

Notulen van de vergadering van de Ministerraad op 13 okt. 1961

*'s Morgens te 10 uur aangevangen en 's middags voortgezet, Trêveszaal.

Aanwezig: De Minister-President De Quay en de Ministers Van Aartsen, Beerman, Klompé, Korthals, Marijnen, De Pous, Toxopeus, Veldkamp, Visser en Zijlstra. (afwezig zijn de Ministers Cals en Luns).

Voorts zijn aanwezig de Staatssecretarissen Bot (punt 2h), Van Houten (punten 1 tot 3), Roolvink (punt 8, 11 en 13i), Schmelzer (punten 11 en 13i), Scholten (punt 7).

Secretaris: J. Middelburg.

2. Buitenlands beleid

f. *Uitbetaling Nederlandse pensioenen e.d. in Indonesië*

Minister *Klompé* heeft vernomen, dat de uitbetaling van pensioenen en onderstanden in Indonesië stagneert. Minister *Beerman* stelt de vraag of de gelden daarvoor niet aan de betrokkenen overgemaakt kunnen worden. Minister *Klompé* acht het denkbaar, dat onze post in Singapore hiertoe postwissels verzendt. Staatssecretaris *Van Houten* zegt toe, dat hij dit zal nagaan.

h. *Nieuw-Guinea* (Zie notulen MR 6 oktober 1961, punt 2a. #Zie ook notulen MR 27/10/61, punt 2a.)

Staatssecretaris *Van Houten* deelt met verwijzing naar het overzicht van de voorlopige reacties op de Nederlandse voorstellen (stuk nr. 7217) mede, dat van de 58 landen 21 steun hebben toegezegd en 9 deze met voorbehoud hebben toegezegd, terwijl 5 het plan afwijzen en 3 een neutrale houding zullen aannemen.

Minister *Klompé* merkt op, dat in een artikel in het laatste nummer van *Vrij Nederland* een scherpe aanval op Minister Cals wordt gedaan. Zij vraagt zich af of hierop geen tegenspraak moet worden gegeven. Minister *Zijlstra* deelt mede, dat dezelfde rubriek in het vorige nummer een mededeling bevatte omtrent zijn houding in de Ministerraad ten aanzien van Nieuw-Guinea. Spreker meent, dat de bewindslieden in het algemeen niet op dergelijke beweringen in bladen of tijdschriften moeten ingaan. Zij zijn alleen verantwoordelijk tegenover de Kamer en als een Kamerlid het wil weten kan hij vragen stellen. Minister *Beerman* staat ook op het standpunt, dat men niet aan tegenspraak moet beginnen. De *Minister-President* sluit zich bij dit oordeel aan.

Minister *De Pous* heeft het gevoel, dat door alles wat over het contact van Dr. Rijkens met Indonesische ministers is geschreven, de positie van het Kabinet wordt ondermijnd. Het is voor spreker de vraag of de overheid niet moet onderzoeken of tot vervolging van Dr. Rijkens c.s. moet worden overgegaan. De *Minister-President* stelt voor, dat eerst de feiten worden nagegaan, voordat tot enige stap wordt besloten.

Bij de hervatting van de bespreking van dit onderwerp in de middagvergadering - waarbij Staatssecretaris Bot niet aanwezig was - zegt spreker, dat blijkens een telegram de Nederlandse vertegenwoordiger bij de Verenigde Naties Schürmann door Dr. Rijkens is ingelicht over zijn gesprekken met de Indonesiërs Zain en Subandrio. Minister *De Pous* stelt de vraag of aan de Nederlandse ambassadeurs opgedragen kan worden, dat zij Dr. Rijkens c.s. niet ontvangen. Minister *Klompé* acht dit niet mogelijk; het is een grondrecht, dat een burger zich tot zijn regering kan wenden.

De *Minister-President* heeft uit de verklaring van Dr. Rijkens voor de pers gezien, dat deze heeft getracht het in de richting van een bilateraal gesprek tussen Nederland en Indonesië te sturen; dat is in strijd met wat hij aan Mr. Schürmann heeft medegedeeld. Spreker meent, dat het beste kan worden overwogen een brief aan Dr. Rijkens te zenden, dat deze zijn belofte aan

Minister Luns niet is nagekomen. Intussen heeft het Kamerlid De Kadt vragen hieromtrent gesteld, zodat de Regering met een snel antwoord hierop zou kunnen volstaan.

Minister *Zijlstra* is van mening, dat men, als men overweegt wat te doen, naar buiten door middel van de persdienst het standpunt van de Regering zal moeten laten blijken. Het lijkt spreker dan niet eenvoudig om te zeggen, dat Dr. Rijkens zijn woord gebroken heeft. Hij gelooft niet, dat de Regering een brief aan Dr. Rijkens moet zenden; dat lijkt hem een overbodige zaak. De Regering moet niet in regelmatige correspondentie met de groep-Rijkens treden; zij zal deze moeten negeren. De Ministers *Korthals* en *Veldkamp* zijn het ermede eens, dat de Regering de groep moet negeren.

Minister *Klompé* zou naar aanleiding van het eerder besproken artikel in Vrij Nederland door de RVD aan de pers willen laten mededelen, dat Ministerraad van mening is op dit soort artikelen niet te moeten reageren en dat Minister Cals omtrent dit onderwerp duidelijk in de Kamer is geweest. Minister *Marijnen* ziet hiertegen als bezwaar, dat men op deze wijze een band legt tussen de activiteiten van Prof. Duynstee en die van de groep-Rijkens. De *Raad* is het ermee eens, dat gezegd kan worden, dat het standpunt van de Regering duidelijk in de Verenigde Naties en in de Tweede Kamer is uiteengezet.

Minister *Zijlstra* merkt op, dat blijkens het nieuwste nummer van de Haagse Post Dr. Rijkens zou kennis hebben gekregen van het advies over Nieuw-Guinea, dat de Amerikaanse adviseurs aan President Kennedy hebben gegeven. Minister *Korthals* acht dit een belangrijke zaak; hij vraagt zich af of niet in de Verenigde Staten moet worden gevraagd of Dr. Rijkens inzage van deze adviezen heeft gekregen.

De *Minister-President* deelt mede, dat hij een brief heeft ontvangen van de Federatie van Oud-strijdersorganisaties, waarin wordt aangedrongen op een onderzoek naar de activiteiten van de groep-Rijkens en naar de vraag of de strafrechtelijke vervolging mogelijk is. Minister *Marijnen* acht een onderzoek alleen zin hebben, als er uitzicht is, dat vervolging mogelijk is. Minister *Zijlstra* herinnert eraan, dat Minister Beerman al eerder duidelijk heeft gemaakt, dat het niet eenvoudig is een artikel te vinden waarop men zich kan beroepen. Minister *Toxopeus* heeft een vorige maal al gezegd, dat hij aan de Officier van Justitie heeft medegedeeld een vervolging tegen Dr. Rijkens inopportuun te achten. Het lijkt spreker ook niet eenvoudig een dagvaarding op te stellen. Minister *Zijlstra* acht de overweging van een vervolging op een verkeerde gedachtengang berusten. In Nederland leeft men in een vrij land en een particulier mag er een andere mening op na houden dan de Regering. Daarbij komt, dat de groep-Rijkens ervan overtuigd is, dat zij het landsbelang dient, ook als zij ingaat tegen het beleid van de Regering, dat door het Parlement wordt gesteund.

