

3. Over de inhoud van een codeber. mag niet met verwijzing naar dat bericht per telefoon worden gesproken.
4. Dossiers, welke codeber. bevatten, dienen veilig te worden opgeborgen.

REFERENTIE No.:

5587

INFORMATIEKOPIE:

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MINISTERIE VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN

Kopie No. 1

AFDELING VERBINDINGEN

's-GRAVENHAGE, LANGE HOUTSTRAAT 28

TEL. Nos: 180309; 184000-284

ONTVANGEN CODEBERICHT

DATUM VAN ONTVANGST:

26 januari 1959

BESTEMD VOOR:

min. v. b.z.

[110 6686]

Dir./Afd.:

Visie:

Ag. No: 13564-614

Dossier: cc 921.15

DATUM VAN AFZENDING:

26 januari 1959

AFKOMSTIG VAN: Londen

PARAAF/OPM:

zeer geheim

van luns stp

voor de ochtendzitting had ik in een prive onder houd van veertig minuten met lloyd deze op krachtige wijze onderhouden langs de lijnen van mijn gesprekken in den haag met mason stp

hier volgt verslag der besprekingen op foreign office over indonesische zaak waarbij aanwezig van britse zijde dubbnt lloyd cma parliamentary under secretary lansdowne cma undersecretary dean cma mason en enige lagere ambtenaren van foreign office cma terwijl bentinck cma boetzelaer cma van heusde en jalink mij vergezelden stp

p r i m o

evaluatie intelligence gegevens stp

sir patrick dean sprak tevredenheid over vorige week alhier door deskundigen bereikte overeenstemming omtrent evaluatie intelligence gegevens omtrent moge lijke indonesische militaire actie tegen nieuw guinea stp onderstreept werd dat het rapport door beide zijden zonder enig voorbehoud aanvaard was stp

s e c u n d o

garanties aan nederland en waarschuwing aan indonesie

selwyn lloyd begreep dat nederland het liefste een verzekering van militaire bijstand zou ontvangen stp het was echter niet mogelijk zulk een verzekering openlijk te geven stp hij was wel bereid een niet openbare verzekering van deze aard aan mij te geven stp aan de indonesische regering zou hij doen weten dat indonesie in geval van actie tegen nieuw guinea het v k tegen zich zou vinden stp hij cma selwyn lloyd cma had deze kwestie besproken met dulles die evenmin aan nederland directe militaire steun had kunnen toezeggen in verband met inschakeling congress stp het v k kan in deze niet verder gaan dan amerika cma wel even ver d w z dat logistieke steun kan worden toegezegd stp ook quo in other appropriate ways unquo zal het v k ons in een dergelijke eventualiteit steunen

2. Afschriften van codeberichten mogen uitsluitend door de afdeling Verbindingen worden /aar

1. Op een codeber. mag teleg. niet in open taal worden geantwoord, tenzij aan bepaalde voorwaarden wordt voldaan (zie Richtlijn)

ONTVANGEN CODEBERICHT

VERVOLG

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stp selwyn lloyd legde er de nadruk op dat deze toezeggingen nog met het britse kabinet moesten worden besproken pntoma zij werden derhalve ad referendum door britse regering gedaan stp

ik heb gewezen op het verschil tussen de britse en de amerikaanse positie ten aanzien van nieuw guinea in dier voege dat de v s zich ten aanzien van de juridische situatie steeds neutraal hadden verklaard cma terwijl het v k het nederlandse standpunt steeds had onderschreven stp ik voegde hieraan toe dat er het gevaar is in een vicieuze cirkel te geraken stp de australiers en de britten zeiden in hun toezeggingen niet verder te kunnen gaan dan de amerikanen die op hun beurt zich achter het congress verschuilen

ik legde er voorts de nadruk op dat bij een aanval op nieuw guinea onmiddellijke hulp geboden was teneinde aan de agressie een eind te maken cma alvorens de zaak in de v n zou worden gebracht stp de bittere praktijk had ons immers geleerd dat dan de zaak verloren is stp ik zeide verder dat wij besloten zijn de souvereiniteit over nieuw guinea te handhaven cma doch dat wij anderzijds niet bereid zijn om een strijd aan te vangen die wij bij gebrek aan buitenlandse hulp gedoemd zouden zijn te verliezen stp nederland wilde niet voor de derde maal in het verre oosten een quo losing war unquo voeren stp

