

Papuan political imaginings of the 1960s: international conflict and local nationalisms¹

Richard Chauvel

The paper examines the ideas of the future - Papuan political aspirations - that developed among the Papuan elite in the late 1950s and 1960s, particularly in the last two years of the Indonesia - Netherlands dispute. It emphasises the context of the dispute, but focuses on the Papuan actors in it. The paper does not contend that Papuans influenced the direction or outcome of the dispute, on the contrary, rather that the dispute shaped the development of the elite and its political aspirations. The first part of the paper examines the emergence of a Dutch-educated Papuan elite after the Pacific War. Dutch policies sought to cultivate an elite that identified with Papua as part of Melanesia rather than with Indonesia. The paper argues that this elite were the "first Papuans", in that they expanded their identities from the regional and tribal to the pan-Papuan. Education policies and structures facilitated the development of a pan-Papuan identity. Another factor influencing an emerging Papuan identity was the very structure of the colonial administration. Netherlands New Guinea had a 'dual' system of colonialism, as much Indonesian as it was Dutch. The 'first Papuans' forged their identity and their political attitudes in reference to and, sometimes, in opposition to the Indonesians, who held many of the middle and lower positions within the administration, education system and the missions. The Indonesian role in the colonial administration of Netherlands New Guinea strengthened Indonesian nationalists' conviction that the territory was part of Indonesia. This paper argues that the Indonesian role in this 'dual' colonial system tended to have the opposite effect on Papuans.

The second part of the paper argues that Papuans developed their political ideas in the context of and in response to the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands. The young and small elite were confronted by choices - integration with Indonesia, the Melanesian Union idea or independence as a separate state. The nationalist impulse, as this was expressed in the *Manifest Politik* of October 1961, represented a Papuan attempt to determine their own future, rather than have the Dutch, Indonesians and Americans do it for them. That small, young and politically inexperienced elite failed to exert any influence on the outcome of the dispute, but it had created a conviction that Papuans had a right to determine their own future. Of all the stakeholders in the New York Agreement, it was only the Papuans in the years after 1962, who clung to the belief that the provisions for an "Act of Free Choice" were anything but a fig leaf. The paper concludes by arguing that the early 1960s was a formative period in the construction of Papuan nationalism and has become the centre-piece of Papuan nationalist historiography.

The Papuan Elite

The mission and Dutch educated elite emerged as a new social group in Papuan society during the Indonesian struggle against the Dutch during the Revolution and the subsequent conflict between Indonesia and The Netherlands. Papua was not one of the centres of the Indonesian nationalist movement, except as a place of exile for revolutionaries. Nevertheless half a century of missionary education had produced a small group of people aware of the great changes taking place elsewhere in the Netherlands empire. A 1949 government report identified an educated group of some 1700 Papuans in the territory - village schoolmasters, government officials, para-medics, agricultural officials, police and tradesmen - most of whom have had some secondary education.² In the view of the first post-war Dutch Resident of New Guinea, J.P.K. van Eechoud: "The intellectuals consist of a very small number of teachers, officials of the lowest rank and nurses. New Guinea cannot achieve any autonomy for many generations."³ He considered that there were hundreds of Papuans ready for training as teachers and officials. This task of training a Papuan elite should be a major objective of Netherlands policy and for this purpose Van Eechoud established special schools for police and officials. He also established a Papuan para-military force, the "Papoea Bataljon". Pupils were deliberately drawn from various regions in Papua so as to broaden local identities into a Papuan one.

Van Eechoud's students understood the essentially political purpose of his policies. In October 1961, eleven years after van Eechoud ceased to be Resident, during the New Guinea Council debates about the recognition of the *Bintang Kejora* as the national flag, one of the Papuan members proposed that, if the *Bintang Kejora* was raised, a flower be placed on van Eechoud's grave as he was the one who had planned all that we are now about to achieve.⁴ About the same time Markus Kaisiepo recalled a meeting with 'Father' van Eechoud in 1945 at the school van Eechoud established to train Papuans as officials. Van Eechoud told the students that they had to study diligently because they were the new Papuans for a new New Guinea. "This is what I have been trying to do ever since. Not only me; all of us."⁵

When, in 1960, The Netherlands sought to accelerate the pace of political advancement the further development of an elite was a critical part of the policy. Th. H. Bot, the State Secretary for New Guinea, established a policy framework for elite development which was much broader, more systematic in its application and more clearly directed towards the political objectives of self-government and self-determination of the Papuans than that envisaged by van Eechoud.⁶ *Residents* and *Controleurs* throughout the territory were instructed to register "prominent Papuans" in the areas of their administration with the objective of identifying those who could be involved in the Government's plans. Specifically, those who would be suitable for political education, potential candidates and government nominees for representative councils, government advisors as well as those who could be sent on trips to Holland and elsewhere. The administration

had a well-established intelligence apparatus to keep pro-Indonesian political activists under surveillance. The register of “prominent Papuans” was a means of identifying the Papuan political resources to be mobilised and cultivated in the administration’s development strategies.⁷

The lists of “prominent Papuans” included all the well-known political figures, such as Nicholaas Jouwe, Markus Kaisiepo, A. Indey, Wettebossy, H. Womsiwor and E.J. Bonay. However, the net went much further to encompass teachers, missionaries, government clerks, village heads, nurses and policemen, skilled and semi-skilled urban wage-earners, many of whom had little or no prior political experience. The lists provide an insight into the processes of post-war social change in Papua. For example, they included people who had served in van Eechoud’s Papua Battalion and worked in the oil industry in Sorong.⁸ By July 1961 some 395 “prominent Papuans” had been identified from five residencies in Papua.⁹

These political developments need to be placed in a somewhat broader context of socio-economic change. In the early 1960s only about 40,000 Papuans out of a total population of around 700,000 lived in the small urban centres dotted around the coastal areas and off-shore islands. Secondary education had been developed only on a very small scale. When Paul van der Veur was planning a survey of secondary school students in 1962 he found it was not necessary to ‘sample’ the population. He could have surveyed the entire population of secondary school students. Van der Veur’s survey found that the students were prominently the first generation of their families with a western education. The fathers of about two-thirds of the pupils worked in the subsistence sector of the economy. While fathers of nearly 16% occupied the teaching, bureaucratic and political positions to which the students themselves aspired.¹⁰

Becoming Papuan

Bot, like van Eechoud before him, recognised that the topography and ethnic diversity meant that there was little sense of national awareness among Papuans. One of the Government’s objectives was to stimulate such awareness. The central education institutions made an important contribution, as would the *Papoea vrijwilligers korps* (PVK-Papuan Volunteers Corps) and the New Guinea Council. Bot also sought to encourage an awareness among the elite that they belonged to the same people as the Papuans of the Australian-administered territories. The objective must be that Papua, located on the periphery of Asia, shall in the future constitute part of a greater Melanesian entity, ultimately independent, yet assuming a place in the world linked spiritually and economically with the West.¹¹

The Dutch and mission education system were key institutions in expanding the horizons from the tribal and the local to the Papuan. The Papuan graduates of van Eechoud’s schools were in some senses the ‘first’ Papuans as well as the first generation of Papuan nationalists in that they were the ones that began to think of themselves as being members of a broader

pan-Papuan society, not merely a member of a particular ethno-linguistic group.

