

The genesis of the Indonesian National Army and some political implications

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Introduction

1.

This paper arises from an attempt to give the younger generations in Indonesia and interested foreigners an opportunity to read about some periods and aspects of Indonesia's history during its

struggle for independence, told in the most objective manner possible.

It is felt this could be done by inviting some active freedom fighters to contribute views on those aspects of history they had experienced or known.

In addition to many studies already published by other prominent writers, journalists etc. around the world, this paper could offer other interpretative ideas which might be missed by studying those sources of written history only.

This last endeavor is not a particular reflection on foreign or national historians. Even in long established European nations, history is frequently interpreted in a narrow, chauvinistic manner. How often are British historians, for example, invited to study their colonial history from an Indian point of view?

Whereas to have invited Indonesian historians to contribute their studies to international seminars, there are nonetheless certain aspects of Indonesia's history in which the resource persons are, not surprisingly, the freedom fighters themselves as active participants during those crucial periods.

This paper has many possible shortcomings. Not all aspects of the complex story of the genesis and some of its implications of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia-the Indonesian National Army or TNI-have been covered. No paper of this size could hope to do so.

2.

The information as explained in these writings attempts to lead to better understanding of the interrelated elements and events of the national movement for Indonesia Merdeka since the National Re-awakening in 1908 till the final recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty in December 1949. Through understanding this 'red thread,' one could more easily determine the significance of events established by their importance, in-out-of-the common post-WW II conditions. Looking back to these turbulent days, the revolutionary developments in Indonesia could invite thought provoking questions with difficult answers.

6. After the war declaration by the Dutch against Japan and the capitulation of the KNIL on March 9, 1942, in Kalijati, how did the Indonesian people see their role and participation in this Pacific War, because this war was not the war of the Indonesian people, but a war between the Allies (Dutch) and Japan, fought out on Indonesian soil?
7. What has happened during the Japanese occupation related to the radical changes of the misconception of the so-called most 'meek people' on earth in finding back its Indonesian national identity and its expression toward any foreign power, including the Japanese oppressors in the period of 1942-1950?

8. What did the Indonesian nationalist movement do and what was their strategy to achieve Indonesia Merdeka before and during the Japanese occupation, prior to the independence proclamation on August 17, 1945?
9. Why was the comeback of the Dutch regime persistently refused and fiercely met by armed resistance in Indonesia while the other colonies in Southeast Asia (except Vietnam) enthusiastically welcomed their colonial masters with open arms?
10. How was it possible that the newly established republic as a former economically pressed out colony instantly had fairly trained combat forces ready to resist any foreign aggressor? What is called the '1945 Generation' and the Badan Keamanan Rakyat (People's Security Body: BKR)?
11. Why did fierce fighting occur mainly in Java, Bali and Sumatera, while the NICA and KNIL only faced incidental and limited resistance in the other parts of the archipelago?
12. After the Dutch capitulation to Japan in 1942 and the Indonesian independence proclamation in 1945, to what extent can the Dutch still expect any form of faith and cooperation from the Indonesian people?

These are just some key questions which will arise, suggested for a thorough and comprehensive survey for those who are still interested in the birth of the Republic of Indonesia and the TNI in particular.

3.

The following chapters have been prepared by a team of former freedom fighters with a PETA or Giyugun (Sumatera) background and academicians, i.e. Professor Dr. Isjrin Noerdin, Drs. Iwan Stambul, Islam Salim, Alwin Nurdin, Supardio, Utaryo, Sudianto Sastroatmodjo, Drs. Tulkah Mansyur (National Archives) and myself.

Chapter I will be a brief sketch of Indonesia's history from the unconditional surrender of the Dutch to the Japanese Army, 9 March 1942, to the withdrawal of the Dutch from Indonesia (minus Irian), 27 Desember 1949.

Chapter II was originally prepared as a summary of the memorial book on the establishment of the former Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air (Volunteer Homeland Defense Army) or PETA, which will be published in mid 1996. The team agreed that seminars on Dutch-Indonesian relations 1945-1950 might be a good opportunity to introduce to an international historians forum a brief insight on the PETA from former PETA officers, enlightened with relevant quotations of eminent statesmen, scholars or historians. The team hopes that, by presenting this chapter, a better understanding could be reached on the genuine nationalistic political motivation

of the PETA, besides their serious efforts in mastering military leadership and skills, which are vitally needed for a national army in an independent Indonesia. From the nationalist movement's point of view, during the 1942 -- 1945 period the PETA was an inseparable part of the movements preparations of the 'power build-up' (machtsvorming) stage of development for Indonesia Merdeka, as well as the proclamation of independence itself.

In Chapter III, the team tried to explain the dimensions of the well combined political/diplomatic and the military strategy used by the Republic of Indonesia during its war of independence. Notwithstanding precarious and difficult situations, in his capacity as the C-in-C of the TNI, General Soedirman has always shown his loyalty to the government. After the capture of the top government leaders in Yogyakarta on December 19, 1948 by the Dutch troops, General Sudirman continued the armed resistance together with the TNI, waging a successful guerrilla war till the RTC and the following entrance as full member of the United Nations. In spite of his poor physical condition, he set an unmatched personal example of military leadership, facing all the perils and hardship of a highly mobile guerrilla war.

Chapter IV might be used as a summary of answers to the questions mentioned in the 'Introduction' chapter of this paper.

Although all the team members had the privilege to be part of the Indonesian struggle for independence, many efforts have been made to include as broad a spectrum of views as possible from several international as well as national scholars, historians, etc. to enliven the historical narrative with illustrations culled from their research and studies.

Jakarta, March 1, 1996

Purbo S. Suwondo
Coordinator

Chapter I

A glance at the history of Indonesia 1942--1950

1.

To enlighten the visualization of the revolutionary situation at that time, it is felt this could best be done by quoting some scholars to contribute their findings on those aspects of the history which they had studied most thoroughly. Related to the period before 1942, some historians have written already about the 'Messianic facets in Indonesia's history,' the Ratu Adil (righteous king),

the Joyoboyo prophecy (Friend pp. 75-78, 117), Soekarno's geopolitical views on the international power struggle in the Asia-Pacific region, or the extraordinary brilliant far-seeing foresight of Dr. G.S.S.J. Ratulangi (1937) on Indonesia's position in the Pacific.

Dr. Nugroho Notokusanto, an eminent Indonesian historian stated that '*...any study of independent Indonesia must start with or at least take account of, the history of the Indonesian revolution and the war of independence of 1945-1949.*'

Furthermore he wrote that study of the 1945-1949 period '*...must, of necessity, make incursions into the previous period, because of the continuity existing between the crucial events preceding it and the occurrences themselves.*'

Failure to do so would, he feared, result in serious misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the succeeding period. It should be well understood that the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, enacted on August 18, 1945, includes the Pancasila State philosophy as well as the right and the duty of every citizen to participate in the country's defense, while the President is the supreme commander of the Army, Navy and Air Force (later called TNI). In the independence proclamation was stated that 'all matters pertaining to the transfer of power and other affairs will be executed in a correct manner within the shortest possible time.'

To illustrate the inseparable time period between 1942 till 1950, another interesting research of years done by an Australian scholar Michael van Langenberg (1976) concluded that the developments taken place throughout North Sumatera between 1942 and 1950 was '*the crucial period during which the key determinants behind political motivations and behavior in the post-independence era (ethnicity, class, religion, commitments of political ideology and specific corporate, group and individual interests) had been stimulated, remolded or created for the first time.*'

Langenberg has considered the period between 1942 and 1950 as a whole single historical period of the national revolution in North Sumatera and quoted John Smail (Ithaca 1946) that '*At the local level, it is no longer possible to see the revolution exclusively or even primarily as a struggle between the Dutch and the Indonesians, What we see instead is the domestic side of Indonesian history in a time of rapid and far reaching change, a social revolution as well as simply a national one.*'

Langenberg's conclusion on the 1942-50 revolutionary period could be interpreted as not fitting in Nugroho's statement that '*the watershed of modern Indonesian history was not 8 March 1942 but 17 August 1945* [Nugroho p.192].'

The Dutch scholar Drs. A.H. Paape correctly observed that '*The experiences and reactions of the Indonesian people, their relations with the Japanese occupational regime and their significance of that period of occupation has had toward the developments of the nationalistic movement in the archipelago are still to a less extent (scarcely) objects for historical research.*' (Dr. R. de Bruin p.5).

This realistic observation is-unfortunately-quite true; moreover, the interest shown up till now to

a large extent has the tendency to be limited to survey objects like war crimes, forced prostitution or labor (romusha), European modeled 'collaboration' with the occupying regime, the bad and tragical stories of POW camp life, etc. An exception is Dr. de Bruin's outstanding research on this subject as proven in his Ph.D. dissertation in 1982 titled 'Indonesie, de laatste etappe naar de vrijheid, 1942-1945.'

The nationalist movement for Indonesia Merdeka was not only participated by the 'political' nationalists, but also by several Islamic groupings, socialists and other anti-colonialism or anti-imperialism individuals and forces. In this connection, De Bruin has also focused his research on the Islam aspects of the nationalist correlation with its activities during the period before 1942 and after August 17, 1945. He concluded that because of the Japanese policies towards Islamic political activities, '*the Islam had a revival*' (Masyumi, Hizbullah etc.) (Dr. J. de Bruin pp.69-94 and pp.95-102). Many prominent Islamic leaders volunteered to become PETA battalion commanders like e.g. Mr. Kasman Singodimedjo (Masyumi), Sudirman, Sitalaksana, Mulyadi, Parjaman (Muhamadiyah), Aruji Kartawinata (Masyumi), Imam Sujai (PSII), etc., which was absolutely impossible in the KNIL before 1942.

The independence proclamation of Indonesia was the culmination point of decades-long nationalist movement and the centuries-long struggle against colonialism by their forefathers; any attempt through armed resurrections failed against the powerful and technological advanced KNIL.

To explain the instant readiness of the physical power 'begeisterd' with its revolutionary élan and will to fight as observed in the 1945-1950 period, it is fairly acceptable that there is a correlation of forces, i.e. the preparatory physical build-up of power (machtsvorming) as an inseparable part of the nationalist movement for Indonesia Merdeka during the 1942-1945 period and the use of that revolutionary power (machtsaanwending) during the 1945-1950 national revolution.