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13. Ingekomen stukken en mededelingen

a. Televisie-uitzending inzake spijtoptanten

Minister *Klompé* heeft enkele dagen tevoren het verzoek ontvangen deel te nemen aan een televisie-uitzending van de NCRV over de kwestie van de spijtoptanten, waaromtrent de NCRV eerder een eenzijdig programma had uitgezonden. Nu haar deelneming aan dit programma reeds in de omroepbladen is aangekondigd, is zij door de late uitnodiging in een dwangpositie gebracht. Daarbij komt, dat door de samenstelling van het programma met een forum, waarin o.a. de Kamerleden Freule Wttewael, Prof. Diepenhorst en de heer Schipper zitting hebben, deze uitzending het karakter van een quasi interpellatie met een eenzijdige samenstelling krijgt. Intussen heeft Minister Beerman al eerder toegestemd mede te werken aan dit programma. Minister *Beerman* herinnert eraan, dat de Regering zich destijds heeft gedistancieerd van de uitzending door de NCRV in verband met het eenzijdige en de Regering en het ambtelijke apparaat veroordelende karakter ervan. De NCRV heeft toen gezegd te zullen zoeken naar een gelegenheid om op andere wijze nog het regeringsstandpunt te laten uiteenzetten. Daartoe heeft overleg plaats gehad met de voorlichtingsafdeling van Justitie, waarna spreker nog eens een gesprek met de NCRV heeft

gehad. Hij meent, dat de ministers het regeringsbeleid niet voor de televisie moeten verdedigen maar hiervan een rustige uiteenzetting moeten geven.

De *Minister-President* is het eens met Minister Klompé dat de opzet van deze uitzending lijkt op een interpellatie en dat het niet juist is, dat Minister Klompé ongevraagd daarvoor wordt gesteld. Spreker vreest echter, dat door het afgelasten van de medewerking van de ministers de repercussies nog groter zijn. Hij hoopt, dat dit interview beter zal zijn dan van Minister Van Aartsen, dat door de VARA in stukken geknipt en niet volledig werd uitgezonden.

Minister *Veldkamp* is van oordeel, dat men de VARA moet laten weten, dat het niet juist is. Voorts moeten de ministers zich erover beraden of het in het algemeen wel wenselijk is, dat zij in een uit te zenden programma optreden. Zij weten in den regel niet hoe dat programma zal zijn. Deze bezwaren hebben geen betrekking op het journaal of op een interview. Spreker acht het denkbaar, dat Onderwijs, Kunsten en Wetenschappen een notitie hierover in de Raad brengt.

Minister *Visser* heeft toegezegd een gesprek over de Nederlandse defensie-inspanning voor de VPRO te zullen meemaken.

Minister *Toxopeus* is van oordeel, dat de NCRV excuses tegenover Minister Klompé moet maken. Spreker acht het deelnemen van ministers aan een forum voor de omroep niet aanbevelingswaardig. Minister *Klompé* is van oordeel dat als de ministers aan deze uitzending deelnemen, uiterlijk maandagmorgen het filmpje gereed moet zijn en maandagmiddag het programma opgenomen moet worden. Minister *Beerman* is het hiermede eens. Overigens lijkt het hem het beste, dat ministers niet aan programma's voor de omroep meewerken.

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k. *Verkoop Indonesische panden* (Notulen MR 6 oktober 1961, punt 10a.)

Minister *Van Aartsen* deelt mede, dat notaris Duynstee heeft laten weten, dat zich een koper had aangemeld voor alle panden. Dit bleek de Landbank te zijn, een nieuwe bank, die in Den Haag meer huizen en gebouwen koopt en waarvan president-commissaris is Dr. Rijkens. De vraag rijst of moeite zal worden gedaan de huizen aan de Prinsessegracht nu van de Landbank te kopen. Minister *Klompé* stelt voor, dat de Secretaris-Generaal van het Departement van Onderwijs, Kunsten en Wetenschappen zich met de Rijksgebouwendienst in verbinding zal stellen. Minister *Van Aartsen* stemt hiermede in.

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Nummer - 650

Bijlage ...1...

**Gedeelte van de rede van Dr. Subandrio in het Algemeen Debat
op 9 oktober 1961**

Allow me to turn now to the question of West Irian – or West New Guinea – which still constitutes a serious dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands and has greatly worsened relations between our two countries. I do so, in particular, to reply to and to comment on the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands on 26 september last, which was devoted almost entirely to this question of West Irian. He even suggested, on behalf of the Netherlands Government, that this Assembly, the United Nations, now intervene and lend its hand to solve the problem – an intervention that the Netherlands Government has so far opposed.

While it was the Government of Indonesia who brought this issue before the United Nations a few years ago, lastly in 1957, against the strong opposition of the Netherlands Government, it is now the Netherlands Government who has come to this Assembly for the solution, the peaceful solution of the same basic problem. What is this conflict, what is really this dispute on West Irian between Indonesia and the Netherlands? What are the issues at stake?

It is a remnant of a colonial problem regarding a certain territory of Indonesia, which was unresolved when Indonesia gained its formal recognition of its independence at the end of 1949. It was, however, agreed that the issue in dispute, the political status of West Irian, would be settled by the Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands through negotiations within one year. Complete and unconditional sovereignty over Indonesia was formally transferred by the Netherlands, irrevocably, as the agreement clearly stated. And what Indonesia was and is, one could read in the Netherlands Constitution of 1948, which replaced the term Netherlands East Indies into Indonesia, the newly accepted name for the former Dutch colony.

West Irian was part and parcel of this colonial territory, and indeed for the newly independent Republic of Indonesia, it was and still is part and parcel of its national territory. West Irian is now one of the twenty-three regional provinces of the territory of the Republic. Therefore, there is no such thing as a territorial claim of the Republic of Indonesia. It cannot have a claim on its own territory. Sovereignty over Indonesia has already been transferred, complete and unconditionally.

What thus only remained to be removed was the Dutch control and, at that time, the Dutch military administration in West Irian, re-established by the Netherlands after its reoccupation of that part of Indonesia during the course of the colonial war.