In the case of the Netherlands Indies / Indonesia, Benedict Anderson has identified the critical influence of the institutions of colonial education, particularly for the first generation of students, in promoting “colonial nationalisms”. The colonial education system was highly centralized, with common textbooks and standardized programs. These institutions provided students with a common experience – “...a territorially specific imagined reality which was everyday confirmed by the accents and physiognomies of their classmates.”¹² Although the scale was much smaller and the level of education not at tertiary level, the expansion of schools and training institutions after the Pacific war in Papua, also promoted the development of a pan-Papuan identity among the first generation of students. Indeed, this was the specific objective of Dutch policy.

In his official study of the emerging political elite of the early 1960s, G. W. Grootenhuis observed that the more progressive and better-educated members of the elite that he found among the leaders of PARN (National Party) were moving out the milieu of their own ethno-linguistic group. They had much greater contact with Papuans from other regions and with non-Papuans. Through their education and occupation they had moved from one region of Papua to another. Many of the PARN leaders were from Serui and had moved to Hollandia (Jayapura) where they tended to live in Hamadi among Papuans of diverse backgrounds, rather than members of their own group. They played an active part in community organizations such as trade unions, youth and sports groups, where they came into regular contact with Dutch residents of Hollandia. They read the local newspapers and listened to the Dutch government as well as Indonesian radio broadcasts. Grootenhuis argued that the PARN members had made but the first step out of their local milieu. They were usually the first members of their family to enjoy an education higher than village primary school. They lived among people of diverse backgrounds in Hollandia, but their spouses were mostly from their own group.¹³ PARN was part of the flowering of political activity that followed the announcement of The Netherlands’ ten-year plan for the decolonisation of Netherlands New Guinea. As its name suggests, PARN purported to be neither anti-Indonesia nor anti-Dutch, but pro-Papuan. PARN sought to unite all Papuans and create a national identity.¹⁴

The objective of Dutch policies may have been to promote a sense of pan-Papuan identity. The regional and tribal composition of the Papuan elite reflected the impact of much longer term influences of the colonial system than the policies of van Eechoud and Bot. Paul van der Veur’s survey of students in 1962 found that students from the regions of Papua with the longest contact with the colonial administration and missionaries were best represented in the secondary school population. Students from Biak-Numfur islands made up nearly 25% of the total student body, while students from other long-contact regions like the island of Japen (Serui) and the region around the capital Hollandia added another 20%. However,

emphasising the role of education as a vehicle of social change there were also some students from some regions only recently brought under Dutch administration.¹⁵

The prominence in the elite of people from Biak and Serui gave political developments in the post-war period a particular regional dimension. The identification of political leaders from particular regions and ethnic groups with pro-Indonesian or pro-Dutch orientations was a feature of 1960s generation of Papuan nationalists. In 1960 the Catholic weekly *Tifa* published an article entitled “Nationaal Partai”, in which it noted that all the PARNA leaders were from Serui and that Biak had no representatives. *Tifa* observed that the struggle between Biak and Serui was the oldest in Papuan politics. After the war Markus Kaisiepo, from Biak, was the leading pro-Dutch politician and Silas Papare, from Serui, led the pro-Indonesia forces.¹⁶

Not becoming Indonesian

Van Eechoud and Bot’s promotion of a Papuan identity was not the only factor responsible for the emergence of a growing political awareness among educated Papuans. Another stimulus came from the very structure of colonial rule in the territory. The structure of the Netherlands administration provided the particular context for Papuan – Indonesian relations. Netherlands New Guinea had a system of ‘dual colonialism’ in which a handful of Dutch officials held the most senior positions in the administration and missionary organizations, while many of the middle and low ranking officials, policemen, teachers and missionaries were Indonesians, many from Maluku, as Papua was administered as part of residencies and governments based in Maluku until the Pacific War. The ‘dual colonial’ structure of Netherlands New Guinea was quite distinct from the forms of ‘indirect rule’ found elsewhere in the Netherlands Indies, where members of local elites were co-opted into the colonial administration and local administrative structures subsumed within the colonial government. In Papuan eyes, the colonial officials were nearly all foreigners – a few Dutch and many Indonesians. Particularly before the war Papuans came into contact with the more numerous Indonesians with much greater frequency than with Dutch officials and missionaries. The Indonesians were at the interface of colonial rule. The inevitable resentments were directed against the Indonesians rather than the Dutch. The presence in Papua of so many Indonesian servants of the Dutch state contributed to the Indonesian nationalist sense that Papua was part of Indonesia, but it did not necessarily contribute to the Papuan sense of being part of Indonesia.

The former Governor of Netherlands New Guinea, Jan van Baal, observed that the educated Javanese, Makassarese or Ambonese, deployed as officials throughout the Indies, were impressed by the sheer size of the colonial state and felt that they belonged to it. Their national awareness as Indonesians developed from this experience. The Indonesians,

particularly Moluccans, who participated in the development of Papua, thought of Papua as part of their country. However, there were virtually no Papuans who participated in the development of Indonesia, outside Papua. Papuans thought of the Indonesians in Papua not as compatriots, but as foreigners, who were colonizing them and their land and most of all occupied the positions Papuans wanted. Van Baal commented that no one foresaw the tragic consequences for the Papua – Indonesia conflict this would have.¹⁷

When Papuans themselves became colonial officials after the Pacific war, Papua was more distinctly set apart than before from the unit of the Netherlands Indies / Indonesia. The Resident of New Guinea still was responsible to the Lt. Governor General in Batavia (Jakarta), but the administration was now more separate from that of the neighboring islands of Maluku. The training of Papuan officials was undertaken in Papua and upon graduation they were appointed to positions in Papua. Hollandia (Jayapura) was the center of their bureaucratic pilgrimage – their Rome – not Jakarta or Ambon. Just as happened in the Netherlands Indies, the deployment of Papuan colonial officials to positions throughout the territory, irrespective of their ethno linguistic background, contributed greatly to their becoming the first Papuans.

