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allo

de Buitenlandse  
Zaken  
Tel. med. Meij de Niet,  
is bij de Minister geweest,  
kan gedeponeerd worden  
29/3-63

MINISTERIE VAN  
BUIENLANDSE ZAKEN  
BEGROEVEN  
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Onderwerp: *dr*  
Aantal: 527070  
Tijdsduur: weken

27 112  
F2000/63

Met Uur Minister

371/168

Canberra, 14 februari 1963

Onderwerp: Ontwikkelingen in  
West Nieuw Guinea.

Voor de Minister  
*[Handwritten initials]*

Peter Hastings, de uit vorige rapportage bekende redacteur van "The Bulletin" (Sydney) heeft recentelijk twee weken in West Nieuw Guinea doorgebracht en beschrijft zijn ervaringen in een drie-tal artikelen in de "Daily Telegraph" (Sydney), waarvan de knipsels in vouwe dezes worden opgezonden.

Over de UNTEA schrijft Hastings: "it takes itself and its own utterances with preposterous seriousness. In the administration buildings few have the faintest idea what New Guinea and its people are really like".

Op het lagere niveau, "where UNTEA at least uses experts" ontmoette de schrijver "the attitude of completely justified cynicism: They know that UNTEA is the officially approved agency of a world sell-out, that it has neither the intention nor the capacity to maintain the Dutch-Indonesian Agreement".

Hastings hoorde en zag veel over botsingen tussen Indonesiërs en Papoea's, meestal naar aanleiding van de Papoea-vlag, doch de administrateur, dr. Abdoh, vertelde hem "blandly" dat dergelijke voervallen niet als incidenten worden beschouwd.

Onder de Indonesiërs in West Nieuw Guinea nam Hastings over het algemeen een grote teleurstelling waar over netgeen zij aldaar hadden aangetroffen: "there are quite a few who will freely admit that they had not realised the island's poverty, the primitiveness of its people, the lack of communications, the appalling magnitude and difficulty of the task that has been thrust on them".

Als gevolg zullen er niet veel Indonesische "top level administrators" lang aanblijven schrijft Hastings "and the number of applications for return home after May has proved an embarrassment".

Van het gezag van UNTEA over de Indonesische instanties in West Nieuw Guinea heeft de schrijver een bijzonder slechte indruk gekregen: "Neither Indonesia's diplomatic

Aan Zijne Excellentie  
de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken  
te den-GRAVENHAGE

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mission in Hollandia, its civil servants preparing for the take-over nor its Army personnel pay anything but the merest lip service to UNTEA."

Vervolgens neemt Hastings de thans reeds aangevangen Indonesische indoctrinatie van de Papoea's onder de loupe: door middel van speciale scholen, zwarte lijsten van non-coöperatieve Papoea's, ransel-partijen door Indonesische troepen, "and, not least, through what is loosely termed 'cultural' exchanges".

Er blijkt onder het Indonesische leger-personeel een diepe minachting te bestaan voor de Pakistaanse troepen. Volgens Hastings niet geheel zonder reden: "It is not an impressive body of men, and its shambling drill, halting discipline, and poor equipment are the subject of endlessly malicious jokes throughout the island - much as that may pain its commander, General Khan."

Ook onder de Papoea's heeft Hastings het oor te luisteren gelegd. Het voor 1969 toegezegde plebiscite was voor een van zijn zeglieden een zeer belangrijk punt: "The world will see that we get it, Australia will see that we get it, for Australia has promised self-government to East New Guinea. Our brothers in East New Guinea will see that we get it."

Hastings voegt hieraan toe dat hij het hart niet had "to tell him I thought Australia would no more help his people at this stage than it had during the crisis preceding the Dutch surrender".

Zich o.m. baserend op gesprekken met Indonesische functionarissen in Hollandia komt Hastings tot de overtuiging dat "learning to live with Indonesia - like learning to interpret their ambiguous statements - is going to be awkward and difficult".