2.

A well known Dutch sociologist, J.A.A. van Doorn (Ontsporing van geweld-1970) has made an excellent and realistic sociohistorical analysis about the 'national mobilization' in Indonesia during the Japanese occupation, in particular the resurrection of the Indonesian national identity, the invitation of nationalist political initiatives and the social mobilization.

As a sociologist, Van Doorn observed the dynamization of the people's potential will to fight, simultaneously with the efficacious stimulation of social energy to mould a collective readiness for actions, together with the systematic, purposeful activation of these undiscovered and unexplored potentials could (and has) generate(d) an enormous collective energy needed as the pushing power of the whole system. He quoted also the findings of other western scholars (Elsbree and Smail) recognizing the different aspects of this mobilization concept like activism,

militantism, utopism, populism and politicization (politisering). In practice, people were involved in mass movements, shock brigades, labor units, youth groups and security units.

The Blitar PETA battalion revolt on February 14, 1945, could be used as an example of the rebellious spirit against the Japanese of the PETA Army members in general, because 'Indonesian independence' for them meant 'the advent of self-respect and national pride' (Nugroho p. 150-162).

These mobilization activities were also noticed by the American scholar Theodore Friend (The Blue Eyed Enemy -- 1988) as his remarks on the manipulation of the power structure which had released new group and individual energies, among other things, 'while establishing an uneasy modus vivendi with Islamic leaders and keeping the secular nationalists under sharp surveillance....reducing the authority of the 'priyayi' and enhancing both the nationalist and muslim elements...'. Noteworthy is Friend's remark that *'To support the general occupation policy the Japanese military put mobilization of people and resources emphatically first, while nationalization was a permissible means to that end. For Indonesian leaders, however, the true goal was nationalization, the means mobilization and by-product Nipponization-inescapable but not profound.'*

As late in 1944 a strategic jeopardy arose: a promise of independence by the Japanese was necessary to be called for, which later was skillfully exploited by the Indonesian nationalists, while for the first time (since 1943) indigenous (PETA) military officers, together with aroused young activists, were introduced on the scene.

Compared with the period before 1942, the Dutch devoted special effort to training native engineers and lawyers, but indigenous military officers have been very limited and not desired, nor native businessmen nurtured (Friend p.85). Notwithstanding their war aims, through the intensive and harsh military training, the Japanese gave back to the Indonesians the rudiments of what the Dutch had taken away: i.e. militant self-assertion and military capacity (Friend p. 98). The short-lived Japanese occupation in Indonesia was assessed largely in terms of the Japan-Allied war conditions, with no political will to evaluate that period from the still active Indonesian nationalist movement's point of view. With the capitulation of the KNIL and the collapse of the Dutch regime in 1942, Indonesia was completely at the mercy of the Japanese.

The effective Japanese counter-intelligence and security measures, plus the absence of active people's support, prevented or eliminated any attempt of Dutch-related organized underground or guerrilla activities, resulting in a complete failure (Immerzeel p.33). It should, however, be noted that no known Indonesian underground movement was designed in advance within the framework of the national movement for independence. Related to subversive actions, Kanahela has been quoted that, except from the ex-KNIL remnants, the Chinese, communist and certain (Indonesian) ethnic groups more loyal to the Dutch, the Japanese military were notable to detect any other anti-Japanese movement or underground organization, which was important enough to be suppressed or even to be mentioned. (De Jong pp. 405 till 450, especially p. 410).

Friend explained the difference between the so-called 'clandestine war or underground activities' in Japanese occupied Indonesia and Nazi-German occupied Europe during WW II. In Indonesia

the 'underground actions' were mostly limited to 'going into hiding (onderduiken) out of public view,' listening to clandestine radio, political education, intercity courier service for dissemination of information and biding time (Friend p. 83, 177-178).

In Holland, the Dutch militants were organized in armed resistance units (OD, LKP, RVV), to assist the Dutch Royal Army in liberating Holland. They became regular army units, called Stoottroepen, which were later incorporated into the Royal Army (Jansen p.7-22). During WW II similar underground fighters were found in occupied Europe, e.g. the Maquis in France, the Partisans in Yugoslavia, or in Asia in Malaya or the Philippines. The guerrilla units fighting the Japanese in Malaya continued their armed struggle after the war as communist insurgents against Malaya supported by the British. At the same time the Dutch transformation cannot be compared to what happened in Indonesia with regard to the birth of the TNI (after the BKR, TKR, TRI) and the spontaneous and voluntary participation of patriotic 'pemudas' to defend the newly proclaimed Republic. It is generally accepted that the TNI 'was born out of the womb of the revolution.' At the same time the Dutch since 1945 worked very hard to lure selected young men from certain native ethnic groups into the newly created KNIL, to fight the Republic and protect the Dutch controlled federal states. Unfortunately, during the RTC in 1949 those 45,000 recruited native KNIL soldiers had the choice for their future between joining the TNI or being discharged. Moreover, on the 20th of July 1950 the KNIL was disbanded by the Dutch government. TNI then became the nucleus of the APRIS in 1950, bearing in mind that about 3 years before (June 3, 1947), TKR/TRI was the core of TNI, increased in size by the merger of the more political oriented armed laskar groups, while the BKR as the original nucleus had transformed itself into the TKR on October 5, 1945. Since August 23, 1945, BKR predominantly consisted of PETA (Java) or Giyugun (Sumatera) personnel, in particular the officers corps.

Except perhaps for a very small unknown and negligible number of individuals, the Indonesian underground movement was of no importance as a military manpower source for the BKR/TNI, compared with the Dutch experience of its partisan groups, and the Royal Army.

3.

Taking into consideration all those historical facts as mentioned above, younger generations could have difficulties finding the right interpretations of the conclusion made by a well reputed scholar that *'Bearing in mind the Dutch attitude of 1945-'50, the Indonesian War of Independence was 'inevitable', and the Indonesian Revolution would have broken out regardless of the situation in Indonesia at the end of the Pacific War. With or without the Japanese, the war of independence would have broken out anyway. WITH or WITHOUT PETA, an Indonesian army would have fought successfully against the Dutch forces.'* (Nugroho p.193)

To answer all the 'would-haves' mentioned earlier, the following are what actually happened: At the end of the Pacific War, Japan capitulated; two days later Indonesia proclaimed its

independence; the Indonesian revolution broke out without Japanese participation; the PETA army in Java, Bali and Sumatera existed from 1943 till 1945 inducing the national leadership to unilaterally proclaim Indonesia's independence (Rengasdengklok) and consequently later guarding (in full PETA Army uniform) the official proclamation ceremony on August 17, 1945, and subsequently its members turned to become freedom fighters as the core of the BKR, TKR, TRI, TNI and APRIS in 1950, joined by other patriotic pemuda from available sources for military manpower, like the Heiho, KNIL, paramilitary (PETA) trained students and youth organizations, etc. Some nationalistic-minded former KNIL cadets and officers trained before 1942 joined the TKR after October 1945 and were given positions in higher staff echelons or as instructors, while most of the ex-PETA officers were fit for duty in the infantry combat units, territorial organizations, instructors or unit staff officers. Taking into account in terms of time and logistical support, the consolidation of the TNI as a professional armed force was often disrupted in coping with the clashes against the allied troops, two Dutch aggressions (June 1947 and December 1948), the PKI rebellion (1948), the implementation of the Dutch-Indonesian agreements to evacuate TNI combat units from the 'guerrilla pockets,' etc.

During this consolidation process, the TNI officers corps had to undergo several aspects of a 'natural selection,' challenged by the conditions of a total people's war of independence in a revolutionary situation, facing an unpardonable enemy backed by a professional military machine with an 'Aceh-VPTL' doctrine (VanDoorn pp.109-132).

Every echelon of the TNI, from the top command level down to platoon leaders, experienced complicated entanglements of military troop-leadership, decision making on tactical or logistical problems, external political intrigues, internal differences of opinions or political bickering, enemy's psywar operations, people's support, moral or morale problems, including the difficult and complex execution of the post-war humanitarian task to repatriate of 35,000 Japanese troops and 36,000 APWI (operation POPDA) regardless of their former military background.

There were no specific ex-KNIL or ex-PETA solutions or directives since the BKR till the TNI. Everything was focused on actions or measures to win the protracted war with the available means. 'Professionalism' was tested, whether somebody -- ex-PETA or ex-KNIL alike could accomplish a given mission in the most effective way with the best results related to the prerequisites for his position.

The international wartime studies on top level military staff cooperation show many examples of controversies between individual generals or admirals, e.g. between American and their Allied counterparts, between KL and KNIL officers during their operations in Indonesia, and also findings of some subtle, fabricated, far fetched or too oversimplified controversies between ex-PETA and ex-KNIL officers during the war of independence.

The reasons why Indonesia rejected the restoration of the Dutch regime after 1945 with all its consequences have been brilliantly analyzed by Theodore Friend in his book 'The Blue-Eyed Enemy.' Nugroho has been quoted, that 'the limity of the struggle (against the Dutch) was provided by the republican army (TNI) and not the politicians in Yogyakarta.' and 'the Indonesian independence was won on the battle field not at the conference table; armed struggle

(perjuangan) rather than diplomacy was the key to republican survival.' (Colin Wild p.XXII).

The issues of the decisive role or correlation between armed struggle and diplomacy in a war of independence as well as the combination of armed and diplomatic struggle, should be seen as the two sides of the same coin, which have invited many studies and research with inherent pro and contra arguments for each dimension of the struggle and are still open for further research or debate.

Chapter II

The period before 17 August 1945

Although the PETA army ('Pembela Tanah Air' or Defenders of the Fatherland) in Java was organized under the command of the 16th Army, while the Sumatera 'Giyugun' (lacking a corresponding Indonesian denomination) was under the authority of the 25th Army with its HQs at Bukit Tinggi, both formations, and for that matter also all other indigenous military organizations in Southeast Asian countries (Indochina, Malaya and British Borneo), had been established based upon a COS Instruction issued on September 8, 1943, by the GHQs Southern Armed Forces in Saigon, bearing the similar Japanese name of 'Kyodo Bo-ei Giyugun' which in essence contains the meaning: 'a voluntary army to protect the native land.' It speaks for Japan's deference to the national ambitions, when they approved the patriotic entitling 'Pembela Tanah Air' to be installed for the Jawa Bo-ei Giyugun.