E.J. Bonay, one of the leaders of PARNA and under the Indonesian administration the first governor of West Irian, states that the terms “Papua” and “Amberi” were the ones used by Papuans during the Dutch period to describe, respectively the indigenous peoples of the territory and the Indonesians, from elsewhere, who had become the officials, police and military officials of the colonial government. The “amberi” were the “accomplices” and “stooges” of the colonial government, whose treatment of Papuans was inhuman and who thought Papuans were stupid, dirty and curly haired. Bonay argued that Papuans took their revenge against the “amberi” during the “Koreri” movement, 1938-1943. He asserts that the “amberi” sense of superiority evident in the Dutch period has got worse since the “amberi” became Indonesians and the new colonizers in Papua. Bonay contends that it is not surprising that the conflict and antagonism between Papuans and “amberi” was a continuity from the past.¹⁸

The antagonism that Bonay observed and experienced between Papuans and *amberi* as a function of the ‘dual colonialism’ of the government structure was one of the central themes in an official Dutch study of the emerging Papuan political elite in the early 1960s. The study argued that Papuan elite attitudes towards the Netherlands – Indonesia dispute were influenced by personal experience. The study’s author, G.W. Grootenhuis, argued that key to personal experience was the notion of “progress” (*voortgang*). Grootenhuis’ Papuan informants made the distinction between the pre-war period when Papuans were treated as “animals” (*bintang*) by Indonesian officials and after the war, when there was increasing interaction with the much greater number of Dutch officials, and Papuans were treated as “humans” (*manusia*). The change corresponded with an improvement of material welfare, but Grootenhuis argues it was the tre-

atment that Papuans experienced at the hands of Indonesian and Dutch officials that was the critical factor. Papuans resented the discrimination they had suffered at the hands of Indonesian officials. Many felt they had been treated as being dumb and not able to speak good Malay (Indonesian) by their Indonesian teachers. Those Papuans who had obtained positions in the administration felt that they were kept in the lower positions by Indonesian officials, who regarded them as incapable of being anything else. The official Dutch were regarded as bearers of development - of education, Christianity and material progress. The Indonesians were not only the source of discrimination and prejudice, but were suspected as working against the progress offered by the Dutch. If Indonesia was successful in its struggle to gain control of Papua, Grootenhuis' informants feared that this would mean a return to the "binatang" period and Papua would be cut off from the source of progress (kemajuan). As young educated Papuans contemplated independence in the early 1960s, they were uncertain about the future role, if any, of the Indonesian officials, teachers and missionaries. Some thought that they should be permitted to remain, but not without conditions.¹⁹ Echoing Grootenhuis' use of '*manusia*' and '*binatang*', Van der Veur, in his survey of Papuan students in 1962, found that students showed a strong desire to be modern, to be *manusia* and not *binatang*. The students aspired to hold the modern political and administrative positions. Among the reasons cited by the students for the opposition to Papua becoming part of Indonesia was that they "did not want to become slaves".²⁰

It would be misleading to assume that all relations between Indonesians and Papuans were as antagonistic as Grootenhuis' report suggests. During Indonesia's struggle for independence against the Dutch there were Indonesian politicians who were able to mobilize Papuan support for independence, with Papua as part of an independent Indonesia. Soegoro Atmosprasodjo was a former internee in Boven Digul.²¹ He had worked for the Dutch during the war in Australia and was appointed as head of a training school for Papuans in 1945. Dr. Sam Ratulangi was the Republican Governor of Sulawesi, sent into exile in Serui in 1946 with his closest assistants and their families. Soegoro's activities in Hollandia and Ratulangi's in Serui suggest that Indonesian nationalists were able to disseminate their ideas among Papuans, both the small group of graduates of the missionary schools and van Eechoud's training schools and amongst less sophisticated villagers. Soegoro did have the capacity to speak to Papuans in terms of their own interests and how these could be advanced within an independent Indonesia. The former detainee from Boven Digul and the Ratulangi group were experienced and skilful politicians, who sought to mobilize Papuan support for the Republican support. They interacted with Papuans in a very different manner to the east Indonesian officials, teachers and missionaries.²²

Born in conflict: Papuan responses to the Dutch – Indonesia conflict

The last months of 1961 and the first of 1962 were the climax of a 12 yearlong dispute that went to the brink of open military conflict. The US sponsored negotiations that led to the New York Agreement of August 1962 took place under the threat that Indonesia would move from armed infiltrations to a large-scale military attack. It was this environment that stimulated and shaped a critical period of Papuan nationalism. Papuan nationalist political activity itself was a factor in the escalation of the conflict. President Sukarno recognized that a rival Papuan national claim to Papua was a much greater threat to Indonesia's own claim than continued Dutch rule.²³

The political developments in Papua were responses to the escalating international conflict. The Papuan leaders' reactions were by no means uniform. For Papuan leaders, both pro-Indonesia and nationalists, this period was a political roller coaster. They were alternatively encouraged and demoralized by the international developments. As the tension escalated, the focus of the dispute for Papuans shifted from the rival claims to sovereignty over the territory to the issue of self-determination and the prospect of an independent state of West Papua. The shift was a catalyst to an emerging sense of Papuan nationalism. Among the Papuan political elite there was an awareness that their homeland's fate was at stake. These international developments and the Papuan responses revealed the divisions in the elite and more broadly in Papuan society. Papuan leaders found it difficult to position themselves in the conflict.

Foreshadowing a theme among the *reformasi* era nationalists, Papuan leaders in 1961 resented the fact that there was an international struggle taking place, beyond their control, but about their future. At a meeting in August 1961 Herman Wayoi, the chairman of PARNNA, protested that Papua was not a commodity: "This land is of and for the Papuans."²⁴ It was with this sense of resentment and in a rapidly changing international environment that led to the flag raising on 1 December 1961. On 19 October a group of some 72 people (all but one Papuans), representing most regions of the territory, both Christians and Moslems gathered in Hollandia. Four of Papua's leading politicians and members of the New Guinea Council – Nicholaas Jouwe, E.J. Bonay, Nicholaas Tanggahma and F. Torey, took the initiative for the meeting.²⁵ The meeting elected 17 people to form a *Komite Nasional Papua*. The *Komite Nasional* issued a *Manifest Politik* that, inter alia, stated:

"On the basis of desire of our people for independence, we urge through the mediation of the *Komite Nasional* and our popular representative body, the New Guinea Council, the Governments of Netherlands New Guinea and The Netherlands so that as of 1 November²⁶:

our flag be flown beside the Netherlands flag;
 our national anthem, *Hai Tanahku Papua*, be sung along with the
Wilhelmus;
 the name of our land become West Papua;
 the name of our people become Papuan.

