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Onderwerps

Verklaring Minister-President Menzies over N.Guinea.

Canberra, 28 april 1961.

~ Your

Wet verwijzing near mijn berichtgeving langs andere weg en mijn open telegram nr. 19659, waarin ik reeds de voornaamste passages seinde van de verklaring van de Heer Menzies in het Parlement, heb ik de eer Uwer Excellentie hiernevens in tweevoud de volledige tekst van deze verklaring aan te bieden.

De verklaring had ten doel een verslag te geven van de besprekingen met Generaal Nasution, hetgeen zij ook doet met een uitvoerigheid en openhartig eid als na dergelijke besprekingen zelden gebruikelijk is. De verklaring is echter bovendien uitgegroeid tot de meest concrete en gedetailleerde uiteensetting van de Australische politiek ten aanzien van Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea welke sinds jaren van de zijde van de Australische Regering is verstrekt.

De verklaring geeft overigens geen antwoord op de meest urgente vraag van het ogenblik nl: wat doet Australië in geval van het uitbreken van een gewapend conflict in Nederlands Nieuw Guinea? Waar echter een toezegging van militaire steun onder de huidige binnenlandse en buitenlandse politieke omstandigheden onmogelijk was is de onzekerheid welke de Heer Menzies op dit punt heeft laten voortbestaan, gepaard aan zijn met nadruk wijzen op de te verwachten ver-strekkende complicaties, uit Nederlands oogpunt gezien een voordeel.

Voor mijnoverige commentaar en een samenvatting van het op de verklaring gevolgde parlementaire debat moge ik verwijzen naar mijn andere berichten terzake.

DE AMBASUADEUR:

Zijner Excellentie de Heer Minister van Duitenlandse Zaken te

(J.G. de Beus)

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## WEST NEW GUINEA

We have had a brief, but most interesting, visit from General Nasution, the Indonesian Minister for National Security and C.G.S. He met Ministers for discussion, while subsequently I had two long talks, at each of which Mr. Townley was present.

In the result, though no new policies were expressed, both General Nasution and I thought that there was a considerable clarification of points of view, and further elucidation of the facts.

The discussions throughout were conducted, as one would expect, in an atmosphere of the utmost good will and of mutual respect. Our two countries are neighbours and friends, with very great interests in common; our interest in peace, in security, in resisting communism. The one matter of difference of opinion relates to West New Guinea. And even there, as I have been able to point out to the General, Australia's interest in New Guinea as an island derives from our desire to see the economic and social progress of its inhabitants, and from our natural interest in the character of its political future. It is an interest which has been emphasised by the significance of New Guinea to us in two wars, and more particularly in the second. It does not derive from hostility to Indonesia, for there is no such hostility in Australia.

Having made these general remarks, I think it due to this House and to our distinguished visitor that I should state in summary form and, I hope, with complete fairness, the Indonesian point of view as explained to us, and the Australian point of view as explained by us. I put it in this way, though at all stages it was made clear that, in the dispute or difference between the Netherlands and Indonesia, Australia is neither a party principal nor a self-appointed arbitrator, but is a naturally interested neighbour.

As General Nasution explained it, the Indonesian position is that its claim to West New Guinea is not legal, but political and historical, West New Guinea having been part of the Netherlands East Indies. He claimed that West New Guinea was part of Indonesia before the establishment of the Netherlands East Indies. It is because of this, he said, that Indonesia will not take the matter to the International Court - a procedure which Australia has constantly advocated, and which the Netherlands is willing to adopt.

We dwelt on this matter for some time. I once more made it clear that Australia attached great importance to sovereignty, in a world in which new sovereignties are being created and independent rights maintained. I said that we recognised Dutch sovereignty in West New Guinea (with all that such recognition involved) and that we could not reasonably or successfully be asked to reverse this recognition. If the matter went to the International Court, I said, and the judgment went for Indonesia, we would of course respect that judgment.

· General Nasution said that he understood our argument on that point, but added that one consequence of it should be that, in any discussions between the Netherlands and

Indonesia about West New Guinea, Australia should be strictly neutral, and should not support and encourage the Dutch either generally or in the United Nations. This indeed, as he made clear, was the great thing that he wanted to establish with us. I therefore reiterated that, as we had said at the time of Dr. Subandrio's visit, we desired three things -

- 1. That there should be no recourse to armed force, whether by major or minor operations (e.g. by armed infiltrations) to give effect to Indonesia's territorial claim.
- 2. That any negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands should be voluntary and free of any threat or duress.
- 3. That any agreement made as a result of negotiations so conducted would be fully respected by Australia.

