

GEHEIM

MEMORANDUM

No. 241

6531  
912.13 mmp  
(ev. aam.)  
cc.: POAD  
DBI/PL

Van: Chef DBI

11 juni 1960

Aan: Z *[handwritten mark]*

Onderwerp: Intelligence overleg met de Britten.

De Britse Raad bezocht mij hedenmorgen om de mededeling van het Foreign Office te bevestigen, die reeds door Hr.Ms. Ambassadeur te Londen was doorgegeven, dat de Britten gaarne accoord gaan met het Nederlandse voorstel de volgende bijeenkomst van vertegenwoordigers van inlichtingendiensten van beide landen in Den Haag te houden.

Het was de Britse Ambassade niet bekend, wanneer de heer Eindhoven weer terug zou zijn van zijn reis naar Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea, maar van Britse zijde wilde men voorstellen het overleg in de ~~tweede~~<sup>eerste</sup> week van juli te houden, zodat alle betrokken diensten zich daarop tijdig zouden kunnen voorbereiden. De conferentie zou b.v. op 5 juli kunnen beginnen en twee dagen kunnen duren.

De Britten stelden zich voor drie of vier vertegenwoordigers van de G.I.C. af te vaardigen.

De heer Etherington Smith vroeg mij hem zo spoedig mogelijk te laten weten, welke data de Nederlandse deelnemers zouden schikken, hetgeen ik hem heb toegezegd.

Verdere details zullen langs de normale "service channels" kunnen worden geregeld.

Hoofd DBI/PL wordt verzocht terzake contact op te nemen met C.V.I.N. en mij te berichten wat ik de Britse Raad zou kunnen antwoorden.

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TOP SECRET

Memorandum on the discussions held at The Hague on July 5, 1960, between representatives of the British and Netherlands Intelligence Services concerning the Indonesian threat to Netherlands New Guinea.

1. The following is an agreed intelligence appreciation up to mid 1961.
2. All elements in Indonesian political life support Indonesian action to secure control of Dutch New Guinea. There are, however, differences about time and method.
3. The Dutch capability to resist an armed attack against Dutch New Guinea is limited, and it is likely that the Indonesian Government is fully aware of this. The local population of Dutch New Guinea, although passively loyal, could not be relied upon in the event of an Indonesian attack in which they had appreciated that the Dutch forces could no longer protect them.
4. It is estimated that during the period under review, apart from current infiltration for subversive activities, the Indonesian capability for armed action in Netherlands New Guinea is limited to a force of up to battalion strength which would most probably be landed at diverse points in detachments not larger than a company. It is likely that an expedition of this size could be mounted and transported without its purpose being immediately obvious and that it could stay put for sufficient time to allow internationalisation of the dispute.
5. It is known from secret sources that at the end of 1959 a plan of action in four phases was submitted to President Sukarno by the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army, covering a stated period of three to five years. The plan provides for the preparation and execution of intensive intelligence operations,

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subversive activities and infiltrations, the stirring up of unrest and rebellion and the setting up of a shadow administration in Netherlands New Guinea. These activities are to be followed by the rounding off of the "Irian campaign" in the diplomatic field possibly accompanied by military action. Indonesian activities apparently along the lines of the initial stages of this plan have already been noted.

6. The authorisation and preparation of such a plan implies that the Indonesian authorities intend to attain their objectives by all means within their power and that in spite of reassuring statements to the contrary they may resort to the use of armed force, particularly if they could engineer a situation or incident in which they would not appear as the obvious aggressors.

The Hague, 5th July 1960.