.1925 from Villiers to De Marees van Swinderen	<p>Note in English proposing</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. statement of objections in writing and</li> <li>2. meeting of experts at the League of Nations Assembly to precede the conference of negotiations in The Hague.</li> </ol>
319B	Annex 2 3.9.1925 François, note	<p>Notes on the principal objections to the Anglo-French collective treaty.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 'Assent' contrary to Belgian-Dutch views on relations with the powers.</li> <li>2. There was no real point in a collective treaty after the abandonment of Belgian neutrality and further guarantees. The guarantees of 1839 were based on</li> </ol>

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the founding of the new Belgian state on which agreement first had to be reached with the Netherlands.

3. Treaty of 3 April 1925 placed almost all the collective burdens on the Netherlands, whereas the former neutrality guarantee and 'Antwerp only a commercial port' clause were to the advantage of the Netherlands.

4. It was not compatible with the Laroche draft on which the Netherlands should have been able to count.

5. The form was not correct in regard to Germany, Austria and Hungary. Even if they were to be excluded, their endorsement should have been made possible (cf. Art. 31, Treaty of Versailles) (which would then have been a matter for Belgium and the Netherlands themselves).