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Land : Indonesië/Nederland/Nieuw-Guinea.

Onderwerp : Indonesian Army reactions to Indonesian-Dutch
cease fire agreement.

Referenties :

Feitelijke datum : 22-29 augustus 1962.

Datum van
waarneming : september 1962.

Bron : van bevriende zijde.

Opmerkingen :

Mede verzonden aan: de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken.

Aan Zijne Excellentie Prof. Dr. J.E. de QUAY
Minister-President

Plein 1813 no. 4

's-GRAVENHAGE.

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Indonesia/Netherlands/New Guinea

INDONESIAN ARMY REACTIONS TO INDONESIAN-DUTCH CEASE FIRE
AGREEMENT

General SUHARTO and most of his top staff arrived in Djakarta on 22 August 1962 in response to a summons by President SUKARNO. The latter was angry at Gen. SUHARTO for continuing some infiltrations into West Irian (WI) even after the cease-fire order of 16 August. The Mandala Command (MC) was advocating continued infiltrations and used the excuse of poor communications for failing to cancel several previously planned infiltrations. The MC deliberately delayed the publication of SUKARNO's 16 August cease fire order and had instructed the troops of the Command that only an order signed by Gen. SUHARTO was to be heeded.

Although he was angry with them, President SUKARNO greeted General SUHARTO and his officers in a very friendly manner at a meeting on 25 August. He personally congratulated and thanked each of them for his work on the WI campaign. In a discussion with SUKARNO, SUHARTO complained that the agreement which SUBANDRIO reached in Washington did not accomplish Indonesia's goals, since the Papuan Council would still function and the Indonesian Army would not be allowed to take over the security function on behalf of the United Nations (UN). SUHARTO said that, if the MC had known that the Army's WI efforts were going to be sold out by politicians and civilian leaders, he would have ordered his men to keep fighting. SUKARNO told SUHARTO that he appreciated his efforts and sincerity but that the agreement was signed and accepted and that it was too late to complain or to ask for changes. Because SUHARTO's troops had not fully heeded the 16 August cease-fire order, SUHARTO was ordered to work out another cease-fire order with UN military representative, General RIKHYE. This order would be in the form of SUHARTO's personal command to all Mandala troops to cease fire.

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The main reason for SUHARTO's complaints was that the MC was being completely left out of the planning for entering into and taking over WI administratively and that the detailed plan which had been worked out for a military government run by the Army was being discarded. SUHARTO said that the Army officers sent to the negotiations had done a very poor job on the Army's behalf. SUHARTO had earlier complained to SUKARNO - on about 9 August - that General HIDAJAT had given no consideration to the problem of getting immediate food and medical supplies to the Indonesian guerillas, making it absolutely essential that the MC continue resupply missions. The large scale air resupply mission on the evening of 12 August included some personnel whose main task was to locate and make contact with Indonesian guerillas and to see that the supplies reached them. On previous resupply missions, it was difficult to locate guerilla areas and the supplies were just dropped in the hope that they might be found.

With the signing of the 25 August cease-fire order, SUHARTO reluctantly agreed to call off a planned large-scale infiltration aimed at getting as many Indonesian troops as possible into WI prior to 1 October. This operation had been devised and planned by the MC without any orders or directives from the higher command in Djakarta.

A meeting was held on 29 August attended by Generals NASUTION, JANI and SUHARTO and their staffs at which WI was discussed. After hearing General SUHARTO's report which included his many complaints, General NASUTION said that it is true that the Army has been cheated and outsmarted by the politicians and civilians and that it did not have a very influential role in the present planning for WI. He then turned to the subject of what could be done. All those present agreed that SUHARTO still would have his powers as the Military Governor of WI (even though he will stay in Makassar) and that he can, therefore, issue directives for WI. The first directive, to be prepared immediately by General

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BASUKI RACHMAT, is that no Indonesians will be allowed to enter the WI area, even if under UN auspices, without first being screened and approved by the MC.

The purpose of the screening is to frustrate the plans of Government leaders such as Education Minister PRIJONO and Information Minister YAMIN, who are already hand-picking officials and teachers who will be allowed to go to WI under UN auspices before WI is handed over to Indonesia. The Army has information that PRIJONO has already prepared for the sending of a large number of leftist-oriented teachers.

SUHARTO suggested to NASUTION and JANI that MC officer, General THAHIR, be sent to the UN as Liaison Officer to replace Colonel JUSUF. SUHARTO said that an officer familiar with MC and the troops in WI should occupy this position and that many of the present MC and Army problems on WI could have been avoided if officers with a better understanding of the situation had been sent to Washington and the United Nations. NASUTION and JANI agreed to send THAHIR to the UN in order to seek a better arrangement for Indonesian Army participation in WI administration. An attempt will be made to send Indonesian Army officers as civilian officials to fill some of the posts available to Indonesia under the UN administration of WI.

During the 29 August meeting, NASUTION and JANI were in agreement on what action the Army should take to increase its influence. There were no signs of any disagreement or friction between them.

Comments: 1) The threat to Army influence represented by civilian dominance on WI matters may tend to cause NASUTION and JANI to forget their recent differences and to work together to protect the Army's interests.

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Comments: 2) It is not yet known how SUHARTO's powers as Military Governor will fit in with SUBANDRIO's appointment as Deputy First Minister Coordinator for West Irian, announced on 28 August.

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September 1962.

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