We may recall, among others, the statement of the Netherlands representative, Mr. van Roijen, to the United Nations Security Council at the end of 1948, when the question of Indonesia's independence was settled through the intervention of the United Nations. The Netherlands representative made the following statement which was clear to us and to everyone else, on 22 december 1948:

“As I explained at the outset, the dispute is not about the question of whether or not Indonesia will become independent. All parties agree that what used to be the Netherlands East Indies” –

I repeat: "what used to be the Netherlands East Indies" –

"should become an independent State as soon as possible." (*official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, No 132, 388th meeting, page 11*)

That statement, that official recognition, was indeed greatly instrumental in bringing the colonial war to an end. It laid the common, agreed basis for the round-table negotiations which produced the formal transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia on 27 december 1949.

We therefore felt confident that the remaining difficulty over West Irian could be settled by further negotiations, in fulfilment of the pledge to make Indonesia's independence really complete and unconditional.

What were the reasons of the Netherlands at that time for retaining its hold and colonial administration over that part of Indonesia after independence? Was this to be understood as a necessary, though temporary, condition? We were told at that time by the Netherlands Government that the reasons were twofold.

First, on the eve of the formal transfer to Indonesia, recognizing Indonesia's independence, a seemingly important section of the Netherlands people was strongly opposed to the idea of losing the former rich and most important colony of the Netherlands. This opposition had to be appeased. The round-table agreements would maintain Dutch economic interests in the newly independent Indonesia to a satisfactory degree. And, as for the remaining feeling about colonial prestige, a colonial hold should be retained. In this respect, the easiest possibility at that time seemed to be the almost unexplored and economically unexploited territory of West Irian, inhabited by 700.000 people. The whole population of Indonesia at that time was 70 million.

Only on those conditions could the Netherlands Parliament be brought to agree on the transfer of sovereignty to independent Indonesia, with a two thirds majority in favour of the policy of the Netherlands Government. The Netherlands Government succeeded in this political manoeuvre, with the further assumption that within one year the problem of West Irian would be solved.

The second reason was that many Indo-Netherlanders, having lived in colonial Indonesia, might no longer feel comfortable in newly independent Indonesia. A new home for a new life – "safe haven", as they called it – might well be reserved for them, although from the beginning it was rather questionable whether West Irian could serve that purpose.

What did this issue of West Irian, thus created, mean to the Netherlands and to Indonesia?

To the Netherlands, it may have meant a success of political expediency, meeting the desire felt at that time for a certain kind of colonial prestige. Economically, West Irian meant nothing, neither militarily nor strategically. Never, as we knew, had there been a demand by the Netherlands people for the annexation of West Irian or its secession from Indonesia. As a matter of fact, the round-table agreements still referred to West Irian as a "Residency" – that is, an administrative unit of the Indonesian State administration.

To Indonesia, this political expediency of the Netherlands meant that the whole Indonesian people – numbering about 70 million at that time – would freely enjoy the independence of their country, except the 1 percent, about

700.000, living in West Irian. But we took some comfort in the fact that this setback could soon be corrected, by negotiations with the Netherlands Government within one year. Never was there a demand by the people of West Irian – to the Netherlands Government or to the Indonesian Government – for separation or secession in favour of any other country. Why should they have made such a demand?

In fact, the population of West Irian participated fully in the defence of the Independence Proclamation of 17 August 1945. It is true that they were partially suppressed after Netherlands troops had reoccupied that territory, but, nevertheless, their sentiments as part of a great Indonesia were never in doubt. The local leaders of West Irian were happy that Indonesia, their own country – of which West Irian has been part for centuries – had become a free, independent country.

The issue for Indonesia, then, was not to let down its people in West Irian and to bring about the restoration of West Irian to the control and administration of the Republic of Indonesia as soon as possible. This was a national issue of great importance to my Government and my people.

In 1950, negotiations started between the Netherlands and Indonesia to settle the issue. However, they failed to settle it within one year. Further negotiations were necessary. Gradually, however, we were confronted with a Netherlands position which showed not only reluctance but, in fact, ill will about settling the issue, which had become a serious dispute indeed. The Netherlands claimed sovereignty over that part of the territory of Indonesia.

Though speaking about the right of self-determination for the people of West Irian, the Netherlands Government conveniently proposed a bill to its Parliament in 1952 to annex West Irian to the territory of the Netherlands Kingdom.

While speaking of educating the people of West Irian for the exercise of the right of self-determination, the Netherlands colonial regime in West Irian, supported by military force which it still retained in that part of Indonesia, oppressed and crushed the Irian party for Indonesian independence, imprisoned their leaders or forced them to flee into "safer haven" in other parts of Indonesia. They reopened the notorious concentration camp "Boven Digul", familiar from before the Second World War. Led by old colonial officials and the police, they embarked upon a regime of terror to de-Indonesianize that part of Indonesia. They started to educate the poor people of West Irian in the Netherlands language, in colonial fashion, in order to make them good colonial subjects which they could govern. Everything was done to educate the people of West Irian in an anti-Indonesian direction.

Against this background, it was no wonder that negotiations to settle the West Irian issue with the Netherlands could only fail. It seemed that the Netherlands Government now harboured the intention of keeping its colonial grip on West Irian, with a view to separating it definitely from the free, independent Indonesia. The Netherlands attitude was a flagrant violation not only of the agreement and understandings, but, indeed, of the spirit of the agreement on Indonesian independence reached at the end of 1949.

When bilateral negotiations with the Netherlands completely and finally failed in 1954, owing to the adamant refusal of the Netherlands to negotiate the real

issues at stake, we turned to the United Nations, still seeking the peaceful solution of the dispute between the two countries. The conflict became more and more serious. It had become a purely colonial problem. The Netherlands Government contested United Nations competence to deal with the question, but that failed. However, the deliberations in the United Nations General Assembly came to no result. A resolution, merely expressing the hope for further negotiations, was strongly opposed by the Netherlands, and its adoption by the Assembly was blocked.

However, the Indonesian Government showed patience in seeking the possible peaceful solution of the question, vital as that was to the freedom of its people.

In the following years, despite the ill will of the Netherlands, the Indonesian Government again followed its peaceful course of action, through the United Nations. Apart from that, we permitted the Netherlands to preserve its privileged economic position, a position which it still maintained after the recognition of the Republic of Indonesia at the end of 1949.

Again, however, we only met with Dutch opposition and resolutions for a peaceful solution of the dispute could not be adopted by the General Assembly. When that happened, in 1957, our patience and goodwill were really exhausted. The United Nations unable, or more correctly, not wanting to lend its assistance in the solution of this problem, left my Government with no other alternative than to find a solution in our own way. In the present world, it meant relying basically upon our own national strength. It was, however, a comfort that the great majority of this Assembly supported our case – our case for freedom for our peoples. That strengthened our determination to continue our struggle for the freedom of the people of West Irian with all the means at our disposal.

