

3. Over de inhoud van een codeber. mag niet met verwijzing naar dat bericht per telefoon worden gesproken.
4. Dossiers, wille codeber. bevatten, dienen veilig te worden opgeborgen.

2. Afschriften van codeberichten mogen uitsluitend door de afdeling Verbindingen worden gedaan

1. Op een codeber. mag telegr. niet in open taal worden geantwoord, tenzij aan bepaalde voorwaarden wordt voldaan (zie Richtlijnen)

REFERENTIE No.:

1815

INFORMATIEKOPIE:

a
z
dbi,-/pl/ef
zs
deu,-/we
dnw
dwh
dvb

MINISTERIE VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN

AFDELING VERBINDINGEN

's-GRAVENHAGE, LANGE HOUTSTRAAT 28
TEL. Nos: 180309; 184000-284

DOSSIERCOPIE

Kopie No. 4

Dir./Afd.: dbi/pl

Visie:


Ag. No: 35737-165788

Dossier: 321.15. Indon

MINUUT GEPARAFEERD DOOR

BW

kL/vdw/z



VERZONDEN CODEBERICHT

DATUM VAN VERZENDING:

2) 9 maart 1959

(1-3) 10 maart 1959

ANKOMSTIG AAN:

min. v. b.z.

[no 6701]

BESTEMD VOOR: 1) g.n.v. parijs

informatiekopie geseind aan: 2) washington
3) amb. parijs

informatiekopie koerier aan: londen
djakarta
canberra
ov. nato posten

PARAAF:

geheim

de amerikaanse ambassadeur overhandigde mij op
zeven dezer het concept van een a s woensdag in
de n a t o raad of te leggen verklaring inzake wapen
leveranties cma zijdens de amerikaanse delegatie stp

alleen voor informatiekopieen: waarvan tekst afzonderlijk
volgt.

na een vluchtige doorlezing van het betreffende
document hab ik de ambassadeur als eerste reactie
gezegd cma dat ik het een zwak en quo unsatisfactory
unquo stuk vond stp ik miste hierin dat amerika van
oordeel is cma dat alleen landen cma die quo able
and willing unquo zijn om verantwoording van de defensie
van nederlands nieuw guinea op zich te nemen cma wapens
kunnen leveren pntcma voorts iedere verwijzing naar
het belang van nederlands nieuw guinea voor de westelijke
posities in de pacific and tenslotte de van indonesische
zijde te verkrijgen beloften dat geen wapengeweld tegen
nederlands nieuw guinea zal worden gebruikt stp tenslotte
vond ik het een zwakkere verklaring dan die welke
dulles tijdens zijn laatste nato bijeenkomst in parijs
heeft afgelegd stp young zou mijn opmerkingen overbrengen
stp hij zeide nog geïnstrueerd te zijn cma dat amerika
akkoord zou gaan met een eventueel door ons in de
n a t o raad in te dienen voorstel cma behelzende
dbbpnt

a een quo general understanding unquo cma dat nato
leden geen wapens zullen leveren aan indonesie cma
indien indonesie niet bereid blijkt aan die landen

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VERZONDEN CODEBERICHT

VERVOLG

-2-

Ref. No: 1815

Rubricering: geheim

te verklaren cma dat geen geweld zal worden gebruikt tegen nederlands nieuw guinea pntcma

b dat nederland quo full information unquo zou dienen te verkrijgen van alle n a t o leden betreffende leveranties van wapens aan indonesie cma voordat deze leveranties worden gedaan pntcma

c dat ook de n a t o council door alle eventueel in aanmerking komende landen bij voortdurieng op de hoogte zal worden gehouden van de stand van hun wapenleveranties aan indonesie stp

de amerikaanse regering zou het op hoge prijs stellen uiterlijk tien dezer een copie te kunnen ontvangen van de voorgenomen nederlandse reactie in de n a t o raad stp

nog zei de ambassadeur cma dat zijn regering bepaald geen behoefte had aan de n a t o behandeling cma doch geen pressie wilde uitoefenen op engeland om af te zien van een behandeling stp wel had men aan de engelse regering doen weten cma dat amerika geen behoefte heeft aan deze besprekking cma mede gezien de te verwachten ketting reactie stp ik heb de ambassadeur gezegd cma dat cma zeker nu ik deze tekst heb gelezen cma ik er mij van overtuigd hield cma dat engeland prijs zou blijven stellen op een behandeling cma aange zien zij daardoor geheel de handen vrij zou krijgen stp ambassadeur young zeide daarop cma dat hij dit weekend nog een onderhoud met de britse ambassadeur hier ter stede zou zoeken cma teneinde de kwestie te bespreken stp ik kreeg de indruk cma dat men in washington bevreesd is voor een felle nederlandse reactie stp

heden deelde ambassadeur young mij nog mede cma dat hij uit washington heeft vernomen cma dat de amerikaanse regering pressie uitoefent op de britse regering cma teneinde deze er toe te brengen af te zien van de n a t o besprekking stp

Luns 16.