In the context of this paper and for all practical purposes, the 'Jawa Bo-ei Giyugun' and the 'Sumatera Bo-ei Giyugun' will both be considered identical in conception as well as in aim and aspiration, and hereafter referred to as the 'Volunteer Home Defense Army' (VHDA).

Now, as history has decisively rebutted the imputations as if Indonesia's independence was 'made in Japan' it will be one of the objectives of this composition to disprove the equally erroneous allegation that these military organizations were mere 'accessories' of Japan's Army.

In her unpublished typescript 'Mobilization and Training of Youth in Sumatera under the Japanese occupation: Giyugun 1943-1945,' Aiko Shiraishi, although admitting that the Japanese primary purpose was to supplement local defense power to fill the shortages after huge troop displacements to the Pacific battle zone, wonders why this wasn't done by the more simple and safe way of recruiting more 'Hei-ho's' (auxiliary soldiers individually incorporated into Japanese units) rather than taking the risk of setting-up this kind of motivated military structure with its more independent character. Here the writer quotes a report from Maj.Gen.Ineda, Vice-COS of

Southern Command, implying that '*... the Japanese military authority had to appease national sentiment of the population in occupied areas and to acquire their cooperation in achieving the war effort.*'

'Therefore, the Japanese had to show that they esteemed Indonesian potentiality and make a pretense of offering chances of political participation.'

Since this couldn't be effected without the involvement of political and civic leaders, the Japanese were compelled to obtain their positive support. This opportunity was immediately exploited for the national cause by motivating the people that the establishment of this volunteer, indigenous army was really a step in the process of building an independent nation.

In the same way, Joyce C. Lebra in her book 'Japanese trained Armies in Southeast Asia' concludes: '*... the effect of the Japanese education on the liberation and volunteer armies in Southeast Asia surpassed the initial Japanese motives in establishing and training them. Besides military education, another factor generating strong internal forces towards revolution, was to single out those segments of leadership formerly not trusted by the colonial administrations, and providing them special schooling and training. This policy led to the choice of detained or neglected national leaders in Java and Sumatra.*'

However, this does not imply that the concept of a native army was a one-sided (Japanese) initiative. In a speech at a seminar about the PETA Army on February 1985, Manai Sophiaan pointed out unmistakably that years before Japan's conquest of Southeast Asia, Indonesia's political leaders had persistently urged the Netherlands East Indies government to implement what the Dutch themselves announced as 'moral rearmament and resilience' when their motherland was overrun by the Nazis. Starting with the 'Wiwoho motion' in 1940 proposing to realize an indigenous militia, the 'Soetardjo petition' soliciting some kind of Round Table Conference to discuss the attainment of statehood for the colonies ('overseas territory') and later the GAPI (the Indonesian Political Alliance), which demanded the institution of a full-fledged Parliament to replace the unrepresentative 'Volksraad' (People's Council), all turned out to be in vain. He quotes W.F. Wertheim from the book 'Indonesia, from Kingdom to Neo-colony': '*The Indonesian leaders are of the opinion that Indonesia as an element in the war effort can be considerably reinforced, if the nationalistic movement is made an ally in the fight against fascism and violence, the at Digul exiled leaders are invited back and a strong national army is founded.*'

Having progressed this far, when the victorious Japanese Army fanfared their arrival with the promise of a 'Greater East Asian Prosperity Sphere' and 'Asia for the Asians,' what was more logical for the Indonesian leaders than to exploit these even more advantageous circumstances to ask for a larger participation in government and defense matters? Roeslan Abdulgani, in a paper presented at a PETA Reunion in Lumajang (East Java) on Hero's Day 1982, among other conclusions, stated: '*Particularly since the creation of PUTERA (Pusat Tenaga Rakyat) or Centre of People's Force, on March 1942 led by the foursome SOEKARNO, HATTA, KI HAJAR DEWANTARA and K.H.MANSUR, there existed a fiery spirit of nationalism and patriotism, which has fired the appeal to obtain military training for the (Indonesian) youth as a*

prerequisite to revive the nation's valorous spirit within a sound military structure.'

According to several sources, months before the Japanese issued the decision to set up a native army, a petition written with his own blood was delivered by Gatot Mangkupraja the Japanese Military Authority expressing that very same desire. Thus, the birth of Indonesia's Volunteer Home Defense Army should really be apprehended as the product of a mutual necessity, albeit for quite different reasons, between victor and victim.

Although these local armies were organized for limited military objectives (mainly to supplement the already thinly spread Japanese defenses), after the end of the war they acquired an important significance in Southeast Asia, more important than the Japanese had ever speculated them to be.

Considering the excerpts from above-mentioned writers, it is appropriate now to underline Aiko Shiraishi's conclusion: *'The importance in Indonesian history of Japanese policy of mobilizing local youth, therefore, can be seen in its ironical results which accelerated the pace for independence.*

The reason why Japanese occupation is often regarded as 'a prelude to independence' is not because of Japan's intention to 'liberate' Asia, but because of this unexpected outcome which Indonesian leaders themselves turned into their benefit.'

At the highest level of the national leadership, that was exactly what the two most prominent founders of the Republic enacted. When addressing a huge massgathering on November 3, 1943, at the Ikada sports field, Hatta exclaimed: *'... Our youth should not forget that no self-respecting nation in this world will relinquish the protection of its fate to another nation. Thus, we Indonesians too have our own duty towards the motherland. The 'Osamu Seirei' (Government Decree) No. 44 opens the door for the Indonesian people to voluntarily become defenders of their own country.'*

'The aspiration to obtain military training has been voiced long before this since colonial times by all political movements. The formation of a militia was incessantly advocated, but the Netherlands Indies' Government was never willing to accept this idea. They did not like us to have military skills. They were only in need of several thousands of soldiers who they can shove forwards against 'the domestic foe,' i.e. against ourselves! Against an enemy from outside, against 'the foreign enemy' they depended upon Britain and America.'

'... The Japanese Government has provided the opportunity to organize a Volunteer Force for the purpose of defending our motherland..... It is your duty, youth of Indonesia to join that force 'en masse,' willingly and freely to get the training as a warrior defender of our beloved country.'

He ended with the inspired message: *'Let us awaken Indonesia's dormant martial vigor and spirit by joining and expanding the Homeland Defense Force.'*

In a letter, dated September 30, 1945, to Lord L. Mountbatten, the C-in-C of SEAC, the then President SOEKARNO wrote: *'It is not necessary to repeat here the history of the national movement in the former Dutch period, for you probably know about that already. It is enough to state that the Indonesian Independence Movement does not ask for little sacrifice. These ideals*

were still burning brightly during the Japanese Military Government, though it was not perceivable.'

'What do we mean by the preparation of independence of Indonesia? First of all to propose several principles of politics. We knew that complete independence would not be acquired under Japan. But by having an own Government, the base was founded for the gradual acquirement of a real independence. Secondly, to receive military training and military discipline for the youth, this being one of the important foundations to acquire independence. This end was reached by means of PETA (Home Defense Army). The military education may be called perfect.'

Apart from their reluctant concession to the nationalistic aspirations, there was another aspect in the Japanese design of indigenous defense armies that played in the hands of Indonesia when plunging head-on into the war for independence. For the very reason of assigning territorial defense duties to the VHDA, with the accent on coastal areas and airfields to meet Allied landings, and be prepared to fight a guerilla war, its organizational structure, selection and recruitment of personnel and the specific military skills conveyed turned out to be taylor-made to confront the returning Dutch forces.

Particular notice should be taken of the guerilla aspect which was aptly anticipated by the Japanese strategists, who in their last year of occupation set up intensive guerilla warfare courses for PETA officers, who in turn trained up to 900 troops in Java alone, skilled in guerilla tactics, combat-and counter-intelligence and territorial control.

In Sumatera (specifically North Sumatera), training programs with the same objectives were also held, but evidently the Japanese Intelligence officers in charge didn't follow the pattern in Java, and recruited directly from para-military youth organizations from outside the Giyugun cadres.

At this point it would be appropriate to unprejudicedly re-evaluate a former Dutch officer's statement concerning the rather disputable interpretations given with regard to the alleged 'dominant and superior' role former members of the Dutch colonial army had played in creating and operating the revolutionary army of independence. No person is in a better position to render his credible and balanced opinion and judgment on this matter than the late Lt.Gen. GPH. Djatikusumo, who happened to be one of only a few former KNIL officers (CORO or Reserve Officers School graduated) who also underwent training at the PETA Officers School (Kan-bu Kyo-iku Tai) at Bogor.

He observed: *'The KNIL was in fact some kind of a Gendarmerie, and it wasn't surprising that their Manual on the Army's Policing Tasks (VPTL: Voorschrift Politionele Taak v/h Leger) was twice as thick as the ones concerning tactics for small units.'*

'The basic unit was an infantry company, which was organized, equipped, armed and trained primarily to the purpose of maintaining internal peace and order. Its principal mode of operation was intensive and extensive patrolling, with the psychological effects of a show of force to dishearten potential disturbances.'

'Although field exercises were held annually, and at least once at regiment-level, they turned out to be mere tests of the mobility and manoeuvrability of battalion-size troops, without training their combat capability.'

'Even among officers, it is widely rumoured that they learned all about war but not how to fight it.'

On the other hand, reflecting on his PETA background, he wrote: *'The Japanese are clearly a very devoted people, thus well adjusted to become professional soldiers, and as battle-hardened veterans they were very efficient and effective in transforming civilians into soldiers within a short time. How else can we explain their ability to train us not only to become field officers, but also into proficient military instructors in just 100 days.'*

He is quoted by Joyce C. Lebra: *'The Japanese have taught me something more important than what I have ever learned from the Dutch-that is How to build an Army from scratch.'*

However, even as the VHDA members determinedly underwent the harsh and punishing Japanese-style military drills and exercises to acquire the fighting spirit, military skill and physical endurance they have all these times yearned for, they never forgot the reason why and for what purpose they wanted to become soldiers in the first place. That they never considered themselves as second-rate 'junior partners' or 'auxiliaries' blindly obedient to their mentors became evident every now and then when the Japanese trespassed the thin line between normal military subordination and outright humiliation or insult, trampling on their national dignity and self-respect. Among the more serious cases in Sumatera, when Indonesian cadres and officers defied and challenged their Japanese masters, were 2 full-fledged rebellions in Aceh, one abortive mutiny attempt in the East Coast Province and one unaccomplished scheme for unsurrection in South Sumatera.

