

MEMORANDUM

Van: Mr. N. S. BLOM

No. 96

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Aan: M

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DBI
PZA
DBI/PL

26 november 1958.

Bij verdere overweging van de vraag hoe de kwestie van de Amerikaanse wapenleveranties en de mede naar aanleiding daarvan door U.E. verkregen Amerikaanse garanties verder zouden kunnen worden behandeld dient m.i. rekening te worden gehouden met het feit dat wij zeer onlangs de beschikking hebben gekregen over het rapport dat de U.C.V.I.N. heeft opgesteld over de bedreiging van Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea. Uit dat rapport blijkt dat het grote gevaar is gelegen in een mogelijke verrassende actie van Indonesische zijde. Zulk een actie zou als zij plaats zou hebben ons voor plotselinge complicaties stellen en het is naar het schijnt een gerechtvaardigde Nederlandse eis dat de hulp die van Amerikaanse zijde is toegezegd voor het geval van een gewapende aanval zo efficiënt mogelijk zal zijn. Daarom zal de Amerikaanse regering rekening moeten houden met de wijze waarop zich onverhoopt de situatie zal voordoen waarbij de Amerikaanse toezeggingen in praktijk zouden moeten worden gebracht.

Het blijft uiteraard primair dat alles zal worden gedaan om zulk een aanval te voorkomen. Niettemin is het - zoals steeds bij latente dreigingen - nodig dat men zich beraadt over de vraag wat er moet gebeuren als dit voorkomen zou mislukken.

Ik zou daarom willen aanbevelen dat de Amerikaanse regering wordt ingelicht over de inhoud van het opgemaakte inlichtingenrapport en dat daarbij wordt gezegd dat de Nederlandse regering het op prijs zal stellen dat de Amerikaanse regering zou willen overwegen in het licht van dat rapport hoe zij de gedane toezeggingen in geval van nood effectief zou kunnen maken. Immers uit dit rapport blijkt dat er in dat geval geen tijd zal zijn voor een gedegen onderzoek en overleg. De nodige planning zal tevoren moeten hebben plaats gehad, liefst in geheim en niet-in prejudiciërend overleg tussen de daarvoor geeignende militaire instanties. Verzocht zou dan kunnen worden om tot zulk een overleg machtiging te geven.

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MEMORANDUM

Van: Mr. N. S. BLOM

- 2 -

Aan:

Het wil mij voorkomen dat Nederland op deze wijze kan trachten de Amerikaanse regering er toe te brengen enige reële inhoud te geven aan de gegeven garanties.

Naar S mij mededeelde overweegt U aan de Amerikaanse Ambassadeur te schrijven dat U zich voorbehoudt om in het publiek volledige opening van zaken te geven, indien zich de situatie zou voordoen dat de Amerikaanse hulp ons in geval van nood niet effectief uit de brand zou helpen. Ik zou in overweging willen geven deze laatste stap eerst te overwegen indien zou blijken dat de Amerikaanse regering niet bereid is enig voorafgaand overleg te plegen over de vorm van haar eventueel te verlenen hulp. Ik meen dat de Nederlandse positie daardoor versterkt wordt mede omdat dan van Amerikaanse zijde niet kan worden gezegd dat niet was te voorzien hoe een noodsituatie zich zou ontwikkelen.

Nummer 6504

Bijlage 1

19 januari 1959

TOP SECRET

Indonesia

THE THREAT TO DUTCH NEW GUINEA FROM INDONESIA OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS

Military capability

Indonesia has already received large quantities of Soviet Bloc arms and more are on order. By April 1959, their armed forces will be materially powerful but they will not be able to make operational use of that equipment for some time after this.

The Indonesian armed forces are now almost wholly occupied in the suppression of rebel activity and the maintenance of internal security generally. Given no political settlement, we do not believe that the rebels can be suppressed in six months and it will probably take much longer. We do not consider that, in present circumstances, the Indonesians could mount an operation of the size required to invade Dutch New Guinea. In the unlikely event of a political settlement with the rebels, the Indonesians would find it easier to raise such an invasion force but, even so, for reasons given below, we do not believe that such an operation is likely, even less that it would succeed.

The Indonesians have mounted successful amphibious operations in both Sumatra and the Celebes and have become increasingly proficient in this technique. However, they have so far only had spasmodic opposition from the land but none from the sea or air.