het gesprek kwam daarop op de wapenleveranties stp selwyn lloyd besepte dat het v k door wapens te leveren een morele verplichting op zich neemt voor wat het gebruik betreft stp hij was bereid om bij de eerstvoorkomende gelegenheid de indonesiers nogmaals duidelijk te doen weten dat het v k onder alle omstandigheden tegen het gebruik van geweld is ter besteking van geschillen cma dat de geleverde wapens nimmer tegen nieuw guinea mogen worden gebruikt en dat cma indien zulks wel zou geschieden quo you will find us against you unquo stp op mijn vraag wat geantwoord zou worden cma indien van indonesische kant zou worden gevraagd of dit inhield quo military against you unquo cma zeide selwyn lloyd dat hij zou antwoorden dat daarmee rekening moet worden gehouden stp

ik stelde daarop dat een dergelijke waarschuwing aan de indonesiers mij welkom was en beklemtoonde het grote belang van de deterrent aangezien het voorkomen van een aanval nog belangrijker was dan de steun na de aanval stp immers cma wanneer een aanval eenmaal had plaats gevonden zou indonesie ongetwijfeld volledig in communistisch vaarwater geraken cma aangezien cma hetgeen lloyd beaamde cma en amerika

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en engeland indonesie dan in ieder geval in de steek zullen moeten laten stp

selwyn lloyd stelde dat een scherpe vermaning aan de indonesiers het beste zou kunnen worden gekoppeld aan de levering door vickers van de torpedo's en lanceerbuizen stp zulks zou ook zijn positie in het parlement cma die moeilijk was cma vergemakkelijken en er zelfs toe kunnen leiden dat ook de oppositie zou instemmen met de grotere verantwoordelijkheid die het v k op zich neemt door wapens te leveren stp

concluderend zei selwyn lloyd bereid te zijn tot volgende actie dubbnt

- a australie en de v s te benaderen en met verwijzing naar de conclusies getrokken uit intelligence gegevens een common policy te bepleiten stp
- b hernieuwde waarschuwing aan indonesie als hierboven omschreven stp
- c een particuliere verzekering aan de nederlandse regering dat het v k ons alle mogelijke hulp zal bieden in geval van agressie tegen nieuw guinea cma en in ieder geval zo ver te gaan als amerika

stp

t e r t i o

behandeling wapenleveranties in nato stp

selwyn lloyd was het met mij eens dat deze kwestie in n a r moet worden besproken stp ik legde nadruk op belang dat amerika en engeland als machtigste bondgenoten een duidelijke verklaring zouden afleggen welke door nederland zou kunnen worden onderstreept stp de n a r diende het beginsel te aanvaarden dat slechts die landen cma die bereid en in staat zijn verantwoordelijkheden te dragen en waar te maken in het verre oosten cma wapenen leveren d w z alleen de vs en het v k stp met mij betwijfelde hij echter of zulks haalbaar is d w z of de andere landen dit zullen aanvaarden stp

ik ben over resultaat van ons gesprek niet ontevreden stp in het bijzonder acht ik het van groot belang dat britse regering bereid is demarches bij australische en Amerikaanse regering te doen cma teneinde van hen positievere toezeggingen te krijgen en aldus deterrent te versterken stp

bentinck 41.

Nummer - 1686

Bijlage

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**AGREED RECORD OF DISCUSSION HELD AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE
ON MONDAY, JANUARY 26, 1959**

**The Indonesian Threat to Netherlands New Guinea and the Question of Arms
Supplies to Indonesia**

Present:

The Secretary of State
Lord Lansdowne
Sir Paul Mason
Sir Patrick Dean
Mr. Morland
and others

Dr. Luns
The Netherlands Ambassador
Baron van Boetzelaer
and others

The conversation on this subject began at 12.30 p.m., and was resumed at 3.15 p.m.