In de eerste plaats is er het grote gevaar - zij het op langere termijn - van de penetratie der besmettelijke ziekten, voor mens, dier en plant, uit Indonesië in West Nieuw Guinea en vandaar in het oostelijk gedeelte en tenslotte in Australië zelf.

Beer actuele moeilijkheden dreigen van Indonesië's groeiende belangstelling voor Australisch Nieuw Guinea. "Indonesians in Hollandia want to establish a mission in Port Moresby and facilities for the exchange of personnel on technical and developmental problems affecting both sides."

Voorlopig is deze belangstelling begrijpelijk, aldus Hastings, doch men weet niet waartoe zij op den duur kan leiden.

De Indonesische propaganda zal zich ongetwijfeld over het Oostelijk gedeelte van het eiland uitbreiden, met als hoofdthema: "that there  $\angle$  advantages in belonging to  $\angle$  are

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
a great nation of 100 million people and that brown skins are common from northern Sumatra to New Britain."

In de laatste alinea's van zijn slotartikel doet Hastings o.m. de volgende suggesties om zich te wapenen tegen een dergelijke subtiele indoctrinatie:

1. meer geld besteden aan de ontwikkeling van Oost Nieuw Guinea;
2. Duidelijk maken aan Indonesië en de Australische bondgenoten dat Oost Nieuw Guinea ook is "a vital and strategic area of national interest over which we will not submit to intimidation and subversion".

Hastings besluit met een vermaning aan de Australische regering om haar vitale belangen eens en vooral duidelijk voor de wereld te poneren: "The slightest hesitation on our part to commit ourselves to a positive policy will be ruthlessly and skilfully exploited."

DE AMBASSADEUR,



J.G. de Beus.

# U.N. "Operation sellout" in New Guinea

OUTWARDLY Hollandia, the West New Guinea capital, seems much the same as before despite a war of sorts, wholesale Dutch evacuation, a Pakistani security force, Indonesian military occupation and the United Nations Temporary Executive Administration.

The town remains a sort of tropical parody of Monte Carlo; a surprisingly extensive collection of overgrown gardens, red roofs and concrete block homes, schools, shops and bitumen roads which meander around the foothills of the brooding Cyclops Mountains and straggle along the foreshores of one of the world's really spectacular harbors.

But, of course it has changed—irrevocably and implacably.

From the flagpoles in the courtyards of the Administration block and the Administrator's palace, a huge blue and white UN flag hangs limply; to the right of each and a little below droops the red and white flag of Indonesia.

The most remarkable change apart from abandoned housing projects, is the absence of the Dutch. The West New Guinea telephone directory whose 178 pages once listed the names of officials, organisations, clubs and restaurants for Hollandia, Merakke, Sorong, Manokwari and Biak is now a directory of the dead.

## OWN LIST

It is useless and UNTEA issues its own telephone list.

Those listed in the old directory would find their offices occupied by UNTEA officials and their homes by secretaries from Brisbane, information officers from New York, or assorted experts from London, Bagdad and Surabaya.

A few Dutch remain either as UNTEA officials or as businessmen in the dismal process of liquidating the best of their commercial interests or disposing of the remains of their depleted stocks.

Up on steep Juliana Way the flags of Australia, Indonesia, and Holland fly over government missions accredited to UNTEA. The Dutch mission is winding up the last Dutch interests in the islands—mostly tedious matters of repatriation claims and pensions.

The few who remain will leave before the Indonesians take over in May. Some will come here to Australia; the rest will go to Holland, dreading overcrowded Europe, job competition and the dreary winters.

Apart from the Indonesians who seem everywhere—Army personnel in jungle green, laughing Air Force officers careering around in jeeps, attractive Javanese schoolteachers, and numerous civilian administrators—the most exotic thing in West New

Guinea today is UNTEA which proudly proclaims that it is carrying out the first dry run as a United Nations government in a transition area.

The administrator is a Persian, Dr. Abdoh, a former foreign minister of Iran who supervised the Cameroons plebiscite.

The chief of police is a canny Scot who until last year ran Ghana's police force.

The Director of Internal Services, on whom the vital field and district services depend, is an Englishman

who ended a distinguished Malayan career as political adviser to the Sultan of Johore.