A force of the size required to mount a successful operation against Dutch New Guinea, for which they have ample shipping, would be detected either in the assembly stage (if mounted from islands close to Dutch New Guinea) or during transit if launched from further afield (e.g. Java). It is likely, in any case, that some intelli-

gence of a projected operation of this size and importance would be received earlier.

An Indonesian amphibious operation would be particularly vulnerable on passage to naval and air attack, especially since the force would be outside Indonesian fighter cover owing to the lack of suitable airfields within range. The Indonesians have the aircraft available to mount an airborne operation: they have never, however, previously mounted an attack of the scale required and we consider the possibility of such an operation extremely remote.

As explained above, the main deficiency of such operations would be the lack of fighter cover owing to the absence of suitable airfields within range. Bloc "volunteers" could not alter this situation and we therefore do not believe that their presence could materially alter the Indonesian military capability.

To sum up, we do not believe the Indonesians, with or without the help of Bloc "volunteers", have the military capability of mounting an operation against Dutch New Guinea within the next six months.

Political considerations

There are conflicting reports of President SUKARNO's intentions with regard to direct military action against Dutch New Guinea. He is reported to have twice stated during a tour of East Indonesia last month that Indonesia will not take "West Irian" by force of arms. Dr. SUBANDRIO told Mr. Selwyn LLOYD during his recent visit to London that

no aggression was contemplated and Lt. Col. SUKENDRO (the Indonesian DMI) repeated this assurance in London during the past few days. On the other hand, a previously reliable secret source has reported a conversation with SUBANDRIO in October who indicated then that a direct attack was being planned for March 1959.

The governing group in Indonesia (at present an alliance of President SUKARNO, Major-General NASUTION and Prime Minister DJUANDA, in that order of importance) are becoming increasingly authoritarian, and in their continued political and economic difficulties they will need all the popular enthusiasm they can rally from a "forward" policy on New Guinea. It is beginning to be clear that the tactics of economic expropriation have failed, and new ideas for "other courses" are no doubt being canvassed. There are various moves which could be taken short of actual invasion (e.g. infiltration of guerillas, sabotage and assassination) and vague threatening remarks by those in positions of influence should not necessarily be taken as good evidence of plans for an invasion.

The Indonesians appear to have made small attempts at infiltration in the past. We have no reason to believe that any future attempts would be likely to gain support among the native population except for the small Indonesian minority (only 11,000 out of a total population of about 750,000).

While the instability of SUKARNO's personality is such that we cannot altogether rule it out, an invasion seems unlikely for the following reasons:

- a) SUKARNO must realise that the chances of achieving a decisive military success are remote, even if the operation was assisted by

Communist "volunteers" (see para 7 above). He would be likely to calculate that failure to achieve this would have drastic repercussions on his own political future, as well as ruling out any possibility of defeating the rebels in Sumatra and the Celebes within the foreseeable future.

- b) While SUKARNO might manage to obtain the sympathy and some political support of certain Afro/Asian countries, he must realise that the use of force would provoke hostile reactions from the Western powers, in particular the U.K., Australia and the United States. Moreover military and civil aid from the United States is becoming increasingly important to the Indonesian Government. Apart from any independent action they might take, the Western powers would probably be able to obtain sufficient support in the U.N. to prevent SUKARNO achieving his objective.
- c) Although the Sino/Soviet Bloc would in all probability give SUKARNO initial propaganda support (including possible references to sending "volunteers"), we do not believe there is any likelihood at present of his obtaining a promise in advance of direct military support from either the Soviet Union or China, without which a military adventure of this kind could not succeed.

Nummer 6504

Bijlage 2

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

ADDENDA TO THE REPORT
"THE INDONESIAN THREAT TO NETHERLANDS
NEW GUINEA"

Chapter B, pages 7 - 11 "Political
Developments in Indonesia with
respect to Netherlands New Guinea".

With reference to the paragraphs on the National Front for the Liberation of Irian it should be mentioned that meanwhile Brigadier-General Mustopo has been relieved of his function as Secretary-General of this organisation, which he now serves in the capacity of Deputy-Secretary-General. The reasons for this demotion are not quite clear, but are probably to be sought in the erratic personality of Mustopo which made him seem less qualified for responsible leading functions.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ahmadi was appointed in his place. He is a member of the National Council, is intimate with Sukarno and is the right hand of the Minister of Veteran Affairs, Chairul Saleh, who has communist leanings. Ahmadi has studied several years in Amsterdam, up to 1954 when it became clear to him that his presence in the Netherlands was undesirable. During his stay in the Netherlands he was charged by the Indonesian Minister of Education to function as a contact between the Indonesian students and the Indonesian High Commission. He also reported to the abovementioned Minister in Jakarta about these students. In 1953 Ahmadi visited the World Youth Festival in Bucharest. He also visited other communist countries and had close connections with extreme left circles in the Netherlands. About Ahmadi it is further known that he now enjoys the confidence of the Indonesian Communist Party-leadership which sometimes uses him as its mouthpiece when it wishes to suggest or communicate something to the President.

