Comments on Salim Said's paper

Ali Budiardjo

Prepared for the International Seminar of the Huygens Institute of Netherlands History and The Royal Society of Historians of the Netherlands

27-29 March 1996 at The Hague, The Netherlands

Salim's paper is full of inconsistencies, lack of evidence and misquotations. Following is a criticism of some of the most salient points of his paper.

1. Said Salim starts by stating that there was 'consensual leadership' during the Indonesian revolution, 'in which the military and civilian leadership played the dominant role' (page 2). With this rather incomprehensible statement Said Salim apparently wants to picture a leadership during the revolution, equally divided between the government and the army. This is not a true picture. The army under the leadership of General Sudirman had indeed very often its own opinion about the policy of the Republic, which was not concurrent with the policy of the government. However, at crucial moments, when the government had made its decision, General Sudirman loyally adhered to it. Example: A truce agreement was reached on 7 October 1946, to pave the way for the 'Linggajati' negotiations to start. Furthermore, the 'Renville Agreement' of January 1948, which among else stipulated that the Republican troops had to be withdrawn from Dutch occupied territories, was dutifully carried out. Page 22 of chapter II of Purbo Suwondo's paper The genesis of the Indonesian army and some political implications, presented to the seminar gives more examples of how government decisions were loyally executed by the army. The group of ex-Peta officers who wrote this chapter conclude: '... the facts from history do not sustain any proof of TNI's "opposition" against legitimate (non political party politics) Government policy, and the idea of "politicization" by the Army's command is only the result of misunderstanding among some external elements from the TNI who have not sufficiently delft into "resource persons" who have actually taken part in, or witnessed the growth of the TNI' (chapter I, 22).

2. Said Salim mentions that the Indonesian army 'spontaneously emerged in the early days following the proclamation of independence' (page 2). He refers in his note to this statement a.o. to A. H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas I Kenangan masa muda (Jakarta 1982) 32. A copy of this page in its original form is attached. It does not deal at all with the subject.

3. Said Salim further mentions the 'hesitancy of the political elite to create a defence force in the early days following the Proclamation of Independence' (page 3). This statement is refuted by the facts: on 23 August, only six days after the Proclamation, the BKR was established (Nugroho Notosusanto, The 'Peta' army during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia (Jakarta 1977) 172-173, as quoted on page 17, chapter II of Purbo Suwondo's paper ; B.R. O'Gorman Anderson, Java in a time of revolution (Ithaca N.Y.-London 1972) 102). This act was followed by Soekarno's decision on 5 October to change the BKR into TKR and to assign Urip Sumohardjo, ex officer of the KNIL to establish the Indonesian defence force, which became the TNI (Anderson, Java 232, and Indonesian sources mentioned there). Sudirman was elected on 12 November as 'Panglima Besar' by the top military officers, since there were no rules or regulations pertaining to the appointment of the highest commanding officer of the armed forces. Urip lost by only a few votes. The government affirmed the election and appointed Sudirman as Panglima Besar, according to Said Salim, 'the following month'. Salim sees the time lag between Sudirman's election and the government's appointment as evidence of the governments's reluctance to recognize the outcome of the election (page 10). Salim forgets that we were in a time of revolution and that Sjahrir became Prime Minister only on 14 November (thus after Soedirman's election, which took place under Soekarno's cabinet) and had to give all his attention to reorganize the government and to start discussions with the British and Dutch authorities in an unsettled and insecure atmosphere. In this connection Said Salim quotes Anderson (Java 247) as saying that 'the Sjahrir government grudgingly proclaimed his (Soedirman's) official appointment as panglima besar'. However, it should be noted that in a note Anderson himself refers to a book, Sedjarah TNI, Diponegoro, in which the anonymous author gives the impression that the election of Soedirman as Panglima Besar and his official inauguration 'virtually coincided, and that the appointment of the panglima besar was not the outcome of a long, drawn out political struggle'.