The Ministers had before them an agreed memorandum of a discussion held on January 23 between Netherlands and United Kingdom representatives on the nature of the threat from Indonesia to Netherlands New Guinea.

2. *The Secretary of State* said that the main point in this agreed paper was that a resort to force by Indonesia would be most likely to take the form of an attempt to secure a lodgement on a limited scale, which could be used for political purposes in the United Nations.

3. *Dr. Luns* said that all the intelligence reaching the Netherlands Government proved that when talking amongst themselves leading Indonesians invariably referred to their programme of armament in the context of an attack on Netherlands New Guinea. These armaments were obviously not only designed for internal purposes and, although the Netherlands defences had been strengthened, the territory was so large that a bridgehead could be established. In addition, the broadcasting war against Dutch New Guinea was a steadily undermining influence. It could be argued that the situation in the Celebes might delay matters, perhaps until 1960, but the threat was a sword of Damocles for the Netherlands. One recent report from Djakarta indicated that plans might be on foot for two small islands off the coast to be occupied in February–March 1959 by 2,000 irregulars with criminal records who had been training as volunteers under a former German officer (now with the Indonesian Navy) and for whom weapons had been delivered at Surabaya in November 1958 by a Soviet ship. Such a *coup* would of course be repudiated by the Indonesian Government if it should misfire. There was some evidence that General Nasution and a number of officers of the regular army were not in favour of these plans. There is, however, no doubt that if the political decision were taken to carry out those plans, General Nasution would not disobey his orders.

4. After the resumption *the Secretary of State* said that he would like to consider whether it was possible for Her Majesty's Government to give the Netherlands Government any assurance of support which would be of value. He said that on this subject he was speaking *ad referendum* because the nature of any such assurance would have to be carefully scrutinised by the Cabinet. Her Majesty's Government would, however, be likely to stand by the principle, which was also that applied by Mr. Nehru in the case of the Indian claim to Goa, and which also applied to such questions as the Off-shore Islands and Berlin, namely that whatever might be the merits of a case they would be opposed to anyone who attempted to settle it by force. But there was no chance that we could say publicly that we would intervene militarily. He understood that Mr. Dulles had warned the Indonesian Government that they would find the United States against them in

any such adventure, but had given no commitment as regarded military intervention. He believed that Her Majesty's Government could go as far as the United States Government had gone. He then read to Dr. Luns the text of a proposed assurance to the Netherlands Government in the following terms:—

“Her Majesty's Government sincerely hope that the Indonesian Government will in fact adhere to their declared policy of refraining from using force to prosecute their claim to Netherlands New Guinea. If, nevertheless, the Indonesian Government should resort to force, Her Majesty's Government would give their support to the Netherlands Government. Her Majesty's Government cannot enter into a commitment to provide military support, but they would do everything within their power to assist the Netherlands Government in other appropriate ways.”

The Secretary of State said that this would not imply merely verbal support; Mr. Dulles seemed to have envisaged massive logistical support, and the Secretary of State believed that there would be approval in this country for the giving of support similar in kind to that given by the United States.

5. In reply to the question whether such assurances from the United States and from the United Kingdom were of value, *Dr. Luns* said that such support would have to come immediately; it would be valueless if it came after an interval of, say, two weeks. He pointed out that the position of Her Majesty's Government on the legal issue was different from that of the United States Government, in that Her Majesty's Government had made clear that they regarded the Indonesian claim as invalid; it would be useful if this could be repeated. Moreover, although Her Majesty's Government did not seem prepared to go beyond the United States in assisting the Netherlands Government, Her Majesty's Government were supplying Indonesia with arms which she required for purposes of this aggression. He must emphasise that, although the Netherlands Government intended to carry out their obligations as the sovereign Power, they must relate this to their other commitments and to their national interests. The Netherlands people considered they had already lost two wars in the Far East and had not received from their Allies support of the kind which other Western Powers had received when their interests had been liquidated by Asian nationalists. If now they were to have to fight alone again when their Allies had helped the Indonesians, knowing that they intended to attack, the position would be very difficult. It would be helpful therefore if Her Majesty's Government would try to influence the United States Government and the Australian Government to do more to help.