Patience and goodwill found no place any more in the strained relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands. The Netherlands contention, previously held, that they could retain their economic positions in Indonesia – a kind of privileged position indeed – could no longer be maintained. That would have been an anomalous situation. Their military and repressive measures in West Irian, their subversion of the freedom and national integrity of the Republic, which, in fact, started with the very independence of Indonesia – all this had to be stopped. The colonial policy, which, even after the establishment of our Indonesian independence, they still harboured in their minds, had to be eliminated, once and for all from the Indonesian soil.

We have every reason to believe that gradually their colonial policy towards Indonesia was no longer based upon the consideration of the preservation of Netherlands interest in that region – nor even upon the standard of national prestige – but that the emotional anti-Indonesian sentiment of some of the leaders in the Netherlands was becoming increasingly the irrational guiding principle of the Netherlands Government approach to Indonesia.

My Government thus embarked on a policy of total confrontation *vis-à-vis* the Netherlands, not only politically but also economically and militarily.

We took the necessary measures against their economic interest, a hold-over from colonial days; their military build-up in and around West Irian, a base of intimidation and subversion, we faced with the building up of our own military strength. Relations with the Netherlands have already been broken off entirely.

In the meantime, Mr. President, we are happy to have been able to consolidate our national political and physical strength, and embark also upon a national overall development programme for the rapid economic and social development and emancipation of our peoples. West Irian is not excluded, although its materialization is hampered by prolonged Dutch colonial occupation of that territory.

Indonesia's freedom has always been posed as a spectre to the Netherlands public. We know it is not easy for a colonial Power to lose its colonial territory, though it is for the sake of human freedom. In fact, we had to gain it bitterly through a colonial war, from 1945 to 1949. Feelings of hostility and disillusionment might prevail, indeed, amongst sections of the Netherlands people after Indonesian independence.

Goodwill and understanding had to be built up on both sides to establish new, friendly relations between the two peoples – based now, however, on the mutual freedom of their two countries. However, the West Irian issue, which became ever more serious, was detrimental to these efforts. The relations between the two Governments became worse until all relations, including, naturally, economic relations, were broken off entirely.

How is the public opinion in the Netherlands now? Now many people – well-meaning people – in the Netherlands realize what this all means, what interests are really at stake. They realize now that this West Irian issue between the Netherlands and Indonesia has brought the Netherlands people only trouble, only hostility from Indonesia, no sympathy from the peoples of Asia and Africa and, indeed, no sympathy from the greater part of the world.

The loss of the greater interests in Indonesia is very evident. And let us not forget the trouble in West Irian itself. Fear, unrest and uncertainty prevail among the population in West Irian; not only among the native population, but also among the Netherlands officials and settlers. The thousands of men and women jailed because of their anti-Netherlands actions is only evidence of the failure of the Netherlands colonial adventure in West Irian. Indonesians who disagree with the colonial policy are expelled and sent to Republican territory at the rate of hundreds a month. An exodus of Dutch officials and settlers has already taken place during the last two years – either returning to the Netherlands or emigrating to Australia. Up to June last, 13,000 Netherlands people in West Irian had left this inhospitable country – inhospitable for the Netherlands, that is to say – for Australia. More than 1,000 Netherlands people are expected to leave this year for the Netherlands. At this very moment, Mr. President, 400 of these people are sailing back from West Irian to Holland.

The theory of a "safe haven" for Indo-Netherlanders, as once envisaged, has turned out to be a complete failure. So this West Irian dispute, and conflict with Indonesia, has now become a real liability for the Netherlands people and budget. Serious doubts about the wisdom of the Netherlands Government to maintain still its colonial hold in West Irian – against its greater interests in Indonesia and in the world as a whole – have been growing. And, as we are told, it has gone so far already that the Netherlands Parliament now would consider the definite relinquishing of Netherlands authority – sovereignty, as they say – over West Irian.

Well, many people in the Netherlands now think that the time has come for West Irian which is, after all, part of Indonesian territory, to be fully restored to

the Republic of Indonesia. Indeed, obstacles which existed in the Netherlands in 1949, which at that time were responsible for the Netherlands policy of expediency to retain colonial hold on West Irian, today exist no longer in the Netherlands.

A number of Dutch people, some prominent and representing a discernible body of public interest and opinion in the Netherlands, have, during the last two years, made persistent efforts to approach my Government, and indeed President Sukarno himself, so as to contribute to a satisfactory solution of the West Irian dispute in the light of the changed or changing circumstances. They are agreed on the transfer of authority over West Irian, in order not only to restore the territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia but also to make possible the re-establishment of normal relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia, especially in the economic field. In this process it has been suggested that in no way should this settlement be interpreted as a victory for one of the parties and a loss of face for the other. Well, Mr. President, we in Indonesia are fully aware of this problem, and we will do everything to accommodate the Netherlands in this respect, even at the sacrifice of some of our own national prestige.

My Government, and President Sukarno himself, appreciate the endeavours of these well-meaning Netherlands people, sincere as they seem to us, and representing presumably the more realistic and honest Netherlands view held by important groups in the Netherlands national life.

As far as my Government is concerned, and my President recently, and indeed repeatedly, has declared, if the Netherlands Government indicates - due to changed circumstances - that it is now prepared to relinquish its so-called sovereignty over West Irian and to seek a satisfactory solution of the dispute with the Republic of Indonesia, my Government is prepared to enter into new negotiations to solve the problem at its very roots. My Government holds the view that the best solution still would be the transfer of administration in West Irian to the Republic of Indonesia, to end colonialism completely in Indonesia in the best interest of the relationship between the two countries. A normal relationship between the two countries would thus be restored, with all its beneficial possibilities for the two countries. Moreover, we would be contributing to stability and peace in an important area of the world.

But so far we have not seen any sign of realism from the Netherlands Government. Meanwhile, our efforts to regain the freedom of our people in West Irian, to end colonialism in that part of the country, cannot be lessened. It has become a matter of peace and security for my country and for our people. We are preparing to face the worst *vis-à-vis* the Dutch in West Irian. This is our task, our national task, from which we do not shrink.

One might not be aware that, in reality, West Irian, as part of my country, has never been actually separated from the Republic of Indonesia, despite sixteen years of protracted colonial occupation by the Netherlands in that territory and its endeavours towards that end. It has never been separated from the Republic of Indonesia, politically, socially or even constitutionally.

Subject only to restrictions imposed by the emergency situation of continued Dutch occupation, we have treated West Irian as an integral part of our country. It has its rightful place in the Republic.

West Irian, as I have said, constitutes a province of the Republic of Indonesia, one of the twenty-three provinces into which the Republic of Indonesia is divided administratively. It is true that our administration cannot be fully exercised in the main island of West Irian so far. But we do have a provincial government of West Irian, seated near the main island of West Irian, but still within the administrative territory of the West Irian province.

The provinces of the Republic of Indonesia have full local autonomy. They have their own local assembly, the administration is headed by Governors from their own local people, and even the territorial military commanders – we have gone so far – are chosen from the local population. This principle applies equally in the province of West Irian. West Irian is already represented by its own sons in the Indonesian Parliament, in the Supreme Advisory Council, in the Peoples Congress – the highest body of the Republic – and all other constitutional organs of the State, including the State Planning Council.