I went on to explain what we were doing in our section of New Guinea in pursuit of our long-held goal of improvement of living standards, education, and health to a point where the population could freely determine its own future. I will refer to this again, a little later. I said that the Dutch were pursuing broadly similar policies, with the same objective.

The General enquired as to whether Australia did not have some military arrangement with the Netherlands in respect of West New Guinea. I said we had no such arrangement, either directly or indirectly, and that whatever might be rumbured or suggested to the contrary had no foundation. The only agreement related to administrative consultation on common problems and for the forwarding of self-determination in New Guinea. That agreement was published when it was made on November 6, 1957. I recall to Hon. members the principles set out in that agreement as follows:—

- 1. The Netherlands and Australian Governments base their policies with regard to the territories of New Guinea, for which they are responsible, on the interests and inalienable rights of their inhabitants in conformity with the provisions and the spirit of the United Nations Charter.
- 2. The territories of Netherlands New Guinea, the Australian Trust Territory of New Guinea, and Papua, are geographically and ethnologically related and future development of their respective populations must benefit from co-operation in policy and administration.
- 3. The Australian and Notherlands Governments are therefore pursuing, and will continue to pursue, policies directed towards the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the peoples in their territories in a manner which recognizes this ethnological and geographical affinity.
- 4. At the same time, the two Governments will continue, and strengthen, the co-operation at present existing between their respective administrations in the territories.
- 5. In so coing the two Governments are determined to promote an uninterrupted development of this process until such time as the inhabitants of the territories concerned will be in a position to determine their own future.

At the same time, I said, not only Australia but other nations could not but be disturbed by any use of force, since even limited hostilities, whether in New Guinea or Laos or elsewhere, could have unforceen and deplorable consequences. We were therefore glad to have the General's renewed assurances that force would not be used. I will refer to this again, a little later.

I took the opportunity of asking about the infiltrations which were reported to have occurred along the West New Guinea coast. The General replied that there had been some infiltrations, some of those concerned being armed; that such cases were not due to any policy of the Central Government, but arose from some unavoidable lack of control in particular areas; and that there had been some infiltration in reverse from West New Guinea to the eastern islands of Indonesia, inspired, he said, by the Dutch for the purpose of fomenting disaffection in those islands. In answer to a question, he agreed that there was no suggestion that the Dutch were contemplating any form of conquest, but maintained that their actions were a form of subversion.

I have stated without comment these remarks by the General, so that the House may have a balanced picture of our discussions.

To conclude this phase of my report, I should refer to two other aspects of the matter.

As has been frequently pointed out in this House, the native inhabitants of New Guinea have no ethnological association with Indonesia. General Nasution retorts to this that there are several distinct ethnic groups in Indonesia, and yet they are within one political structure, and that Malayan is widely spoken in West New Guinea.

In answer to this we have pointed out that the indigenous inhabitants of the island of New Guinea have more in common, both ethnologically and otherwise, than any of them have with the various races of Indonesia, and that this is a factor which should not be ignored.

But General Nasution adds to this another point. In answer to our emphasis upon ultimate self-determination for both sections of New Guinea he contends that West New Guinea should be (and, as he would say, is) part of Indonesia, and that there is no more reason for conceding self-determination to West New Guinea than to any other racial group or peographical area in Indenesia.

This meant that Indonesia rejected the idea of self-determination for the people of West New Guinea. It was further made clear that the only form of trusteeship acceptable to Indonesia would not be one under the Charter of the United Nations, but would be one for the purpose of transferring West New Guinea to Indonesia after a brief intervening period.

Having regard to this view, I carefully developed our views on self-determination, and now record them for the House.

(a) In our own New Guinea territories, our policy is, by steady degrees and up to the limits of our financial and administrative capacity, to promote the advancement of the people so that ultimately they will choose for themselves their own constitution and their future relationship with us. We will respect their choice whatever it may be. This, for us, is not a new policy. We have pursued it for years.

It arises from our sense of responsibility, a responsibility which cannot be suddenly or prematurely abandoned if our trusteeship is to be honourably performed.