A Burmese is District Commissioner, Hollandia. A New Zealander with 25 years' experience in Borneo is D.C. Biak. Yet another Englishman is D.C. Manokwari.

An Egyptian runs the information services, and a Russian—darkly hinted to have portraits of Lenin and Krushchev over his desk—is director of Public Works.

All heads of departments and District Commissioners have Indonesian deputies who for the most part are able and efficient officers.

On the top level UNTEA takes itself and its own utterances with preposterous seriousness.

In the administration buildings few have the faintest idea what New Guinea and its people are really like.

Even fewer have the slightest interest in their jobs apart from the fact that they are receiving double salaries and will before the end of May, they pray, be repatriated.

Could one ever forget the American at Biak who said, with bated breath, that he had travelled half a day inland and actually seen women "so primitive that they wore nothing from the waist up"?

At the actual level of political operation in Hollandia in the districts and in villages where UNTEA at least uses experts, the attitude is one of completely justified cynicism.

They know that UNTEA is the officially approved agency of a world sell-out: that it has neither the intention nor the capacity to maintain the Dutch Indonesian Agreement.

They know that the police force is Indonesianised already in the lower

ranks, and that the Indonesian Army runs the island while laughing at the Pakistan Security Force.

They also know that the Papuans have neither the means nor capacity to voice what resistance they may have.

Until the takeover Holland and Indonesia are sharing the budget. Expenditure is at about the same rate as under the Dutch, and UNTEA has managed to halt unemployment by reactivating various projects throughout the territory—for example, the timber mill and shipyards at Manokwari, the rubber and rice projects at Merauke—thus re-

But even though there will probably be enough beer and goods in the shops until May, passions still run high throughout the island.

Most of the incidents that have occurred on the island have been over the flag—either Papuan or Indonesian. About 18 months ago the Dutch gave the Papuans their own flag—even in today's world a curiously forlorn symbol—but the effects were unexpected.

Papuans all over the island cherished it and identified themselves with it.

In Hollandia and other New Guinea towns more daring Papuan youths wear it sewn to the back of their multi-colored shirts, or tack it to the handlebars of their bicycles. Some even hang it outside their homes.

Pro-Indonesian Papuans wear the Indonesian flag or the parachutists' green beret, or an Indonesian Air Force badge. Some wear Garuda Airways emblems.

Fights ensue and heads are broken. More serious in Indonesian eyes are attempts by Papuans to cut down Indonesian flags.

Under the Agreement—a word you hear a lot of in West New Guinea—the Indonesian flag may fly only in officially designated places.

Actually, pro-Indonesian villages, fly rows of them and anti-Indonesian

youths will cut them down at night. Indonesian soldiers then take the offenders up into the hills and thrash them with bicycle chairs as a lesson.

If the youths bring charges, the Indonesianised police force doesn't listen. Even if the complaint sticks there is little chance of identifying assailants or getting justice. Beatings occur all over the island, but UNTEA prefers not to know about them.

## 'ONLY ONE'

When I called on Dr. Abdoh, who sits high on the hillside above Hollandia in the former Governor's palace, I asked him if there had been many incidents.

Only one, he explained gravely, when two Dutchmen had been shot at Sorong, plus, he added, a little trouble in Merauke in November.

"What about the beatings?" I asked.

"We do not regard those as incidents," he replied blandly.

Later, in another part of the island, I related this incident to a witty and irreverent Indonesian, who laughed delightedly and said: "Pure UNTEASE, my dear fellow. A new language for 1963."

**NEXT: Passive and bewildered Papuans.**

## by PETER HASTINGS Editor of *The Bulletin*

⊙ This is the first of three articles on West New Guinea which the Indonesians have been in the process of taking over from the Dutch for the last five months. Mr. Hastings has just spent two weeks in the area.

storing some measure of confidence among the Papuans of the towns.

Mostly these are an urbanised proletariat, who existed in Dutch times on high labor rates, with which they paid for their beer, their sharp clothes, household goods, and motor scooters.

