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MEMORANDUM

Van: DIO


datum: 6 april 1962.

Aan: S

Onderwerp: Plannen Bunker

ZEER GEHEIM

Bijgaand zend ik U een zeer voorlopig stuk waarin een aantal gedachten over de plannen Bunker zijn neergelegd. Dit stuk zou aan de orde kunnen komen op de besprekking, die U maandagmiddag aan dit onderwerp wilt wijden.



Netherlands' suggestions and proposed alterations with respect to the outline for an agreement between the Governments of Indonesia and The Netherlands concerning the future administration of Western New Guinea.

The Netherlands wish to seek added guarantees for three aspects of the proposed plan i.e.:

- I. Elaboration of the guarantees for the exercise of the right of free choice of the population under U.N. supervision.
- II. Greater clarity concerning the process of the transfer of administrative authority.
- III. Guarantees for maintenance of order and safety during the transitional period.
- IV. Provisions for UN assistance in the field of technical assistance for economic, social and educational advancement of the people not only for the duration of the transitional period but at least for the total period till the exercise of the right of free choice by the population.
- V. More detailed arrangements for financing.

Re I. Guarantees for the exercise of the right of free choice for the population under UN supervision.

Sub a)

The target date for the exercise of the right of free choice, at present left open under point 4, should be in the foreseeable future. Since the period for the transfer of full administrative control to Indonesia will be two years, it is proposed to specify under point 4 that the exercise of the freedom of choice by the population will take place not later than two years after the moment that Indonesia will have assumed administrative responsibility over the territory.

- Sub b) -

sub b).

In punt 3 wordt thans gesteld dat bij het eind van het tweede jaar "full administrative control" overgedragen zou worden aan Indonesië. Deze tekst moet aldus geamendeerd worden dat van de overdracht wordt uitgesloten de plebiscits-administratie. Deze administratie dient te blijven onder verantwoordelijkheid, leiding en beheer van de V.N. Voör en na de overdracht van de administratie aan Indonesië blijft deze bestuurlijke eenheid voortwerken aan de voorbereiding van het plebisciet, zulks onder uiteindelijke verantwoordelijkheid van de Secretaris-Generaal of de Algemene Vergadering. Het is denkbaar dat de plebiscite administrator een hoge functionaris is onder de U.N. Chief of Mission of daarmee een personele unie vormt. Het is echter ook denkbaar dat deze een afzonderlijke eenheid met eigen bevoegdheden zal zijn.

Als gevolg van het voorgaande dient punt 4 gewijzigd te worden, zodat het niet meer luidt dat Indonesië "agrees to make arrangements to give the people of the territory the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice", doch komt te luiden dat de V.N. via de plebiscite administrator de uitoefening van de vrijheid van keuze zal regelen en dat Indonesië bereid is tevoren (derhalve bij de onderhandelingen) de arrangements vast te leggen, die noodzakelijk zijn om de V.N. het plebisciet in het door Indonesië bestuurde gebied op behoorlijke wijze te laten houden.

(Voor de volksstemming in West Samoa is een uitvoerige wetgeving opgesteld door de trust-mogendheid met medewerking en goedkeuring van het V.N.-Secretariaat. Deze wetgeving wordt thans onderzocht op haar bruikbaarheid voor analoge toepassing.)

II. Greater clarity concerning the process of the transfer of administrative authority.

The text of point 2 en 3 of the proposed outline needs clarification and amplification:

- a) In order to allow proper planning of the different phases of the proposal for double transfer it would seem necessary to define from the start the duration of the administration of the territory under the responsibility of the UN administrator, i.e. a period of two years.
- b) It would seem evident that a replacement of all top Dutch officials at one and the same time would be both impossible and particularly undesirable. It is proposed that this process should

be a gradual one. In the text the words "would replace" should therefore read either "should gradually replace" or "should progressively replace".