6. Dr. Luns repeated that the value of the support could only be measured in terms of the technical arrangements made in advance; otherwise the Indonesians would secure their lodgement, and action would pass to the United Nations, who would then give them everything that they wanted.

7. *The Secretary of State* said that Her Majesty's Government would regret a Netherlands decision to quit. The Netherlands were our friends and Allies and had a right to be in New Guinea. But Her Majesty's Government had no direct interest such as the Australians had. *Dr. Luns* said that the Netherlands Government were not planning to quit, but appreciated that they might well be forced out. It was regrettable that the United States Government seemed to be unhappy at any idea that a Netherlands task force should visit Netherlands New Guinea and Far Eastern ports. Dr. Luns felt that British and American naval visits to Netherlands New Guinea would be useful and constitute an additional warning to the Indonesian Government.

8. *The Secretary of State* suggested that our supplying a few Gannet aircraft to the Indonesian Government made no practical difference but gave us an opportunity to warn the Indonesian Government of the displeasure which they would encounter if they made any aggressive use of these aircraft. *Dr. Luns* observed that, while the Gannets might make little difference by themselves, there were also rumours about applications for naval craft and ammunition. But he agreed that the warnings given by Mr. Dulles had had a beneficial effect. He added that a renewed and clear British warning would also be useful.

9. *The Secretary of State* said that, whilst we should think it disastrous that the Netherlands should suffer a military defeat in the area, we did not possess the military potential to make the kind of early intervention which would help the

Netherlands. *Dr. Luns* said that the military strength likely to be deployed by Indonesia against Dutch New Guinea would be rather modest. He asked whether Her Majesty's Government could not give to the Australian Government an assurance of military support, and he quoted from a record by Mr. Menzies of a conversation on January 16 with the Netherlands Ambassador. Mr. Menzies had said that Australia could not give an assurance of active support unless they had similar assurances from the United States and the United Kingdom, since the Indonesians might dispose of forces superior to those of the Netherlands and Australia combined. But Mr. Menzies believed that it was essential to build up a deterrent, because any attack by Indonesia on Netherlands New Guinea would, by itself, inevitably lead to a withdrawal of all support to Indonesia from the United States and the United Kingdom. In effect therefore the mere fact of such an attack would push Indonesia into the Communist orbit. Accordingly Mr. Menzies considered that the Western countries should make it clear that no attack by Indonesia would be tolerated. The Australian Government could not themselves base their strategy on individual action.

10. *Dr. Luns* said that he was of course prepared to deny the existence of any assurances of military support; Mr. Dulles had made it clear that he could not promise military support publicly.

11. *The Secretary of State* said that if the United States were involved with the Netherlands in such a conflict, he could not conceive that Her Majesty's Government would not give support of the same nature although not to the same extent or quantity as the United States. He proposed that action should be taken under the following four headings:—

- (i) An approach to the United States Government, drawing attention to the agreed intelligence appreciation, and suggesting that we should concert deterrent action;
- (ii) A similar approach to the Australian Government;
- (iii) Warnings to the Indonesian Government; and
- (iv) Assurances to the Netherlands Government.

With regard to (iii) the purpose should be to lead the Indonesians to think that they would be in deep waters if they attacked. He considered that there would be support in this country, possibly even opposition support, for the view that by supplying any arms to Indonesia we increased our moral responsibility for ensuring that these arms were not misused. Accordingly, the occasion should be taken to request renewed assurances from the Indonesian Government, and to leave them in no doubt that if there were any breach of these assurances they would find the United Kingdom against them; if they asked whether this implied military intervention they could be left to infer that it well might.

12. *Dr. Luns* pointed out that the treatment meted out to Netherlands interests in Indonesia had been far more scandalous than anything done by the Soviet Union in 1917 or by Iran or Egypt. *The Secretary of State* said that it was difficult for Her Majesty's Government to say to the Indonesians that they could not expect arrangements with the United Kingdom unless and until they paid compensation to the expropriated Dutch interests. He believed that the important objective was to keep Indonesia out of the Communist orbit.

