

[no 7242]

AMBASSADE VAN HET KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN

ROYAL NETHERLANDS
EMBASSY

No. 21801-4389 GS/1772.

Onderwerp: Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea.

26 oktober 1961.

GEHEIM.



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
Ik heb de eer Uwer Excellentie hiernevens te doen toekomen foto-copie van een rapport van de Britse Ambassadeur te Djakarta d.d. 16 dezer, betreffende de Indonesische reactie op de Nederlandse voorstellen wat betreft Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea. De Heer Peck, Assistent Under-Secretary van het Foreign Office, gaf mij dit stuk ter inzage mede. Het spreekt van zelf, dat ik Uwe Excellentie van de inhoud van dit stuk op de hoogte kan brengen, maar ik heb niet gevraagd of ik zulks per foto-copie zou mogen doen zoals thans geschiedt. Derhalve moge ik verzoeken hiervan niet tegenover de Britse vertegenwoordigers te doen blijken.

De Heer Peck zeide mij nog te menen, dat de openbare uitlatingen van de Indonesische leiders wat betreft onze voorstellen krachtiger waren dan hun stemming zou rechtvaardigen. Het sprak van zelf, dat genoemde voor-
mannen (voorshands) publiekelijk niet konden terugkrabbelen.

De Ambassadeur,

[Handwritten signature of A. Bentinck]
(A. Bentinck)

Zijner Excellentie
de Minister van
Buitenlandse Zaken
te
's-GRAVENHAGE.



CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY

Indonesian reaction to the Dutch proposals on West New Guinea has hardened. There have been numerous public statements suggesting that, in a default of an early peaceful settlement, violence will have to be used (paragraphs 1 and 2).

The twin objects are probably to scare the Dutch into further concessions, and to display zeal in supporting a patriotic campaign. Immediate armed action seems unlikely; but Indonesia's leaders are becoming increasingly committed to further action, violent if necessary, if the dispute has not been settled to their liking by the end of 1962 (paragraph 3).

The Dutch proposals have evoked no sympathetic response in Indonesia. Apparently convinced of the justice of their cause, the Indonesian leaders are impervious to argument. Even the principles underlying not merely self-determination but the U.N. itself must if necessary give way to their claim (paragraph 4).

The Communist Powers are exploiting the situation to the full and giving assurances of unreserved support for Indonesia. The longer the dispute drags on, the more difficult will it be for Indonesia to re-establish normal relations with the West (paragraphs 5 and 6).

*The Right Honourable The Earl of Home,
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Office S.W.*

*British Embassy,
Djakarta
October 16, 1961*

My Lord,

In my telegram No 645 of the 28th of September I had the honour to report that the initial Indonesian reaction to the new Dutch proposals in regard to West New Guinea had been surprisingly moderate. Indeed, President Sukarno himself had said that he would study the proposals carefully. The general feeling here at the time was that the Dutch proclamation of their readiness to abandon sovereignty over the territory was the beginning of the end, and a friend of this Embassy's in the Department of Foreign Affairs told us that the belief in the Ministry was that it was all over bar the shouting.

2. As Your Lordship will be aware, the Indonesian Government have since rejected the Dutch proposals unless they are modified to include a provision for the immediate transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia, and there seems to have been a considerable hardening of the Indonesian attitude. In any event there has, to say the least, been a great deal of clamour, much of it bellicose in tone. Thus, speaking in Bali on the 9th of October, during the State Visit of the Polish President, President Soekarno exhorted his countrymen to "work and sweat to the utmost, and even sacrifice our blood if necessary, to liberate West Irian". On the 5th of October, in his special Order issued on the occasion of Armed Forces Day, he had declared that, in relation to West Irian, "we are following a policy of confrontation (of the Dutch) in the political, economic and military fields. We shall include West Irian within the territory under our authority by all means necessary". On the same day General Nasution, in his own message to the Armed Forces, reiterated that West Irian must be returned to Indonesia "through whatever means". He pointed out that the Political Manifesto embraced a three-point programme: food and clothing for the people, the restoration of security and the liberation of West Irian. "Thank God", he said, "the main tasks have been realised. It is to be hoped that the whole programme will have been carried out by 1962". The peaceful means, he continued, which Indonesia had adopted could not be prolonged indefinitely, and the people should thus be ready to adopt the "1945 course", implying recourse to arms. Indonesia, the General said, was now in a stronger position to oppose the Dutch in West Irian, and he repeated the phrase he has used before in this connexion: "We love peace, but we love freedom more". On the same day the Chief of the Air Staff also called on the Air Forces to increase their combat readiness, and he and other local military commanders stressed that they were waiting for an eventual command from the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces to join the struggle against the Dutch over West Irian. The East Java Regional War Administrator has since announced that preparations are being made to register those who wish to contribute their energy to combat activities as well as to other kinds of activity in the struggle to gain West Irian. Political meetings all round the country have expressed similar and sometimes even more violent views. On the 3rd of October, for instance, the Chairman of the Indonesian Youth Movement proclaimed that members of his organisation were ready to take up arms to liberate West Irian; and associations of veterans and others have passed resolutions in like vein. On the 13th of October the Indonesian Parliament unanimously endorsed the Government's rejection of the present Dutch proposals, and called both for the rejection of all forms of

