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No. 115

MEMORANDUM

Van: Mr. J. M. A. H. Luns

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W. wordt wel terug tot praten over de onder te volgen procedure. Papijs moet in ieder geval reeds geïnformeerd worden. (8/12)

De Amerikaanse Ambassadeur overhandigde mij op 5 dezer hiernevensgaande tekst van de verklaring, die de Amerikaanse Regering zich voorstelt voor de NATO-Raad te houden over wapenleveringen aan Indonesië. [De passages tussen haakjes zijn uitgevallen en de onderstreepte passages zijn nieuw. Paragraaf 3 en 4 zijn eveneens toegevoegd.

Ik heb de Ambassadeur gezegd dat ik de verklaring onbevredigend vond en dat ik niet kon toezeggen niet hierop zelf scherp te reageren bij de NATO Ministersconferentie op 16 dezer. Na enig heen en weer gepraat zeide de Ambassadeur, dat hij Washington zou adviseren de verklaring voorlopig nog in portefeuille te houden. De Heer Young onderstreepte sterk het voorlopig volstrekt geheime karakter van bijlage dezes.

Den Haag, 6/12/58

*fotocopie 175827
ag. no. 173129-9292 P.S.*

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DRAFT UNITED STATES STATEMENT
To NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

December 3, 1958

173129-9292 J.S.
- 8 dec. 1958
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1. In amplification of the U.S. delegation's August 18 note, I am authorized to state that on August 13, the United States concluded an agreement with the GOI (under which certain) for the sale of arms, military equipment, and services. Under this agreement, arms and materiel totaling approximately \$7 million were made available to Indonesia. Small arms and ammunition, and transport, communications, engineering and medical equipment for the Army represent about 80% of the total value. The remainder consists of six 36-foot LCVPs and one 173-foot subchaser for the Navy, three helicopters with a range of 100 miles and a capacity of 5 passengers, plus the pilot, and three light liaison aircraft. (Delivery has been on a phased basis and will be completed except for the aircraft about 1 December. The ETA of the aircraft is not yet known. The program is small in size and does not increase to any significant degree Indonesian offensive potential.) Delivery was made on a phased basis and has been completed except for the aircraft and helicopters, which will be delivered shortly.

2. In accordance with U.S. requirements on all sales of military equipment, the GOI provided assurances that the materiel would be used only to maintain internal security and for legitimate self-defense within the scope of the UN charter which excludes acts of aggression against any other state. In addition, the U.S. informed the GOI that the U.S. regarded these assurances to mean that the materiel would not be used to seek to obtain control of West New Guinea by force.

3. (New Paragraph) Because of favorable internal developments in Indonesia, the U.S. has decided to extend further limited military assistance under the August 13 agreement. This further assistance will cost about \$7.8 million and includes engineering equipment for the Army, small transport and patrol vessels and small arms for the Navy, and training for the Air Force.

4. (New Paragraph) The U.S. program of assistance to Indonesia will be generally on a Government-to-Government basis. We cannot exclude the possibility, however, given our system of free enterprise, that there may be commercial sales of military equipment from time to time under license by the U.S. Government, although we will urge the GOI to keep procurement of military equipment on a Government-to-Government basis. In any event, through our licensing system the U.S. will maintain the same controls over any commercial transactions as have been and will be maintained with respect to any Government-to-Government transactions. Our programs are small in size and do not increase to any significant degree Indonesia's offensive potential.

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5. (Formerly Paragraph 3) Indonesia is an island republic and almost any type of arms or military equipment needed to restore and maintain internal security is also susceptible to aggressive use. As a member of the U.N., Indonesia has abjured force as a means for settling international disputes and understands clearly that the U.S. is opposed to the use of force against West New Guinea using arms from any source. The U.S. at the same time does not believe Indonesia intends such action. In the U.S. view an attack on New Guinea cannot be prevented by denying Western source of arms in light of Soviet bloc willingness to supply arms. It depends rather on the character and orientation of the Indonesian Government and the degree to which the free world can influence its character and affect its orientation.

6. (Formerly Paragraph 4) The Indonesian Government has, in our view, need for modern standardized equipment for internal security purposes and we believe it is in our common interest that Indonesia look to the free world for these needs. (The U.S. decision for a direct Government-to-Government sale of arms to Indonesia is) The U.S. decisions explained above are part of a U.S. effort to encourage Indonesian military and civil leaders to take steps to check the growth of Communist power in Indonesia and to strengthen the Government's ability to maintain internal order against any subversive threat. The U.S. regards the Army as the most important obstacle to a Communist take-over and we believe that military and civil anti-Communist leaders cannot attain their objectives unless they are assured of support from the free world. The U.S. will, therefore, take such action to support these leaders as may facilitate attainment of these objectives, including such arms deliveries as may be appropriate.

7. (Formerly Paragraph 5) The NAC may be assured that the U.S. is fully alive to the preoccupations of certain NATO members regarding the situation in Indonesia and we do not intend to participate in building up Indonesian military potential beyond that which would seem to be required by internal security and legitimate self-defense. Because of continuing uncertainties in the situation in Indonesia, the U.S. is not for its own part proposing to supply arms to Indonesia without most careful consideration of all factors involved. In this sense we continue to feel that general and unrestricted sales of arms, e.g., without regard to quantity or type, would not be in the best interests of the free world. The U.S. believes that other NATO members may wish to bear similar considerations in mind with respect to any possible sales which may be discussed within their governments. The U.S. will continue to inform the NAC of any decision taken with respect to arms for Indonesia and suggests that other NATO members may wish to take similar action.

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