Men moet aannemen dat als "top officials" worden gezien de gouverneur, de 8 hoofden van diensten van algemeen bestuur en de 6 Presidenten. Hun vervanging kan onmogelijk op één bepaald tijdstip plaatsvinden, doch het ware denkbaar de internationalisering van de top binnen 6 maanden te doen plaatsvinden.

c). The first sentence of point 3 would need clarification or amendment. In the first place it is suggested that, some time before the "specified date" mentioned in the first sentence of point 2, i.e. before the beginning of the two year period of administration under UN responsibility, the UN administrator should establish his office, including a small personal staff.

Secondly it is proposed to reword the first sentence of point 3 in order to clarify that at the end of the first year of UN administration all top Dutch officials would have been replaced by UN officials which would neither have the Indonesian nor the Dutch nationality.

Thirdly due consideration should be given to the question whether it would not seem desirable and feasible to use instead of the words "~~top~~ Dutch officials" the words "Dutch officials of Netherlands nationality". It goes without saying that all present indigenous officials should be maintained in office and it would even be necessary to define full guarantees for safeguarding the rights of such officials, not only during the period of UN administration, but also for the ensuing period of full Indonesian administrative control. There should not only be no victimization, but a guarantee for the rights of indigenous officials including their pension rights.

d). As a parallel to the gradual replacement of officials mentioned sub b), the wording of the second sentence of point 3 should also provide for the gradual or progressive replacement of UN officials with Indonesian officials.

Re III. Guarantees for maintenance of order and safety during the transitional period.

On this point the outline for the plan is not clear. Three different terminologies are used for the physical presence of the UN i.e.:

- (i) in paragraph 2: "officials" which are to replace "top Dutch officials"
- (ii) in point 3: "personnel"
- (iii) at the end of point 3: "technical assistance personnel".

It is not clear in how far the word "personnel" covers only (top) officials and technical assistance personnel or whether this might also be interpreted as "military personnel".

Given the example of the Congo, the Netherlands Government, in agreeing to a plan of the type proposed, would wish and indeed would be in honour bound to seek sufficient guarantees for preventing the development of a situation where disturbances might occur with ensuing danger for the life and property of the population now under its administration and control. The present plan does provide for UN personnel acting as intermediaries for the succession of high officials responsible for the administration. The minimum guarantee would be that the term "top Dutch officials" should be interpreted as to include "top Dutch military officials". Nevertheless it seems unlikely that a direct replacement of Netherlands military units by Indonesian military formations could be carried out without incidents, if not between the military personnel of both sides, at least between the military on the one hand and elements of the local population on the other hand. It would therefore seem advisable and even necessary that the transfer not only of military responsibility should be effected through the intermediary of (high) UN military officials, but that for a limited period UN military formations should replace the Netherlands units ~~functioning~~ before the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order would be transferred to the Indonesian military forces.

It is therefore proposed that, before the end of the first year, all Netherlands military forces in the territory should be replaced by UN forces and that by the end of the second year these UN forces should be replaced by Indonesian forces. It may be noted that since under these conditions it can reasonably be expected that all outside military threats against the territory would cease, the UN military forces to be used in the territory could be restricted to between 1.000 and 2.000 man.

~~In order to guarantee that during and after the transitional period the economic, social and educational advancement of the population will not be hampered and if possible be further promoted, the Netherlands propose that the UN should establish a technical assistance mission, headed by a resident technical assistance administrator to be appointed directly by the (acting) Secretary General of the UN. In the Netherlands view there would be no objection against combining this office with that of the UN plebiscite administrator mentioned sub I b. It is however deemed essential that, besides preparatory work for the plebiscite, a small staff of economic,~~

Re IV. Provisions for UN assistance.