On this basis we the Papuan people demand to obtain our own place like other free peoples and amongst nations we the Papuan people wish to contribute to the maintenance of the freedom of the world."²⁷

The *Manifest Politik* was formulated a couple of weeks after the Netherlands Foreign Minister, Joseph Luns, presented his plan to internationalize the dispute to the UN General Assembly. Torey, who was one of the founders of the *Komite Nasional* and a member of the New Guinea Council, explained the *Manifest Politik* in the context of Luns' proposal. He said that Luns' proposal had created much misunderstanding in Papua. Some members of the New Guinea Council considered that if all they did was passively listen to the claims of the Indonesian and Netherlands Governments, they would eventually be forced to support one of the adversaries and their own voice would not be heard at the UN or in the international community. Torey argued that the objective of the *Manifest Politik* was to establish Papua's right with the raising of the flag to demonstrate to the international community that Papuans desired to stand on their own feet and later establish their own nation. That was Papua's right. Torey related that this was why *Komite Nasional* proposed to the Government that on 1 November that the Papuan flag would be flown beside the Netherlands flag, the anthem be sung and our land and people be known as Papua.

The *Manifest Politik* was the first assertion of the Papuan demand to join the other free peoples of the world and establish their own nation state. Following Kelly and Kaplan, Papuans wanted to become part of the system of nation states developed after the Second World War. It was significant that the Papuan demand was expressed at a moment when the processes of decolonization were being played out in the forum of the UN. Kelly and Kaplan are correct in asserting that decolonization was an imposition of a new political order from top down.²⁸ Papuans understood that the process was largely out of their control, but at this brief moment they attempted to use the international system and its central institution – the UN – as well as its language and principles to assert their demand to become a member of the club.

Despite the fact that not all the leaders who gathered on 19 October supported the *Manifest Politik*, it was decided to press on because shortly the UN would decide the fate of Papua and its people. The *Komite Nasional* wanted to make sure Papua's voice be heard and that the world understood that Papuans had their rights and Papuans knew what they wanted. Torey acknowledged that it was unusual to raise a national flag beside that of the colonial power. It was not *Komite Nasional's* intention that the raising of the flag meant the transfer of sovereignty. In Torey's opinion,

a proclamation would pose a dilemma. Independence would mean the departure of the Dutch, Indonesia would invade and Papuans would not have the resources to defend themselves.²⁹

As Torey acknowledged there were some members of the *Komite Nasional* and the Council, who had concerns about the flag. Achmad argued that the flag should only be raised after there was an information campaign about the flag and when sovereignty was transferred to Papua.³⁰ Burwos thought that many people would not understand the distinction the *Komite Nasional* leaders were making between the flag raising and independence. Many of the people he represented in Manokwari thought that the flag raising would mean that independence had been granted.³¹ Outside the Council there were others who shared this view. PARNA initially argued that independence could be achieved within the framework of the Luns Plan. In November PARNA insisted that a transfer of sovereignty should take place at the same time as raising the flag.³² Despite these reservations the Council members supported the *Komite Nasional's* petition.

Despite the misgivings the Luns' proposal had created in Papua, when the New Guinea Council came to debate the proposal there was strong support from Papuan members because of the centrality of Papua's right of self-determination in the Luns Plan. Torey argued that the Luns Plan represented the one chance to resolve the problem of West Papua. However, he wondered what would happen if the Luns Plan was not accepted. It was certain that Indonesia's demands would grow. He feared that the Dutch would withdraw. He asked himself what steps would need to be taken by the Netherlands Government to guarantee Papuans right of self-determination.³³

Two days prior to the flag raising, none of the resolutions supporting the Luns Plan for the internationalization of Papua gained the required two-thirds majority in the General Assembly.³⁴ The reaction of the most senior Papuan politicians was not quite what the Netherlands authorities in The Hague had expected. Kaisiepo, for example, told a Dutch journalist although he had accepted the wisdom of the Dutch attempt to obtain an international guarantee for Papua's right of self-determination, Papuans had never sought internationalization, rather they wanted the continuation of the Netherlands administration until self-determination. Jouwe contended that the result offered little hope for Indonesia's case as an absolute majority of UN members had supported Papua's right of self-determination.³⁵

The first raising of the flag took place in front of New Guinea Council building on 1 December 1961. The *Komite Nasional* organized the occasion. Kaisiepo, the deputy speaker of the New Guinea Council, and W. Inury, chair of the *Komite Nasional*, welcomed the Governor, senior officials, members of the Council and political party leaders. Unfavorable weather helped keep the ceremony in Hollandia quiet.³⁶ Flag raising ceremonies took place throughout the territory. Not surprisingly, in areas like Biak there was strong interest shown, but even where support for Indonesia

had deep roots, like Serui and Yapen, there was much local interest. There were no "incidents" reported.³⁷

Papuans and the New York Agreement

An examination of Papuan thinking and actions surrounding the *Manifest Politik*, with its assertion of Papua's right to independence, and the flag raising of 1 December shed light on a critical period in the development of the nationalist movement. Another aspect of this period relates to the key issue of self-determination, the New York Agreement and the implementation of the "Act of Free Choice" in 1969. Central to Papuan concerns was their own participation, or rather the lack of it, in the determination of Papua's future.