13. *Dr. Luns* said that Mr. Dulles had several times said that the last thing the United States Government wished was for the Netherlands Government to compromise over Netherlands New Guinea. He had secret information to the effect that President Eisenhower was dismayed at the prospect that the Netherlands might relinquish the territory under military attack. All this reinforced what Mr. Menzies had said about the effect of any such attack on Indonesian relations with the West.

14. *The Secretary of State* said that Her Majesty's Government were anxious that the question of arms supplies should be discussed soon in NATO. He did not feel that this discussion should be delayed to await the outcome of the approaches to the United States and Australian Governments referred to in paragraph 11 above. He agreed that any Government supplying arms incurred a moral obligation to do what they could to ensure that the Indonesian Government did not misuse these arms. It could be held that only the United States and United

Kingdom Governments were in a position to discharge such an obligation. From this it could be argued that no other Western countries should deliver armaments to Indonesia. Dr. Luns suggested that an understanding to that effect should be reached in NATO and said that the support for such a policy on the part of the United Kingdom would be of great value. The Netherlands Government had knowledge of a message from the Indonesian Embassy (in London) to Djakarta where the view was expressed that an early attack on Netherlands New Guinea would be rash because of current developments in the Celebes and also because the United Kingdom might well be against Indonesia. He thought however that if we continued to supply arms to Indonesia on this basis we might, in about 18 months' time, reach a point where it would be necessary to stop further supplies because of the alarming proportions to which Indonesian armed strength would have grown. As regards the other NATO Powers, he thought that there might perhaps have been agreement that only the United States should supply arms to Indonesia, but that if the United Kingdom was also supplying them there was little chance that the others would refrain, although the French Government had in fact refused to accept substantial orders for helicopters. However, a stern British warning might have some effect in restraining Indonesia.

15. The Secretary of State said that he was not opposed to the argument being advanced in NATO that those Governments which supplied arms to Indonesia incurred a moral obligation to ensure that they were not misused by the Indonesian Government and that therefore only those Governments which could discharge such an obligation should supply arms. He would examine the extent to which the United Kingdom could give formal support to such a suggestion if it were put forward in NATO.

Nummer 6686

Bijlage 2

TOP SECRET

afschrift

Ontvangen van het Hoofd van de B.I.D..

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MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON, ON FRIDAY
23rd JANUARY, 1959, BETWEEN NETHERLANDS AND U.K.

REPRESENTATIVES ON THE THREAT FROM INDONESIA
TO NETHERLANDS NEW-GUINEA

1. The following is an agreed intelligence appreciation.
2. All elements in Indonesian political life support Indonesian action to secure control of Dutch New-Guinea. There are however differences about time and method.
3. The Dutch capability to resist an armed attack against Dutch New-Guinea is very limited, and it is likely that the Indonesian Government is fully aware of this. The local population of Dutch New-Guinea, although passively loyal, could not be relied upon in the event of an Indonesian attack in which they had appreciated that the Dutch forces could no longer protect them.
4. Although the Indonesian armed services have the men and equipment to mount an invasion of some 6,000 men, they are unlikely to do so for both military and political reasons. It is more likely that they would aim to secure a foothold with up to 1,000 men. This force could stay put for a sufficient time to allow internationalisation of the dispute.
5. There is some chance of advance warning, but it must be accepted that an expedition to New-Guinea of up to 1,000 strong could be assembled and transported unnoticed, or at any rate without its purpose being detected, especially if it is mounted from East Indonesia.
6. We can expect no effective opposition to such an expedition from within the Indonesian armed forces.
7. Although there are some secret reports from reliable sources that military invasion within the next few months has been decided upon, these reports do not constitute decisive evidence of this timing, nor is there yet any isolated conclusive report on this point. The indications in these reports, however, supported by the continuing and unusually large influx of arms from Communist sources, make clear that the threat is sufficiently serious to justify increased attention to all indications of action within the next few months.

LONDON.

23rd January, 1959