Only the top Dutch officials will as soon as possible, but in any event within a period of six months, be replaced by non Indonesian and non Dutch officials. In order to guarantee that during and after the transitional period of two years the economic, social and educational advancement of the population will not be hampered the Netherlands propose that the transition of essential tasks will take place in two phases. During the first phase of one year tasks would be transferred from Dutch to international personnel and during the second phase from international to Papuan or Indonesian personnel. To this end the UN should establish a technical assistance mission headed by a Chief of Mission to be appointed directly by the (acting) Secretary General of the UN. After the departure of the UN administrator the office of the Chief of Mission could be combined with that of the UN plebiscite administrator mentioned sub I b). The UN administrative authority, consisting of the administrator and the top officials will not serve beyond the fixed transitional period. The technical assistance mission, however, will remain to be available after the transitional period and until the population has exercised its free choice.

It is essential that for the whole period before the plebiscite the Chief of Mission should be authorized to appoint local technical assistance representatives and plebiscite observers.

Re V. Financial arrangements.

As to point 5 of the proposed plan, it would seem desirable to add to the cost sharing formula the words "falling upon the U.N.". The Netherlands, basing themselves upon the proposals they made before the 16th General Assembly of the U.N., declare their preparedness:

- a. in the first year of the transitional period to contribute funds to a maximum of \$ 30 million to cover the deficit of the budget of New Guinea;
- b. equally in the first year to pay their share in the U.N. costs, made during that period;
- c. in the second year of the transitional period to provide funds to a maximum of \$ 30 million for covering their share in the U.N. costs of that period and as a contribution to the budgetary deficit for

New Guinea during that second year;

- d. after the second year of the transitional period until the date of the exercise of free choice to put at the disposal of the U.N. a contribution towards the costs of the U.N. technical assistance mission to a maximum of \$ 30 million yearly.

Indien men voorgaande financiering om enigerlei reden niet aantrekkelijk zou vinden, ware in ieder geval rekening te houden met de volgende overwegingen en suggesties.

Het dragen van de kosten gezamenlijk door Indonesië en Nederland zonder een nadere precisering leidt in de praktijk tot niets. Indonesië zal ongetwijfeld stellen dat de kosten in de overgangsperiode op het Indonesische peil zouden moeten liggen en Indonesië zou zich ook anderzins aan betalingen, die voor een deel via de VN moeten lopen, kunnen onttrekken. Beter zou m.i. zijn te bepalen, dat in de overgangsperiode de personele kosten van Nederlanders door Nederland worden betaald en dezelfde kosten van Indonesiërs door Indonesië.

Wat de internationale kosten betreft lijkt een Nieuw-Guinea fonds geen aantrekkelijke oplossing. Dit zou hetzij door uitsluitend Nederland en Indonesië hetzij door een groter aantal landen op basis van vrijwilligheid moeten worden opgebracht, door de V.N. Algemene Vergadering worden gecontroleerd en dus aanleiding geven tot onverkwickelijke politieke complicaties als zich voordoen ten aanzien van de Kongo-financiering. Beter zou het zijn te stellen, dat gedurende de overgangsperiode de kosten door Nederland worden gedragen, behoudens de betalingen aan Indonesiërs, doch dat de kosten van het internationale personeel voor Nederlandse rekening via de VN worden betaald. Daarbij zou dan de gelegenheid kunnen worden gelaten, dat in beginsel Indonesië ook bijdraagt in de VN-kosten zonder dat daarvoor een vaste verdelingssleutel wordt toegepast. Men zou natuurlijk kunnen stellen, dat in het tweede jaar de internationale kosten op 50-50 basis door beide landen moeten worden gedragen, maar het mag natuurlijk niet zo zijn, dat Indonesië door te late betaling of door zich aan zijn verplichtingen te onttrekken de internationale inmenging in gevaar brengt.

Behalve de personele kosten zijn er natuurlijk ook aanzienlijke materiële en project-kosten zoals deze thans in de deficit-financiering zijn opgenomen.

Zou men deze in het tweede jaar door beide landen gezamenlijk doen dragen, dan doet zich dezelfde moeilijkheid voor als bovenbedoeld.

6/4/62