On 16 February 1962, after Sukarno's *Trikora* speech calling for the liberation of West Irian, the New Guinea Council held a debate on the right of self-determination. Tanggahma and Bonay's contributions reflected two broad approaches. One rejected Indonesia; the other argued that a solution could only be found with Indonesia. Tanggahma discussed four possible scenarios: Integration with Indonesia was undesirable. An association with Australian New Guinea could only be contemplated when both halves of the island were independent. A long-term association with The Netherlands was not possible because the world considered it colonialism. The only option was continued Dutch administration leading to self-determination. Bonay argued that it was only possible to resolve the conflict if Indonesia and The Netherlands cooperated. As long as there was a dispute, Papua would never be able to exercise its right of self-determination. Bonay wanted a tripartite conference, where Papua would seek recognition for its right.³⁸

These diplomatic developments surrounding the climax and eventual resolution of the West New Guinea dispute took place at the highest levels of the United States, Indonesian and Netherlands Governments. Papuan leaders, pro-Indonesia or nationalists, took no part. They could only observe from a distance and send protest telegrams, petitions and resolutions to those in Washington, Jakarta and The Hague determining their fate. These means of representation were much used as the tensions grew and negotiations continued. The Papuan responses were in keeping with the pattern of political developments after 1960. Members of the New Guinea Council and those involved in the political parties established in the atmosphere of rapid political advancement were critical of the American intervention, which they considered partisan. Robert Kennedy in particular attracted their ire. Political leaders also sought to remind the Netherlands Government of its commitment to self-determination and consultation.³⁹ PARNAs took a somewhat different line. While maintaining its established policy of Papuan representation in any negotiations, it addressed issues raised in the Bunker Plan. It proposed a two-year joint administration of Indonesia, The Netherlands and West Papua responsible to the United Nations. At the end of the two years there would be a United Nations-supervised election.⁴⁰

The crucial aspect of the Bunker Plan for Papuans was when, how and under whose administration they would exercise their self-determination. In June, Jouwe, who was a member of the Council delegation to The Hague and who had then attended the 4th Committee meeting in New York, made it clear to Ambassador Bunker that the guarantee for self-determination had to be watertight. Jouwe insisted that Papuans should exercise their self-determination under the supervision of the United Nations and before the administration was transferred to Indonesia.⁴¹ Given that Indonesia had not accepted the right of self-determination for any of its regions and had consistently rejected it in the specific case of Papua for the duration of the dispute, any Indonesian commitment to self-determination under the Bunker Plan was treated with some scepticism by Papuan leaders.⁴² The demand for the plebiscite to be held during the period of United Nations administration was a consistent and enduring theme of debates in the New Guinea Council and the subject of many motions while the negotiations were in progress and after the New York agreement was announced.

Bonay, one of the PARNA leaders, was the only member of the Council who accepted the Bunker Plan as it offered a prospect of a peaceful resolution. Tanggahma was another Council member who sought something of a rapprochement with Indonesia. He tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the Council to send a delegation to Indonesia.⁴³

Student opinion

The activities of the *Komite Nasional*, the formulation of the *Manifest Politik* and the debates in the New Guinea Council provide some insights into how the senior leaders in the Papuan elite were responding to the escalating conflict. It is difficult to assess to what extent the views expressed by members of the New Guinea Council and parties like PARNA reflected broader sections of Papuan society. Paul van der Veur's survey of 927 students attending post elementary schools – "a potential elite group" – give us a glimpse into the thinking of another section of the emerging elite. The survey was conducted between April and June 1962, thus after Sukarno's *Trikora* speech, during the Bunker negotiations and the Indonesian military infiltrations.⁴⁴ Van der Veur asked the students their views about Papua's future political status. He posed the students a number of possibilities: continuation of Dutch rule; transfer of Papua to Indonesian authority; federation with the Australian-ruled eastern half of the island and independence in the not too distant future. Van der Veur argues that the results indicated that the program of "...rapid decolonisation had caught the imagination of a large segment of the youth...".⁴⁵ Specifically, the results indicated that a large majority (77.4%) of the students favoured the continuation of Dutch rule, a very small number (0.9%) preferred Indonesian rule, a substantial minority (34.5%) favoured independence and a substantial majority supported some form of union with the eastern half of the island. The support for continued Dutch rule was qualified by statements (300 out of 598 respondents) to the effect of 'until we are ready

for independence'. Similarly, the support for independence was qualified with comments such as 'not too soon' and 'by 1970', the date foreshadowed by the Dutch for independence. The students' responses indicating strong opposition to the transfer of Papua to Indonesian rule were sometimes associated with comments reflecting anti-Indonesian stereotypes.⁴⁶ Van der Veur considered that the students were relatively well informed about the political developments. In retrospect, the student's confidence, in April-June 1962, that continued Dutch tutelage to self-government and independence was a possibility seems optimistic. The students may have been expressing, unconsciously, their own vested interest in the conflict. They were among the beneficiaries of Dutch policies. They, like the members of the New Guinea Council, were the potential elite of an independent Papua. This said, the students' strong opposition to the solution then being negotiated by the Dutch and Indonesians seems clear enough.

The New York Agreement

In August, as the Bunker negotiations reached their final stage, both the Indonesian and the Dutch governments appointed Papuans to their respective delegations. Silas Papare, Fritz Kiriho and Dimara joined the Indonesian delegation, while Council members Jouwe, Womiswor and Tanggahma were appointed as advisers to the Netherlands delegation. Governor Platteel was especially keen that Papuans be seen as participants in the negotiations. Since before the negotiations commenced, the New Guinea Council and the major political parties had demanded participation and consultation. He wanted to avoid any suggestion that the Dutch had excluded Papuans from the decision-making.⁴⁷ As it turned out, the Papuan advisers arrived after the negotiations had been finalized.

The Bunker negotiations culminated in the New York Agreement, under which Netherlands New Guinea would become the Indonesian province of West Irian. The administration would be transferred through the mediation of a United Nations transition administration from 1 October 1962 to 1 May 1963. After six years of Indonesian administration, the inhabitants of West Papua would have the opportunity to exercise their self-determination through an "Act of Free Choice".

Papuan reactions to the agreement were mixed. There was rejection, feelings of betrayal, resignation and accommodation to an Indonesian future as well as some discussion of possible proclamations of independence. The Governor's good intentions did little to appease Papuan feelings that forces beyond their control had determined their fate, despite their representations. The political organizations and activity as well as the Papuan nationalist sentiments and national symbols that had emerged in the previous couple of years counted for little in the last analysis.