Recently Ahmadi visited the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic together with two other members of the National Council. On his return he gave a lecture in which he praised these two countries.

As the Irian Front is now virtually led by the team Ahmadi-Mustopo, this means in practice that the leftish element in the top of this front has been strengthened instead of weakened. If Nasution has tried to prevent the infiltration of the Irian Front by leftish influence, this attempt has failed.

TOP SECRET

Chapter F: "Clear Indications of Plans
For Aggression"

To this list of indications the following should be added:-

10. It was learned from an informant in a country belonging to the Soviet bloc, who is considered to be reliable, that plans are being prepared for widespread communist action which would include parts of South-East Asia. Specifically these plans would include Singapore with the cooperation of the many Chinese with sympathies for the Chinese People's Republic.

(The question arises as to whether a connection should be made between the above and the remarkable fact that the delivery of arms by the Soviet bloc to Indonesia is so extensive that for the time being Indonesia completely lacks the required military and technical personnel to use this equipment, notwithstanding the fact that in Poland, Tchecho-Slovakia, Egypt and Yugoslavia several hundreds of Indonesians (as far as is known) have received military and technical training.)

11. According to a reliable Indonesian source, the Indonesian Government plan shortly to provoke an incident in the neighbourhood of Netherlands New Guinea, for instance by shooting at a ship of the Royal Netherlands Navy or a Netherlands aeroplane. It would then be made to appear that the ship or the plane had made provocative movements or entered Indonesian territory. (In this connection mention should be made of the recent unilateral extension by Indonesia of its territorial sea to 12 miles).

Should the reactions of other countries to this incident be favourable to Indonesia, it would be possible to proceed with landings on the coast of Netherlands New Guinea, in which connection the said source also mentioned the possible use of parachutists. To world opinion it would be made to appear that not Indonesia, but the Netherlands had resorted to the use of force and that Indonesia was forced to countermeasures out of self-defence. According to this source this action is planned for approximately March 1959.

12. The information mentioned under 11 is confirmed by intelligence from a completely different side according to which the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Subandrio, has recently expressed the hope that action against Netherlands New Guinea would start in March of next year. Indonesia would then be strong enough to face the consequences of such action.

TOP SECRET

Subandrio alleges that both the Government and the Chief of Staff of the Army had decided anyway to take such a step, even if this meant the risk of a world conflict.

According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs it was the opinion of President Sukarno that Indonesia would accept the intervention of volunteers from the Chinese People's Republic or the Soviet Union if the Netherlands were helped by their friends.

13. The Indonesian Military Attaché's recently received instructions to determine how the countries, where they are appointed, would react in case of an armed conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia.

ANNEX I: "THE ARMED FORCES OF INDONESIA"

NAVY, Pages 1 and 2

With the exception of the paragraphs "The Marines" and "Further particulars about the Naval Forces", the text of these pages should be replaced by:-

Naval Vessels:

- 1 destroyer (old)
- 2 modern frigates (from Italy)
- 2 modern corvettes (from Italy)
- 3 corvettes (old)
- 4 LCI's (old)
- 1 LST (from China ?)
- 3 LCT's (from Yugoslavia)
- 6 new LCVP's
- 10 LCVA's (from Yugoslavia)
- 10 new LVT's (amphibious tractors) (from Yugoslavia)
- 31 LCVT's
- 10 coastal minesweepers
- 24 patrol vessels (A- and B-class)
- 2 coastal sub-chasers (from U.S.A.)
- 4 sub-chasers (from Soviet bloc)
- 4 tankers
- 2 large supply ships and an unknown number of small ones.

Due to arrive from abroad:

- 6 small landing craft from U.S.A.
- 8 M.T.B.'s from Germany (speed 44 miles)
- 1 coastal sub-chaser from U.S.A.
- 6 patrol vessels from Yugoslavia (to be expected shortly)
- 4 destroyers from Soviet bloc, of which 2 expected in december 1958, and 2 in first quarter of 1959.
- 2 medium large sub-marines from Soviet bloc, to be expected in first quarter of 1959.
- 4 sub-chasers from Soviet bloc, probably already on the way to Indonesia from the Black Sea.