# Sadly Papuans learn to play ball

"WE did not exactly expect Paradise when we came here," an Indonesian official said grimly in Biak, West New Guinea, "but we didn't expect hell either."

It is understandable that after the beauties of Java and the delights of Djakarta, Indonesians should find West New Guinea just about rock bottom, but significant that so many were taken in by their own propaganda.

Even among the top class of Indonesian administrators who have been sent or enlisted for service in West New Guinea there are quite a few who will freely admit that they had not realised the island's poverty, the primitiveness of its people, the lack of communications, the appalling magnitude and difficulty of the task that has been thrust on them.

Top level administrators are not expected to stay after the official Indonesian takeover in May, and the number of applications for return home after May has proved an embarrassment.

Many of them, in fact, went to West New Guinea for the money. Even though Djakarta holds between 20 and 30 per cent of their salaries — as a "voluntary" gesture — a double salary on a hard currency is nothing to sneer at in a country as short of foreign exchange as Indonesia.

Many Indonesians are saving up to 70 per cent of their salary. They get foreign friends to change the Dutch New Guinea guilders in which they are paid to U.S. 100-dollar bills which can be smuggled through Customs on their return.

## SAVING

"I can save enough to live for a whole year in Djakarta," one told me.

"And if you are caught?" I asked.

"Then the Customs officer will take half. He has to live, too, and that is increasingly hard in Indonesia. We are all doing it."

However, one should not be misled about Indonesian determination to succeed in their mission in West New Guinea.

"How I miss Djakarta," a Garuda Airways official said to me. "I haven't seen a decent looking woman in months." Then, hardening, "However, it is my duty to be here. This is our country now, and don't you Australians forget it."

No one is allowed to forget it—the U.N. Temporary Executive Administration, the Papuans, the Pakistani Security Force or Australians.

For all that Indonesians find West New Guinea last, loneliest and unloveliest of their possessions, they regard it with feelings ranging somewhere between horror and missionary fervor.

After all these years of struggle with the Dutch, culminating in a ruinously expensive arms build up, they have Irian Barat and they mean to keep it even though the territory cannot legally become theirs except by an "act of self-determination" to be held before 1969.

Neither Indonesia's diplomatic mission in Hollandia, its civil servants preparing for the takeover, nor its Army personnel pay anything but the merest lip service to UNTEA.

Indonesian civil and military planes come and go throughout the territory at will.

There is no proper Customs or immigration procedure. Papuans who are willing — perhaps even those who aren't—are carried off to Djakarta and other Indonesian centres for indoctrination without any reference to the nominal government of the island.

It is impossible for UNTEA—no matter what its denials—to say with any certainty what elements of the Indonesian Army occupy the island or where.

If the UN Administrator, Dr. Abdon, demands a court martial of a member of the Indonesian irregular forces—as he did after the shooting of two Dutchmen at Sorong—the soldiers are repatriated under the Agreement for trial in their own country.

He cannot know for sure what action is taken, or even for sure whether the soldiers have even left the island.

Any measures taken by UNTEA in the political administration of the island are easily subverted by the Indonesian Army.

There is intense, undisguised Indonesian political activity on all levels by means of special indoctrination schools for Papuans and those Indo-Europeans who remained after the Dutch left, through police blacklisting of Papuans who won't play ball, by means of organising phony Papuan demonstrations in favor of an immediate and permanent Indonesian takeover, through Army beatings and, not least, through what is loosely termed "cultural" exchanges.

There are entertainment groups all over the island, which are airlifted in and out by the Indonesian Air Force.

I stood at the airport at Manokwari — surely the loveliest town in the whole of New Guinea—watching a heavily laden Air Force Dakota prepare for take off.

Smiling Air Force majors drank bottles of Coke and cracked jokes with Indonesian girls with mandolins.

A voluptuous singer made the rounds of the officers making her farewells while Papuans with side levers, fancy shirts and snap-brim straw hats loaded musical instruments on board the plane.

A small Papuan boy sobbed bitterly because his father was leaving for Djakarta. Another boy wearing a green Army beret and sporting a Garuda badge on his shirt watched the scene delightedly.