(b) Having regard to these undoubted facts, Indonesia cannot reasonably expect Australia to take, nor will Australia take, an initiative in a procedure designed to lead to a handing over of sovereignty and the abandonment of the right of self-determination in the territory concerned. That was, and is, the reason why Australia is most definitely not prepared to put pressure on the Netherlands to negotiate for the transfer of sovereignty and the abandonment of self-determination.

In other words, we recognise Dutch sovereignty, we deal with the Netherlands as a sovereign power, and we approve of the policy of ultimate self-determination which has been adopted by the Netherlands in relation to West New Guinea. If this is regarded by Indonesia as partisanship, we point out that it favours the recognition of sovereignty and the objective of self-determination, to both of which Australia is inevitably attached.

- (c) But on such matters the Netherlands, as the sovereign power, will make, quite freely, its own decisions. Those decisions will be recognised and respected by us.
- (d) We are on most friendly terms with the Dutch, as, remembering the last war, we ought to be. We are also close to and friendly with Indonesia. What Australia has done in the United Nations when the West New Guinea item has come up there, is to support sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction. Sovereignty is basic for Australia not less than to others, including Indonesia. None of this is hostile to Indonesia, and it ought not to be thought so.

Before I conclude, I return to the matter of military involvement. I repeat, in the most categorical terms, that Australia has no military commitment with the Netherlands in relation to West New Guinea, direct or indirect. But armed conflict in that country, whether arising from mass invasion or limited guerilla episodes created by armed infiltration, would present Australia, in common with other countries, with a grave problem. Any such conflict could certainly not be ignored by the United Nations. It would engage the attention, helpful or otherwise, of the great powers. It would threaten world peace, and could well bring disaster to South-East Asia by its encouragement of Communist activity and intervention.

It is therefore necessary to make our position quite clear. We stand for peaceful negotiation at all times, provided that such negotiation is conducted without the threat of force of any shape or kind.

I have stated our recognition of Dutch sovereignty, and our approval of the Dutch policy of self-determination. We have entered into no military commitment beyond those involved in the Charter of the United Nations. But if military conflicts, great or small, arose out of these differences, new and grave problems would arise for many nations, including our own. It is for this reason that the renewed assurances of peaceful pursuit of Indonesia's claims, made by General Nasution, are of such profound importance and international value.

Before I conclude this section of my statement, I would like to say that we were all impressed by General Nasution's frankness and personality. I am sure that he and his wife

enjoyed their visit to Australia. Every opportunity was given to the General by the press, broadcasting and television stations, to express his views. I know that he appreciated this, as we do. He has left Australia after faithfully and ably representing his own country, with, I am certain, a confidence in his own mind that, while his visit may not have changed our policies, it has certainly made a powerful contribution to our common understanding and good will.

## LAOS

Since I last spoke to the House on Tuesday, 11th April, new and important developments in the continuing crisis in Labs have occurred.

In Moscow, negotiations have at last resulted in a measure of agreement between the Soviet and the United Kingdom Governments as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference of 1954 which settled the Indo-China conflict.

The United Kingdom Government has acted throughout these negotiations in close consultation with its friends. We hope and believe that the Soviet Government did likewise, for the value of the new agreement will depend largely on its being respected by other members of the Communist Bloc.

The arrangements agreed upon are, in brief, that -

- (a) the Co-Chairmen should call for a cease-fire in Laos which should be arranged by the Laotian combatants themselves. This call was issued on 24th April;
- (b) the Indian Government, as Chairman of the International Control Commission for Laus, was invited to reconvene that Commission in New Dolhi. The Commission is to report to the Co-Chairman and to receive instructions from them on the Commission's functions in controlling the cease-fire. (The Indian High Commissioner in Australia, Mr. Sen, has been chosen by his Government to represent it as Chairman on this Commission. We welcome this, for Mr. Sen has a close knowledge of Labs, and a wide understanding of the problems involved.)
- (c) an international conference on Laus should be convened in Geneva on 12th May.

Invitations have already been issued for the proposed international conference which will be attended by 14 nations.

These will comprise -

The nine nations who met in Geneva in 1954 - (U.S.S.R., Communist China, United Kingdom, United States, France, Laos, Cambodia and North and South Vietnam).

The three-nation members of the International Control Commission (India, Canada and Poland).

The other two nations who border on Labs (Thailand and Burma).

(Pending the establishment of a Government of Labs which is accepted by both sides, it will be for the conference to determine how Labs should be represented at the conference.)

I make the following observations.