The New Guinea Council building became a focus for well-organized and well-supported demonstrations against the agreement. At the first such

demonstration Markus Kaisiepo condemned the agreement: "We were traded as goats by the Americans." He agreed with the PARNA leader, Bonay, that the time had passed for Papuans to support Dutch policy. Now they must support us.⁴⁸ Bonay himself recalled two of the chants at the demonstration: "How many dollars for Papua, Yankee." "We Papuans want freedom, not Soekarno."⁴⁹ There were some Council members who noted the difference between the resolution of the international dispute and the accommodation of Papuan national aspirations. As was the case during the negotiations, the critical factor for many Papuan leaders was timing of self-determination after years of Indonesian control. The issue provoked a clash at the National Congress in September between supporters of a plebiscite in 1963 under the United Nations administration or 1969 under Indonesian control.⁵⁰ Zacharias Sawor, a Dutch educated Papuan agricultural official, attended the meeting. He recalled that the majority at the Congress wanted the plebiscite to be held while the UN-TEA troops were present so as to insure a proper vote.⁵¹

Among some Council members there seemed to be an awareness, that despite their protestations and representations, the New York Agreement meant Papuans had lost this battle. The intent of the National Congress, held in mid September 1962, appeared to be both to reassert the Papuan national ideals and yet reach some accommodation with the Indonesian administration. The 1969 plebiscite was the focus of symbolic compromise and the next objective of the national struggle. Tanggahma argued:

We must give Indonesia no chance to destroy our aspirations. Jakarta would get the opportunity if Papuans were disruptive. Therefore I will urge people to maintain law and order. Papuans must strengthen themselves in order to sustain and preserve their nationalist sentiments until the plebiscite. To this end Papuans must organize themselves in large parties with the same objective: independence in 1969.⁵²

During the brief period between the *Komite Nasional* and its *Manifest Politik* in October 1961 and the signing of the New York Agreement in August the following year there was a shift in the Papuan political agendas. The changes reflected the roller coaster ride that the Indonesia – Netherlands dispute generated for Papuan leaders. The nationalist demands of the *Manifest Politik* were formulated at a time of relative optimism. The *Komite Nasional* members might have resented the fact that the Dutch government, despite the undertakings to the contrary, had not consulted the New Guinea Council about the Luns Plan; still, the plan held some promise that Papua's right of self-determination would be protected and an Indonesian takeover avoided. When the New York Agreement was signed there was little discussion about what the flag raising of 1 December meant. The focus of the debate was on the agreement's provisions for self-determination, particularly when and how these provisions would be implemented. Papuan leaders were keenly aware in 1962 that implementation under the UN administration would mean something different from implementation after Indonesia assumed control of the administration.

Self-determination

A key ingredient and consistent theme in the development of Papuan nationalism from 1962 to the renaissance after Soeharto is the interpretation of the self-determination provisions of the New York Agreement. The provisions for self-determination were the straw of hope to which Papuans clung. Clemens Runaweri, in his report prepared just before his attempt to represent Papua at the UN discussions on the "Act of Free Choice" in 1969 wrote:

The main problem of the dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia was dealing with the political future of the Papuans. And the presence of the UN Representative in this territory is for the purpose of protecting the Papuans right of self-determination. Unfortunately this UN man seem not to be a protector but as an advisor with competence and authority. He is actually a looker watching at a game played by the Indonesian Army Generals against the innocent and unweapon Papuans.⁵³

What Clemens Runaweri saw as the crux of the problem, the other interested parties in the conflict regarded as something to be shaded by a fig leaf. The Australian Minister for External Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick in January 1962 anticipated that successful negotiations would probably include a 'face saving' formula for the protection of Papuan interests. The Papuans' right to choose their own future would be "entirely dependent on Indonesian good faith" and that there would be no way of ensuring that this aspect of the agreement would be carried out.⁵⁴ Foreign reporting on developments in Papua between the Indonesian assumption of the administration and the "Act of Free Choice" was intermittent and patchy. However, one of the consistent themes in the reporting was the hope and trust Papuans placed on the just implementation of the self-determination provisions of the New York Agreement. It was a hope maintained in the face of overwhelming evidence that Papuans experienced in their daily lives that the Indonesian authorities had a different understanding of the provisions and contrary outcome in mind. For example, Floyd Whittington, the Counsellor of the US Embassy who visited West Irian in August 1964, observed that knowledge of the terms of the New York Agreement was widespread in Papuan society and "...the prospect of a plebiscite burns like a talisman of hope for the future. The most remarkable aspect of this problem was the unanimity with which Papuan leaders of varying attitudes toward continued union with Indonesia agreed that it was of the greatest importance that a fair plebiscite actually be conducted."⁵⁵

In retrospect, that hope and trust seems misplaced, naïve and ignorant of the international forces that facilitated a resolution of the West New Guinea dispute in Indonesia's favor. Perhaps the contemporary Papuan belief that a thorough investigation into the New York Agreement and the conduct of the "Act of Free Choice" will resolve their conflict with Indonesia reflects something of the same view of the world and how international relations are conducted. Naïve the Papuan faith in the self-determi-

nation provisions might seem, but it is a key and consistent ingredient in Papuan nationalism.

Correcting the course of Papuan History

In the post Suharto *reformasi era* revival of Papuan nationalism the history of the 1960s – that of Papua’s incorporation into Indonesia – has become the history to be “rectified”. Much of Papuan nationalism has become a debate about history. This paper has argued that Papuan nationalism was also shaped by history. The nationalists of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s were educated and developed their political ideas in the context of Indonesia’s struggle for independence and the subsequent dispute between The Netherlands and Indonesia about who owned the land of Papua. The key ingredient that made Papuan nationalism was the demand in the *Manifest Politik* of October 1961 that the Papuan people obtain their own place like other free peoples and nations. This demand was formulated as a response to Foreign Minister Joseph Luns’ ill-fated attempt to internationalise the dispute with Indonesia. Luns’ Plan sought to protect Papuan interests, yet just as much as Sukarno’s command a couple of months later to crush the puppet state of Papua, it was a case of others determining Papua’s future, not Papuans.

To say that much of Papuan nationalism has been a debate about history is misleading. It has been more of a monologue. The *Kongres Papua* of mid 2000 formalised in the following resolutions the key assertions of the Papuan rectification.

1. The people of Papua have been sovereign as a nation and a state since 1 December 1961.
2. The people of Papua, through the Second Congress, reject the 1962 New York Agreement on moral and legal grounds as the agreement was made without any Papuan representation.
3. The people of Papua, through the Second Congress, reject the results of Pepera (the Act of Free Choice) because it was conducted under coercion, intimidation, sadistic killings, military violence and immoral conduct contravening humanitarian principles. Accordingly, the people of Papua demand that the United Nations revoke resolution 2504, 19 December (sic) 1969.⁵⁶