No one asked for passports or travel documents. Except for the Indonesian air control officer, UNTEA was nowhere to be seen.

"It happens all the time," a nationalist Papuan told me back in Hollandia. "Nothing can be done about it. Those who want to go just go, and no questions asked."

## by PETER HASTINGS

• The second of three articles on West New Guinea by the editor of *The Bulletin* who has just spent two weeks in the area.

"What happens to them in Djakarta?"

"They are taught to be anti-Papuan, that is, pro-Indonesian."

"How is this done?"

"They are told they belong to a nation of 100 million people, that they have no future outside Indonesia if they want jobs, money and promotion. If that fails there are always beautiful women and lots of liquor."

Pressure is applied all the time and in various ways but never without calculation. When, for example, Indonesia's Army Chief of Staff, Jani, arrived on Blak he carried with him his own guard of honor of Indonesian soldiers.

The Pakistanis were ignored.

The island's District Commissioner, representing the U.N. government of West New Guinea, was not even told of his arrival.

Later he was invited to a cocktail party in honor of Jani where he duly arrived, but not before his car was held up and Indonesian soldiers asked him for his credentials.

The Indonesian Army has an equal contempt for the Pakistani Security Force, which is not entirely undeserved. It is not an impressive body of men, and its shambling drill, halting discipline, and poor equipment are the subject of endlessly malicious jokes throughout the island — much as that may pain its commander, General Khan.

The Pakistanis are equipped with antiquated 303s, compared with the wicked-looking Israeli and Czech automatics carried by the Indonesians.

The future of the Papuan under Indonesia is anybody's guess. Most of the elite, the former "dynamic few," have jumped on the Indonesian bandwagon in a rush for patronage, jobs and profitable deals.

## WAITING

The 200,000 or so semi-sophisticated Malay-speaking peoples of the coastal areas are merely waiting and watching.

Many of them are buying consumer goods against the shortage that will come with the official takeover in May.

The primitive peoples of the interior, more than half the population, simply do not count in anybody's political calculations.

It is no longer easy to talk to Papuans, even to those with whom I have corresponded over several years.

A former prominent member of the New Guinea Council ran slap into me in a hotel corridor. With a wry smile and an expressive shrug of the shoulders he brushed past me. A day later his name, together with those of two other Papuans whom I had known, appeared at the bottom of a Malay language leaflet calling for a pro-Indonesian demonstration.

Radio broadcasts of a demonstration were cut out by 1000 Papuans. A cynical European counted 250 lethargic marchers, and later told me that the Indonesian Army officer who organised the "spontaneous mass parade of Hollandia workers" rang up the supervisors demanding to know why the parade was 10 minutes late getting started.

Papuans who do talk are unintentionally pathetic. One whom I met late at night at a friend's house in Blak said that there were several underground organisations working against Indonesia throughout the island and that members were conducting "secret psychological warfare."

"What do you mean by that?"

"We have members who go into the bush and tell the tribespeople that the Indonesians are liars, that when the takeover comes and we go on to rupiahs we will have no money (this is true enough) and that they want to rob us of their promise of self-determination."

## PLEBISCITE

"We ask them to tell their children not to believe Indonesian schoolteachers. We tell them that this is the new colonialism, the new imperialism."

"Yes, but what is your ultimate objective? What future can you have outside of Indonesia now?"

"The plebiscite," he said passionately, "we must accept Indonesia outwardly but reject it inwardly. When the plebiscite comes we will vote for Papua Barat not Indonesia."

"How do you know there will be a plebiscite?"

"It's in the Agreement. The world will see that we get it. Australia will see that we get it, for Australia has promised self-determination to East New Guinea. Our brothers in East New Guinea will see that we get it."

I hadn't the heart to tell him that I thought Australia would no more help his people at this stage than it had during the crisis preceding the Dutch surrender.

Most of all I avoided saying that his monumental contempt for UNTEA was sufficient comment in itself on the UN being able, let alone willing, to insist on a plebiscite when and if the time came.