A native son of West Irian is also represented in our delegation to this session of the General Assembly. Yes, a native son of West Irian, representing the free, sovereign Republic of Indonesia of more than 90 million people. Mr. Dimara – that is his name – has served seven years of imprisonment in a Dutch colonial gaol in West Irian, only because he wanted his people in West Irian to enjoy the freedom that the Republic of Indonesia has gained. He was released only last April, and he can tell you what is the real situation in West Irian: the reign of fear and frustration, the oppression and intimidation inherent in a colonial regime and the mockery of democracy and self-determination, so loudly proclaimed by the Netherlands Government.

West Irian remains backward, and the gap between the free development of this area and the other regions of Indonesia is ever widening. What is more, the people remain constantly subjected to fear, frustration and confusion. This is a human problem in itself.

As far as the Republic of Indonesia is concerned, West Irian as a province has naturally been included in the Eight-Year Overall National Development Plan of the Republic, now already under way. Schools, hospitals and roads will be built; industries will be founded, as in all other parts of Indonesia. Many native sons and daughters of West Irian are now already being educated or are finding work in other parts of Indonesia. For those who remain in West Irian, special attention and priority will be needed, indeed. This awaits only their liberation from the Netherlands colonial grip. We cannot forget the human aspect of the problem. No one can be more concerned than my Government about the future and welfare of the people of West Irian, of people in our own province, our own people.

And let no one tell us what is best for them, or begin to tell us about the fairy tale of "self-determination", when he himself has never believed in it. And why should the right of self-determination for our people be decided by others? We exercised this right sixteen years ago. We have fought for it – it was not a matter of charity – and we won it only with blood, sweat and tears. We are now determined to defend this right which we have gained so bitterly, with all our strength and all the means at our disposal.

The Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, Mr. Luns, has now come to this Assembly to present a plan to solve the West Irian problem, the same problem his

Government has left unsolved for eleven years. These eleven years have destroyed the relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia, to no one's benefit, certainly not to the interest of the Netherlands people themselves. They have not brought any change for the better to the people of West Irian itself. This is tragic. Yet, the solution remains basically simple. It is basically a colonial question. It is still a question of freedom for West Irian in the framework of Indonesia's freedom and independence, as I have explained before. The best solution remains, therefore, also the same.

President Sukarno, commenting on Mr. Luns' plan, stated, on 27 September:

"The best way for the Netherlands is to transfer immediately its authority to Indonesia. But if the Netherlands for different reasons would prefer the medium of the United Nations for the immediate transfer of authority to Indonesia, Indonesia is prepared to consider seriously that proposal.

"If not based upon this assumption, any intervention of the United Nations may only make the problem more acute and explosive. The problem of the urgent transfer of authority to Indonesia is becoming a security problem in this region of the world.

"Our task is to preserve peace in this part of the world, but the Netherlands and the United Nations should also give their urgent contribution to achieve this aim."

Let us now examine Mr. Luns' plan carefully. Let us see whether it could serve to bring about the best solution of the problem, not only viewed from the standpoint of my Government and the real situation in West Irian, not only from the viewpoint of the best interests of our people in West Irian, but also as regards the best interests of the people in the Netherlands, as we understand them. We are convinced that, especially at this present juncture, this problem can be solved peacefully in a way that is satisfactory and beneficial to all parties concerned. The Netherlands, after relinquishing its last vestige of colonialism in Indonesia, is no longer inhibited from developing the best relations with Indonesia in particular and with the countries of Asia and Africa in general. The 700,000 people of West Irian itself are at last allowed to share the national security of their 90 million compatriots within the Republic of Indonesia. The people of West Irian at last can practice their full measure of local autonomy, as in other parts of Indonesia. Certainly, the Republic of Indonesia as a whole is also one of the benefactors of this peaceful solution.

Not only is the struggle for independence completed, not only are peace and security in our region no longer in danger, but, more than that, our relations with the Netherlands can be normalized, and subsequently the mutual inhibition in the relations between the West and Indonesia can be removed.

Unfortunately, one thing struck us immediately in Mr. Luns' plan. In my view, he has allowed himself to make two grave mistakes.

In the first place, he presented this plan for a solution of the West Irian issue as if it had no background of a conflict with my country – that is to say, as if it were a clear case of decolonization, as if he could come here with clean hands.

Secondly, he tried to suggest that a peaceful solution of the issue could be attained without the participation or co-operation of Indonesia.

Because of these two basic mistakes, his plan – if adopted – can and will solve nothing. It will not resolve the dispute, the conflict, with Indonesia which is the crux of the problem. Mr. Luns cannot with impunity ignore his counterpart in the conflict, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, and, indeed, the people of my country. If he thinks he can, he is making a very grave mistake indeed.

What does he really want? What does he really mean? What kind of solution then does he really envisage? He wants a “decolonization” of West Irian. Is this not sixteen years too late, or at least eleven years? It does not seem too progressive to us. When West Irian – as part of Indonesia – was decolonized by the Republic of Indonesia, it was in fact his Government, the Netherlands Government, that afterwards recolonized this territory again.

For that reason, the so-called decolonization plan of Mr. Luns does not impress us too much. It loses its moral ground. Its submission may only be attributed to an attempt by the Netherlands to get out of an untenable situation in West Irian, created by their own shortsighted and despotic colonial policy. Nevertheless, if it represents a serious attempt now to escape from his Government’s dilemma, my Government will welcome it for the sake of our people in West Irian who have been suffering already too long from the prolonged Netherlands colonial rule in that part of Indonesia.

However, this “escape” policy should not have an anti-Indonesian spirit, with the design of promoting the forcible separation of West Irian from the Indonesian national body, even under the banner of “self-determination”.

The facts of history as regards this issue, the Dutch policy of political expediency in this matter, should have shown this Assembly that the Netherlands policy on West Irian had and still has nothing to do with the right of self-determination for the people in West Irian. The people of West Irian were never asked for their consent, not even their opinion, when the Netherlands Government recolonized them in 1949, and in 1952 annexed their territory into the territory of the Netherlands Kingdom. This new argument of self-determination for the people of West Irian was only adopted by the Netherlands as a matter of political expediency, to be used for international consumption. This has been so rightly pointed out by Professor B. V. A. Röling, a Netherlands professor of International Law and a member of the Netherlands delegation to the United Nations for several years until 1957, in his book: “*New Guinea, a World Problem*”, published in the Netherlands in 1958.

Let us look closely, for instance, at the so-called Papuan Council set up by the Netherlands Government of which the Assembly has been informed. It was set up in West Irian as a supposedly representative council of the people. According to Mr. Luns, it constitutes a first step towards self-government.