4. Said Salim sees as the weakness of the Indonesian Defence Forces that it was not homogeneous, as it contained three elements, namely the laskars who were, according to him 'the most politicized faction of the defense forces' (page 4) and, the ex-PETA and the ex-KNIL militarymen, who were not always friendly disposed toward each other. Regarding the relationship between ex-Peta and ex-KNIL the ex-Peta writers of Purbo Suwondo's paper point out on pages 22 and 23 of chapter II: '... difference in opinions or interpretations occurred among the TNI leadership, as took place within the Allied and Dutch circles, such however does not immediately call for hairsplitting theories on its origin or genesis, due to differences in educational background, like the far stretched and absurd PETA-KNIL dichotomy, as though an unbridgable dualism existed in the leadership'.

5. Said Salim mentions further that Sudirman had a great sympathy for the laskars, whom he named his 'sons' (page 5). No evidence is given. Salim also stresses the antagonism between Sudirman and the Dutch educated officers (page 6). Again without evidence. If Salim is right, how then to explain the close relationship between Sudirman and Urip? How could Simatupang and Nasution, both ex-KNIL be appointed to respectively WKSAP and Kommandan Komando Jawa? How to explain that Nasution could pursuade Soedirman to agree to the cease fire preceding the Round Table Conference? (A.H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas IIb TNI berposisi antigerilya (Jakarta 1983) 22-23).

6. As evidence of the critical attitude of the politicians regarding the armed forces at the start of the revolution, Said Salim presents a quotation of Sjahrir's 'Perjuangan kita' (page 10). It should be noted, however, that Sjahrir refers in that quotation þ and those close to Sjahrir would certainly confirm this þ to the 'pemuda' (youth) in general. Sjahrir knew quite well that in spite of their shortcomings the TNI was the most disciplined group of the fighting forces.

7. On page 19 of his paper Said Salim writes: 'Soedirman and most of the Peta officers suspected that Simatupang and his circle of the military modernizers were conspiring with the government to replace Panglima Besar Soedirman'. In his notes on this statement Said Salim refers in the first place to Nasution, Memenuhi panggilan tugas II Kenangan masa gerilya (Jakarta 1983) 122. A copy of this page, which only shows photographs and of the following page, which clearly bears no correlation with Said Salim's allegation is attached. Since Said Salim might have made a typographic error, copy of pages 120 and 121 which only show photographs, is also attached. Said Salim also refers to Matondang SH (ed.) Percakapan dengan Dr. T.B. Simatupang (Jakarta 1986) 32-33. However, there is not one single sentence in above pages which relates to Said Salim's allegation. A copy of these pages in its original form is attached. Also, the pages 144-145 in Tahi Bonar Simatupang's book Membuktikan ketidakbenaran Suatu Mitos (Jakarta 1991), which Said Salim also refers to, do not deal at all with Said Salim's allegation. A copy of these pages in its original form is also attached. Simatupang's high regard and respect for the Panglima Besar was known to Soedirman and all officers. Simatupang was also generally known in army circles as an exemplary officer, who would never oppose his superiors, let alone conspire to replace the highest commanding officer.

8. With regard to General Sudirman's political opinion, Salim Said implied that Sudirman was soft on the communists. On page 24 Salim states: 'As Panglima Besar Sudirman had no other choice than to obey... Hatta to crush the Madiun communist rebellion', suggesting that if Hatta had not given him the instruction to crush the rebellion he would not have done so. In conclusion it may be said, that Salim's paper gives a distorted picture of the Indonesian Defence Forces during the revolution. They were 'politicized' (to use Said Salim's words) in the sense that they had their own ideas about the domestic and foreign policies of the Republic, which often were contradictory to the policies of the Republican government. Moreover, Said Salim pictures the Indonesian Defence Forces as an internaly divided force.

In contradiction to Said Salim's paper Purbo Suwondo's paper, written by him in conjunction with other ex-Peta officers gives a completely different picture of the Indonesian Armed Forces during the revolution. It was indeed politically conscious, but always adhered loyally to the government's decisions. The paper denies a controversy between ex-Peta and ex-KNIL officers. It is regrettable that Said Salim in writing his paper has not taken the trouble to interview ex-Peta and other officers. Therefore he tends to exaggerate the political awareness and the heterogeneous nature of the Indonesian Defense Force.