I did suggest, as tactfully as possible, that it was entirely possible, despite his feelings, that both he and his people might eventually be better off under Indonesia, that they would at least belong to something, that their future lay in co-operation and hard work.

This he would not accept at any price. I then added that I felt sure that if he and his friends continued their activities after the takeover in May they would risk imprisonment or worse.

"Our names are already known," he replied. "We are being watched. We have had warnings..." he finished his sentence by drawing his hand across his throat.

It wasn't until some days after our meeting that I learned, with amused relief, that he was one of a group considering a higher training course in Djakarta. He wasn't a cynic—merely a good little man trying to make up his mind about a highly uncertain future.

• NEXT: Indonesia and East New Guinea.

# Strong line is needed on East New Guinea

"YOU Australians must learn to live with us," a senior Indonesian official told me in Hollandia the day I left. "You must learn to overcome your suspicions of us."

Far below us Humboldt Bay glittered in the mid-morning sun. "We understand your suspicion, even your resentment, over the West Irian affair, but you should remember that our two peoples live in the same part of the world, that we have common interests and even, I believe, a common enemy — Red China."

He stirred his coffee reflectively. "I often think," he continued, "that the West New Guinea affair was a blessing in disguise. Our two countries now understand one another in a way that was impossible while the Dutch stood between us."

Learning to live with Indonesia—like learning to interpret ambiguous statements such as those above—is going to be awkward and difficult.

Current practical aspects of having Indonesia as a neighbor in West New Guinea are already awkward.

On the west coast, in the swampy Asmat area, Indonesian paratroops introduced a particularly virulent strain of cholera

which spread slowly up and down the coast and inland through the rivers and streams. Of 1000 cases reported there have been nearly 800 deaths, which is something in the nature of a world record.

At Pirmapoen — a tiny west coast centre in the Rockefeller search in 1961 — despite inoculation of the entire village population of 250, I was told that there were 16 cases and 20 deaths.

Despite prompt action by doctors of the United Nations Temporary Executive Administration (and Australian help with helicopters) the disease is still thought to be spreading and almost bound in the future to make its appearance in East New Guinea where a large-scale border inoculation campaign has been undertaken.

## THREAT

Apart from human diseases Indonesia has about 51 animal diseases and 44 plant diseases unknown to the island of New Guinea. Some of them are extremely serious and include foot and mouth disease, rabies, glanders, trichinosis and Newcastle's (poultry) disease.

Foot and mouth disease must pose a grave threat to the Australian cattle industry owing to the difficulties of imposing quarantine. Of plant diseases prevalent in Indonesia and so far unknown to New Guinea, five attack bananas, rubber, rice, coffee and cocoa.

Even given Indonesian quarantine co-operation many of these diseases must eventually make their way into New Guinea and some of them into Australia.

These are merely long-term practical problems. Greater problems remain in the political field.

At this stage, with a deteriorating internal economy, a "confrontation" with Malaya over Brunei boiling into a major diplomatic and semi-military campaign, all Indonesia wants in West New Guinea is to consolidate its position and fix the eyes of the West Papuan elite firmly on Djakarta.

The Indonesians' present desire is to co-operate with us in East New Guinea.

They are also naturally curious about our side of the island, and it is difficult to find an Indonesian in West New Guinea who does not wish to visit East New Guinea. It is hard to see how they can be prevented. Garuda Airways has already established a weekly service be-



## by PETER HASTINGS

This is the last of three articles by the editor of *The Bulletin* who has spent two weeks in West New Guinea.

tween Hollandia and Lae. Indonesians in Hollandia want to establish a mission in Port Moresby and facilities for the exchange of personnel on technical and developmental problems affecting both sides. They also want to learn about East New Guinea's economic potential (which they know is far greater than that of West New Guinea), its communications, and its people.

They are also interested in political development on our side and some are sceptical of its rate of development.

In all of these things they display a lively and, at this stage, scarcely sinister interest. From their own point of view such interest is both natural and justified.

"After all," an Indonesian said to me, "you Australians showed a very lively interest in an Indonesian territory (West New Guinea) for years and years. You even tried to prevent us getting it back. You must not complain if we are interested in your side."