internationalisation of the territory and for its return "by any means and in the quickest possible time to the authority of the Indonesian Government". The resolution appealed to all Indonesians to be ready for any command to liberate West Irian, and to the rest of the world to support their just struggle.

3. All these statements and resolutions do not, in my view, signify any great likelihood of armed action in the immediate future. They doubtless derive partly from a desire to frighten the Dutch and their potential supporters, and partly from anxiety not to lag behind in supporting a patriotic campaign. Dr. Leimena, the Deputy Chief Minister and Acting Foreign Minister, made clear here on the 13th of October that there was still time for a peaceful solution. "The best solution for the Dutch", he said, "is to cede West Irian directly to Indonesia. But if the Dutch for one reason or another want to effect the transfer of the territory through the U.N., then the Indonesian Government has no objection . . . on the understanding that it is done in the shortest possible time". But even the invariably moderate Dr. Leimena stressed "that the failure of peaceful negotiations to yield any results to date had forced the Indonesian Government to pursue a policy of total confrontation in the political, economic and if necessary military fields"; and I fear that all Indonesian leaders are becoming increasingly committed to a policy of eventual violence from which they will be unable to retreat without considerable loss of face. If therefore the present discussions in the U.N. General Assembly should end in an abrupt termination of all apparent possibilities of achieving a peaceful settlement, clearly a most difficult situation would arise.

4. I wish I could report that the proposals which the Netherlands Government have laid before the United Nations had evoked some response in Indonesia which might point the way to a compromise. Unfortunately I cannot. Among all the many public statements which have been made here, no word has been said in favour of the Dutch proposals. It is difficult indeed to avoid the impression that, leaving aside the question whether or not they are morally justified in the attitude they are taking the Indonesians, emotionally convinced of the justice of their cause, are quite impervious to any reasoned argument in regard to it. On the contrary, they have displayed discouraging readiness to abandon even the ideals are invoked to counter the emotional urge which the campaigning for the re-incorporation of West New Guinea has some to represent. The President of the local United Nations Association has told my Counsellor that there has been a marked decline of interest in his Association because of the failure of the United Nations to let Indonesia have her way. Even the principle of self-determination, which has been such a useful tool for the castigation of others in the past and will doubtless be so again in the future, has been dismissed as irrelevant in the present context. The general argument here - and I venture to think it is widely supported elsewhere - is of course that, whatever the views of the local inhabitants in any given area, self-determination must not be invoked to cause the fragmentation of unitary States. Logic has been thrown overboard. Whereas an Indonesian representative, Mr. Karel Supit, was quite willing to call on Australia on the 6th of October in the Trusteeship Committee to accelerate target-dates for independence in East New Guinea, his colleague Mr. Palar was asking in the same Committee on the 13th of October, in his angry exchange with Mr. Schuurmann over West New Guinea, how people who lived in the Stone Age could determine their future for themselves.

5. Meanwhile, the Communists are naturally exploiting the situation to the full. As I have reported in a separate despatch, the President of Poland, during his recent State Visit to this country, was able to express his country's unreserved support for the Indonesian people in their struggle to liberate West Irian. The Supreme Commander of the Soviet Navy and the Deputy Minister of Defence of the U.S.S.R., Admiral Gorskyov, who also recently visited this country, went even further. He not only supported the Indonesian claim but seems, on at least two occasions, almost to have incited the Indonesians to armed action by telling them that they had very strong armed forces which were quite capable both of defending Indonesia's sovereignty and of restoring Indonesian authority in West Irian.

6. I have drawn attention, in the separate despatch referred to above, to the danger arising from the heaven-sent opportunity thus afforded to Communists of appearing in the rôle of the supporters of the Indonesian revolution, while the Western Powers can be depicted, quite falsely, as its opponents all along the line. I need scarcely add that the longer this situation prevails, the more difficult will it be, if and when the problem of New Guinea is solved, for the Indonesians to forget the abuse which they have heaped on the Western Powers and the praise they have bestowed on their opponents.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington and The Hague; to the Head of the United Kingdom Mission in New York; to the United Kingdom Commissioner General for South East Asia in Singapore; and to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Canberra.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

(Leslie Fry)