TOP SECRET

Negotiations are under way with Japan for delivery of 2 frigates of the AKEBONO-class (1075 ton).

Merchant Navy:

- 3 ships of 6800 tons
- 1 ship of 4200 tons
- 4 ships of 2500 tons
- 10 ships of 1500 tons
- 3 ships of 1100 tons
- 60 coasters of 500 to 600 tons

To be delivered between 1959 and 1962 by Poland:

- 4 ships of 4500 tons
- 7 ships of 2300 tons
- 2 ships of 10,000 tons
- 11 ships of 950 tons

Arms etc.:

a. From the Soviet bloc:

- An estimated number of 200 torpedoes, delivery date unknown.
- An estimated number of 8000 mines, delivery date unknown (probably mines have already been delivered, as five mine-experts have arrived).
- A large number of depth-charges, partly delivered.
- 25 A.A. guns of 37 m.m. (delivered).
- 25 A.A. guns of 85 m.m. (delivered).
- Large quantities of ammunition.

b. From Switzerland:

- An unknown quantity of Napalm-bombs (delivered).
- 143 tons of rockets of 10 Kilogrammes ("Hispano Suiza").

AIR FORCE: Pages 3 to 5:

With the exception of the paragraphs "Further Particulars about the Air Force" and "Civil Aviation", the contents under "Air Force" in Appendix I should be replaced by:

Present strength:

- 15 B 25 Mitchell medium bombers, suitable for high altitude and low level bomb attacks, suitable for offensive operations. Range about 600 nautical miles.
- 12 P 51 Mustang long distance fighters, suitable for offensive operations. Range about 300 nautical miles (600 with extra tanks).

TOP SECRET

- 6 DH 115 Vampire jet-aircraft (trainers). These aircraft may be armed and used as fighters. Range about 400 nautical miles.
- 5 PBV 5A Catalina long range reconnaissance aircraft. Range about 1300 nautical miles.
- 8 SA 16A Albatros long range amphibious reconnaissance aircraft. Range about 700 nautical miles. (1150 naut. miles with extra fuel tanks).
- 6 Cesena 180 light reconnaissance aircraft. Range about 300 naut. miles.
- 31 C 47 Dakota transport-aircraft, suitable for dropping paratroopers. (Range 600 nautical miles).
- 6 Hiller and Bell helicopters.
- 24 U-MIG 15 Trainer jet-aircraft (probably all delivered).
- 71 MIG 17 "Fresco" jet-fighters. Range about 600 naut. miles. Of these jet-fighters at least 9 operational.
- 32 IL 28 "Beagle" medium jet bombers. Range maximum 700 nautical miles, suitable for launching torpedoes. Of this number at least 11 operational (probably all delivered).
- 11 IL 14 "Crate" transport-aircraft. Capacity 22 men with equipment. Range maximum 710 nautical miles at 10,000 feet. Of this number at least 6 operational and probably all delivered.
- 20 TS 8 Training aircraft, probably delivered.

To be expected:

- 15 MIG 17 "Fresco" fighters (see above), to be delivered in May 1959.
- 2 Helicopters for training (H-1 ?), to be delivered in January 1959, from the Soviet bloc.
- 2 Liaison Helicopters (H-1 ?), to be delivered in January 1959, from Soviet bloc.
- An unknown number of Antonov-Transport-aircraft (Poland).
- 15 Radar installations from Poland (probably already arrived in Indonesia).
- 3 Liaison aircraft from U.S.A.
- 3 Helicopters from U.S.A.
- 6 Fairey Gannet anti-submarine planes from the U.K. To be delivered in 1959. (This number will probably be increased to 18).

ARMY:

The last paragraph on page 9 of Appendix I (Commandos and Paratroops) should be replaced by:-

Up till now the presence of 2 companies of paratroopers (Air Force), and at least 3, possibly 6 companies of Commando Troops (Army) has been established.

TOP SECRET

BASES.

On page 13 of Appendix I at the end of sub-Chapter 2: "Facilities", and just above sub-Chapter 3: "How airfields in Eastern Indonesia can be reached from Java" the following should be inserted:-

Recently the airfields at Amboina and Morotai were visited by a senior Indonesian Air Force Officer to test these. It is assumed that he inspected these airfields in order to establish whether they are now suitable for jet-aircraft.

On the airfield of Pitu approximately 300 men are working. Probably a second airstrip is being prepared.