27 juli 1962.

U 8735-62 -C46 - P1/ES9.

GEHEIM

v.N 1/10394

SPOED

Land: INDONESIE.

Onderwerp: Indonesian attack plans in case Dutch do not agree to New Guinea transfer by end of 1962.

Referenties:

Datum van waarneming: 27 juli 1962.

Bron: Van bevriende zijde.
Source: F(unknown reliability).

Evaluation: paragraphs 1 + 2: 2.
paragraphs 3 + 4: 3.

Opmerkingen:

Mede verzonden aan: Z.Exc. de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken.

Zijner Excellentie Dr. J.E. de Quay,
Minister-President,
Plein 1813 nr. 4,
's-Gravenhage.

GEHEIM

Kenmerk: v.N 1/10394 geheim.
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http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/indonesischebetrekkingen1945-1969/Nederlands-indonesischeBetrekkingen1950-1963/Document/22676

Subject: Indonesian Attack Plans in Case Dutch Do Not Agree to New Guinea Transfer by End of 1962.

Source: A high-ranking official of the Indonesian Foreign Department, from talks with First Deputy Foreign Minister Suwito and from official Foreign Department discussions before Foreign Minister Subandrio departed for Washington.

1. On the basis of Foreign Minister Subandrio's initial reports from Washington stating that there is some chance the Dutch will agree to Indonesia's demand that West Irian be transferred to Indonesia by the end of 1962, President Sukarno has authorized Subandrio to continue his talks in Washington until August 1, at which time he must return to Indonesia to report to Sukarno. Originally, Subandrio was authorized to talk only until July 25 and then return to Djakarta. If the Dutch have not agreed to the transfer of West Irian by the end of 1962 when Subandrio returns to Indonesia, the decision to attack West Irian will be made the first week in August and carried out shortly thereafter.

2. President Sukarno's instructions to Foreign Minister Subandrio before his departure for Washington talks firmly stated that the Dutch would have to agree to transfer West Irian to Indonesia by the end of 1962 or Indonesia would take the area by armed force. President Sukarno has ordered that full preparations be made for large-scale attacks on West Irian in early August if the talks in Washington have not accomplished Indonesia's minimum objectives by the first of August. Subandrio and General Hidajat have been told that there will be no slowdown of attack preparations until the Dutch have agreed to Indonesia's terms. Because of the technical problems in preparing large-scale attacks, General Hidajat has been specifically charged by Sukarno with sending separate comments and suggestions concerning attack preparations based on his estimate of the situation from participating in the talks as an assistant to Subandrio.

3. Source Comment:

On the basis of talks with persons close to President Sukarno, such as State Secretary Ichsan, it seems that Sukarno is worried about losing PKI

(Partai Komunis Indonesia) and leftist support unless he can show that Indonesia has triumphed over the Dutch and forced the Dutch to give in to Sukarno's promise that West Irian will be under Indonesia control by 1963. Since Sukarno's whole life has been spent as a revolutionary fighting western imperialism, he is most reluctant to do anything which might dim the luster of his historical role as a great revolutionary leader of the Afro-Asian nations. He therefore does not want to alienate a large segment of his domestic support and put himself in a position where he may be accused of joining with the capitalists and imperialists. Sukarno knows full well that he is drawing closer to the United States and the West and drawing away from the Soviets if he fully accepts the bunker plan and obtains West Irian without any further show of force. Therefore, Sukarno feels he can justify a peaceful return of West Irian only if he demands and obtains the return of West Irian by the beginning of 1963.

4. Source Comment:

In the period of readjustment and some confusion following the initial steps in reorganizing the armed forces, General Nasution has been left out of many top discussions concerning West Irian. Therefore, whatever influence Nasution might have exerted to cause Sukarno to take a more reasonable attitude has been lost and there is no one, including Foreign Minister Subandrio, who is able to exert a telling influence on Sukarno concerning West Irian.

27 July, 1962.