Although the Pandrah (a village on the Northern Aceh coast) incident was principally a people's movement, storming and overrunning a Japanese outpost in the early hours of May 3, 1945, thereby killing all the soldiers except one who escaped to his mother unit, the partisan leader Pang Akob with his 40 followers were joined by Muhammad Daud, a Giyugun cadre who had deserted his unit and by sharing his military skill enabled them to achieve this feat without losing any of their men!

The other Aceh case involved three Indonesian Giyugun officers (Hasan Ismail, Teuku Abdulhamid and Teuku Muhammad Ali) who defected their barracks at Jungkabuya (near Meureudu) fully armed. Eluding the Japanese by hiding in the jungle, they made efforts to build up organized physical resistance against their oppressors, but the Japanese cut them off by threatening to imprison and torture their families. Although this exploit, which took place in November after the Pandrah incident, for all military purposes may be considered a failure, it did have a strong psychological effect on the population, inspiring their future actions to encounter and disarm the then defeated Japanese Army.

In Java, usually leading the way in most social and political matters, obviously quite a number of similar conflicts between Indonesian militaries and their Japanese instructors broke out during that same period towards the end of Japanese rule in Asia. Suffice it here to expose just 2 of the most noteworthy cases. First, the Cileunca mutiny which can furthermore attest to the reckless bravery and fearlessness of these young cadres in standing up against what they consider as

tyranny and injustice. In this case, the 1st Company of the 4th Battalion (Dai-dan), guarding three hydro-electric plants in the area of Pangalengan (a mountain resort town to the South of Bandung), rebelled against the 2 Japanese instructors attached to the Company. After an abortive attempt of 2 platoons to defect into the mountains, in another incident the Japanese officer-instructor was hit by the Companies Sergeant Major, sometime later followed by an unjustified face-slapping of the Company 'medic' by that same instructor, taking the already tense and emotional situation to its climax: the killing of Sergeant-instructor Hara by 2 soldiers ordered by the Companies Sergeant Major. Actually, the plan was to kill them both, but Lieutenant Yamamoto managed to escape by motorcycle. One officer, 2 non-coms and 2 soldiers paid with their lives (execution by beheading) and others were cruelly tortured by the infamous Kenpeitai for their bold resistance against overwhelming odds, which was taken motivated by their unbearable resentment to witness the miserable suffering the people had to endure, imposed by the overlords.

Thus, in retrospect it should be justifiable to conclude that on the advent of Independence, the VHDA was the principal military formation in the country. Apart from the fact that it was immediately dissolved by the defeated Japanese Armies, for political reasons the Republican leaders on their part deemed the direct conversion of the VHDA into a National Army not opportune. On August 23, 1945, a decree was issued pertaining to the Formation of the 'Badan Keamanan Rakyat' (BKR or People's Security Body) as a rallying point to draw together, assemble and control the entire militant power of the people. In Java, where the PETA battalions (Dai-dan) were officially disbanded two days after the Proclamation of Independence, the transfer into the BKR was executed in units, in several instances as whole battalions!

This was not the case in Sumatera, because of the tight secrecy of the Japanese commanders in carrying out these measures. There was a delay or 'time lag' due to the poor communications at that time, and for that reason most Giyugun units weren't anymore intact when the BKR was installed.

Aside from this handicap, what set the former VHDA members apart from the other paramilitary youth organizations was their automatic and spontaneous metamorphosis from what outwardly had seemed to be just another Japanese vassal army into the patriotic vanguards they really were from the very beginning. Without in the least belittling the share and merits of all other armed legions and combatant people's units (laskar rakyat) in the ensuing physical struggle, it is a historical fact that in Java, as well as Sumatera, ex-VHDA officers formed the core, if not the top-leaders of the BKR (API in Aceh, BPI in Eastern Sumatera, BPKR in Southern Sumatera) as a natural consequence of their professional, mental and ideological preparedness for that mission.

Concerning two other main segments of the Indonesian population with a military background, i.e. the former colonial Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) and the Japanese auxiliary soldiers (Hei-ho), who at the moment of Japan's collapse had to decide where they stand, it was obvious for the ex-Heiho's to side with the Republican cause without hesitation. Many of them though of the lower ranks, became the militant leaders in their village communities. In contrast, participation of ex-KNIL officers and soldiers into the BKR organization took place on an

individual, case by case and rather limited scale, evidently because most had spent the war years as POW's or had fled to allied territories.

For these reasons it is appropriate to state that modern Indonesian military history has its roots in the political and social upheaval of the Pacific War, and that the BKR with its core of former VHDA officers became the very foundation upon which the National Army was built.

An understanding of this historical process is indispensable if one intends to evaluate and judge the far-reaching impact, not only of the Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia, but equally impressive, of the astoundingly swift breakdown of centuries-long Dutch rule, on the mind and thoughts of Indonesia's youths and intelligentsia. How else could the transformation of those erstwhile gentle and peaceful people into the ardent and determined freedom fighters they suddenly became be explained?

As Aiko Shiraishi keenly observed: *'...this development was only possible in the context of decades of national struggle.'*

In a paper presented in Jakarta on August 4, 1995, Michael van Langenberg ('A new Nation enters Civil Society') exposed irrefutably that the nationalistic movement, far from being crippled during the Japanese occupation, on the contrary was roused to new heights and dimensions, in correlation with Japan's needs to accommodate rather than alienate anti-colonial forces: *'Between 1942 and 1945 the Japanese military administration in North Sumatera engineered far-reaching structural change in the political economy of the region. Much of that change benefited many nationalist agendas. Some changes ensured that eventual success of the nationalist struggle would require considerable sacrifice.'*

'In November (1943), recruitment began for a fully-fledged territorial army, the Kyodo Boei Giyugun. Officially described as a 'People's Force' (Laskar Rakyat), the Giyugun, was to be:..... an organization specifically to fight in the field and having the power to offer resistance. This force stands in the front line in the defence of this our motherland.'

This chapter may be closed with the following conclusions:

1. In the course of its centuries-long colonization of the East Indies Archipelago (Dutch East Indies, Insulinde, Indonesia), the Dutch were at long last able to quell and eradicate practically all centres of armed and physical oppositions and uprisings in various regions of its territory (except maybe for the province of Aceh, which till the end of Dutch rule was never completely pacified, and the Dutch garrisons of *marechaussees* or specially trained anti-insurgency troops who never patrol with less than one section or platoon).
2. The KNIL or Royal Netherlands Indies Army was their instrument to attain that political goal. Therefore, the KNIL was from its very conception designed as a force to counter, suppress and crush all kinds of internal (or local and domestic) rebellions and

insurrections, and thus, by definition, contradictory to the national freedom movement.

3. When Japan ended 3 centuries of colonial rule, the national leaders naturally seized the opportunity to obtain the so-much-needed but always-denied military know-how and experience as a prerequisite of nationhood, when the Japanese military government was strategically compelled to offer the establishment of some sort of 'voluntary and indigenous territorial army,' although everyone was well aware of their actual motives.
4. However, it should be understood that the creation of such an Indonesian indigenous army, could not have been possible if the Indonesian themselves were not idealistically and politically motivated by their national leaders to partake. The young intelligentsia (including 'western-educated' youth) eagerly joined these officers-training-camps, on the firm conviction that this would be an integral part of the struggle for independence as a whole.
5. The 'Kyo-do Bo-ei Giyu-gun' exactly as its name implies was, unlike the Hei-ho's (auxiliary soldiers) apparently not incorporated into the Japanese Imperial Army proper, and the Japanese commanders weren't given a chance to back out of their initial promises of a 'voluntary army to protect the motherland'. There is plenty evidence of instances where nationalistic pride and patriotic feelings stood up to confront Japanese military wilfulness.
6. True to the spirit of their nationalistic and patriotic conception, all the VHDA members, irrespective of rank, whether already disbanded by the defeated Japanese Army or still in their original formation, made themselves immediately available and combat-ready, not only to join but practically in every region also to lead the revolutionary army when independence was proclaimed, officially founded on the BKR (People's Security Body) as a provisional and transitory martial organization to embrace the entire spectrum of militant and armed groups that sprang up spontaneously during the early days of the revolution.

Chapter III

The complex dimensions of the Indonesian War of Independence 1945-1950

1. The colonial and post war legacy

Up to the first part of the twentieth century, the colonial regime succeeded in suppressing people's rebellions in several places throughout the archipelago. The Netherlands Indies government always took care with all means and in all fields to prevent the development of potential forces, nationalism, etc. which could grow into the seed of a threat against the colonial establishment.

It induced the colonial Government not to accept the cordial offer of the Indonesian people to join in defense against foreign fascist aggression during both World Wars, in 1916 as well as 1942, even though Queen Wilhelmina later professed equal status to her colonies within a commonwealth on December 7, 1942. These policies, at the end, effected the Dutch position which had to face Japan without the Indonesian people's support.

In contrast with the generally accepted western perception of World War II, it should be understood that the Pacific War of 1942 -- 1945 was clearly not a war of the Indonesian people; it was a war between the Dutch (Allied) and the Japanese fought out on Indonesian soil without any commitment of the Indonesian people. For these reasons it is completely wrong to judge the Indonesians during the Pacific war in terms of being either only loyal Dutch subjects (onderdanen) or disgraceful and detestable Japanese collaborators.

This happened because of the reluctance of the Dutch to accept the Indonesian offer to cooperate on the military field in facing the danger of German imperialism in the 1st World War as well as the danger of Japanese fascism in the 2nd World War. Thus, the Indonesian people after the Dutch capitulation in March 1942 had to find their own and independent way to face the international situation during World War II.