The Papuan Council, established only 5 April of this year, is naturally headed by a Dutch official, appointed by the Dutch colonial Government. The same holds true as regards the Executive Secretary of the Council. Needless to say, the work and policy of this advisory council – which, by the way, is composed mostly of Netherlands and pro-Netherlands West Irianese, induced in various ways to

become pro-Netherlands and most of them are officials of the colonial administration – is entirely under the guidance of the Dutch Chairman and Executive Secretary. Is there any sort of self-determination of the people of West Irian in such a Council?

It is evident that the Netherlands Government will tolerate the right of self-determination, if at all, only for West Irianese who can be made pro-Netherlands, are led and guided by Dutch officials and often intimidated by Dutch military forces.

As a matter of fact, the entire colonial administration and policy in West Irian can only be sustained by the Netherlands military power.

It is interesting and pertinent in this connexion that the plan presented by Mr. Luns is silent on the cessation of all armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples, as required by paragraph 4 of resolution 1514 (XV), in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence and so that the integrity of their national territory shall be respected. Mr. Luns completely and conveniently ignored this paragraph, which is especially applicable to the situation in West Irian.

Self-determination without freedom is, of course, absurd. It was not surprising to us, therefore, that the first action of the so-called Papuan Council was of a rather peculiar character. The first decision of this Council is, in fact, very revealing. It consisted of a motion proposed, if not dictated, by the Netherlands Chairman and naturally adopted by the Council as a whole, to send a cable to the Netherlands Government at The Hague expressing, on behalf of the people of West Irian, the Council's abiding allegiance to the House of Orange – that is, to the Netherlands Crown – and its sentiments of strong ties with the Netherlands people.

Well, are the people of West Irian to be educated for independence or for perpetual dependence? This cable of the Papuan Council, though not surprising, is truly a remarkable indictment of the Dutch colonial mentality. Again it shows that the Dutch policy in West Irian is a colonial policy, pure and simple. And I may add, a rather old-fashioned one in this era of decolonization.

No wonder, therefore, that thinking people find it very difficult to accept seriously the pronouncements of the Netherlands Government on self-determination.

If the Netherlands slogan of "self-determination" in the present Netherlands Government plan still sounds rather appealing to some Members of this august Assembly, which I doubt after knowing the real record of the Dutch colonial regime in West Irian, let me add the official Netherlands Government record in the United Nations itself.

When in 1955 the Third Committee included the right of self-determination of peoples as Article 1 of the draft covenants of human rights, the Netherlands delegation opposed it. The further record of the Netherlands delegation on other various items involving the exercise of the right of self-determination in this Assembly shows the following:

It did not support this right for the people of Morocco. It did not support this right for the people of Tunisia. It has not supported this right for the people of Algeria. It has not supported this right in the case of South West Africa or of any

other Non-Self-Governing Territory. It has never cast its votes in the United Nations for the actual implementation of the right of self-determination.

Even when it did vote for Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in December of last year, the record of the Netherlands delegation since that time shows still a curious reluctance to support the right of self-determination of peoples. In April of this year, the Netherlands delegation withheld its support from a resolution affirming the right of self-determination for the people of Angola, although this resolution is explicitly based upon resolution 1514 (XV) and seeks its application in regard to Angola. Again, only in August of this year, the Netherlands delegation withheld its support when the people of Tunisia demanded their legitimate rights in the case of Bizerta.

No, I am sorry to say that we cannot take the Netherlands notion of self-determination too seriously. Let us not be deceived by this slogan of self-determination now so conspicuously advanced in Mr. Luns' plan with regard to West Irian. As a matter of fact, its fallacy has been noted before, both in this Assembly as well as in West Irian itself, and even now in the Netherlands itself.

A few years ago when the question of West Irian was debated in the United Nations, the representative of Iraq pointed out rightly:

"Apart from being a completely irrelevant argument, this game of self-determination, as played by colonial Powers, is nothing but a hypocritical endeavour to prolong their presence in colonial territories. Before taking such a position, it would be wise for the Netherlands Government to go over its negative record involving self-determination over the past ten years."

And may I remind this Assembly of what the representative of the Federation of Malaya, Mr. Ismail, said in respect to this aspect of the West Irian question during the last Assembly debate on this item in 1957. Mr. Ismail pointedly stated that Netherlands promises on the exercise of self-determination "ring hollow in the ears of a colonial people." He went on to note:

"When Abraham Lincoln freed the slaves in this country, (the United States) he did not do so after waiting for those negro slaves to express their will and to have the opportunity to decide for themselves. Abraham Lincoln abolished slavery because it is a crime against humanity. The United Nations must apply the same standard in considering the case against colonialism." (A/C.1/PV.907, p. 61-65)

This enlightened view is shared by many. In the Netherlands itself, there are many people – well-meaning people – who think the same way. Professor Röling in his book to which I already referred, wrote with respect to the debate on this issue in the United Nations – and I quote from page 72 of his book:

"There were understandably" – I repeat: "understandably" – "many delegates who definitely did not take the (Dutch) argument on the right of self-determination of the Papuans seriously."

Further, a prominent member of Mr. Luns' own Catholic Party, Professor Duynstee of the Catholic University in Nymegen, stated only last month in an address to the Utrecht Students Association that the promise of the Netherlands Government to give the people of West Irian the right to make their own choice about their future status – this so-called right of self-determination – and I quote what he said: "in reality is nothing but a play upon words." In even harsher terms, Professor Duynstee described their so-called choice as "nothing but a swindle."

Yes, the Netherlands policy, including the present manoeuvre outlined in the plan submitted by Mr. Luns, has nothing to do with self-determination for the people of West Irian. Today, as in the past, it merely represents the self-determination of the Netherlands Government itself – with or without a Papuan Council.

What do we expect from Mr. Luns' plan? The Luns' plan as it is will not solve the West Irian issue, because it ignores the background, it ignores its conflict with Indonesia. The arguments on so-called decolonization and "right of self-determination" for West Irian are deceiving and may even be self-defeating.

Under this plan, the Netherlands will not relinquish its claim on sovereignty over West Irian until the right of self-determination for the people is "properly safeguarded". When will that be? Evidently no one knows except the Netherlands.

Moreover, the thousands of Dutch officials in West Irian will remain there indefinitely. This is, of course, nothing else but neo-colonialism. Another Congo. Another Katanga.

We say this because of our own bitter experiences in Indonesia when the Netherlands Government sold the slogan of "self-determination" in the various regions of Indonesia, in opposition to the already expressed self-determination of the Indonesian people as a whole. It was part of their policy of divide and rule; a policy we know only too well, and so many Members of this Assembly also know it too well.

Under the cloak of self-determination they succeeded in creating at the time of the colonial war several small sub-States within Indonesia, headed by their puppets, to counter and subvert the Republic of Indonesia.

When this policy failed and the Republic of Indonesia survived this trial, they made another attempt in 1950. Supported by a revolt of Dutch colonial forces in the Moluccas, they created the so-called "Republic of the South-Moluccas", which fortunately was crushed immediately by the Republic's National Army.