One of the few Indonesian attempts to respond to and engage with the *Kongres Papua’s* interpretation of history was that of former foreign minister Dr. Subandrio in his book entitled, appropriating the Papuan slogan, *Meluruskan Sejarah Perjuangan Irian Barat* (Correcting the History of the Struggle for West Irian). Subandrio can make as good a claim as any Indonesian, with the exception of Sukarno, for the diplomatic success of 1962, so it is appropriate that he responded to the *Kongres Papua* and celebrated his own and Sukarno’s achievement. He criticised President Abdurrahman Wahid for giving in to the demands of the “Papuan separatists” by changing the name of the territory from Irian to Papua and for

supporting financially the *Kongres Papua*. Subandrio sought to rebut the *Kongres Papua's* arguments that Papuans were not involved in Indonesia's struggle for independence, by asserting that thousands of Indonesian freedom fighters had been exiled to West Irian (Boven Digul), where they acculturated with the local inhabitants. Subandrio concluded that: "Apparently, the Papuan Peoples Congress did not understand the history of independence of its own nation."⁵⁷ Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, then Security Minister, said at the launch of Subandrio's book that: "How fortunate are the Indonesian people to have elder statesmen, who still possess great *concern and commitment* to clarify the truth and the facts as an official guidance to the Indonesian people and the international community, when there is a group of people attempting to *cloud, distort and manipulate the facts of history*, certainly with subjective comment and interpretation and with the political objective of separating from the territorial unity of Indonesia."⁵⁸

The history of the land of Papua and the Indonesian state during the 1960s is where two contending nationalisms confront each other. In a letter to a Dutch friend at the time of the Luns Plan, Subandrio wrote that if The Netherlands persisted with the policy to establish *Papua Merdeka*, for Indonesia that could mean nothing else but *konfrontasi*.⁵⁹ The Netherlands decided not to persist, but many Papuans have and it has meant *konfrontasi*.

ENDNOTES

- 1 In addition to the references cited, this paper draws on a number of the author's earlier publications, in particular *The Land of Papua and the Indonesian State: Essays on West Papua*, volumes one & two (Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Working Papers 120 & 121 (2003));
 - *The Papua Conflict: Jakarta's Perceptions and Policies* (Policy Studies 5, East West Center Washington, March 2004) ;
 - co-author with Ikrar Nusa Bhakti; *Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity and Adaptation* (Policy Studies 14, East West Center Washington, 2005)
- 2 *Report on Activities, Reactions and Aims of the autochthonic population of Netherlands New-Guinea concerning the future political status of their country in connection with the Dutch-Indonesian Round-Table-Talks*, Hollandia, September 1949.
- 3 J.P.K. van Ee choud, Nota Bestuursbeleid Nieuw Guinea, 10-3-47, *Nationaal Archief Den Haag (NA), Archief Minog, Rapportage Indonesië, dossier 779*.
- 4 *Handelingen Nieuw Guinea Raad (NGR), Eerste Buitengewone Zitting*, 30-10-61, p. 33
- 5 Vraaggesprek met Kaisiepo and Jouwe, 13-10-61; *NA, Archief Minog, Kabinet van de Gouverneur van Nederlands Nieuw Guinea, dossier 35*.
- 6 Verslag van de Reis van de Staatssecretaris van Binnenlandse Zaken, Mr Th. H. Bot naar Nederlands Nieuw Guinea, Australische Nieuw Guinea, Australië en de VS, 9 jan - 24 feb 1960, p. 33, *NA, Particuliere collectie Th. H. Bot, dossier no. 44*.
- 7 Memo Residents Conference november 1959 re: registration of prominent Pa-

- 8 Letter Resident Hollandia to the Governor of Netherlands New Guinea 25-4-60; Letter A. Boendermaker, Directeur van Binnenlandse Zaken, to the Governor of Netherlands New Guinea, 9-5-60, *NA, Archief Minog, Kabinet van de Gouverneur van NNG, dossier 17*.
- 9 The 'List of Prominent Papuans' of July 1961 mentions 151 'prominents' in Hollandia, 90 in the Geelvinkbaai, 29 in Fakfak, 98 in West New Guinea and 27 in South New Guinea, *NA, Archief Minog, Kabinet van de Gouverneur van NNG, Dossier 17*.
- 10 Paul van der Veur, "Questionnaire survey among the potential Papuan elite in 1962 West New Guinea", *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (BKI)*, (1964) vol 120 no 4, pp. 425, 431-432.
- 11 Verslag van de Reis van de Staatssecretaris van Binnenlandse Zaken, mr. Th. H. Bot naar Nederlands Nieuw Guinea, Australische Nieuw Guinea, Australië en de VS, 9 jan - 24 feb 1960, pp. 1-3.
- 12 Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: ed. 1991) pp. 121-122
- 13 Rapport van de wetenschappelijk ambtenaar G.W. Grootenhuis in NNG, "Papoea Elite en Politieke Partijen", (Hollandia 1961) deel I, pp. 26-27, *NA, Archief Minog, Dossierarchief no 11575*. This official report was written at the height of the government's promotion of the Papuan elite and as tensions with Indonesia increased. It was sympathetic to the Netherlands Governments's policy objectives.
- 14 Tifa, (Hollandia) no. 226, 27-8-60
- 15 Paul van der Veur, 'Questionnaire', *BKI 120:4*, pp. 429-430
- 16 Tifa (Hollandia), no. 226, 27-8-60
- 17 Jan van Baal, *Ontglipt Verleden* (2 vols, Franeker 1989) vol. II, pp. 166-7; Danilyn Rutherford, *Raiding the Land of the Foreigners: The Limits of the Nation on an Indonesian Frontier*. (Princeton 2003) p. 180.
- 18 E.J. Bonay, "Sejarah Kebangkitan Nasionalisme Papua." (Unpublished manuscript, Wijhe, The Netherlands, 1984) p. 84.
- 19 Rapport Grootenhuis, "Papoea Elite en Politieke Partijen" vol I, pp. 15-17, 106.
- 20 Paul van der Veur, 'Questionnaire' *BKI 120: 4*, pp. 449, 453-4
- 21 Boven Digul, north of Merauke in southeast Papua, was established after the 1926-7 communist uprisings in Java and Sumatra as a place of internment for Indonesian nationalists and communists. Anderson argues that Boven Digul had a central place in the folklore of the Indonesian nationalist struggle and was "a sacred site in the national imagining". He mistakenly contends that, apart from the internees, no Indonesian nationalists saw Papua with their own eyes until the 1960s. Anderson, *op. cit.* p. 176
- 22 Richard Chauvel, *The Land of Papua and the Indonesian State*, vol. I, pp. 10-13.
- 23 Sukarno, "Tahun Kemenangan," August 17, 1962, *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi*, (Panitya Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, Jakarta), vol II, p. 500
- 24 Bestuursverslag van de Resident van Hollandia over de maanden augustus-september 1961, *NA, Archief Minog, Dossierarchief no G 16725*.
- 25 Monthly Report – Australian Liaison Officer to Netherlands New Guinea – October 1961, *National Archives of Australia (NAA), DEA file 3036/1/1/1, CRS A1838*.
- 26 The Dutch authorities accepted the *Manifest Politik*, but wanted the first flag raising to take place on 1 December rather than 1 November so that it would