Moreover, the Indonesian people, left defenseless by the Dutch surrender to Japan on 9 March, 1942, were forced to look after their own interests and consequently approached the Japanese to provide them with necessary military training and equipment, which they failed to receive from the Dutch during World War I and World War II.

On request of the Indonesian National movement and consented by its national leaders, the Japanese forces cooperated to provide military training to the Indonesian people. Together a territorial force was developed, the PETA (Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air), to the total strength of 70 battalions in Java, Madura and Bali, with an additional 55 companies in Sumatera.

It has been considered that the leaders and men need to have their 'roots' and be 'known' in the terrain they were to operate in. Therefore, in Bali, the leaders of the military units were selected from among the 'Hindu-Bali' people, while in Java and Madura, where the majority of its population were Moslems, in general the leaders of the units (battalions) were chosen from among the Kyais and Santris (Islamic religious leaders), besides selecting other nationalists or people of the national movement. The Japanese occupational forces showed much concern for Islamic aspects among the PETA units.

2. On the establishment of the BKR

It is appropriate to survey PETA's history on the role of its members in the forming of independent Indonesia's army, i.e. the BKR.

There are several useful sources on the process of formation of the BKR. In this connection, a prominent Indonesian historian wrote: '*..... Everybody in their hometowns was expecting the former Peta soldiers to take an active part in the coming struggle by becoming pejuang or freedom fighters. They did not need much persuading: they had acquired the skills necessary to wage an armed struggle; they felt an intense desire to test their newly acquired skills and they had little regard for Dutch military prowess, having witnessed the Japanese invasion. But they lacked weapons. Instinctively they turned to the Japanese who were still in their midst.....*' (Nugroho p. 172, 173).

He further stated that: '*The National Leadership's decision to form the BKR rather than a national army was influenced by their fear of the Allied reprisals against the Republic. The National Leadership believed that they did not, as yet, have sufficient military skilled persons to oppose the Allies. They decided to adopt a national strategy based on diplomacy rather than confrontation. They calculated that by adopting a low profile, the Allies would not be provoked by the existence of the Republic and would not take repressive measures against it. This low profile concept included the policy of forming a people's militia rather than a national army. This decision by the National Leadership (which consisted of the older nationalist leaders) was not popular with the youth. They thought that a national army was a prerequisite of independence, and that an armed force was urgently needed to deter foreign powers from attacking the Republic. The youth reacted in two ways to the formation of the BKR instead of a national army. Part of the youth, especially those who were ex-members of the Peta or Heiho, decided to enter the BKR and 'make the best of it' by using it as a 'vehicle for struggle.' Others, having no taste for membership in the BKR, started to form what was generally known as 'badan perjuangan' or struggle organizations.*

The formation of the BKR began on 23 August 1945. Ex-members of the Peta joined the BKR in their respective hometowns, not necessarily at the place where their former daidan was stationed.

One other effect, however, was that after the proclamation of independence, some nationalists, socialists, communists and other non-Islamic groups, might have developed an unobserved and not openly stated prejudice, fearing the PETA may easily integrate with or develop into a substructure of one of the Islamic groups, like MASYUMI, PSII, NU, Hizbullah or other denominations.

These concerns or suspicions probably became one of the reasons for the development of a

'reluctance' or 'hesitation' among other groups -- nationalists, socialists, communists, moreover the non-Moslems who in general have enjoyed Dutch education -- to, in conformity with the Constitution enacted on 18 August 1945, establish the PETA with its real power as the National Army, in contrast to the adoption of the Police Force and Civilian Government Services into the Republican structure.

In PETA circles, however, as professional soldiers, they were not aware of these kinds of sentiments, i.e. 'reluctance' or 'hesitation' among certain groups to accept the PETA directly as the Republican Army, and therefore just followed the Government decree by forming the BKR (Badan Keamanan Rakyat) on 23 August 1945 instead, which was automatically executed through integrating PETA para-military trained youth and integrating some HEIHO and former nationalistic KNIL elements individually into their ranks; thus the BKR spiritually might be seen as an extended PETA.

The Japanese Command, on instruction of the Allied Command issued instruction towards the 'disbandment' of the PETA by 19 August 1945. These instructions were naturally ignored by the people because by August 17, 1945, the national independence had meanwhile been proclaimed in Jakarta, and the PETA had already been actively involved in its preparation in Rengasdengklok since 16 August 1945 and had joined as guardians to, and flag-raisers during, above proclamation ceremony.

Looking back to that turbulent period, nowadays some Indonesians suggest that the government's decision of forming the BKR instead of establishing 'an official army' as an indispensable attribute of any sovereign state was considered the more favourable option in neutralising the false allegations made by the NICA leaders that the Republican Army was part of the Japanese Army who lost the war, as such to be disarmed and possibly treated as Allied's prisoners of war. The BKR as a provisional security organization functioned in reality just as any conventional army.

Recognizing the commemoration each year on the 5th of October as the official Indonesian Armed Forces Day (TKR on 5 October 1945), ultimately about 48 year later, the government announced the President's Order number 63/1993, which stated, that BKR is the 'origin' (cikal bakal) of TNI and all the BKR members who continued to serve in the TNI or Police during the war of independence are entitled to receive the BKR commemorative medal.

3. Political aspects affecting the TNI

a.

The TNI's code of conduct 'Sapta Marga' (Seven Pillars) was formulated and accepted in

1951/1952, reflecting the spiritual values as a 'pejuang' (1945 freedom fighter) and a soldier's pledge. In 1946, the President laid down the principles for the Armed Forces in the revolutionary situation vis-a-vis the state and the armed laskar organizations with political strings to certain political parties as follows:

1. The Nation's Constitution forms the foundation of the Nation and makes up the Army's (Armed Forces) politics.
2. The Army (Armed Forces) in no way discerns or adheres to any political creed (belief/system/doctrine).
3. The Army (Armed Forces) exists solely to defend the nation and its political belief.
4. The Army (Armed Forces) under no circumstances compromises in defending the Nation and its political belief (creed/system).
5. The Army (Armed Forces) must have a blazing spirit, a steely self-assurance and an iron-forged ideology.

b.

Commander in Chief General Soedirman also issued a five- point directive to the TNI on 7 June 1946.

1. Confidence in one's own strength (self-reliance).
2. Keep on your struggle, much has been sacrificed already.
3. Defend/protect our houses and homes (hearths, garden).
4. Our Army (Armed Forces) under no circumstances yields to whomever who wants to subjugate us (again).
5. Firmly uphold the Army's (Armed Forces') discipline, physically (outwardly) and morally (inwardly) as well.

In absence of the necessary codes usually known in already long established national armed forces, these directives or orders issued by the Supreme Commander / President Soekarno and the C-in-C. General Soedirman were monumental guidelines, indispensable to the TKR/TRI/TNI as the struggle's vanguard in facing the complexity of the political and national security situation, especially affected by the domestic political developments and dynamic social changes.

c.

The mass media, useful for creating domestic and international public opinion, have always focused their coverage on military related affairs; and although post war studies have never disclosed the effectiveness of Dutch strategic intelligence operations inside the Indonesian Republic, in particular activities on high-level and the top government circles, it is most likely to expect that it has happened.

General Spoor was not only a qualified C-in-C. of the KNIL, but he had also wide experiences as the NEFIS Chief during the Pacific War in Australia (Bouman p. 207).

Considering the objective factors, like the unexperienced Indonesian intelligence apparatus, the obvious ambitions of the power-hungry politicians in the domestic political scene, the aggressive Dutch regime, grasping all that is possible to eliminate the Republic, there will be no doubt or arguments that the Dutch might also have used covert strategic intelligence operations alongside the conventional, physical military operations.

During the Japanese occupation, Dr. J. De Jong has noted the role of Amir Syarifudin to organize an anti-Japanese underground movement with funds provided by the Dutch (De Jong, 11b II Eerste hlft p.406).

As a matter of fact, it was the same Amir Syarifuddin, who became Syahrir's Deputy Chairman in the Badan Pekerja KNIP (16 Oktober 1945), the Minister of People's Security and Information (14 November 1945), Minister of Defense (2 March 1946, again 2 October 1946), Prime Minister/Minister of Defense (3 July 1947, and again 17 November 1947), Chairman of the Indonesian Delegation during the Renville negotiations (8 December 1947), and later led the Front Demokrasi Rakyat (the People's Democratic Front) and the Madiun PKI (communist) rebellion (18 September 1948); captured, court-martialed and executed. It should be noted that Amir Syarifuddin held the position of Minister of Defense since the Second Cabinet of Syahrir, till the fall of the Sixth Cabinet in January 1948, even during his appointment as the Prime Minister in the Fifth and Sixth Cabinet.

In his capacity as the Minister of Defense, Amir Syarifuddin was directly involved for more than 2 years in 5 cabinets in the government's efforts to manage its defense apparatus. Looking back to those formative years of the TNI, the question arises whether during those (legal) years in office Amir has (mis)used his position in favour of his party's interest, at the expense of the Republic.

Recognized as a Dutch educated, highly intelligent and shrewd politician, Amir Syarifuddin was more 'close' and communicated more easily with the Dutch educated (in particular the ex-KNIL) TNI officers, who in general were older in age than the ex-PETA or ex-Laskar / Students TNI officers, concentrated in the Ministry of Defense (Bouman p. 224-233).

With his ex-Gerindo anti-fascist politics and the trust given by the Dutch to set up an anti-

Japanese underground movement during the Japanese occupation, Amir Syarifuddin was indeed really 'allergic' to anything Japanese, apparently also including the Japanese-educated PETA officers, although many of them had some Dutch high school or college education as well.

In his dissertation, Dr. Robert Bridson Cribb observed that the newly proclaimed Republic of Indonesia soon made serious efforts to consolidate an effective government, formulating a strategy to defend its territory by military means, to be respected internationally and have worldwide recognition, which could give an umbrella in international law and practice needed to cope with foreign aggression. This meant that the urgent need for a more effective administration and military organization had to be given top priority. Simultaneously Amir Syarifuddin (a socialist, later communist politician) as the Minister of Defense, made elaborate attempts using a multipronged approach, not only to control the armed forces but also the laskars (Cribb, 1990, p. 95, 96).