Is it any wonder that my Government, knowing the anti-Indonesian measures and propaganda of the Netherlands colonial regime in West Irian, their same old propaganda of the right of self-determination, is seriously asking itself whether this plan of Mr. Luns may not be designed to promote the setting up of a so-called "independent" West Irian against Indonesia? It may appear incredible indeed, but we have a great responsibility towards our people, especially now towards our people in West Irian, in the province of West Irian.

If Mr. Luns harbours such an idea, it will indeed be against the natural growth of our people, against the logic and the real goal of decolonization for the building up of free nations. The right of self-determination is not to be applied for the division of a nation, but for the national unity and growth of a strong and stable nation. This is very important in the special case of nations fighting for freedom from colonialism. The boundary of such a nation is decided by the boundary of the

former colonial territory. This is a clear and simple issue, which should not be complicated.

Let me recall, in this respect, the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Senegal, in which he stated clearly:

“From the very instant that a colonized territory accedes to independence, its new sovereignty must be exercised within the boundaries where colonial sovereignty extended.”

This is exactly what the Netherlands Government has tried with their West Irian issue to undo and prevent in the last twelve years.

The peoples of Asia and Africa who fought against colonialism and struggled for their freedom and independence will clearly identify this attempt and manoeuvre of the Netherlands Government for what it is: neo-colonialism and the subversion of freedom and independence.

I believe I can speak here for Asia and Africa, from Dakar to Manila. Yes, to Manila. Permit me to quote from an editorial on the plan presented by Mr. Luns that appeared in the influential nationalist paper, the *Manila Chronicle*, on 29 September last. It declares:

“Indonesia is rightfully claiming West Irian, a part of its territory, and the Dutch proposal is, of course, intended to frustrate the Indonesians so that the Netherlands can keep her sole remaining colony in Asia. But the Dutch proposal is as immoral as it is unoriginal.”

It continued further:

“And there is no reason to believe that the United Nations will fall for this colonial subterfuge. For already the United Nations is in trouble because Belgium decided on keeping her diamond-rich colony in Africa by prodding puppets to declare Katanga – a rightful part of the Congo – as an independent nation . . . The Asians should particularly abhor the Dutch trick. Because if West Irian becomes Asia’s Katanga, there will be uneasy peace in these parts.” This is what the Philippines *Manila Chronicle* said.

Let us guard against another Congo, another Katanga in Asia, to which Mr. Luns’ present plan may lead. It may even have graver consequences and lead to a graver conflict, one not confined to our two countries alone.

I believe that Mr. Luns is not entirely unaware of the possibility of a grave conflict on this West Irian issue as it has developed in the last few years. In fact, if I have read his statement of 26 September correctly, he based the introduction of his plan to the United Nations on the philosophy attributed to the late Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, which considers that the United Nations should be utilized as a dynamic instrument not only for seeking reconciliation, but also with the aim of forestalling conflicts. In line with this basic philosophy Mr. Luns, as he implied, sought with his plan to “contribute to the removal of a dangerous development”. Well, there seems to exist at least one area of agreement between

Mr. Luns and I; namely that the West Irian dispute represents a dangerous development and harbours the possibility of erupting into a grave conflict, which should be forestalled. Unfortunately however, Mr. Luns' plan cannot and will not forestall a conflict. The conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia will be left unsolved. It will be aggravated even to a wider extent. It will not solve the West Irian problem at all. It will not serve the purpose of peace.

May I therefore conclude my statement with a suggestion. It is presented in an effort to contribute sincerely to the solution of the West Irian dispute, which has too long troubled the relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands, troubled too long the peace and the peaceful development of the people of West Irian.

First, the plan of Mr. Luns in its present form cannot solve the problem of West Irian peacefully, and subsequently cannot solve the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

Second, if the Netherlands Government is really sincere in its wish to relinquish its claim of sovereignty over West Irian and end its colonial control over that territory, this intention should be welcomed as the start of the real solution of the conflict between Indonesia and the Netherlands on the West Irian issue. In fact, the original source of the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands will then be removed.

Third, to complete this settlement, it then requires only the orderly transfer of administration in West Irian from the Netherlands to the Republic of Indonesia, based upon a co-operative spirit between both countries and a mutual desire for normalization of relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

Fourth, my Government would have no objection at all if the United Nations were to assist, if so required, in the realization of such a plan through the creation of a special body or special authority which on behalf of the United Nations would enable the orderly attainment of that solution.

Fifth, if this plan is based on General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the resolution referred to in Mr. Luns' plan, it should pay due regard to the principle laid down in paragraph 6 of that resolution, which reads:

“Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” (*Resolution 1514 (XV)*)

On the other hand, the Republic of Indonesia with the assistance of the United Nations will adhere to the principle that the local Indonesians of West Irian will have the full responsibility for the local autonomy of that region. This is in conformity with the other existing autonomous provinces within the Republic.

Sixth, the right of self-determination, which is a living principle upheld by the Republic of Indonesia for which the Indonesian people fought in attaining their freedom and independence, should not be abused in its application and should not be used against the real interests of the people of West Irian by subverting national independence already gained.

Seventh, if the West Irian problem is to be solved peacefully, it must be solved at the earliest possible time.

Eighth, the Indonesian Government is prepared to contribute its share in a

United Nations endeavour to solve the problem of West Irian speedily along the lines indicated, both in terms of personnel and in terms of technical as well as financial assistance.

I believe that this approach is a constructive one. The solution I have indicated is the best possible solution for which the United Nations can lend its assistance. A "solution" such as envisaged by Mr. Luns' plan, we will reject and reject strongly. If the Netherlands Government will see fit to implement this plan as it stands now – that is to say, to solve the West Irian problem without Indonesia, considering Indonesia as non-existing – then I can tell this Assembly in all seriousness that for the Indonesian Government and people there will be no alternative but to solve the West Irian problem in a reciprocal way.

We ourselves are confident that West Irian will be fully restored into the Republic of Indonesia. West Irian is, after all, a part of my country. The people are part of the Indonesian people. Let no one make a mistake about this.

May God bless us in our struggle for freedom, justice and peace.

Vertaling :

Sta mij toe dat ik mij thans bezig houd met het vraagstuk West-Irian (of West-Nieuw-Guinea), dat nog steeds een ernstig geschil vormt tussen Indonesië en Nederland en de verhouding tussen onze beide landen zeer heeft doen achteruitgaan. Ik doe dit in het bijzonder om te antwoorden en commentaar te leveren op de verklaring van de geachte Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken van Nederland van 26 september j.l., welke bijna geheel gewijd was aan het vraagstuk West-Irian. Hij stelde zelfs voor, en hij sprak uit naam van de Nederlandse regering, dat deze Vergadering, de VN, thans zou interveniëren en behulpzaam zou zijn bij de oplossing van het vraagstuk – iets waartegen de Nederlandse regering zich tot nu toe verzet heeft.