East New Guinea is worked into a number of little jokes, some subtle, some on the level of schoolboy humor.

When Major Bambang (the paratrooper who made a daring midnight jump over Merauke) was laughingly asked by an Australian if he would like to visit East New Guinea some day he replied with equal good humor that he fully intended to—"in the first wave of paratroopers."

Jokes range all the way from, "Now we're here you'll really have to get a move on with your self-determination plans," to "West Irian is the end. It'll be even worse if we have to take over your side as well."

### SENSITIVE

To read too much into this sort of thing is fatally easy. To ignore implications for the future would be folly. Indonesians now regard themselves as members of a great nation with a stake in the Pacific area.

They are acutely aware that their country lacks skills, technicians and efficient management. They are sensitive to criticism and condescension. Individually they will complain of Soekarno, worry about the Communist Party, denounce corruption in the Army, bemoan that one of the world's richest countries is heading for economic collapse.

Others will list the tremendous economic problems waiting to be tackled in the home islands, then point to a map of West

Irian and shrug their shoulders in comic despair.

But all of this can be extremely misleading. Scratch an Indonesian of almost any political complexion and you find a nationalist. Indonesians are consumed by a ruthless and restless dynamic, set loose at the end of 400 years of colonialism, which in the final count, despite civil war and internal disorder, will hold them together.

They regard themselves as a big nation in the big time of world power politics.

What can we expect from them as neighbors sharing a common border?

We can expect that they will set about incorporating West New Guinea without delay into the Republic by means of language, education and political indoctrination. They will seek money from whatever sources are available to maintain at least the standard of development set by the Dutch. They will certainly develop the main towns and continue with the rice, rubber and timber projects.

They will almost certainly start beaming radio propaganda from West New Guinea to East New Guinea purporting to show that West Papuans are as happy as larks.

Other propaganda will subtly convey two messages—that there are advantages in belonging to a great nation of 100 million people and that brown skins are common from northern Sumatra to New Britain.

They, and sophisticated West Papuans, will take a continuing and informed interest in political development in East New Guinea. They know that when independence really starts to take shape in East New Guinea it will include much that is anti-white and anti-Australian.

Indoctrinated West Papuans will undoubtedly be true to the "sacred principles of anti-colonialism" and offer help and aid to their embattled brothers on the other side.

Those who fear armed aggression from Indonesia in the ordinary course of events are, I think, both pessimistic and naive. If there is ever a struggle between us over New Guinea it will be fought in the now familiar terms of anti-colonialism, propaganda and subversion—a struggle for the allegiance of the emerging East New Guineans.

What can we do about

this? The answer is plenty. We can start spending far more money in New Guinea. The present yearly budget of £123 million is a pittance.

We can hasten not only the rate of material and welfare development but that of education and political responsibility. We can make it worthwhile for new investors to come into the Territory and for old investors to remain by offering reasonable guarantees.

We can accelerate the building of air strips, roads and communications.

Above all, we can make it crystal clear both to Indonesia and to "our great and powerful allies" that we regard East New Guinea not only as a trust to be developed but also as a vital and strategic area of national interest over which we will not submit to intimidation and subversion.

### GOODWILL

This should be conveyed to our allies with maximum force. We have already had one experience of what happened when our allies doubted where we stood.

We should not be dismayed by events. We have several things in our favor.

Indonesians still have a reservoir of goodwill towards us—a legacy from our stand over their bid for independence—even though they regard us as having been incomprehensibly stupid in our support of the Dutch.

They also think of us as part of the area, as part of Asia, not as transient European colonialists.

We should not be led into a fearful overestimation of their military power based on Russian equipment which will become obsolete.

Neither should we overestimate the support they enjoy among "our Asia" who show signs of becoming fed up with them. And we should not dismiss the possibility that the present expansionist dynamic may—with a change in leadership—turn inward and deal with domestic problems.

Above all, we must state our own vital interests. The slightest hesitation on our part to commit ourselves to a positive policy will be ruthlessly and skillfully exploited. If that should happen we would have no one to blame but ourselves.