Since the early beginning of their existence, the local BKR/TKR units formed in the regions far from Jakarta without any logistical or whatsoever help from the Central Government have always rather skeptically, critically or reluctantly looked up to General Headquarters or the Ministry of Defense, in addition to such sentiments as mutual suspicions, prejudices or political mistrust in a revolutionary environment.

'It is quite obvious that the Japanese-allergic Amir Syarifuddin, and other like-minded Indonesian top leaders and politicians, might have not only (person to person) communication problems with some BKR/TKR/TRI units led by former PETA officers (with quite different cultural backgrounds), but soon emerged also differences in the political outlook and perceptions between those TNI units and the (more to the left leaning) armed laskar organizations in the field.

Apparently the main target for all Amir Syarifuddin's attempts might be to isolate, unseat and if possible to replace General Soedirman as the Panglima Besar of the TNI, and most likely Lieutenant General Oerip as the Chief of the General Staff (as an older generation KNIL officer). By so doing, the TNI units of Central or East Java, predominantly led by ex PETA officers, would come under ex KNIL officers, more favoured by Amir as a-political professionals, expecting that those Diponegoro and Brawijaya units could be much easier molded into 'KNIL model barrack battalions.'

Using the same classical Dutch colonial methods in the past to spread discord in a 'divide and rule' spirit, Amir stealthily might have exploited some trusted ex-KNIL officers (who seemed not to be aware of his political intrigues) to belittle and minimize General Soedirman's power and leadership in favour of their own ambitions with manipulating so-called technical aspects of a western army organization.

To accommodate Amir's role as a socialist (later communist) politician, he organized a mechanism for political ideology control of the TNI, the PEPOLIT and the Biro Perjuangan for access to the (mostly 'left or extreme left' oriented) laskar groups (Bouman p. 230, 231).

In some cases, this created dissension with strategic dimensions that might have developed its

implications in various degrees between the ex-PETA and ex-KNIL officers, the Ministry of Defense and the Markas Besar Umum (General Headquarters), between the TRI and the laskars, between the TNI divisions and, to some extent, between individual senior officers, although this artificial and inflated discord disappeared in facing the Dutch aggressions.

In the struggle against the Dutch, on the Indonesian side can be observed different groupings, like the federalists versus the unitarists (republicans), the cooperators versus the non-cooperators, the KNIL native soldiers versus the TNI etc.

This kind of situation might be an ideal environment for clandestine psychological or strategic intelligence operations for the anti-Indonesian Republic elements, not yet disclosed, revealed or fully researched. It was fascinating that all the targets of the domestic power struggle in the Republic during Amir's office played in the hands of the Dutch plan de campagne.

d.

Even though naturally suspicious about the RERA (Reorganization and Rationalization program) executed by the Central Government in Yogyakarta within the Army, especially since the effort to place 'political commissars' (PEPOLIT) in the Army units, the Army disregarding from whichever group they originated, either PETA, ex-KNIL or whatever in general, rejected the Government, i.e. Minister of Defense Amir Syarifuddin's policy, who afterwards, anyway showed his original color as a leader of the FDR (Front Demokrasi Rakyat) or PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) during the Madiun communist uprising in 1948.

It may well be that it was this attitude that gave grounds for the idea that the Army took an 'opposing' position against Government's policy (coinciding with certain Amir Syarifuddin's politics), and for 'politicizing' the Army's position even though they, ever since the Government deployed their policy of the POPDA line, Linggarjati, Renville, PDRI, Van Royen-Roem's Statement and The Round Table Conference, the Army persistently loyally executed the Government policy. Only against the Dutch Gendarmery plan, where the TNI was to play a subordinate role to the KNIL, the Army unitedly opposed with disregard of whether they originated from the PETA or from the former KNIL.

Thus, the facts from history do not sustain any proof of TNI's 'opposition' against legitimate (non-political party politics) Government policy, and the idea of 'politicization' by the Army's command is only the result of mis understanding among some external elements from the TNI who have not sufficiently delved into 'resource persons' who have actually taken part in or witnessed the growth of the TNI. Moreover, they give the impression that they may not comprehend and appreciate the spirit and the substance of the Indonesian struggle of Independence.

As a growing and dynamic organization, the more so in an atmosphere of struggle, uncertainty,

Dutch psy-war intrigues, dark intrigues among the politicians and a number of internal and external reasons, it is not impossible, in fact quite only reasonable, that differences in opinions or interpretations occurred among the TNI leadership, as took place within the Allied and Dutch Government circles; such however, does not immediately call for hairsplitting theories on its origin or genesis, due to differences in educational background, like the far stretched and absurd PETA-KNIL dichotomy, as though an unbridgeable dualism existed in the various echelons of leadership. Facts show that every time the Central Government decided upon a certain policy, the TNI leadership always loyally executed the Government's official decision.

e.

The Indonesian nation being a very large conglomerate of various peoples and cultures, only united by its common struggle against colonialism, strengthened by the well known 1928 Sumpah Pemuda, faced the difficult and complicated task of forming a united Army to face foreign colonialism and fight for its independence and sovereignty in a relatively short time after the end of World War II.

The forming of the PETA in a mostly Islamic Indonesian society, in the beginning may have caused some misevaluation which afterwards during the War of Independence was gradually overcome by the other non-Islamic groupings.

The important role of the PETA was actually already evident at the Proclamation of Independence of August 17, 1945, which was safeguarded by nationalistic PETA troops fully equipped and dressed with their PETA attributes.

f.

The loyal attitude of General Soedirman, as Commander in Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, strongly upholding his military support in the execution of the diplomatic strategy of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia during the execution of the POPDA operation as Indonesia's first international humanitarian post war task to repatriate 35,000 Japanese troops and 36,000 Allied prisoners of war and internees during 1945 -- 1947, was evident proof of his loyalty towards the diplomatic efforts by the Government. This loyalty was also evident during the 1946 'Rice for India operation' even though the Army was quite aware of the fact, that at that time, Indonesia was not especially oversupplied.

This loyalty of General Soedirman was the more evident when, facing the implementation of the Renville agreements and also the establishment of the Emergency Government of the Republic

of Indonesia (PDRI) by December 22, 1948, he immediately by radiogram confirmed his loyalty towards the PDRI instead of forming the Army's own 'War Cabinet' as proposed by a senior staff officer by January 1949.

Based on this loyalty, only after the returning of the Mandate of the PDRI to the President/Vice President, he consented to issue his cease-fire order to all TNI troops in accordance with the 'Van Royen-Roem's Statement' of May 7, 1949, which ultimately led to the international recognition of Indonesia's independence and sovereignty.

4. Some brief remarks on the TNI's military strategy in Indonesia 1945-1950

a.

Dr. Groen's analysis of the Dutch military strategy against Indonesia's struggle for independence based on the fundamental question 'Strategy? Did we (the Dutch Armed Forces -- DAF) have a strategy?' has been explained as 'the occupation of the vital points as fast as possible, subsequently the surrounding areas and operations' (Groen p. 88-90, 97, 109).

The execution of this strategy apparently has been much inspired by Clausewitz's book 'On War,' believing that the aim of war is the complete destruction of the enemy's forces (i.e. the TNI) in which, consequently, the battle which accomplishes this (i.e. the occupation of Jogjakarta) is the end of all strategy.

To accommodate the Dutch political aim to establish the (federal) RIS, the (unitarist) RI should be destroyed by conducting a war (police actions) which was bent solely on the annihilation of the enemy (the TNI), named by Delbruck as 'Niederwerfungsstrategie.'

After Dr. Groen's question on the Dutch strategy, it is fair to ask whether the TNI has formulated and implemented the right military strategy to accomplish its national mission of Indonesia's war of independence. What was the TNI's military strategy?

After careful consideration of all circumstances prevailing during that period, e.g. the aim of the armed struggle to defend the Indonesian independence, the political repercussions, all factors related to the Dutch national power, the limited national resources, etc., the TNI preferred a strategy named by Delbruck as the 'Ermattungsstrategie' with its two poles (battle and maneuver), in a 'people's war' with 'guerilla operations' organized in 'Wehrkreises.' Clausewitz in his book 'On War,' was the first to attempt to synthesize the characteristics of guerilla warfare and insurgent war—also described as 'people's war.'

Considering the geostrategic conditions in Java and Sumatra at that time and maybe no specific textbooks or field manuals were available to be consulted to formulate it, was this chosen TNI

strategy theoretically justified? For the purpose of an analytical exercise in this paper, some theories could be used e.g. the writings of Clausewitz, Delbruck or Lawrence.

b.

Although during the independence war most of the TNI officers (field commanders at the infantry battalion level) had not yet the opportunity to read Clausewitz's writings (a privilege only available to the KNIL elite before 1945), nevertheless, they were enlightened by other sources or field/battle experiences and were able to conduct the 'perang rakyat (people's war) or perang wilayah (territorial war)' on similar lines as explained in theory by Clausewitz or Delbruck's Ermattungsstrategie.

1. Clausewitz had identified two major characteristics of a 'people's war' as being military and political. Clausewitz's writings are primarily oriented toward the idea of people's war being a forceful realization of a political aim (i.e. the defense of the newly independent Republic of Indonesia). As he stated 'War can never be separated from political intercourse.'

He sets the climate for the conduct of guerillawarfare as follows: *'According to our idea of a people's war, it should, like a kind of nebulous vapory essence, nowhere condense into a solid body; otherwise the enemy sends an adequate force against this all, crushes it... and the weapon falls from the people's hands. However on the other hand, it is necessary that this mist should gather at some points into denser masses and form threatening clouds from which now and again a formidable flash of lightning may burst forth. These points are chiefly on the flanks of the enemy's theatre of war... (they serve to create a feeling of uneasiness and dread...'* (Lykke p. 182).