Terwijl het de Indonesische regering was die dit vraagstuk enkele jaren geleden, voor het laatst in 1957, aan de VN voorlegde tegen het krachtige verzet van de Nederlandse regering in, is het thans de Nederlandse regering die zich tot deze Vergadering heeft gewend voor de oplossing, de vreedzame oplossing, van hetzelfde fundamentele probleem.

Wat is dit conflict toch, wat behelst eigenlijk dit geschil over West-Irian tussen Indonesië en Nederland? Welke belangen staan op het spel? Het is een overblijfsel van een koloniaal probleem betreffende een zeker deel van het grondgebied van Indonesië, dat nog onopgelost was toen Indonesië eind 1949 formeel erkend werd als een onafhankelijke staat. Er werd evenwel overeengekomen dat de kwestie waarover het geschil ging, de *politieke status* van West-Irian of West-Nieuw-Guinea, door de regering van Indonesië en de Nederlandse regering, door onderhandelingen binnen een jaar zou worden geregeld. Nederland had de volledige en onvoorwaardelijke soevereiniteit over Indonesië formeel overgedragen, onherroepelijk, zoals dit duidelijk in de overeenkomst stond. En wat Indonesië was en is staat in de Nederlandse Grondwet van 1948, waarin de term „Nederlands-Oost-Indië” werd vervangen door Indonesië, de nieuw aanvaarde naam voor de voormalige Nederlandse kolonie.

Nummer 650

Bijlage 2

**Rede van Mr. Schurmann in het Algemeen Debat
op 9 oktober 1961 in antwoord op Dr. Subandrio**

I thank you for having given me the opportunity for saying a few words in reply to the remarks made by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Indonesia this afternoon. My observations will be very brief not only because of the lateness of the hour, but also because at this stage we, the Netherlands, have done no more than announce certain plans of the Netherlands Government for Netherlands New Guinea in the general debate. Full discussion of these proposals should, in our opinion, wait until the resolution which my delegation has just submitted will be dealt with by the Assembly under the proper item on its agenda.

Dr. Subandrio has said a number of unwarranted unpleasant things about my country and my people. I shall not follow him on the path of controversy, even though his Government has gone so far as to organize and cause to be carried out a number of armed infiltrations into New Guinea. In due course we shall answer the many erroneous statements that have been made this afternoon. What I wish to say at this moment is that my delegation regrets that Indonesia has so quickly and without further study adopted a negative attitude with regard to our plans which by the way – and I say this in connexion with a remark made by the Foreign Minister of Indonesia – have just had the full support of 97% of the Members of our Parliament in The Hague, including those belonging to the opposition.

For our part, we had scrupulously avoided introducing any controversial matters in our statement, and our Foreign Minister had merely mentioned the fact that Indonesia maintains a territorial claim to the Territory. In regard to that claim all that needs to be said at present is that the Netherlands has many times offered to submit Indonesia's thesis that Netherlands New Guinea is an integral part of Indonesia to the International Court of Justice – and that offer still stands.

Even from the Indonesian point of view, we fail to see what objection Indonesia can have to our plans. As was explained in the Netherlands speech in the general debate, our plans contain four points.

The first point is that the Netherlands is willing to relinquish its sovereignty over Netherlands New Guinea to the people of that territory. To that Indonesia cannot possibly object, nor does it, as Dr. Subandrio said this afternoon.

The second part is that in the transitional period that is, so long as the population is not yet able itself to exercise all the attributes of sovereignty, the United Nations should set up an international development authority which would assume the necessary powers in order to assist the population in its development. Certainly Indonesia could but welcome a development under which the administration of the Territory could be taken over from the Netherlands by the United Nations. And indeed, if I did understand Dr. Subandrio rightly, Indonesia would raise no objection to the establishment of such a United Nations authority.

The third part, which Dr. Subandrio did not even find it worth mentioning, is that the Netherlands offers to continue to contribute to the development of Netherlands New Guinea at the rate of 30 million dollars per annum. Can anyone object to that?

Finally, the last part is that the people of Netherlands New Guinea should be granted the right of self-determination.

Now I know that this is really the only principle which is not palatable to Indonesia. Mr. Sastraamidjojo stated the other day, and Dr. Subandrio has repeated this afternoon, that the right of self-determination was already exercised in 1945 when Indonesia declared itself independent. Now I would remind my colleagues here that in 1945 Indonesia was occupied by Japan and had been so occupied for three years, the whole duration of the war, whereas the greater part of Netherlands New Guinea had remained free and was under Allied administration. All during the occupation there had been no communication whatsoever between Netherlands New Guinea and Indonesia. The Papuan people were never consulted about the declaration; and when Indonesia now says that the people of Netherlands New Guinea exercised their right of self-determination in 1945 what it really means is that Indonesia did it for them without having received any mandate to do so – and I, for one, do not believe that anyone will consider that a *bona fide* exercise of this fundamental right under our Charter. Hence it is perhaps not surprising that Dr. Subandrio spoke this afternoon of “the fairy-tale of self-determination”.

If the Indonesian conviction that the people of Netherlands New Guinea consider themselves part of Indonesia is correct, then that will be clearly shown in due time when a plebiscite is to be held by the United Nations. If the Indonesian thesis is sincerely held, then again Indonesia should welcome this means of proving to the world that its estimate was correct. We have said many times, and I now repeat it: if the Papuan population declares in a free plebiscite that it wishes to join Indonesia, the Netherlands will raise no objection whatsoever and will abide by the decision. Therefore it is incorrect to say, as did Dr. Subandrio this afternoon, that our plans have an anti-Indonesian spirit.

Now instead of self-determination the distinguished Foreign Minister of Indonesia has this afternoon recommended what he calls “full responsibility for local autonomy of New Guinea within Indonesia”. When he made that recommendation I was irresistibly reminded of the story of the cook who gave the chicken a free choice as to whether it wished to be eaten with a thick sauce or with a thin sauce; he did not leave it free to say however that it might prefer not to be eaten at all. If the Papuan people are to be told that they must be incorporated into Indonesia and that they can choose only what amount of autonomy they would like to have within that State, that means that the most important choice is to be withheld from them. It has been argued over and over again in the United Nations by many delegations that any decision of a territory to be incorporated into another State must be taken after independence has been attained and that any handover of a Non Self-Governing Territory by the administering Power to another State is not permissible and is contrary to the letter and the spirit of our Charter.

May I end, Mr. President, by appealing to the distinguished representative of Indonesia to reconsider this matter and to think over what I have just said. Our proposals, which are entirely in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations, ought not really to be unacceptable to his country. And the true interests of the Papuan people of New Guinea would be greatly served if this matter could be dealt with without acrimony.

Vertaling

Ik dank U voor de gelegenheid die U mij gegeven heeft om enkele woorden te