Nummer - 6701

Bijlage

~~SECRET~~

March 7, 1959

PROPOSED U.S. STATEMENT TO NAC ON ARMS TO INDONESIA

1. In amplification of the U.S. delegation's August 18 note, I am authorized to state that on August 13, the U.S. concluded an agreement with the Government of Indonesia for the sale of arms, military equipment and services. Under this agreement arms and materiel totaling approximately \$7 million were made available to Indonesia. Small arms and ammunition, and transport, communications, engineering and medical equipment for the Army represented about 80% of the total value. The remainder consisted of six 36-foot LCVP's and one 173-foot subchaser for the Navy. Delivery was made on a phased basis and has been completed.

2. [In accordance with U.S. requirements on all sales of military equipment, the Government of Indonesia provided assurances that the materiel would be used only to maintain internal security and for legitimate self-defense within the scope of the UN Charter which excludes an act of aggression against any other state.] (In addition, the U.S. informed the Government of Indonesia that the U.S. regarded these assurances to mean that the materiel would not be used to seek to obtain control of West New Guinea by force.)

3. Because of favorable internal developments in Indonesia, the U.S. has decided to extend further limited military assistance under the August 13 agreement. This further assistance will total approximately \$15 million, about two-thirds of which will be for light arms, transportation and communications equipment and training for the Army. The balance of the program will include small transport and patrol vessels, small arms and training for the Navy and training for the Air Force.

4. The U.S. program of assistance to Indonesia will be generally on a Government-to-Government basis. We cannot exclude the possibility however, given our system of free enterprise, that there may be commercial sales of military equipment from time to time under license by the U.S. Government, although we will urge the Government of Indonesia to keep procurement of military equipment on a Government-to-Government basis. In any event, through our licensing system the U.S. will maintain the same controls over any commercial transactions as have been and will be maintained with respect to any Government-to-Government transactions. Our modest program does not increase to any significant degree the Indonesian offensive potential.

5. The Indonesian Government has, in our view, need for modern standardized equipment for internal security purposes and we believe that it is in our common interest that Indonesia look to the free world for this equipment. The U.S. decisions explained above are part of the U.S. effort to encourage Indonesian military and civil leaders to take steps to check the growth of Communist power in Indonesia and to strengthen the Government's ability to maintain internal order against any subversive threat. The U.S. regards the Army as the most important obstacle to a Communist take-over and we believe that the military and civil anti-Communist leaders cannot attain their objective unless they are assured of support from the free world. The U.S. will therefore take such action to support these leaders as may facilitate the attainment of these objectives, including such arms deliveries as may be appropriate.

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6. Indonesia is an island republic and almost any type of arms or military equipment needed to restore and maintain internal security is also susceptible of aggressive use. However, as a member of the UN Indonesia has abjured force as a means for settling international disputes and the Indonesian Government has stated publicly, on several recent occasions, that Indonesia does not intend to resort to force in connection with its claim for West New Guinea. In our view the possibility of an attack on West New Guinea cannot be prevented or eliminated by denying the Western source of arms in light of the Soviet bloc willingness to supply arms. Security from attack depends rather on the character and orientation of the Indonesian Government and the degree to which the free world can influence its character and affect its orientation. Our program of assistance is aimed at influencing the character and orientation of the Indonesian Government in the direction of the West.

7. We appreciate, of course, that certain NATO members believe that an Indonesian attack on West New Guinea is a possibility, even in the near future. But in this connection, I should like to recall the remarks of Secretary Dulles at the Meeting of the Council on December 17, 1958, and I quote: "And I might say that our influence is exerted in the most categorical manner against any effort to take, by force, or use force against West New Guinea."

"I have personally discussed that situation with the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Mr. Subandrio, and no one could have been more categorical and more emphatic than I was upon that point, and no one could have made it clearer that if they should engage upon that way they would not only have the opposition of the Netherlands but they would have to confront the opposition of the United States itself."

"I do not myself, on the basis of our intelligence, believe that there is any present danger of an effort being made to take West New Guinea by force. . . .

"I know that there is talk about such things from time to time because it is politically expedient to make talks along those lines and it's a popular slogan in Indonesia, but our information is that there is no serious effort contemplated along those lines and if there were there can be no doubt as to where the United States would stand on that issue and no doubt whatever has been left in the minds of the Indonesians as to where we would stand if the events should take such a course and I cannot but feel that that constitutes a very considerable deterrent to them."

I should like to stress that the above remains the firm position of the United States.

8. NAC may be assured that the U.S. is fully alive to the preoccupations of certain NATO members regarding the situation in Indonesia and the effects of our military assistance on that situation. We recognize that there are

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certain risks involved in furnishing military assistance and in this connection we equally recognize the self-evident necessity for continually assuring ourselves to the extent possible that the assistance so provided will not be used in a manner which would contravene UN principles and commitments, including the ban on the use of force to effect territorial changes. Because of continuing uncertainties in the situation in Indonesia, the U.S. is not for its own part proposing to supply arms to Indonesia without the most careful consideration of all the factors involved, including, of course, the possible aggressive use of these arms. We do not intend to participate in building up Indonesian military potential beyond that which would seem to be required by internal security and legitimate self-defense. In this sense we continue to feel that general and unrestricted sales of arms (e.g., without regard to quantity or type) would not be in the best interests of the free world. The U.S. believes that other NATO members may wish to bear similar considerations in mind with respect to any possible sales which may be discussed within their government. The U.S. will continue to inform NAC of any decision taken with respect to arms for Indonesia and suggests that other NATO members may wish to take similar action.

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