2. For historians or researchers in the field of military history, it might be interesting to what extent the TNI has performed its guerilla strategy and operations according to Clausewitz's thinking and writings. He identified the field techniques of guerilla warfare as mobility, dispersion and speed of action with emphasis on the enemy's flanks and rear. After the Dutch 'doorstoot' to Jogjakarta on December 19, 1948, all TNI units in Java moved to their assigned bases. Not only small units have shown their tactical mobility, but the whole Siliwangi Division (with their families) marched from Central to West Java and within two months they were ready to continue the armed struggle. General A.H. Nasution had excellently written many books about Indonesia's successful guerilla war in the period of 1945--1950.
3. Clausewitz also noted certain conditions under which a 'people's war' can be effective.

The conditions are:

1. That the war is carried on within the interior of the country.
2. That it is not decided by a single catastrophe.
3. That the theatre of war embraces a considerable extent of the country.
4. That the national character supports the measures.
5. That the country is of a broken and inaccessible nature, either from being mountainous, or by reasons of woods and marshes or from the peculiar mode of cultivation in use (Lykke p. 182, 183).

These guidelines have had a significant effect on the application of the Indonesian guerrilla warfare and may serve as guides to be used by those scholars or researchers concerned.

4. Dr. Groen has also referred to the different views of Schilling, on the qualities of the TNI as a military force and its guerrilla strategy (Groen p. 30, 47, 56, 283).

If many TNI officers lacked the opportunity to read Clausewitz, it might be more meaningful for interested researchers to read 'Seven pillars of wisdom' written by T.E. Lawrence (of Arabia)-regarded by some historians as the first theorist on guerrilla warfare, where he expanded the military ideas of Clausewitz-in order to have a better understanding of the TNI as a guerrilla force. The lack of the opportunity to read and to understand guerrilla warfare applies also to many Dutch educated civilian leaders or politicians on the Indonesian side as well at that time, affecting their confidence in Indonesia's resilience to cope with the Dutch Army's material superiority.

It will not be difficult to draw many parallels between the Arab or Indonesian side and the Turkish or the Dutch side.

Some interesting (universal) parallels are as follows:

1. The determination that there should be no direct confrontation with major Turkish (Dutch) forces.
2. Due to the lack of defensive power, they should never adopt a defensive posture and present a target to the Turks (Dutch).
3. Due to certain Arabic (Indonesian) conditions, they should not develop a large army and fight a conventional war type. They had to rely on small forces and (desert) mobility for security (rural areas in Java and Sumatra).
4. Since the Turks (Dutch) were not capable of dominating the entire area, the choice of 'time and place' of engagement should be made by the Arabs (TNI).

5. The friendly population would enable small forces to move in secrecy and these forces could paralyze the enemy's routes of communications.
 6. The small forces would operate as 'an idea, a thinking' invulnerable, intangible, without front or back, driving about like gas.' (This gas concept is almost identical to Clausewitz's description of guerilla warfare).
 7. The longer the war lasted, the more assured (Arab) would be of victory (Lykke p. 186).
5. These were Lawrence's ideas as how the guerilla war should be fought, which could be easily applied to Indonesia's case and which are diametrically opposed to Spoor's ideas of how an Indonesian army (conventional army or guerilla force?) should be and to conduct a war on his terms.

Lawrence has consolidated his thoughts into several concepts in his book which he used while with the Arabs. These included the following:

1. Be superior at the critical point and moment of attack.
2. Attack enemy's weaknesses.
3. Never defend; avoid contact except at your choice.
4. Highly developed intelligence and counter-intelligence are of major importance.
5. High mobility is a must.
6. Psychological warfare must be employed (mass and individual-against enemy and friendly forces-local and international).
7. Emphasis for a small force must be on speed and time-not hitting power.
8. Tactics should be characterized by 'tip and run-no pushes, but strikes'
9. Surprise is the main element of guerilla tactics. Mobility, deceit and ambush are among its strongest weapons (Lykke p. 186, 187).

These principles have been applied by the TNI continuously according to the local situation with satisfactory success, to survive the 'Aceh -- VPTL' operations of the KNIL/DAF.

c.

It is interesting to note that the fundamental characteristics of guerilla warfare as visualized by Lawrence are also present in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict: weak vs. strong (modern equipped

DAF), evasive (guerilla) vs. conventional offensive or defensive tactics, mobility and fluidity vs. fixed and protracted vs. quick.

Spoor's spearhead strategy failed to annihilate the nucleus of the armed struggle of the Indonesian people -the TNI- which had applied (as later analysed and compared with all those theories of Clausewitz or Lawrence) its Ermattungsstrategie successfully through a guerilla war supported by the people with a strong motivated will to fight, disapproving all the assumptions made by Spoor before launching his ill-fated strategy (Dr. Groen p. 235).

In her book, Dr. Groen has brilliantly explained many factors which have led to Spoor's failures of his spearhead strategy combined with merciless and ruthless 'pacification' operations. Besides those factors, other factors might be underlined. It seems that the Dutch, since the first attempts after World War II to reestablish its colonial regime in Indonesia, had based their perceptions of The Indonesian's attitude toward the Dutch after its Proclamation of Independence on August 17, 1945, which was still unchanged as it was on March 9, 1942-the day of surrender of the Dutch to the victorious Japanese Armed Forces in Kalijati. Dr. J.A.A. van Doorn has observed those social changes during the Japanese occupation in his book 'Ontsporing van geweld' as a 'maatschappelijke' or 'sociale mobilisatie' (Van Doorn pp.28 -- 32).

Another important factor is the domination of the colonial (pre World War II) state of mind and intellectual arrogance prevailing in the KNIL officers corps towards the nationalistic movement for Indonesia Merdeka since 1908, in particular related to the history of the formation of the TNI, later transformed as the avant-garde in the armed struggle of the young republic and subsequently became the nucleus of the 'APRIS' in 1950.

d.

At the end of this War of Independence in 1950, the KNIL (the once main invincible and unbeatable protector of the pre-World War II Dutch colonial regime) has been disbanded, the remaining DAF peacefully sailed back to the Netherlands and the TNI had to face the new challenges experienced by the new Republic of Indonesia.

The historians or other scholars interested in military history may continue the writings of Clausewitz, Delbruck, Lawrence or other famous guerilla war theoreticians (Mao Tse Tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, etc.) to analyze the Indonesian experience of its guerilla war related to an Ermattungsstrategie vis-a-vis a (conventional) 'spearhead strategy' as applied to annihilate its enemy involved in a patriotic revolutionary war to defend a nation's independence against a foreign invader.

As an illustration, the Indonesian guerilla war meant mainly a war on the platoon or company level with all its consequences of military leadership practices, tactical and technical decision making, logistical support, etc. No matter how sophisticated or brilliant the overall strategy and

related directives might be, all depended on their execution of the discipline, professionalism, perseverance and the will to fight of those freedomfighters in the field and support of the people.

There was not a Dien Bien Phu type final decisive battle, involving many army divisions with complete heavy artillery fire support. The TNI experienced only a wide spectrum of offensive actions, consisting of a multi-battalion general attack type attracting international attention (Jogyakarta 1 March 1949) or the destruction of an important single bridge (Bumiayu, 30 July 1947), vital for the advancing Dutch 'V' Brigade to conquer Purwokerto, executed by some high school TP (Student Army) 'unprofessional' freedom fighters, but later rated as technically 'very good' for its results by the former Anjing Nica (KNIL) company commander S.A. Lapre R.M.W.O. (letter to T.P. 'I..M.A.M.' dated October 15, 1992).

e.

As Schilling earlier estimated, except if certain conditions are met in terms of available troops, time, etc., ultimately the war ended not in favour of the Dutch, based on the idea that the TNI should be forced 'to fight a conventional war' (Groen p. 46, 47, 235). In line with Lawrence's thinking, during the last stages of the war, TNI has avoided such kind of operations. The dramatic conquest of Jogyakarta and the capture of many top Republican leaders at the end of 1948 was not subsequently followed by a (Dutch) Kalijati type surrender in 1942 of the TNI to the KNIL. Au contraire, the guerilla war of the TNI was planned and conducted in full force, not after 'a military defeat' of the KNIL to Japanese forces in 1942.

The overall result of the perilous guerilla war was made possible by the fully integrated efforts on all levels of the TNI exploiting all kinds (ex-PETA, ex-pre war KNIL, etc.) of military expertise, troop leaders' skills in the field and the people's support (the fish and water principle).

The interesting question which might follow is whether it is possible, at least theoretically, that a guerilla war-which is considered indecisive in nature-ultimately could become decisive, as what happened in attaining the ultimate objective of the Indonesian struggle for independence.

In his book, Taylor correctly pointed out, that '*.... the gravest psychological miscalculation occurred with the launching of the (so-called) second police action. As a result, the Netherlands suffered defeat in its relationships vis-a-vis the Federalists, the Asian countries, the United States, the Security Council, while for its part the Republic was able to profit from a resurgence of militant resistance with the initiation of full-scale guerilla warfare and the establishment of an emergency Government in Sumatra.....*' (Taylor p. 300).

It was definitely the strong spirit of nationalism and patriotism that became the driving force of the all-out Indonesian resistance during the period of 1945-1950. In addition to other already existing studies (Taylor pp.3,4) and to have a better understanding of Indonesian nationalism in the period of 1908-1950, it is noteworthy to study the Indonesian struggle for independence with

some theoretical aspects of Williams Pfaff's writings, e.g. that *'the most powerful political force of the twentieth century which is likely to prove the most powerful of the twenty-first as well: nationalism'* (Pfaff p.1).

He further explained that *'Nationalism is the political (and military) expression of a form of group identity attached to an existing state or to a community, which is not yet a recognized nation-state but believes that it should become one. It can be a form of utopianism'* (Pfaff p. 197).

Considering these theoretical aspects of his analysis of Indonesia's struggle for independence, he concluded that: *'the major West European States had already been humiliated in their confrontations with Asiannationalism. The Netherlands (and France) attempted and failed to reestablish colonial rule in Dutch East Indies (Indonesia and in Indo China) in the 1940s (and 1950s).'* (Pfaff p. 158).

As Pfaff described, Indonesian (Asian) nationalism developed against the assumed belief of Dutch (European) moral superiority, guardian ship, possessing the natural right and bringing political enlightenment (mission civilisatrice). He confirmed that it was this Indonesian nationalism -- developed during the Dutch colonial period and enhanced during the Japanese occupation -- that challenged and resisted the Dutch attempt to reestablish their colonial rule in Indonesia, and caused its failure, diplomatically and militarily as well. (Pfaff p. 158).