- not compromise the Dutch position during the debate about the Luns Plan at the UN. See Chauvel, *The land of the Papua and the Indonesian State* vol. 1, p 41.
- 27 Manifest Politik, Hollandia, 19-10-61, *Pengantara: het nieuwsblad voor Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea*, 21-10-61; Politiek Leven over Oktober 1961, *ibidem*, Hollandia, 28-11-61 in NA, *Archief Minog, Dossierarchief no G 16725*. The *Bintang Kejora* was chosen as the national flag from three designs. The *Hai Tanahku Papua* was composed by the Dutch missionary Kijne in 1925.
 - 28 John Kelly and Martha Kaplan, *Represented Communities: Fiji and World Decolonization*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001, p. 5
 - 29 NGR 30-10-61, pp 13-18
 - 30 NGR 30-10-61, p. 21.
 - 31 NGR 30-10-61, pp. 40-1
 - 32 Codetelegram Platteel 435 to Bot, 9-11-61, NA, *Archief Minog, Codetelegrammen 1945-1963*.
 - 33 NGR 31-10-61, pp. 19-20. Nicholaas Jouwe was not present in Hollandia during the debate about the Luns proposals. He recalled that he objected to Luns' initiative on the grounds that the New Guinea Council had not been consulted nor, he thought, had the members of the South Pacific Commission, particularly Australia and New Zealand. Jouwe considered that Papua's future was to be secured in association with its neighbours in the Pacific, rather than with the UN. Interview, Nicholaas Jouwe, The Hague, 5-12-2001.
 - 34 Codetelegram Bot 488 to Platteel, 28-11-61, NA, *Archief Minog, Codetelegrammen 1945-1963*. The Brazzaville resolution, which expressed the strongest recognition for Papua's right of self-determination as established in the UN Charter, received 53 votes in favour, 41 against and 9 abstentions.
 - 35 Codetelegram Platteel 482 to Bot, 29-11-61, NA, *Archief Minog, Codetelegrammen 1945-1963*.
 - 36 Bestuursverslag van de Resident van Hollandia over de maanden november en december 1961, NA, *Archief Minog, Dossierarchief G 16725*.
 - 37 Maandverslag over de maand December 1961 van de afdelingen Geelvinkbaai en Centraal Nieuw-Guinea, NA, *Archief Minog, Dossierarchief G 16726*; Codetelegram Platteel 485 to Bot, 2-12-61, NA, *Archief Minog, Codetelegrammen 1945-1963*.
 - 38 Codetelegram Hollandia 61 to Bot, 16-2-62, NA, *Archief Minog, Codetelegrammen 1945-1963*.
 - 39 Monthly Reports – Australian Liaison Officer to Netherlands New Guinea – March & April 1962, NAA File M 341, 5..
 - 40 Bestuursverslag van de Resident van Hollandia over de Maanden Maart en April 1962, NA, *Archief Minog, Dossierarchief G 16725*.
 - 41 Interim Report – Australian Liaison Officer to Netherlands New Guinea – 19-6-62, NAA, File M 341, 5. From Jakarta's perspective, the Bunker Plan was the first of numerous formulas for a settlement of the dispute in which self-determination was acceptable. Self-determination was acceptable precisely because Papuans would exercise it after a period of Indonesian administration.
 - 42 Monthly Report – Australian Liaison Officer to Netherlands New Guinea – April 1962, NAA, File M 341, 5.
 - 43 *Nieuw Guinea Koerier*, 14-7-62. Tanggahma's motion failed seemingly because a majority of members considered that a delegation could not go to Indonesia while Indonesian military activities persisted.
 - 44 Paul van der Veur, 'Questionnaire', BKI 120: 4, p. 424

- 45 *Ibid*, pp. 447-449.
- 46 *Ibid*, p. 449
- 47 Codetelegram, Platteel to Bot, 7-8-62, NA, Archief Minog, Codetelegrammen 1945-1963. Platteel was responding to advice from J.H. van Roijen, the Netherlands Ambassador in Washington and head of the negotiating team. Van Roijen had advised against the inclusion of any Papuans as they would be seen as "stooges" by the Indonesians and others and this would have undesirable consequences for the further conduct of the negotiations. Telegram, Bot to Platteel, 7-8-62. NA, Archief Minog, *Archief kabinet van de Gouverneur van NNG dossier 12*.
- 48 *Nieuw Guinea Koerier*, 11-8-62; Interim Report – Australian Liaison Officer to Netherlands New Guinea – 14-8-62, NAA, *File M 341*, 5.
- 49 Bonay, *op cit*, bab 5, p. 1
- 50 *Nieuw Guinea Koerier*, 21-9-62.
- 51 Sawor, Z. *Ik bén een Papoea. Een getuigeverslag van de toestanden in Westelijk Nieuw-Guinea sinds de gezagsoverdracht op 1 oktober `1962* (Groningen 1969), pp. 83-84. When a delegation from the Congress went to Jakarta, Sawor recorded Soebandrio as telling them that the Indonesian Government would do its best to establish security through peaceful and diplomatic means, but if that was not possible the troops would be sent in. Soebandrio forbade the delegates to express their views on self-determination until they had seen the conditions in other parts of the country. It is our principle that Indonesia does not claim anybody else's territory. Sawor noted that a few months later Indonesia launched its confrontation campaign against Malaysia.
- 52 *Nieuw Guinea Koerier*, 24-8-62.
- 53 Clemens Runaweri, 'Political Situation in West Papua between May 1, 1963 and April 11, 1969, and the Act of Free Choice in July – August 1969', p. 18 (English original).
- 54 Submission 10, West New Guinea, 'Where is the Dispute Heading', G.E. Barwick, 11 January 1962, NAA, *Prime Minister's file C508 pt 2, CRS A4940*.
- 55 Airgram A-207 from the American Embassy in Jakarta to the Department of State, Washington, 11 September 1964, West Irian – August 1964, Floyd Whittington, p. 9. *National Archives Record Administration (NARA) 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-6, Box 2307, POL 2*.
- 56 Resolusi Kongres Papua, Port Numbay (Jayapura), 4 June 2000. The UN resolution was on 19 November 1969.
- 57 H. Dr. Subandrio, *Meluruskan Sejarah Perjuangan Irian Barat*, Yayasan Kepada Bangsa-saku, Jakarta, 2001) p. 12
- 58 *Ibid*, p. 248. Emphasis in the original.
- 59 *Ibid*, p. 41.