5. The situation at the end of 1949

a.

Some Dutch historians claim that the end results of the Dutch 'Niederwerfungs strategie' with the implemented Spoor's spearhead strategy were among others: about 5000 Dutch military personnel killed, the negative reactions of about 150,000 military men who concluded that all their efforts were for nothing, more than 300,000 Dutch citizens were forced to repatriate and about 12,500 Moluccan former KNIL soldiers preferred to stay in the Netherlands, etc.

The Dutch military actions (1947 and 1948) have been backed up by tremendous international and diplomatic efforts, which as Prof. Dr. Teitler had described, *'were ultimately maneuvered helplessly to a total loss of the colony, the federation, the trade relations, the properties and the KNIL'*.

After the formal recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty on 27 December 1949, it was proved that Indonesia wanted its own nation, its own armed forces, its own foreign service, etc.

b.

Indonesia's almost five-year-long struggle for independence, exploiting all means available in the military and diplomatic field (Taylor), had tremendously increased the political and national consciousness of Indonesia's people, after 1950 stimulating to exercise their own legitimate rights in the political, military, economic and social fields, formerly considered the exclusive preserves of the Dutch.

Indonesia had to make all efforts to consolidate its position and its major preoccupation, i.e. thenational unity, although still facing simultaneously opposing remnants of former KNIL elements (Westerling, Andi Azis, RMS), the Darul Islam fighting for an 'Islamic state,' local anti-government rebellions supported by foreign powers and the Dutch refusal to relinquish Irian Jaya.

Epilogue

As so often with wars in the past, the Second World War proved also a forcing ground of many shifts, developments and radical changes in the international community which prevented the return to the old state of affairs. As history has shown, nowhere was this more apparent than in Southeast Asia, where people of many former colonial territories of European powers were able to exploit existing 'disequilibrium of force' situations so as to fulfill their own aspirations for national independence.

The Indonesian case has shown a unique and rough but inevitable transition from colonial to sovereign status. A prolonged diplomatic and military struggle resulted in an independent Indonesia as the sixtieth member of the United Nations fully fledged in the international community.

The misinformed Dutch diplomats in the United Nations on the actual strength of the Republican resistance were not able to belittle, downsize or play down the results of the power of a protracted fullscale guerilla warfare needed for a stronger bargaining position, in particular to back up the Indonesian (Republican) diplomatic endeavours against the Dutch in the United Nations (Taylor pp. 192, 194, 195).

The Dutch attempts manipulating the Linggarjati and Renville agreements to eliminate the 'militant resistance' or its 'extremist and irresponsible' elements of the Republic, i.e. in particular the TNI, were not successful, while two 'police' actions and ruthless 'pacification' operations using 'Aceh -- VPTL doctrines' failed to annihilate the TNI and to purge the Republic by armed

force. As a general conclusion it can be fairly accepted that the so-called 'reality in the field' in Java and Sumatra was the TNI, the core of the armed resistance against the Dutch military ('police') efforts.

Moreover, as a foreign diplomat emphasized, the Republic (of Indonesia) was both a political entity and the heart of Indonesian nationalism, which could not be eliminated by military action (Taylor p.179).

The forming of the unified Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, which actually took place amidst the War of Independence, was of course not an easy task and, therefore, it was accomplished only gradually, starting with the integration of the PETA-trained para military groups into the regular Army beginning with the Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR) by August 23, 1945, and gradually by the integration of local laskar organization (local militias) into the TNI (Indonesian National Army), like the Laskar Rakyat, Pesindo, KRIS, Hisbullah, Sabilillah, Napindo, Halilintar, etc. After the Round Table Conference of December 1949, some former KNIL units and individuals were given the opportunity to join the TNI, which already formed the core of the APRIS.

By the historical development of the political/diplomatic and military strategy used by the Republic of Indonesia to carry out its War of Independence, it is clearly evident that from the beginning until the entrance of the Republic of Indonesia into the United Nations Organization by September 1950, the nationalist TNI led by General Soedirman had always played the role of a loyal and professional Army.

Such loyal attitude was fully dramatized during critical moments as happened resulting from the 2nd Dutch colonial aggression of December 1948, where General Soedirman strongly rejected any deviation from the Constitution of 1945 and upheld his motto that 'the Army's policy always should adhere to the State policy.'


Such is the heritage left by the 1945 Generation, especially by the hundreds of thousands fallen heroes, in the hope that it further be patriotically carried out by the following generations, which in the absence of a conscription army as indicated by Article 30 of the Constitution. decreeing the duty and right of every citizen to take part in the national defense, reflecting the philosophy of the Preamble of the Indonesian Constitution that 'Indonesian people love peace, but above all, they love freedom.' For the surviving 1945 Generation (Angkatan 45), the present Indonesia is identical with the result of an uninterrupted and continuous struggle of its people inspired and guided by the unquenchable spirit for liberty of its ancestors, later implemented in the nationalistic movement and struggle for independence since 1908 (National Awakening), 1928 (Youth Pledge), 1942-1945 (the physical preparation), the Proclamation of Indonesia's Independence 17 August 1945, 1945-1950 (the defense of the Indonesian Republic) and finally the liberation of Irian in 1962.

As for the seven questions brought up in the Introduction, interested scholars, historians and researchers are hereby invited to draw their own conclusions on the substance of this paper. Moreover, many aspects of this subject are still open for further research and study.

The genesis of the Indonesian National Army and some political implications

Annex A

Indonesia's struggle for independence



The genesis of the Indonesian National Army and some political implications

Annex B

Suggested readings

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K.M.L. Tobing, *Perjuangan politik bangsa Indonesia: Linggarjati* (Jakarta 1986)

Tobing K.M.L. *Perjuangan politik bangsa Indonesia: Renville* (Jakarta 1986)

E. Vanvugt, *Het dubbele gezicht van de koloniaal: Nederlands-Indië herontdekt* (Haarlem 1988)

The genesis of the Indonesian National Army and some political implications

Annex C

Abbreviations and Glossary

APRIS	Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Indonesia
APWI	Allied Prisoners of War and Internees
BKR	Badan Keamanan Rakyat People's Security Body

KNIL	Royal Netherlands-Indies Army
KL	Royal (Dutch) Army
LKP	Landelijke Knok Ploegen
NEFIS	the Dutch Intelligence Organization
NICA	Netherlands Indies Civil Administration
OD	Ordedienst
PETA	(Tentara Sukarela) Pembela Tanah Air in Java (Volunteer Army) of Defenders of the Homeland) In Sumatra it is called Giyugun
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia Indonesian Communist Party
PEPOLIT	Organization for Political Indoctrination in the Ministry of Defense
RTC	Round Table Conference
RVV	Raad van Verzet
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia Indonesian National Army
TKR	Tentara Keamanan Rakyat People's Security Army
TRI	Tentara Republik Indonesia Army of the Republic of Indonesia

The genesis of the Indonesian National Army and some political implications

Annex D

List of biodata

Born on September 13, 1926 at Bukittinggi, West Sumatra.

ALWIN NURDIN
(69) 1939-1942 : Hogere Burger School Medan (5-y Gymnasium) 3rd-y.
1943 Medical College (I-ka Daigaku) Singapore, 1944 Giyu-gun (Home Defense Army) North Sumatra

1945-1950 BKR, TKR, TNI Officer (War for Independence), 1951-1953: Hogere Krijgsschool (Dutch C&GS College) the Hague, 1960 Honourable retirement in rank of Major, 1963-1965: Business Academy of Indonesia (BBA).

Born on March 20, 1923 at Langsa (Aceh).

Graduated in 1941 from H.B.S. Medan, continued study at the Technical College in Bandung.

**ISJRIN NOERDIN
(73)
Professor Doctor Ir.**

Became 2nd Lieutenant of the Boei Giyugun Sumatra in 1943 and joined the TKR in 1945.

In 1950 resumed studies, graduated as an Organic Chemistry Engineer, followed by a Ph.D degree at the Institute Technology Bandung.

Born on July 14, 1923 in Jakarta, son of the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Haji Agus Salim during the War of Independence.

ISLAM SALIM (73)

In 1944 became a platoon leader of the PETA Army in Jakarta, later joined the BKR since 1945 till his retirement as a Lieutenant Colonel of the TNI, writer of a book "Breakthrough of the Indonesian Emergency Government (PDRI) and the role of the TNI" (1996).

Born on January 20, 1923 in Jember. In 1944 became a platoon leader of the PETA Army in the 5th Battalion in Malang.

**IWAN STAMBUL
Drs. HAJI
MOHAMAD (73)**

Active in the BKR since 1945 and retired from the TNI with the rank of Major General and has been appointed as the Indonesian Ambassador in Lagos (Nigeria).

Born on September 27, 1927 in Purwokerto (Central Java).

In 1944 became a platoon leader of the PETA Army in Malang, joined the BKR in 1945 and was Commanding General of the Armed Forces Academy (1973-1978). After his appointment as the Indonesian Ambassador to the U.N. New York, retired from the TNI with the rank of Lieutenant General in 1982.

**PURBO S.
SUWONDO (68)**

Lecturer graduate studies in the University of Indonesia in Jakarta.

Born on August 10, 1927 in Tuban (East Java).

SUDIANTO

SASTROATMODJO (68) In 1945 joined the PETA Army in Malang, later became active in the BKR till his retirement from the TNI in 1967 with the rank of Colonel.

Born on August 25, 1926 in Kutowinangun (Central Java).

SUPARDIO (70)

In 1944 became a platoon leader of the 3rd PETA Battalion in Gombong, joined the BKR in 1945 and retired as the Deputy Head of the Military History Division of the ABRI in 1980 with the rank of Colonel.

TULKHAH

MANSYUR Drs. (36) Born in Wonosobo (Central java) in September 23, 1962, graduated from the Diponegoro University (Semarang) majoring in History. Government Official of the National Archives Office in Jakarta.

UTARYO (71)

A former student of the Medical Cllege in Jakarta, become a platoon leader of the PETA Army in 1944, joined the BKR, was active during the POPD A Operations and later retired in 1950 from the TNI with the rank of Major.